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introduCtion
Bridget Anderson and Michael Keith
1. A deCAde of migrAtion
‘Migration’ is a difficult word. Difficult because it 
encompasses a vast array of  interlinked phenomena, 
none of  which are clearly explained by the word itself, 
and because it is a political, social, economic, historical, 
anthropological, geographical, demographic and global 
developmental issue. Furthermore, it touches people all 
over the world personally in myriad ways. Harnessing 
public issues and private problems, mass migration 
in the last decade has attracted political controversy in 
the global north, been at the heart of  vigorous urban 
agglomeration in the BRICs and the global south, and 
mushroomed academic analysis and public scrutiny. Its 
associations with economic growth and development, 
with security, crime and political conflict, and with 
changing demographics and communities have excited 
often furious debate, particularly in what The Economist 
calls ‘the rich world’. The 2003 Global Commission on 
International Migration, a UN high level dialogue in 
2006, and the establishment of  the Global Forum on 
Migration and Development in 2007 have kept migration 
on the international agenda. Significant economic 
changes and shifts in power have themselves given rise 
to or been facilitated by population movements and 
the global move to the city. Such moves may be within 
as well as across international borders. In China, rapid 
economic development has been fuelled by a massive 
rural-urban movement of  people. While Europe has 35 
cities of  at least a million people, by 2025 China will have 
an estimated 225, and India’s number will have grown 
from 42 to 68. By 2030, some 350 million more people 
will live in Chinese cities. And though growth in Indian 
cities is driven more by expanding urban populations and 
the reclassification of  formerly rural land, the move to 
the city has already restructured traditional social and 
economic relations. Migrants themselves, internal and 
international, are increasingly vocal. Migration is set to 
be a key political issue into the future. The proportion 
of  people that move internationally, approximately 3 per 
cent of  the world’s population, has remained relatively 
stable for a considerable period of  time. Yet it seems 
that the meaning, significance and constitution of  such 
movement have changed both the way in which we 
consider our present and the calculus through which we 
conceptualise the future. 
 Technology and economic growth has meant that 
travel has become easier, in Europe particularly for people 
from former Communist states. Some borders have 
fallen; for example European Union (EU) enlargement 
in 2004 and  2007 (and now in 2014) eventually facilitated 
free movement for EU citizens across 28 member states 
of  the European Union. At the same time, states are 
ever more concerned to manage migration. In place of  
the Iron Curtain we have new walls – according to one 
estimate, 6,000 miles of  walls have been built in the past 
decade to divide territory and population, from the West 
Bank to India, to the US and to South Africa, oftentimes 
turning mobility or walking to work into ‘migration’. Walls 
and borders are not impermeable, however, but rather, to 
use Balibar’s term, ‘polysemic’. While for some travellers 
they are impassable, patrolled with guns, detectors and 
unnavigable bureaucracies, for others these same borders 
are barely noticeable, requiring nothing more than 
a nod to a security guard. More particularly, travel for 
the wealthy has usually been easier than travel for the 
poor. The 1905 UK Aliens Act did not apply to those 
travelling first class, and in November 2013 UK Home 
Secretary Theresa May announced the launch of  the 
invitation only ‘GREAT club’, a fast track premium visa 
service for elite business executives coming to Britain. 
This is not a phenomenon restricted to the UK. Several 
EU states now offer permanent residence to those who 
can afford to pay for it: in Spain, investors spending 
€500,000 or more on residential real estate or a portfolio 
of  properties are eligible for the “Spanish golden visa” 
meaning they and their family can live and run a business 
in Spain. Portugal and Ireland run similar programmes. 
In Malta a person who pays €650,000 (plus €25,000 each 
for any spouse or minor children) can be granted Maltese 
citizenship, provided they meet due diligence criteria and 
pass a criminal background check. Cyprus too offers 
‘citizenship by investment’. 
 In the face of  ever more diverse attempts to check and 
to channel flows of  people, mobility itself  has continued. 
In 2012 there were approximately 365,000 apprehensions 
of  undocumented migrants by US border agents at the 
US-Mexico border alone. Such attempts at control can 
be at terrible cost: 477 deaths at the US southern border 
in 2012 and an estimated 16,000 deaths at the borders 
of  Europe between 1993 and 2012. Thus, enforcement 
and control run alongside concerns about the human 
rights of  migrants and abuse of  migrant workers: 
conditions endured by workers in the Gulf  States, and by 
(undocumented) workers in Europe, the US and across 
Asia, and the treatment of  asylum seekers have given rise 
to a sustained growth of  campaigning around the human 
rights of  migrants, against deportation and detention, 
and in support of  mobility. Grassroots activism may be 
driven by the engagement of  migrants themselves. The 
‘DREAMers’ movement in the US in recent years drew 
on the self-selected ‘outing’ that structured the politics 
of  sexuality to promote migrant rights of  the children of  
undocumented residents. Migrant workers have formed 
their own trades unions – the Seoul-Gyeonggi-Incheon 
Migrants Trade Union (MTU), for example, is a union 
established for and by migrant workers in South Korea. 
As well as self-organising, there has been a growth in 
the numbers and types of  organisations working with 
migrants. Some national trades unions have developed 
considerably by organising migrant workers and admitting 
them into their ranks. The gradual softening of  attitude 
by the American Federation of  Labor and Congress of  
Industrial Organizations, and their split with the ‘change 
to win’ trades unions in the US, for example, spurred 
immigration reform possibilities and new thinking in the 
American legislature. 
2. beyond the empiriCAl
Mobility has ineluctably slipped many of  its descriptive 
typologies. This challenges the ways in which scholarship 
is structured by both analytical lenses and empirical 
evidence, how we make sense of  the world both through 
gathering ‘data’ and the analytical frames which make such 
data meaningful. Analyses of  migration were for years 
premised on a distinction between the refugee/‘forced 
migrant’ and the economic migrant. This distinction 
was formalised in the 1951 Refugee Convention and key 
to structuring international policies on the governance 
of  mobility, but in the past decade academic attempts 
to describe and analyse these phenomena have moved 
further and further away from the refugee/economic 
migrant binary. There have also been significant moves 
beyond old push-pull paradigms. New approaches in the 
social sciences of  the 1990s reconceptualised the building 
blocks of  ‘society’ – transnationalism, super-diversity, 
autonomy of  migration, and a rediscovery of  the urban. 
Conceptual rethinking in turn challenged what it might 
mean both to dwell and to be mobile, forcing migration 
studies to transcend a methodological nationalism that 
once saw the world through a Westphalian lens of  separate 
and discrete nation states (with distinct populations), and 
to begin to rethink the geometries and temporalities of  
networks, circuits, propensities and flows of  mobility. 
While these represent very different schools of  thought 
on migration, they all demand a rethinking of  the nature 
of  the relation between the individual/family, the state, 
and the nation; between identity, sovereignty and place, 
foregrounding questions of  citizenship and belonging. 
The construction of  both individual subject positions 
and collective subjects through rule, law, power and affect 
demand an understanding in migration studies of  the 
propensity of  people to act as well as their demonstrated 
patterns of  movement. The latter privileges an empirical 
subdiscipline that measures movements in numbers, with 
data that is invariably flawed and incomplete. The former 
provokes a social science that takes the very definition 
of  the migrant as problematic and shifts attention on to 
contested theoretical framings of  regimes of  citizenship, 
freedoms to move and the unintended consequences  of  
migration’s externalities. Both are necessary to compose 
a picture of  contemporary migration, but this theoretical 
turn we suggest moves us beyond the empirical (or 
occasionally empiricist) inflection of  some migration 
studies scholarship.
 For many years, the theory, practice and policy 
of  citizenship was insulated from migration research 
(though not from the lives of  migrants), but the two now 
inform each other far more closely, with some scholars 
arguing that citizenship offers new possibilities for the 
developing politics of  migration, and others that it is 
necessary to think beyond citizenship. This is part of  a 
more general move to break out of  the constraints of  
border thinking, and to embrace the scholarship of  the 
social sciences that constructs individual and collective 
human subjects through complexities of  institutional 
forms and path-dependent specificity. For example, while 
in the 1990s the invisibility of  gender in migration policy 
and analysis was rectified by ‘adding women and stirring’, 
there is a reaching towards the beginnings of  theorisation 
of  subject making, considering how queer migrations 
disrupt gender binaries and categories completely, and 
interrogating the different ways that gender is constructed 
at borders. 
 The arrogation of  powers to keep people ‘in place’ 
– from historical regimes of  serfdom, to contemporary 
measures to regulate movement, to modern city forms 
such as the hukou system in China – all define who is 
and who is not a migrant in relation to regional, national 
and municipal governance of  scarce public goods 
and ideologies of  nation or belonging. However, the 
mechanisms of  state power have long been made more 
complex through the contingent formations of  both 
the institutions of  governance and the subjects of  their 
logics of  governmentality. The flow of  bodies is regulated 
through regimes of  the biopolitical as well as through 
the more arbitrary deployment of  powers of  allocation 
and coercion by the state. How individuals, families and 
networks come to consider themselves to be connected, 
to share a propensity to move, to trigger relationalities 
between virtual exchange and chains of  mobility reflect 
particular configurations of  technology and regulation. 
 The externalities of  the migration process may be 
priced or regulated through state arbitration but, as 
Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom remarked, the challenge 
of  common pool resources is made much more complex 
in the context of  new arrivals triggered by migration 
flows. For example, moral categories of  eligibility for 
welfare may inadvertently favour or discriminate against 
the migrant. Systems that are based primarily on a 
contributory contract – that those deemed worthy of  
welfare support must have paid in before they claim – 
inevitably favour those who have remained in a single 
nation state. Systems that allocate resources – be it 
schooling, subsidized housing, unemployment insurance 
or public and private health – principally according to 
measures of  social need, may favour the new arrival 
more. At times this can be contentious – as when new 
arrivals with vulnerable children claim access to scarce 
resources, such as school places, subsidized shelter or 
social housing. At other times it can hide alternative 
rationalities. Public health concerns over communicable 
disease may trump categories of  rationed access to 
medical care when it becomes in the interests of  all 
to prevent major outbreaks of  ill health rather than 
differentiate between the eligibility criteria of  migrants 
and local people. The promotion of  competitiveness 
at the scale of  the city may sit in tension with national 
or regional policy, or regulated freedoms of  locational 
preference. The institutional foundations of  comparative 
advantage may generate varieties of  capitalism that 
structure markets and valorize migrant labour differently. 
Trade-offs between the openness to admitting migrants 
and migrant rights in liberal democracies may in turn 
structure potential flows of  people and the possible as 
well as the actual phenomena of  those who stay or are 
left behind, as well as those who move.
 In each case, the data that is so essential to critical 
judgement and becomes grist to the mill of  scholarly 
inquiry can mislead, as empirical inquiry potentially slips 
into empiricist scholarship and the positivist fallacy that 
to measure all is to know all. Migration, like all fields of  
human and social sciences, demands a careful balance 
between a scientific measurement of  data and a nuanced 
understanding of  the institutions that structure human 
behaviour. 
3. migrAtion And the soCiAl sCienCes
As the study and analysis of  migration becomes more 
open to social science and to the humanities, so it 
challenges the way in which we think of  some of  the 
foundational concepts of  the social sciences and the 
humanities. 
 Conceptually, conventional academic disciplinary 
boundaries and a language of  national economies 
and nation states look increasingly limited in a world 
characterised by flows of  people as well as capital. 
The large majority of  humanity continues to stay in 
a single state for most, if  not all, of  their lives, but in 
this new context, how do we understand economic 
performance and sustainable growth, and how do we 
theorise sociologies and economies of  the nation state in 
an era marked by geographical mobility of  ‘non-citizen’ 
workers, free flows of  Foreign Direct Investment and 
by organizational forms of  transnational corporations? 
If  one high-tech worker moves between jobs for a 
limited time within a single corporation in two different 
international spaces, and another moves between two 
companies operating online in a virtual global space 
while living in the same country, which is the migrant? 
What does this mean for the obligations of  one country 
to educate future generations in a national context when 
significant fractions of  the labour force might have been 
educated elsewhere? How does economics prioritise 
the development of  human capital and the support of  
national workers and companies, whilst maximising the 
comparative advantage of  a flexible economy attracting 
the ‘best and brightest’ and competing for global 
investment?  How do strong affiliations to both local 
neighbourhoods and global diasporas reframe what we 
mean by ‘the social’ and ideas of  political community? 
How are the arithmetical calculations of  social policy 
that structure logics of  rationing scarce public goods 
challenged by international mobility? How are welfare nets 
made politically legitimate in the context of  newly mobile 
demographics across the medium term? What challenges 
do migration-driven diversities pose to the creation of  
the good society? What do new transnationalisms (and 
complex new configurations of  the field in anthropology) 
mean for ideas of  ‘culture’, and how do they relate to new 
conflicts and intercultural dialogues? How do legal and 
democratic institutions respond to and shape these drivers 
of  economic globalisation and diasporic identities, which 
are influencing behavioural norms and gender relations, 
and informing interventions?
 Practically, new social science paradigms must address 
questions arising from the globalisation of  mobility. How 
will new cartographies of  development structure future 
patterns of  migration? What is the relation between 
migration and the management of  global markets?  How 
does massive urbanisation reframe our understanding 
of  the social, the economic and the political? What do 
migration’s challenges to sovereignty and territoriality 
mean for the relation between (non-)citizen, state and 
nation? How do changes in the way we think about the 
future reconfigure the geometries of  collective wellbeing?
 In formulating policy interventions, the UK faces 
particular challenges. The 2011 Census has revealed the 
growth of  super-diverse local areas and neighbourhoods 
,but integration and cohesion remain major public 
concerns, placing emergent identities of  ethnicity and 
faith at the heart of  social policy concerns. In contrast 
to most other countries, demographic changes in the 
UK in the last decade have been driven principally by 
international migration. How does the UK promote the 
interests of  workers and companies, particularly when 
they act globally?  How does international migration 
structure public debates about the UK’s place in the 
EU, the evolution of  nationalism, and devolution? What 
are the options for Britain in a Europe where the free 
movement of  people is a fundamental right? How do we 
shape political community to reflect the plural scales of  
neighbourhood, municipality and nation? How do we 
organise an understanding of  citizenship that recognises 
the obligations of  international law, the principles of  
human rights, and the geographical and historical realities 
of  mobility? 
 Policy agendas across the rest of  the world reflect 
this combination of  generic pattern and geographical/
historical specificity. Liberalisation of  trade sits uneasily, at 
times, with the development of  local human capital: brain 
drain is offset by remittances which may diminish with 
time, flight and exit may serve as an alternative to political 
reform and local social movements. Diasporic politics 
can create new geometries of  political engagement across 
transnational networks of  influence. Gender relations, 
kinship, and the family may be stretched and reinvented 
for better or for worse in time and space through the 
process of  movement. Quantitative national measures of  
social mobility, which mark how one generation fares in 
comparison with the next, are potentially undermined by 
migration. If  first-generation migrants occupy positions 
where they are commonly overskilled – engineers driving 
New York cabs, doctors cleaning floors in the financial 
districts of  Europe – their own class position and their 
childrens’ may be hard to define. Social capital may 
trump objective class or status position, juxtaposing 
problematics of  social and geographical mobility.
4. the rAtionAle of the Anthology
To understand mobility we have to transcend 
boundaries:territorial, disciplinary and professional. 
Post-war 20th-century scholarship tended to privilege a 
study of  migration as movement between free standing 
nation states, with a once and for always commitment 
to a new country, notwithstanding the complexities of  
free, forced, family, temporary and permanent flows that 
long characterized the complexity of  the process. But for 
the study of  the contemporary moment we need to think 
across different geographical scales and temporalities, 
recognizing that geography generates plural geometries 
and relationalities, and that history might run backwards 
as much as forwards, faster at some times than at others. 
This involves moving beyond the analytical register of  
the nation state, beyond the Eurocentric focus of  the 
ivory tower, and beyond a privileging of  the empirical 
field. 
 In this anthology, we start from a recognition that 
the sense in which the conceptualization of  migration 
as a singular process (itself  always a simplification) is 
increasingly nuanced by the manner in which mobility is 
increasingly qualified. It is qualified by the complexities 
of  its geographies and the plurality of  its histories – the 
selective permeability of  destinations, and the rights 
and freedoms of  places of  origins and arrival; the 
contingencies of  the future home, the presence of  past 
elsewheres, and the multiple allegiances of  diasporic and 
transnational imaginaries. It is typologised by routes, 
networks and circuits. The reasons, aspirations and 
purposes of  those who move and reactions to their 
movement are similarly variable. 
 The publication corresponds with the 10th anniversary 
of  the ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, 
which opportunistically – if  slightly arbitrarily – offered the 
chance to look backwards and forwards simultaneously, 
linking the publication to a conference held in the 
University of  Oxford in February 2014. Entries are 
drawn principally – but not exclusively – from the work 
of  researchers who are or who have been based at the 
Centre over the last decade. Their work is supplemented 
by invited contributions from a range of  scholars who 
have collaborated with and/or been admired by the team 
at the Centre. Pieces were commissioned on the basis 
of  previous work, but often contributors responded by 
saying that they would like to write about quite a different 
subject that had caught their interest. Thus, we hope to 
have captured a transformative moment in the decade 
of  migration that is both contemporary and forward 
looking.
 Contributors did not undertake to write on the 
themes through which we have organised the text, such 
as ‘Troubling bodies’ or ‘Keeping Time’. The structure 
of  the anthology has consequently arisen from the pieces, 
rather than the contributions being shaped for particular 
headings. Many pieces could fit under more than one 
heading, and the headings themselves are interrelated: 
how can we separate bodies from representation, or time 
from place? The style varies, some contributors have 
extemporized, others have outlined and described. All 
contributors were asked to make short entries prompting 
further reading and reflection. Put together we hope 
that they provoke new insights and suggest new ways of  
thinking, both about migration and about some of  the 
foundational concepts of  social science. 
 The anthology does not aspire to be a synthetic 
overview of  migration research today, nor to provide 
a comprehensive range of  geographical or theoretical 
perspectives. Instead, we hope that it might serve as a 
provocation.  We have chosen to publish primarily online 
(although a limited number of  conventional books are 
available), so that the anthology might work as both 
an intervention and a resource. Because migration 
studies shares the sub-disciplinary dangers of  the self-
referential and the parochial, we hope that the anthology 
might suggest pathways and routes of  future scholarly 
inquiry that draw on reflections of  past research, linking 
migration as a theme to wider patterns of  social change. 
For these reasons, we have combined academic prose 
with a selection of  photographic images drawn from 
the annual COMPAS photography competition over 
recent years, and selected of  poems drawn from poetry 
competitions for adults and children run this year, which 
were kindly judged by two members of  Keble College, 
Oxford, Dr Erica McAlpine and Dr Matthew Bevis, and 
by novelist, critic and author, Ruth Padel, who has kindly 
added one poem to the collection.  
 Sub-discipline conventions commonly betray 
disciplinary roots, but we have nevertheless tried to 
provide a general resource, and to link material to further 
reading which might be taken up by people inside and 
outside the academy. In deciding to publish online using 
principles of  a creative commons license, we intend to 
make material as widely available as possible. We hope 
that the anthology will thus serve as a resource for 
teaching and research: a grab bag to dip into as much as a 
text from which to teach.
5. towArds provoCAtion
Beyond Rules
International migrants are made, in large part, by laws 
and the imbricated powers of  borders and sovereignty. 
Migrants are not simply governed by laws, but constructed 
by them, and immigration controls are not only about 
admittance but about the creation of  particular types of  
relations. This places the state at the heart of  immigration 
studies. Yet the state has often been under theorised 
in migration analyses, either treated as a neutral arbiter 
between the competing forces of  capitalism, democracy 
and nationhood, or as an instrument of  brutal coercion, 
intervening from a position somehow outside ‘society’. 
However, there is a move towards more nuanced 
approaches to analyzing the state and its relation to 
migration, not least as popular hostility to immigration 
is increasingly invoked as a reason for heightened 
restrictions, and as citizens are ever more deeply implicated 
in immigration enforcement. When external borders 
become more permeable, internal borders are often 
tightened,  and there is increased interest in examining 
post-entry controls governing welfare benefits, labour 
rights and the right to settlement and citizenship. This 
has received particular academic and political attention 
within the European Union, and rights to free movement 
of  all European Economic Area (EEA) citizens within 
the EU have run alongside ‘habitual residence’ tests for 
accessing welfare benefits. This has implications for 
nationals: in Italy, local residence requirements, which 
had hitherto been a formality, are increasingly drawn on 
to police the claims of  international migrants in response 
to populist anxiety. This has had a significant impact on 
Italian internal migrants, who may be from Italy but who 
are not ‘local’. So, even as they are shored up, the borders 
between the citizen and non-citizen are revealed as ever 
more fragile. The tension between citizenship rights and 
human rights, or between citizenship and equality, has 
been the focus of  considerable interest in political theory, 
and looks to be moving centre stage in political debate as 
detention, deportation and hostility to migrants increases, 
raising concerns about discrimination and fairness. 
Keeping Time
How long a person stays or intends to stay is an important 
qualifier in the distinction between the mobile and the 
migrant. States not only control migration through refusal 
or granting of  entry, but also through imposing temporal 
requirements. Liberal democracies can be averse to 
ethnic citizenship, and often restrict access to nationality 
through ever more stringent conditions regarding length 
of  stay. More generally, states govern through temporal 
devices and rationalities. Institutions such as the school, 
the university, the factory, the city hall, the hospital and 
the prison sustain temporal logics, turning time into 
place-specific rhythms. Regarding migrants in particular, 
bureaucratic procedures are marked by different and 
sometimes contradictory tempos, with time traps set, in 
deadlines that are simply impossible to meet. With some 
notable exceptions, migration research has not typically 
engaged with theories of  time, but equally, work that 
engages with the social theory of  time rarely engages with 
migration scholarship. Much of  the literature on time 
takes the nation state as an unexceptional container of  
time, even as histories of  mobilities inevitably historicise 
both state and nation. Departing from an often strongly 
imagined, if  contested, past, nations increasingly look to 
the future with demographic and cultural anxiety, and 
states consider the future and how it may be governed 
through a series of  anticipatory actions: ‘pre-emption, 
preparedness and precaution’ work their way through 
government.
 But time is not only a matter of  governance. The 
bringing to bear of  the imagined future and of  the 
remembered past on the contemporary moment is a 
critical element of  human subjectivity and agency. With 
this in mind, how should we understand, for example, 
the ‘decision’ to migrate? As the originating point in a 
series of  familiar stages, rationally oriented towards some 
intended future? Or as a much more distributed, uncertain 
and emotional phenomenon? What are the costs and 
possible pleasures of  states of  uncertainty, waiting and 
temporariness? What does the spatial process of  migration 
tell us about experiencing and passing time? Futures 
present map unevenly for different migrants. The horizon 
of  possibility for the skilled worker may involve a calculus 
of  known unknowns, a career that translates professional 
uncertainty into financial risk through rational optimising 
of  human capital over a multi-year investment in the 
migration process. In contrast, the future for the low 
waged and undocumented may be more immediate, the 
horizon of  possibility foreshortened: temporalities of  
just in time and getting by that generate alternative tactics 
of  the quotidian, choreographies of  everyday life that use 
the propensity of  the city to hide the stranger and the 
freedoms of  anonymity. 
Beyond Contract
Immigration controls are not only about the creation 
of  migrants. The contracts of  citizenship, of  marriage 
and of  work for example are codified at the border: 
what is citizenship, what is marriage, and what is ‘work’? 
Are the paints, carried in the bag of  an artist entering 
as a visitor, evidence that she will break her conditions 
of  entry? Workers and labour markets are, like migrants 
and immigration, constructed in important ways by law. 
The law does not simply intervene to regulate naturally 
occurring processes of  buying and selling labour, but 
rather, is key to their construction in the first place. Are 
there types of  labour that should never be classified 
as ‘work’ (sex work being the most contentious and 
consistently struggled over with respect to immigration)? 
Are there groups of  people who should never be 
classified as ‘workers’ (children for example)? Responses 
to such questions vary by state and by ‘culture’, and how 
these two domains of  work and immigration intermesh, 
reinforce and undermine each other raises fundamental 
policy and theoretical questions. 
 Immigration also raises questions about the nature of  
‘free labour’. How is it that while liberal democracies evince 
horror at ‘modern day slavery’ on Gulf  construction sites, 
they condone sponsorship, precarity and subcontracting? 
What does this tell us about the relation between labour, 
freedom and contract, particularly as migrants continue 
to queue up for the possibility to work in the Gulf  and 
elsewhere? Furthermore, when does being a ‘migrant’ 
matter, and when and where are the questions of  interest 
addressed that relate to the precarity and insecurity that 
are experienced by citizens and non-citizens alike?
Representations: Powers and Pitfalls
It is not only rules that define migrants. Social scientists 
are beginning to acknowledge the ways in which research 
itself  contributes to the making of  ‘migrants’. As with 
many population groups, particularly those identified as 
sources of  social problems, this can make the relation 
between research on the studied population and 
government policy extremely delicate. Social science 
often does not follow state definitions: the subjects 
of  many migration studies on integration and ‘second 
generation’ migrants are, in law at least, commonly 
citizens. The burden of  representation falls selectively. 
Qualitative research, in particular, has focused on the low 
waged, the poor and the excluded. The wealthy and the 
‘expat’ have received, surprisingly, little attention: once a 
non-citizen is well heeled, their migrancy, it seems, is of  
less interest to both state and science. 
 There are methodological implications, and migration 
research requires reflexivity, whether qualitative or 
quantitative. While ethnographic or qualitative research is 
associated with interpretivism – with the researcher not 
separable from reality, and their subjectivity implicated 
in the findings – survey methods, big data analysis, and 
certain more quantified social science disciplines tend 
to be associated with positivism, facts, objectivity and 
truth. The researcher is separate and observes, and the 
research object has qualities that exist independently 
of  the researcher. However, the unavoidably politicised 
and fuzzy definition of  the migrant and the lexicon 
of  migration suggests that, like qualitative methods, 
quantitative immigration research methods are not 
apolitical and free from bias. Like Schrödinger’s cat, the 
observation cannot be detached from the experiment. 
This also has ethical ramifications: once we ask people 
if  they are concerned about immigration, they become 
concerned about immigration. The more they hear that 
others are concerned, the more concerned they become. 
While representations in current affairs and journalism 
are often hostile, the migrant as depicted in myth and 
in story – from soap operas to portraits, films, poems, 
novels, and religious allegory – is far more complex. 
Exploration of  migration in multiple forms, and a 
coming together of  social science and the humanities 
in exploring the experience of  mobility, mark important 
new developments. The structures of  feeling that such 
narratives evoke are often invoked most powerfully 
through creative expression such as the poems and 
images incorporated into this anthology. 
Troubling Bodies
The annual COMPAS photography competition, whose 
winning entries are to be found in this volume, was initiated 
partly to support the development of  more creative, 
less stereotyped images of  migration. It is surprisingly 
difficult to acknowledge bodies in migration, because 
visual representations are freighted with assumptions and 
anxiety about gender, class, religion, culture, identity and, 
encapsulating all, race: that is, anxieties about migration 
and embodiment. Anxieties about the bodies of  migrants 
emerge in concerns about threats to the national body: 
the pregnant woman accessing health services, the rise 
of  ‘non-white’ populations, the spread of  disease, and 
so on. Part of  being a ‘migrant’ is to be marked by one’s 
body, one’s way of  being in the world. When people are 
not so marked, their migration is more likely to be viewed 
as unremarkable. 
 It is a truism to say that migration is about the 
movement of  bodies; the movement of  voices and minds 
through computers and telephones, like the movement 
of  capital, is free of  many of  the constraints that bind 
the movement of  bodies. Yet it seems that bodies are 
largely absent from immigration policy (though not 
anti-trafficking policies), as indeed they are absent from 
many state policies. Thus, the bodies of  migrants and 
non-migrants are invisible, even as the sustaining of  
bodies is increasingly becoming a migrant job, creating 
a global demand for specifically female care workers. So, 
for all the anxiety about migrants and the national body, 
in policy the migrant is largely disembodied, imagined 
as a rational calculator of  costs and benefits, though as 
feminist scholarship in a range of  disciplines and sites 
has demonstrated, liberal disembodiment is grounded in 
assumptions of  male and ‘fit’ bodies as the norm. 
 Certain skills and experiences are strongly imagined as 
embodied, and migrants can be in demand as embodied 
rather than abstracted labour. For example, UK horse 
trainers claim that they need migrant work riders because 
British people are ‘too large’, and owners of  Asian 
restaurants claim that customers do not expect to be 
served by white bodies. This makes migrants’ bodies 
troublesome for policy to manage, particularly when 
it comes to labour. Migration and immigration policy 
reveals some serious contradictions and tensions with 
this, even as it promotes the idea that anybody/any body 
can do low-skilled work, which is why low-skilled jobs 
can be preserved for nationals. There is a longstanding 
tendency to imagine low-waged labour as disembodied, 
or as ‘hands’. As far back as his landmark 19th-century 
explorations of  the new industrial metropolis, Friedrich 
Engels commented that the typical Manchester factory 
owner ‘cannot comprehend that he holds any other 
relation to the operative than that of  purchase and sale; 
he sees in them not human beings, but hands as he 
constantly calls them to their faces’ . The moral power and 
ethical imperative of  Levinas to recognize ‘the presence 
of  humanity in the eyes that look at me’ is displaced by 
the substitution of  ‘faces’ by ‘hands’. In this sense, just as 
the representation of  the migrant is never innocent, their 
corporeal form signifies the intersectionality of  identity 
typologies of  gender, class, race and sexuality, all mutually 
constituted.
Towards Emotion
Technology is facilitating the transnational spread of  
caring networks, through Skype and through email, 
with families that monitor each other on screens, where 
grandparents can see and speak to their grandchildren, 
and share apps that allow you to kiss online: pursed lips 
setting off  pairs of  vibrating smart phones across the 
planet. At the same time, the disembodied migrant is 
typically regarded in policy as hiding suspect emotions. 
Immigration officers must discover motivations and 
intuit plans as part of  their roles. In contrast, the citizen 
is an emotional subject in their responses to migrants – 
fear, anger and hostility, but also pity and compassion. 
Immigration is regularly typified as exciting ‘heated’ 
debate, yet the relation between the study of  emotion 
and of  immigration has been underdeveloped, both 
in relation to the emotions of  the migrant, and the 
emotions of  the enforcer of  immigration controls. The 
emphasis has been, rather, on the requirement for the 
cold light of  reason and of  objectivity, yet, according to 
Weber, a fully developed bureaucracy is dehumanized by 
the elimination of  the personal, irrational and emotional. 
The question of  whether ethics is founded on reason or 
emotion continues to excite debate in political theory, but 
is also manifest in political practice around immigration. 
 Apart from attitudes to migration, an exemplary 
exception to the lack of  interest in emotion is in the study 
of  ‘integration’. While with respect to integration policy, 
emotion has sometimes been reduced to ‘getting along 
with one another’, scholarly interrogation of  ‘community’ 
with respect to migrants, citizens and neighbourhoods 
has practical and political ramifications. Ideas of  inclusive 
communities, unmarked by hierarchies of  gender, class 
and faith, are revealed as complex multi-layered relations 
of  belonging and exclusion. Yet it is through an affective 
register that many of  the qualifiers of  belonging are 
expressed in everyday life – a sense of  desire, a fear of  
loss, the vertiginous moments of  insecurity that may 
trouble and traumatise the new arrival and the seemingly 
settled alike.
Beyond Politics
Migration is unavoidably political. It is not just that it is a 
hot topic used by political parties in liberal democracies, 
and by other forms of  power in non-liberal democracies, 
in order to achieve certain political ends, but it lies at the 
heart of  social activity and relations. If  politics queries 
the constitution of  the good society, then migration 
amplifies some of  its core questions. Who belongs? 
What do they belong to? Who decides? What rights and 
obligations do belonging and not belonging carry? These 
politics cannot be reduced to party politics. Indeed it 
is noticeable that when it comes to immigration, those 
on the right may talk about workers’ rights and welfare 
states, subjects usually associated with those on the left, 
while those on the left often talk about efficiency and 
contribution, concerns generally associated with those 
on the right. The stranger, that is the foreigner and the 
migrant, has the propensity to generate a mirror dance of  
political discourse, with left and right uncertain, flipped 
around or merely a matter of  perspective. 
 Central to the politics of  migration are notions of  
national identity, subjective and collective, and their 
relation to citizenship. Understanding and identifying 
oneself  as a part of  a native group has become an 
important aspect of  the politics of  laying claim to social, 
cultural, economic and political resources, be it land, 
livelihoods, social service, or a sense of  home. Such 
claims of  autocthony, also evident across the political 
spectrum, are often made against migrants. Those who 
claim nativity against migrants may be the larger body of  
citizens, but in certain parts of  the world they may also 
be first-nation sovereignty movements. This suggests 
that the conventional understanding of  colonialism, as 
a form of  foreign occupation and domination, has had 
major implications for the framing and recognition of  
immigration and politics.
Rescaling and Re-placing
Migration scholars, such as Nina Glick Schiller, have 
long pointed out the danger of  conceptualizing social 
science through a lens that studies societies contained 
within nation states. The fallacies of  methodological 
nationalism reflect the interconnected nature of  a world 
that has, in at least some senses, globalized, but this 
problematic is particularly pronounced in situations of  
migration. The consequences of  migration play out at 
different geographical scales. The movement to the city 
in countries such as India or China commonly involves 
movements of  both cultural and emotional distance 
greater than most international migrations, and logics 
of  ‘rights’, labour markets and integration that blur 
the hard boundaries of  intranational and international 
movement. Importantly, people move to places, to streets 
and to towns. They do not move just to nations, and in 
the moving to places and communities they also reshape 
them, often quite literally building places. The imperatives 
of  the small neighbourhood characterized by rapid social 
change (including processes of  migration) are logically 
different to those of  the municipality whose economic 
growth may be fuelled by migrant labour, or the nation 
that contemplates its own optimum population. 
 The turbulence of  social change in small 
neighbourhoods may display strange similarities 
of  suspicion, towards cultural incomers of  both 
gentrification and new migrants from other parts of  the 
same continent. As Simmel argued at the turn of  the last 
century, we should not confuse spatial distance and social 
distance, particularly as the challenges of  diversity do not 
necessarily respect the passports of  the single market. 
The European Union considers that movements within 
the EU are not formally covered by policy prescriptions 
of  migrant integration – a policy term reserved for 
‘third country nationals’. But such legal typologies and 
technical niceties may not reflect the social dynamics of  
life on the ground, where relations between strangers may 
flourish or generate new kinds of  border marking, where 
a metropolitan paradox may be characterised by both 
intense intercultural dialogue and nascent xenophobia in 
the same space. 
6. And so ...
Fundamentally, the very category of  ‘migrant’ has 
been opened up. Who has not been a ‘migrant’? Who 
does not have mobility written into the histories of  
themselves or their loved ones? But if  everyone is a 
‘migrant’, if  the category or subject is so broad, how can 
it be analytically useful? What is the difference between 
migration and mobility? And what does using the lens 
of  mobility/migration bring to our understanding of  
human relations: political, social and economic? These 
questions bring migration to the core of  the social 
sciences, and raise dilemmas and trade-offs that are 
both ethical and scientific. The scholarship of  migration 
inevitably invokes questions of  the ‘ought’ as well as 
of  the ‘is’. How we consider the cognitive framing 
and utility optimising of  neoclassical economics or 
contemporary political science, alongside the charged 
dilemmas of  moral obligation, international law and the 
weight of  historical injustice challenges researchers and 
the public alike to consider how commensurable these 
very different policy goals and structures of  scholarship 
might be. Migration questions the fundamental relations 
between people, our obligations to the stranger as well 
as the familiar, and implies a political economy and a 
research agenda that speaks both to moral sentiments 
and the hidden hand of  market imperatives. In this 
sense, this anthology aims to provoke a thinking that is 
simultaneously analytical and normative, recognizing the 
logical and epistemological differences between the two, 
but encouraging an endeavour that strives to be up close 
and then at a (critical) distance from its subject matter. 
 Of  course, this indicates an entire research agenda 
rather than the subject of  an anthology, but we hope that 
the following pieces can suggest some ways in which the 
field can be opened up. We have included an annex of  
further reading as a resource to help map some routes 
out of  the anthology. This combines the canonical, the 
eclectic, and important COMPAS contributions for those 
readers who are interested in rediscovering key texts or 
starting new lines of  analysis and inquiry. We hope that it 
will encourage you to author your own contribution, and 
to share it with others by adding to our online version of  
Migration: a COMPAS Anthology.
‘We Want to Hear from You’: How Informing Works in a Liberal Democracy 
Dace Dzenovska
The UK Border Agency (UKBA) conducts raids during 
which it arrests persons deemed illegally resident or 
illegally working. In order to undertake such raids, the 
agency relies on the public’s willingness to report. 
Apparently, ‘over 100,000 allegations are received per 
year from members of  the public’ by ‘letter, email or 
telephone’ about ‘individuals living in their community’ 
(Vine, 2010). The agency’s website addresses the British 
public as follows: ‘If  you suspect that someone is working 
illegally, has no right to be in the UK or is involved in 
smuggling, we want to hear from you.’ 
 For someone like me who grew up in Soviet Latvia, 
and who analyses socialist legacies and postsocialist 
transformations, it seems paradoxical that government 
institutions in a liberal democratic state like Britain 
rely on citizens informing on individuals living in their 
community. How is it that the informing machinery that 
the Communist Party deployed is commonly thought of  
as a feature of  a totalitarian state, whereas the informing 
apparatus crafted by the UKBA is an acceptable technology 
of  government? How is it that in the Soviet Union 
individual informers were either victims or collaborators, 
whereas in Britain they are virtuous citizens? Is it because 
the Soviet state is thought to have governed through 
arbitrary power whereby everyone was living in fear that 
tomorrow they too could be informed on, whereas the 
British state is thought to govern through transparent 
power whereby the public receives clear guidelines on 
how to inform and on whom? To put it another way, is 
it because the Soviet state used informing to govern its 
own, whereas the British state invites citizens, that is, ‘us’, 
to inform on foreigners, that is, ‘them’? But is informing 
not still informing, regardless of  who is informing on 
whom, as Ivan Krastev has argued with regard to spying 
(2013)? 
 The collapse of  the Soviet Union in 1991 set into 
motion a myriad of  re-bordering practices. Former 
internal boundaries between Soviet republics became 
external borders between new nation states and for 
some, such as Latvia, they became borders between the 
European Union and Russia. The interests of  the renewed 
Latvian state converged with those of  the European 
Union, as both aimed to strengthen the external border 
in order to regulate the movement of  variously defined 
foreigners. The initial period of  transformations was 
somewhat chaotic, since border control procedures and 
technologies were not yet standardized. The Latvian 
border guards did what they thought appropriate in order 
to meet the goal of  strengthening the border. Border 
guard officers explained to me that one of  the techniques 
used to reach this goal was to approach people on the 
street if  they looked as though they did not belong. 
 In the process of  further EU integration and border 
standardisation, the Latvian border guard was tasked not 
only with strengthening the external EU border, but also 
with becoming civilized, that is, with protecting borders 
while observing the basic human rights of  border 
crossers. Approaching people on the street without any 
intelligence could be deemed discriminatory. The border 
guard shifted to other strategies: they collaborated with 
the police, employment agencies and hotels, and asked 
government institutions and businesses to report on 
suspicious persons or activities. The border guards went 
on raids, but most raids took place because the border 
guard was tipped off. Hotels and guesthouses reported 
when guests did not pay or looked suspicious, people 
reported when they got angry with their boyfriends or 
girlfriends. Informing turned out to be a crucial strategy 
for controlling the territory in conditions of  freedom. 
Nobody made a connection between the Soviet and post-
Soviet practices of  informing. In Latvia, like in Britain, 
it was now clear who needed to be informed on, which 
made informing acceptable. 
 There are important differences between the 
informing apparatus of  the Communist Party and that of  
the UKBA. Whereas in the Soviet Union everyone could be 
considered under suspicion, in liberal Britain, it is mostly 
certain bodies that are targeted by informing practices. 
While the Soviet state used informing to exercise 
repressive power over its citizens, the British state uses 
informing to produce virtuous citizens willing to report 
on their neighbours. If  the Soviet informing apparatus 
aimed to maintain the power of  the Communist Party, 
the UKBA’s informing apparatus aims to allocate rights. 
People are asked to report on those who seem like they 
do not have the right to be present or to work. 
 Rights-based thinking, then, might be at the foundation 
of  the liberal democratic practice of  informing. If  one 
thinks of  political life in terms of  rights granted by the state 
– who has the right to be present, to work, to be housed 
and to receive assistance, then the distinction between 
those who have rights and those who do not becomes 
a constitutive feature of  the polity. In conditions when 
polity-making is about the accumulation and distribution 
of  rights and when rights-based resources are thought to 
be scarce, informing on those who do not have a right to 
be present or to work becomes a civic duty. And rights-
based resources are often thought to be scarce in the UK, 
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as is evident by the sustained ‘moral panic’ in public and 
political life (Hall et al., 1978). Moral panic translates into 
the emergence of  the virtuous citizen who makes that 
phone call and writes that email to inform on individuals 
living in their community. 
 Surveillance is a modern technology of  government 
deployed by totalitarian states as well as liberal democratic 
states. However, the difference between them lies in the 
power of  freedom to blind us to the effect of  power on 
ourselves, our ethics and our politics. Perhaps the Soviet 
state and its traces can still be useful for bringing a critical 
lens onto the late liberal workings of  power.
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Deportation
Nicholas De Genova
Deportation is a term that has no distinguished pedigree 
in the history of  political ideas and legal concepts. Unlike 
citizenship, for instance, which derives from a hallowed 
history of  philosophical debate and political practice 
concerned with the proper relationship of  individuals to 
the public life of  a larger community, deportation has no 
such exalted genealogy. As a figure of  law-making and law 
enforcement, of  course, the practice of  deportation will 
always be found to have a history. But there is something 
distinctly nondescript about the term, perfunctory even, 
which underscores its status as a kind of  understated, 
largely unexamined fixture of  statecraft. 
 To de-port is suggestive of  an undoing. In effect, 
etymologically, the word’s origins would indicate a 
carrying away, a removal, a disposal. A still more 
euphemistic and sanitized contemporary bureaucratic 
synonym for deportation is, indeed, removal. When 
conducted on a mass scale, deportations have historically 
been similarly euphemized as ‘population transfers’. With 
this proliferation of  banal language to describe what can 
only be experienced in fact as a rather coercive if  not 
violent dislocation, however, we begin to appreciate that 
we are in the midst of  what Hannah Arendt famously 
designated ‘the banality of  evil’ (1963). 
 As is well known, Arendt invoked this notion with 
regard to the unsettling ‘normal’-ness of  the high-
profile Nazi technocrat Adolf  Eichmann, during his 
trial for ‘crimes against the Jewish people, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes’. ‘It would have been 
very comforting indeed to believe that Eichmann was 
a monster…. The trouble with Eichmann,’ Arendt 
explains, ‘was precisely that so many were like him … 
neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still 
are, terribly and terrifyingly normal’. Devoid of  any 
‘diabolical or demonic profundity,’ Eichmann’s very 
pedestrian thoughtlessness ‘predisposed him to become 
one of  the greatest criminals’ of  his epoch. This was 
possible, furthermore, because, in Arendt’s account, 
despite Eichmann’s evident culpability for repeated 
and systematic criminal acts, ‘he had no motives’ apart 
from ‘an extraordinary diligence in looking out for his 
personal advancement’ within a large-scale bureaucratic 
organization dedicated to administrative mass murder 
and genocide, for which criminality and injustice had 
become ‘legal’. In other words, the banality of  Eichmann’s 
particular evil derived from what Arendt deemed to be 
‘the essence of  totalitarian government, and perhaps 
the nature of  every bureaucracy’: the dehumanizing 
reduction of  individuals into ‘functionaries and mere 
cogs in the administrative machinery’.
 Notably, given his instrumental role in the perpetration 
of  the so-called Final Solution, the particular evil in 
question was precisely inseparable from Eichmann’s 
superintendence of  the mass deportation of  European 
Jews to their eventual extermination. Indeed, this is 
what chiefly characterizes deportation in its more 
contemporary connotation as the prosaic and procedural 
(individualized) expulsion of  non-citizens – that it is 
pervasively institutionalized as a merely administrative 
measure. Hence, something that can only be experienced 
by the non-citizen subjected to it as a profoundly punitive 
iniquity operates as an utterly routine and mundane 
recourse of  states ‘removing’ (or disposing of) their 
ostensibly unwanted, undesirable, unwelcome foreigners. 
Thus, deportation has the air of  a purely administrative 
corrective:  some people are deemed to be ‘out of  place’; 
they must be ‘removed’.’
 Ensnared within the pompous gestures of  ‘national’ 
sovereignty and a state’s prerogative to enforce its own 
legal order, the desultory deportation of  non-citizens 
sustains a dissimulation of  the more elementary fact that 
some people’s lives are plainly judged to be disposable. 
This may not ordinarily take the form of  deliberately and 
forcibly shipping people off  to their literal deaths, but 
neither is that consequence an implausible or improbable 
result of  some deportations. In a recent study of  
deportation in the United States, for example, legal 
scholar Daniel Kanstroom provides case histories of  
immigration judges who can be found to explicitly admit 
that they are sometimes sending medically vulnerable 
deportees to almost certain death simply because ‘that … 
is the law of  this land’ (2012). More generally, however, 
deportation always entails the enforcement of  a dire and 
usually abrupt separation of  an individual non-citizen 
from all the material and practical coordinates of  her day-
to-day circumstances, the actual life and livelihood that 
she has been engaged in sustaining and cultivating, as well 
as all the immediate and affective human relationships of  
which these are made.
 A non-citizen’s susceptibility to deportation – her 
deportability – therefore involves a deeply existential 
predicament that is defined by the grim prospect of  
being coercively removed from the space of  the nation 
state where she has otherwise sought to make a life. 
The always unpredictable possibility of  deportation 
becomes a defining horizon for her life. This prospective 
disposability within and across the bordered spaces of  
states, furthermore, enforces a protracted condition 
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of  vulnerability to the recriminations of  the law, and 
consequently, a complex and variegated spectrum 
of  ways in which everyday life becomes riddled with 
precariousness, multiple conditionalities, inequality 
and uncertainty. In this respect, deportability is also a 
temporal predicament that renders one’s way of  life and 
one’s life projects to be always relatively tentative and 
tenuous, vexed with precautions and often overshadowed 
by a diffuse but persistent terror – the fear of  detection, 
apprehension, detention, and expulsion. Yet, these more 
or less torturous conditions of  life for those who are 
compelled by circumstances to make their lives beneath 
the horizon of  the possibility of  deportation have been 
made ever increasingly normal – ‘terribly and terrifyingly 
normal’ (to recall Arendt’s phrase) – within our modern 
global ‘deportation regime’ (De Genova and Peutz, 2010). 
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I want to address a fundamental question of  deregulation, 
namely the exclusion of  migrants without documents 
from employment rights. Martin Ruhs and Bridget 
Anderson, in their innovative work on compliance 
(Anderson and Ruhs 2010), show how workers fall into 
non- (or semi) compliance as a result of  the operation of  
immigration rules and that it is the law, rather than the 
migrants themselves, that determines migration status. 
The consequences of  this are particularly relevant in the 
application of  employment law. Though the origins of  the 
common law doctrine of  illegality of  contract are unclear, 
by the middle of  the nineteenth century it was being used 
in the courts to declare contracts unenforceable where 
there was an issue of  illegality, either in the construction 
of  the contract or in its operation. Initially, it was not 
applied to employment cases, but by the middle of  the 
20th century this position had been reversed, particularly 
in cases where there was tax or national insurance 
avoidance. It was inevitable that it would be applied to 
undocumented migrants who generally are not able to 
pay taxes since they are not registered, and judges have 
denied some migrants employment protection simply 
because they are non- (or semi) compliant. This means 
for example, that migrants in these categories have no 
right to be protected during maternity, nor even the right 
not to be discriminated against. This is important because 
these rights are otherwise generally applicable to all 
workers and, in the case of  maternity and discrimination, 
are also protected under European law. 
 The common law interpretation of  contracts where 
there is status irregularity is exceptionally harsh in a period 
where tightening immigration controls have restricted 
lawful entry, particularly for those in low-skilled jobs. 
It is increasingly difficult for non EU workers to enter 
the country with permission and the law then privileges 
employers who are aware of  the weak position of  the 
undocumented. This not only makes the undocumented 
a ‘cheap’ workforce but it means that they have no legal 
redress, however poorly they may be treated. It cannot 
be right that the law should operate so as to encourage 
abusive treatment, as in the recent case of  Zarkasi v 
Anindita and another UKEAT 0400/11 (2012) where the 
courts denied the right of  any employment protection 
to a vulnerable young Indonesian woman who had been 
brought to the UK to work in her employer’s home. She 
had been promised generous terms and conditions, but 
the reality was very different, and she suffered abuse at 
the hands of  the employer while being paid just £150 a 
month, well below the national minimum wage. The fact 
that it was her employer who had brought her to the UK 
knowing that she would not have a legal right to work 
was deemed irrelevant.
 While both the current coalition and the previous 
Labour governments have asserted the need to eliminate 
what they describe as ‘illegal work’, the truth is that their 
policies have served to make the vulnerable even more so. 
The government points to the use of  sanctions against 
those employing undocumented migrants (and in 2013 
proposed to increase them from £10,000 to £20,000 
per worker) but immigration authorities appear to focus 
on ‘easy’ targets such as employers in ethnic enclaves, 
identifying them as the main offenders. Undocumented 
workers are present in most low paid sectors, but outside 
of  the ethnic enclave employers know that they are very 
unlikely to face immigration raids or to be prosecuted. 
 It cannot be right or just that employers can get away 
with exploiting vulnerable workers in this way. Effectively the 
common law doctrine encourages the exploitation of  those 
without documents and, as our research on undocumented 
migrants has demonstrated (see Bloch et al., 2013), the 
employment conditions of  those who are undocumented 
worsen when the only option is no work at all.
 Is there an alternative? I would argue that the 
first duty of  the state is to ensure the enforcement 
of  minimum employment standards, regardless of  
immigration status. This protects not just those who 
are undocumented, but benefits all workers who do not 
face being undercut or having their terms and conditions 
reduced to ‘match’ those offered to the undocumented. 
Indeed, governments could go further. If  their policy 
aim was to eliminate exploitative working conditions (a 
legitimate public interest) they could legislate such that 
those undocumented migrants who blew the whistle 
on their employers’ exploitative conditions would be 
given additional protection, in particular the option of  
regularisation. If  this is considered a step too far in the 
current political climate, then surely as a bare minimum 
we should be arguing for the regulation of  all employment 
relationships and the guarantee of  at least the minimum 
statutory employment protection, in keeping with EU and 
international standards. We urgently need an alternative 
model which guarantees the separation of  immigration 
and labour law, to validate labour law as a fundamental 
guarantor of  rights in the workplace. 
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Why Are the Most Vulnerable Denied Employment Rights?
Sonia McKay
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Marriage and movement have long been intertwined. In 
many societies, brides move to their husband’s household 
upon marriage (and less frequently vice versa), but in 
contemporary marriage migration the distances involved 
can be substantial and may span national borders. This 
transnational border-crossing is nothing new: British 
brides sought by 17th and 18th-century British men in 
colonial India, Japanese ‘picture brides’ chosen from 
photographs for Japanese immigrants to the United 
States in the early 20th century, and the ‘war brides’ 
leaving Europe to join their GI husbands after World 
War II all provide historical examples of  international 
migration on the basis of  marriage. However, with 
increasing international migration and travel and the ready 
availability of  communication technologies, transnational 
unions and international marriage migration occur with 
increasing frequency.
 Contemporary marriage-related migration is diverse. 
International migrants may bring a spouse from their 
country of  origin to join them; established diasporas 
sometimes maintain connections to ancestral homelands 
through marriage; in parts of  Asia women move from 
poorer to wealthier nations to fill rural bride-shortages; 
tourists, international students or business travellers meet 
future partners during overseas sojourns; international 
dating websites facilitate online relationship formation, 
whilst companies offer men from developed countries 
introduction services and ‘romance tours’ to meet 
prospective brides from eastern Europe, Asia and Latin 
America. Gendered imaginaries of  place underlie some 
unions. One suggested tension has been between some 
men’s search for a more ‘traditional’ spouse overseas, and 
women’s hope that an international marriage will provide 
a more progressive partner. Assumptions of  hypergamy 
– that women are often marrying ‘up’ the international 
hierarchy – may be complicated by the sometimes marginal 
status of  men who seek a foreign wife. Migrant wives 
are often viewed as vulnerable to abuse and exploitation, 
their isolation amplifying patriarchal control, but where 
husbands migrate (often against a virilocal norm) they 
may encounter new gendered challenges in the inversion 
of  conventional domestic relations of  power.
 Governmental perspectives on marriage-related 
migration also vary. In Europe, southern states have 
conventionally viewed family reunification in a positive 
light, as facilitating migrant integration (see European 
Council Directive 2003/86/EC) whilst northern 
European countries have more often seen family 
migration as an unwanted side-effect of  earlier labour 
migration. As this latter view suggests, marriage can 
pose a fundamental challenge to governmental attempts 
to manage migration, given that spouses are generally 
selected by individuals (and/or families) rather than 
the state. In this context, the ‘right to family life’ has 
become hotly contested. Some types of  transnational 
marriage, however, attract more political attention than 
others. Marriages between individuals from developed 
countries are seldom problematic. In contrast, the 
vulnerability of  so-called ‘mail order brides’ has been 
a topic of  concern in the US, while in Europe the 
‘homeland’ marriages of  some ethnic minorities have 
become a high-profile political issue, in the form of  
debates around forced marriage, problematic integration 
and immigration fraud. Some regulatory instruments 
have been developed which disproportionately affect 
such groups, whilst allowing others to continue to 
enjoy marital mobility. In the UK, the Primary Purpose 
Rule (1985-97) required would-be spousal migrants to 
demonstrate that the primary purpose of  the marriage 
was not immigration. This was seen as targeting South 
Asian arranged transnational marriages, where evidence 
of  a long standing romantic relationship would not be 
available to demonstrate alternative motivations. Current 
minimum income requirements for those applying to 
sponsor a spouse’s immigration have more impact on 
groups whose average incomes are lower, including 
ethnic minority groups in which transnational marriage 
has been common. Denmark’s ‘Combined Attachment’ 
requirement presents a particularly ingenious response 
to the impulse to sort immigrant spouses according to 
hierarchies of  socio-economic and cultural desirability: 
couples must demonstrate a combined attachment to 
Denmark greater than to another country, something 
which has proved particularly difficult in the case of  
inter-ethnic ‘homeland’ marriages. 
 Emphasis on transnational marriages as motivated by 
opportunities for migration, evident in much policy and 
scholarship in this area, has often been at the expense 
of  a more rounded understanding of  these relationships. 
Such models are of  limited use in explaining cross-
border marriages between partners from developed 
countries occurring in globalised marriage fields. But 
even in the arranged marriages between British Pakistanis 
and cousins from Pakistan, which have been the subject 
of  my own ethnographic research, the opportunity to 
migrate is only one contributing factor in marriages 
that often help reconnect families to much-missed kin 
in Pakistan. Transnational marriage must be understood 
Marriage Migration
Katharine Charsley
Beyond Rules
in the context of  broader transnational relationships. A 
focus only on the ‘migration’ in ‘marriage migration’ can 
blinker appreciation of  the broader value and meanings 
of  relationships to those involved. In order to maintain 
marital relationships in the face of  increasingly restrictive 
immigration policies, some couples have found equally 
ingenious ways to be reunited with their spouse. The 
‘Surinder Singh’ route involves taking advantage of  the 
rights of  European Economic Area (EEA) citizens 
exercising freedom of  movement to be joined by non-
EEA spouses, whilst in Denmark, significant numbers 
of  Danish Pakistanis now live lives which are doubly 
transnational – becoming frequent commuters on 
the so called kærlighedens bro or ‘love bridge’ between 
Copenhagen and Malmo in Sweden, where their Pakistani 
partners have been granted permission to reside.
 Thus, the growing interest in marriage-related 
migration reflects a belated recognition that, rather than 
being a marginal topic for migration studies, this is an 
area in which issues of  crucial importance are brought 
to the fore, including the gendered nature of  migration, 
the diversity of  contemporary international mobility, the 
centrality of  relationships for understanding migration 
motivations, experiences and patterns, and tensions 
between human rights and immigration control. 
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Undocumented Migrant Children
Vanessa Hughes
In the UK, undocumented migrant children are a diverse 
population. Over half  of  the estimated 120,000 were 
either born in the UK or have spent most of  their life there. 
They come for a variety of  reasons, from a number of  
different backgrounds, migrating independently or with 
their family, with diverse pathways into their precarious 
immigration status (Sigona, 2013). Their experiences are 
accordingly heterogeneous: in terms of  their journeys, 
which can range from a several months long, arduous, 
cross-country passage to a short ariline flight; interactions 
with immigration authorities and other state institutions 
(such as schools and healthcare professionals); and their 
everyday life. What unites most of  them, however, is their 
position at the intersection of  immigration and children’s 
policies and legislation. This policy and legal framework 
creates a space of  limbo for these children. On the one 
hand they are de facto non-deportable, while on the 
other, despite legislation that turns them into ‘citizens in 
becoming’ (Sigona and Hughes, 2012), their possibilities 
of  regularisation are limited, thereby trapping them in 
a ‘no way out and no way in’ situation. Children have 
always been part of  migration, but despite increasing 
literature and research in this area, little remains known 
about undocumented migrant children, their experiences 
and how their precarious immigration status impacts 
their lives.
 The legal status of  undocumented migrant children 
can be understood as a complex and dynamic combination 
of  relations vis-à-vis the state, embedded in the policy 
and legal framework, public services and their own plans, 
expectations, histories and position. Or, as Willen (2007) 
argues, ‘migrant illegality’ can refer to a legal status, a 
socio-political condition and a ‘mode of  being in the 
world’. Furthermore, ‘illegality’ is not a fixed status. 
Rather migrants, as non-citizens, move through a range 
of  statuses and can simultaneously inhabit both ‘legal’ 
and ‘illegal’ spaces in relation to different institutional or 
policy arrangements, so that their legal status becomes 
more or less visible at different points in time. While 
children under 18 years remain relatively protected, the 
transition to adulthood often also marks a transition to full 
visibility of  their irregular status, leading to a certain loss 
of  control over their future. Sigona (2013) thus suggests 
a shift in scholarly scrutiny towards precariousness of  
immigration status, rather than focusing exclusively on 
‘illegality’.
 Precarious immigration status affects migrant children 
in a myriad of  ways and on a daily basis. While there 
are many differences in their migration history, danger 
of  deportation and family or household situation, some 
similarities can be observed. Undocumented migrant 
children usually live in poor housing conditions and 
experience high housing mobility, insecure incomes and 
destitution. Legally, undocumented migrant children are 
entitled to access education and healthcare in the UK and 
are mostly able to access these public services; indeed, 
schools often represent a safe place for many children 
(for a US comparison see Gleeson and Gonzales, 
2012). However, local variations remain and difficulties 
in access emerge over time, in particular in connection 
with increasing restrictions of  migrants’ access to public 
services.
 While in Europe undocumented migrant children have 
so far received little attention in public policy and research, 
a view across the Atlantic shows a different situation. 
Despite an increase in the number of  deportations under 
Obama (Lopes and Gonzalez-Barrera, 2013), or perhaps 
because of  it, the voices of  young undocumented 
migrants have become loud and clear over the past 
decade, declaring themselves as ‘undocumented and 
unafraid’. The political movement around the DREAM 
Act (Development, Relief, and Education for Alien 
Minors Act) demanding a pathway to legalisation and 
citizenship for themselves and their parents has so far 
led to Obama’s executive order suspending deportations 
for some under DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals). Whether more comprehensive reform will 
take place remains to be seen, but so far abjectivity and 
illegality has motivated some young undocumented 
migrants to engage politically and and to resist being 
defined by their legal status.
 Contrary to the US, deportation numbers have 
been declining in Europe and it is highly unlikely that 
children will be deported from the UK (Sigona, 2013). 
Counter to the deportation trend, however, the potential 
changes in immigration reform currently under debate 
make a permanent future for young undocumented 
migrants more tenable in the US than in the UK. Either 
way, undocumented migrant children are likely to be a 
continued reality and, as such, it is important to better 
understand how they are affected by their legal status.
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The Human Rights of  Migrants 
François Crépeau
Migrants face very specific human rights challenges. 
Vulnerable groups, such as women, aboriginals, ethnic 
minorities, LGBTQs and prisoners have won formal 
citizenship. They now fight for their rights from their 
position as citizens. Migrants are not citizens: they don’t 
vote or get elected. They fear being arrested, detained or 
deported; they rarely mobilise or protest. Some migrants 
have more resources to defend themselves: the highly 
skilled labourer and permanent resident are often treated 
as a citizen. But for many others, including ‘low-skilled’ 
labourers and irregular migrants, when something bad 
happens (an employer refuses to pay them, for example), 
their best option seems to be ducking and moving on, 
as they have learned to fear encounters with authorities. 
 Migrants rarely participate in public debates on 
migration policies: they are the objects of  debate, 
rarely subjects or recognised interlocutors. Migration is 
one policy area where politicians can make outrageous 
statements without facing any consequences at the polls 
– indeed they may benefit from them. Despite years of  
research to the contrary, repetition by politicians and the 
media means the public still believes that migrants take 
jobs from locals, create unemployment, bring crime and 
illnesses, or come to the global north with the intention 
of  syphoning social budgets. The culture of  impunity 
around anti-migrant rhetoric remains because migrants 
are not, and will never be, politically represented at the 
national level, as they are not citizens. Migrants face a 
structural limitation of  electoral democracies. Politicians, 
even those with a moral compass, have little incentive to 
protect migrants’ rights, if  by doing so they risk losing 
the polls. The toxic immigration debate in many parts 
of  the world reveals the extreme instrumentalization of  
migration and the malleability of  an uninformed, often 
hostile public opinion.
 Yet migrants have rights. With two narrowly defined 
exceptions (the right to vote and be elected, and the right 
to enter and stay in the country), under international 
human rights law (and often constitutional law), migrants 
– including irregular migrants – benefit from the same 
human rights guarantees as do citizens, by virtue of  
their common human dignity. Human rights are not 
only citizens’ rights – they are for ‘everyone’. The two 
international covenants on human rights explicitly 
include ‘national origin’ among the prohibited grounds 
of  discrimination in the enjoyment of  civil, cultural, 
economic, political and social rights. Enforcing this 
prohibition in law and practice is a key challenge in 
ensuring the protection of  the human rights of  migrants 
at the national level. This does not imply that migrants 
have the benefit of  all the same government entitlements 
that citizens or even long-term residents, as not all 
benefits represent the implementation of  a fundamental 
right. The question is whether the distinction between 
individuals can be justified, and immigration status does 
not justify just any distinction.
 Migrants face an increasing culture of  systemic 
rights violations by states in both the global north and 
south. Because migration is related to borders and is 
politically sensitive, states consider migration policies to 
be a component of  their discretionary powers relating 
to territorial sovereignty, and accept very little control or 
oversight over their policies and practices. The past decade 
has witnessed the securitization of  border controls and 
migration policies. Even though crossing an international 
border without proper documentation is at worst an 
administrative offence and should never be considered 
a crime, irregular migrants face arrest, deportation and 
detention, often in appalling conditions. The procedural 
maze facing the migrant on any legal issue is generally 
undecipherable without help, and judicial assistance 
is rarely available. States have often set up systems of  
administrative detention for migrants that result in long-
term detention, with scant or pro forma periodic review. 
Facilities range from purpose-built centres to ad-hoc 
camps, police stations and even containers, and are often 
not well regulated, supervised or monitored. Alternatives 
to detention are almost nowhere available. 
 Migrant children, unaccompanied or not, are often 
detained and deported like adults, with no legal guardian, 
or legal representative. They rarely undergo a proper 
‘best interests of  the child’ determination, and access to 
school or health care is often illusory.
 Victims of  human trafficking (for the sex trade or 
forced labour) are often treated as irregular migrants, 
without benefiting from the specific protections they are 
owed under international law.
 Temporary migrant workers should have the security 
of  regular status and a work contract. However, their 
foreignness, lack of  language skills, social isolation and 
categorization as ‘low-skilled or unskilled’ make them 
vulnerable to exploitation such as confiscation of  identity 
or travel documentation, wage theft, poor housing, dirty, 
difficult and dangerous working conditions, lack of  health 
care and so on. Additionally, unscrupulous recruitment 
agencies can request egregious fees, forcing them into 
long-term debt. 
 State policies often increase vulnerability. Some work 
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permits are tied to the immigration sponsor, who then 
wields enormous power, as he can have the migrants 
deported the moment he terminates their contract. Most 
countries have unrecognised labour needs and do not 
adequately repress ‘irregular employment’, tolerating 
underground labour markets where undocumented 
migrants are exploited. Access to citizenship is often 
denied, even to long-term residents, often resulting in 
statelessness.
 Like all human beings, migrants need a strategy of  
empowerment to fight for their own rights. In particular, 
meaningful access to justice (courts, administrative 
tribunals, national human rights institutions, 
ombudspersons, labour inspectors and so on), freedom 
of  association and the right to organise and join unions, 
and support from civil society organisations are crucial 
elements of  such strategy. Public discourse relating 
to migration also needs to change: the media must be 
much more accurate on migration issues, politicians need 
the courage to reject the scapegoating of  migrants, and 
public opinion needs education about migrants’ rights 
and the benefits of  diverse societies.
The author thanks Anna Purkey and Bethany Hastie for comments on 
an earlier version of  this article.
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Rethinking Migrant Rights for Development
Martin Ruhs
In early October 2013, the UN General Assembly debated 
the global governance of  international labour migration. 
This meeting was particularly timely, as it came on the 
heels of  reports of  numerous deaths among Nepalese 
workers on World Cup construction sites in Qatar.
 But as they gathered in New York, policymakers once 
again overlooked one of  the hardest questions in this 
debate: how to manage the trade-offs in immigration 
policy between openness to admitting migrant workers 
and some of  the rights migrants are granted after 
admission.
 Qatar and the other Gulf  states are examples of  
countries operating a ‘high numbers/low rights’ system; 
they have very open admission policies but place severe 
restrictions on migrants’ rights. At the other end of  the 
spectrum some countries of  northern Europe offer 
migrants comprehensive rights but admit relatively few 
migrant workers.
 There is a clear trade-off  to be made between these 
two models, but international policymakers are yet to 
design a strategy for migrant rights with this in mind. 
The failure to deal with this issue has to end. A coherent 
approach to the global governance of  migration requires 
that this difficult issue is explicitly and openly discussed. 
 The liberalisation of  immigration policies in high-
income countries is supported by many low-income 
countries and development organisations such as the 
World Bank and the United Nations Development 
Programme. There have been particular calls for the 
rules governing admission of  lower-skilled workers to be 
relaxed. This section of  migrants currently face the most 
restrictions, but it is where migration could easily lead to 
large gains in income and development. The World Bank, 
for instance, believes that more international labour 
migration is one of  the most effective ways of  raising the 
incomes of  workers in low-income countries.
 At the same time, workers’ rights organisations, such 
as the International Labour Organization (ILO), demand 
more equal rights for migrants. Activists around the 
world have called for more countries to ratify the 1990 
UN Convention on the Rights of  Migrant Workers, 
which lays out a very comprehensive set of  civil, political, 
economic, and social rights for migrants, including those 
living and working abroad illegally. To date, fewer than 50 
countries, none of  them major migrant-receiving nations, 
have ratified this convention.
 The dilemma is that it is not always possible to have 
both ‘more migration’ and ‘more rights’ for migrant 
workers. After examining labour immigration policies in 
over 45 high-income countries in my recent book The Price 
of  Rights: Regulating International Labor Migration (2013), 
I found an inverse relationship between openness and 
some rights for migrants. Greater equality of  rights for 
new migrant workers tends to be associated with more 
restrictive admission policies, especially for admitting 
lower-skilled workers from poorer countries.
 The tension between ‘access and rights’ applies to a 
few specific rights that are perceived to be costly for the 
receiving countries. The right of  lower-skilled migrants to 
access certain welfare services and benefits is particularly 
affected. The implication of  this trade-off  is that insisting 
that new migrant workers get the same rights as citizens 
can come at the price of  more restrictive admission 
policies. Equal rights can protect the few migrant workers 
admitted, but reduce the opportunities of  many more to 
benefit from work available in richer countries.
 Few migrant-sending nations insist on full and equal 
rights for their workers abroad, for fear of  reduced 
access to the labour markets of  higher-income countries. 
Witness, for instance, the muted reaction of  the Nepalese 
government to the deaths of  their citizens in Qatar. With 
the current arrangement suiting both nations’ economic 
interests, the two governments even held a joint press 
conference to say migrant rights were ‘fully respected’.
 International debates about the global governance of  
migration have almost completely ignored the trade-off  
between openness and rights. Global migration debates 
such as those at the 2014 Global Forum on Migration and 
Development in Sweden should open up the discussion. 
We need a reasoned debate between organisations that 
advocate more migration to promote development, such 
as the World Bank, and those primarily concerned with 
the protection and equality of  rights, such as the ILO.
 So if  there is a trade-off  to be made between openness 
and rights, what is the solution? This is a question with 
no single answer. But there is a strong case for liberalising 
international labour migration, especially for low-skilled 
workers. This could be achieved through temporary 
migration programs that protect a universal set of  core 
rights and account for the interests of  nation states by 
restricting a few specific rights that create net costs for 
receiving countries, and are therefore obstacles to more 
open admission policies.
 We should start discussing the creation of  a list of  
universal ‘core rights’ for migrant workers. Exactly which 
rights would be on this list is still up for debate, but it 
is a debate that should be at the centre of  upcoming 
discussions on the global governance of  migration.
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 A ‘core’ list would include fewer rights than the 
1990 Convention, but more countries would be likely 
to accept it. Most significantly, this would include those 
countries that admit large numbers and currently have 
minimal incentive to seriously improve conditions. Thus, 
given the large numbers involved, overall protection 
for migrant workers would be increased. It might be a 
counter-intuitive conclusion, but it is one grounded in 
reality: when it comes to protecting migrant rights, it 
turns out less is more.
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Equality is, one might have thought, an inclusive principle. 
The Universal Declaration of  Human Rights commits 
nations to protect ‘the equal and inalienable rights of  all 
members of  the human family’, while closer to home 
the British Conservative party speaks of  equality of  
opportunity for ‘every single individual in this country’.1 
Equality is not, however, the intention of  any government 
for one section of  society: migrants. Their conditions of  
entry spell out the terms of  their inequality, imposing 
limits on their right to access jobs, public services, social 
assistance and participation in elections. 
 These departures from the equality principle are 
not seen as discrimination but as a legitimate part of  
immigration control. Few would indeed suggest that 
migrants should be able to make their way to the benefit 
office or polling station on the day they step onto the 
tarmac at JFK or Charles de Gaulle. Yet there are other 
rights – such as freedom from torture and to a fair trial 
– where migrants’ equality with citizens is, in a liberal 
democracy, taken as read. 
 That divergence raises a fundamental question: 
when is it legitimate for a state to impose restrictions 
on migrants as part of  its sovereign right to control its 
borders, and when should that right be trumped by the 
principle of  equality for all within the territory? As Linda 
Bosniak puts it: when is it legitimate for the border to 
follow the migrant inside (2006)? If  it is legitimate to 
restrict some of  the rights of  some migrants in some 
circumstances, what are those circumstances, and when 
do the restrictions amount to illegitimate discrimination? 
Is there a workable test we can use to decide where to 
draw the line?
 Academic and policy discourses have toyed with 
various criteria as the basis on which migrants should 
acquire equal rights: the strength of  the individual’s 
social ties; length of  residence; contribution. All have 
strengths but also flaws; for example, contribution may 
not be within the migrant’s control (if  still a child or 
barred by discrimination), or their existing affiliation 
may be weak but their need for protection strong. Basing 
access to equality on such criteria, moreover, reinforces 
exclusion rather than building capacity to overcome it. 
Nor is it clear how affiliation or contribution should be 
measured and hence at what point equality in civil, social 
and political rights should be granted.
 Rather than criteria for earning equality, the question 
should be ‘on what grounds is it justified to exclude?’ 
The majority of  states have signed up to human 
rights instruments, like the International Covenant on 
Equality for All?
Sarah Spencer
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), in which equality 
is the default position from which states have to justify 
any departure. 
 The ECHR provides protection from discrimination 
in relation to the rights in that Convention ‘on any ground 
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, association 
with a national minority, property, birth or other status’ 
(Art.14). Not every difference in treatment amounts to 
discrimination – only if  the less favourable treatment 
has no objective and reasonable justification. To be non-
discriminatory, the restriction must pursue a legitimate 
aim and there must be a reasonable relationship of  
proportionality between the restriction and the aim that 
it is intended to achieve. So the Convention provides a 
clear test against which any restriction must be judged.
 In decisions binding on the 47 Council of  Europe 
member states, the European Court of  Human Rights 
has clarified that these provisions include protection from 
discrimination on grounds of  nationality, immigration 
and residence status. Austria’s denial of  unemployment 
benefit to a tax-paying Turkish national on the basis 
of  his nationality was, for instance, discrimination in 
the enjoyment of  his right to property. The Court 
said a government would have to provide ‘weighty 
reasons’ before it could regard difference of  treatment 
based exclusively on nationality as compatible with the 
Convention (De Schutter, 2009; 2011). The absence of  a 
stable residence permit was likewise not sufficient reason 
to deny the right to family reunion to a refugee whose 
marriage post dated his arrival, when other temporary 
residents (workers and students) are allowed to be joined 
by their spouses. The UK justified this on the grounds that 
it needed to provide an incentive to workers and students 
to come. The court thought this a legitimate aim but did 
not consider the difference in the treatment of  refugees 
to be justified and proportional on those grounds. It is 
not sufficient to claim restrictions are necessary for the 
purposes of  immigration control or to protect the public 
purse. There must also be evidence that the restrictions 
are necessary and proportional to that end. 
 That test provides more than fine points to debate 
in court. It is an operational yardstick public authorities 
can use to consider when it is legitimate for a right to be 
restricted and when the equality principle should prevail. 
It brings into play a broad range of  economic, social and 
personal considerations when weighing up the necessity 
and proportionality of  the restriction. 
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 European governments have not yet felt any need to 
spell out their reasons for the restrictions they impose or 
the evidence on which they are based. Recent COMPAS 
studies had difficulty tracking down any rationales for 
many restrictions in place except where, retrospectively, 
they had been challenged through a parliamentary 
process or in court (Pobjoy and Spencer, 2012; Oliver, 
2013). If  challenged, governments may find the impacts 
of  restrictions poorly evidenced, suggesting a new 
research agenda. If  the aim is indeed not equality for all, 
then inequality for whom, and on what grounds? 
Notes
1 Teresa May, Shadow Home Secretary, Second Reading 
Equality Bill, May 11, 2009. Col 565. UN Declaration: 
author’s emphasis.
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Reflections on an Anniversary: EU Citizenship at 20
Cathryn Costello
I am writing this 20 years to the day after the Maastricht 
Treaty entered into force on 1 November 1993. ‘Economic 
and monetary union’ and ‘political union’ (coordinating 
foreign policy and ‘justice and home affairs’) were 
the main events. The Treaty also grandly announced: 
‘Citizenship of  the Union is hereby established’. The 
status was for those ‘holding the nationality of  a Member 
State’. The rights attached were largely pre-existing and 
politically underwhelming. Without great fanfare, the 
weightiest of  political concepts was uploaded into the 
EU Treaty, apparently an afterthought.  
 EU citizenship status is Janus-faced, drawing on 
existing rights, but promising much more. The original 
European Economic Community (EEC) (1957) was 
a common market, aiming to liberalise not only trade 
in goods and services, but far more ambitiously, the 
movement of  capital and persons in the capacity of  
economic actors. The drafters didn’t anticipate the next 
moves: having created a court with real clout, it got to 
work quietly but effectively. ‘Free movement’ for workers 
between EEC states, while not availed of  in massive 
numbers, was legally enforceable. The Court insisted that 
migration was not subject to executive discretion, but a 
right, with few bureaucratic hurdles. Governments lost 
many early cases (a common pattern in Euro-law), failing 
in attempts, for instance, to keep public sector work 
out of  bounds to EEC migrants. ‘Work’ was broadly 
understood, and no income or skills tests permitted. 
The Treaty freedoms embraced the mobile student 
and guaranteed her equal treatment in some domains, 
in particular fees for tertiary education (a right a US 
citizen cannot expect on moving residence from, say, 
Texas to California). Other equality rights followed, with 
legislation interpreted generously and exceptions strictly 
construed. In a community of  just six or nine countries, 
migration of  ‘fellow Europeans’ seemed untroubling.   
 When Greece, Spain and Portugal joined, transitional 
periods were included, a precursor to the more 
controversial transitional constraints accompanying the 
enlargement of  2004, which brought an additional ten 
states, with almost 75 million people, into the EU. For 
many migrants from these countries, EU enlargement 
meant instant regularisation and greater security of  
their rights of  residence in the countries where they 
were already living. Many left and went home, safe in 
the knowledge they could return. The EU is the world’s 
circular migration laboratory.
 With the creation of  EU citizenship  came expectations. 
Why should transnational free movement be the central 
right? Isn’t it odd to put leaving one’s country as a 
prerequisite for citizenship rights? Why valorize leaving 
over staying? Even within the ‘free movement’ frame, the 
privileging of  the ‘economically active’ sits uneasily with 
citizenship’s inherently egalitarian inclusivity. Requiring 
health insurance and ‘sufficient resources’ to enjoy 
residence rights seems to privilege the already privileged, 
and suggests that equality with national citizens was 
elusive. An awkward compromise is reflected in current 
legislation and case law, with full entitlement to social 
benefits being accrued over time. The freshly arrived 
job-seeker or student cannot claim all that the local 
welfare state offers its own, notwithstanding populist 
scaremongering about ‘benefit tourism.’    
 In the larger EU, free movement has become 
more fraught. EU migrants are subject to anti-migrant 
sentiment. For all its legal robustness, EU citizenship 
has failed to protect the most marginalized. The ongoing 
forced evictions of  Roma (including EU citizens) from 
France and Italy defy legality, both EU and human rights. 
Initial reports of  mass expulsions of  Roma were met 
with horror, but no legal actions were taken.  
 No less troubling are tensions between EU citizenship 
and nationality law.  Leaving it to states to decide who gets 
EU citizenship paradoxically asserts national sovereignty. 
Indeed, for those who seek to understand the EU as 
a polity, it begs confederal analogies. EU citizenship is 
capable of  exerting a restrictive pull on nationality law. 
For example, Ireland removed the constitutional right to 
citizenship for children born on the island of  Ireland, 
partly in response to concerns about the ‘abuse’ of  this 
provision by families seeking EU citizenship for their 
offspring. Suggestions that the EU should have common 
standards on naturalization are consistently rejected, in 
favour of  a much less secure denizenship type status 
created by EU directive. The EU remains a polity in which 
not all of  its long-term residents participate equally.
 Meanwhile, nationality law has become a means for 
member states to seek out the migrants they want, and repel 
others. So when Italy confers nationality on EU migrants 
drowned on its shores, making them posthumously 
Italian, the gesture is not so much empty as restorative 
of  statist order. And while Malta is condemned by the 
Strasbourg court for detaining asylum seekers who arrive 
by boat, it simultaneously announces that it will expand 
‘investor citizenship’. Bulgaria too sells EU citizenship to 
investors, without even a maintaining a pretence that they 
will actually live there. It is easy to obtain EU citizenship 
for some, at a price. There are hints that these practices 
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will prompt a legal reaction in EU law, but thus far, the 
EU has largely obscured underlying questions of  who is 
a citizen.
 The most energized legal shenanigans have concerned 
non-EU (so called third-country national) family 
members of  EU citizens. EU law allows EU citizens 
to reside together, irrespective of  the family members’ 
nationality. That this has become the most litigated of  
EU citizenship rights reflects the restrictive national turn, 
when family formation migration of  states’ own citizens 
was seen to involve too many ‘others’. EU law came to 
the rescue for many, giving them a right that trumped 
domestic immigration control. Governments sought to 
restrict the EU rights, and much litigation ensued. 
 For some wishful thinkers, EU citizenship is the 
ultimate in post-national status. The EU Court speaks of  
it as ‘destined to be the fundamental status.’ However, 
citizenship remains predominantly transnational, 
although no longer intractably so. The tensions are best 
exemplified in the EU case of  Zambrano (Case C-34/09, 
2011). The Zambrano children’s EU citizenship status 
(by virtue of  their birth in Belgium), created EU rights 
for their parents (or at least for their father on whom 
they were financially dependent), not just to live but also 
to work in Belgium. The Zambrano children’s rights did 
not depend on their having left Belgium to enter the EU 
legal space. The parents had lived in an all too familiar 
legal limbo, as rejected asylum seekers with precarious 
humanitarian leave to remain. The scope of  the ruling 
continues to be litigated. The Belgian response:  restrict 
nationality so children in that scenario would no longer 
become Belgian by virtue of  birth in the territory. 
Without that nationality, EU citizenship is irrelevant. In 
this respect, EU citizenship is revealed as not post-, but 
hyper-national.
Beyond Rules
Framing and Reframing Irregular Migration 
Franck Düvell
The concept of  irregular or ‘illegal’ migration dates 
back to the 1930s; it was occasionally applied during the 
1970s before becoming popular from the late 1980s. It 
is related to the emergence of  the modern nation state, 
but its current version is associated with the social 
transformation from modernity to liquid modernity, 
from Fordism and Keynesianism to neoliberalism and 
globalisation, resulting in the new flexibility, mobility 
and precarity in risk societies. These changes have given 
rise to new forms of  geographic mobility; nation states 
conventionally perceive these as challenges if  not threats 
to their sovereignty, and continue to tightly regulate 
mobility and migration. But often tensions arise between 
demands for labour and immigration restrictions, 
between institutional goals and individual aspirations, 
between state definitions of  persecution and individual 
perceptions, and between flexible lives and inflexible 
immigration rules and bureaucracies. These tensions 
bring about irregular migration.
 Irregular migration only exists because policies 
determine which types and levels of  migration are 
permitted and which are not. Thus, irregular migration 
is a social, political and legal construct. This is not a 
mere intellectual statement, for legal constructs can be 
deconstructed, meaning that what was once declared 
illegal can also be declared legal. For instance, in 2004, 
ten states joined the European Union. The borders of  
the EU shifted east, and irregular migration from states 
such as Poland and the Czech Republic became regular. 
Regularization programmes have given some 4 million 
irregular migrants legal status. When, in 2010, Greece 
abolished visa requirements for Albanians, illegal entries 
dropped dramatically. Thus, irregular migration can be 
reduced or prevented by changing, or reconstructing, 
the political status of  the citizens of  another country (as 
with EU enlargement), or the political status of  foreign 
nationals already (irregularly) residing in a country 
(regularisation), or immigration modalities. 
 Irregular migration is typically perceived to be a 
major and increasing problem. However, irregular 
immigrants only account for around 0.5 per cent of  the 
global population of  7.1 billion. Globally, there are an 
estimated 30-40 million irregular immigrants, around one 
fifth of  all international migrants. In the EU, however, 
research has found not only that numbers are lower than 
previously estimated, but also evidence that they are 
decreasing from an estimated 3.1-5.3 million in 2002 to 
1.9-3.8 million in 2008, around 10 per cent of  the EU’s 
immigrant population. Estimated annual inflow decreased 
from its peak of  151,000 in 2008 to 73,000 in 2012. This 
decrease in stocks and flows is due to EU enlargement, 
large scale regularisations, improved entry and border 
controls, intensified law enforcement and the economic 
crisis. In contrast, in the US in 2008, the stock of  irregular 
immigrants was 3.6 per cent of  the total population, 
and over 25 per cent of  the immigrant population were 
irregular. Over time, stocks have increased from 9 million 
(2000) to almost 12 million (2012) whilst inflows seem 
stable with around 550,000 annual apprehensions. Tighter 
border controls and lack of  regularisation policies result 
in this population accumulating.
 Hence, the overwhelming majority of  migrants 
move, reside and return within the conditions set by law. 
This suggests that current policies are rather effective, 
though the EU is faring significantly better than the US, 
calling into question the level of  attention and resources 
allocated to repressive measures.
 Conventional discourses and media reports suggest 
that irregular migration is a border control and border 
security issue. But research has found that clandestine 
entry – often of  individuals who subsequently successfully 
apply for asylum – only accounts for around 10 per cent 
of  irregular migrants in the EU (in contrast to around 40 
per cent in the US). In the EU, legal entry and overstaying 
or working in breach of  visa conditions are the main 
paths into irregularity. Another important path is related 
to refused asylum seekers who either do not return, are 
not removed and/or are de facto non-removable. Equally 
relevant are overly bureaucratic or inefficient visa, 
residence renewal and appeal procedures, and withdrawal 
or loss of  status. Impractical legislation and laissez faire 
practices also facilitate irregular immigration. 
 Migration is inherent to fluid modernity but current 
polities are ill-equipped and unwilling to accept mobile 
populations. As a consequence, irregular migration is 
constructed. Numerically, irregular migration is a minor 
phenomenon; however, normatively it is a major social 
problem. For the individual it can be a disaster. Irregular 
migration illustrates some of  the shortcomings of  our 
society, and the exclusion of  certain mobile populations 
represents a major injustice at the beginning of  the 21st 
century.
 Policy options such as introducing legal migration 
channels, including refugee resettlement programmes, 
improving legal and administrative practices and (re-) 
regularisation combined with border controls and law 
enforcement could efficiently prevent, reverse and reduce 
irregular migration.
This article is based on a paper presented at the Metropolis conference on 
12 September 2013.
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Diaspora Governance 
Alan Gamlen
Migration is often equated with immigration, but every 
immigrant is also an emigrant with ties to a place of  
origin. With the help of  modern technologies such 
ties are growing broader and deeper, and diasporas – 
communities dispersed across borders from a professed 
place of  origin – are becoming a more conspicuous force 
in global affairs. They act as filaments for the cross-
border flows of  money, goods and ideas that established 
authorities at every level, from the global to the local, are 
struggling to govern. Diasporas are thickening. How is 
the international system adapting?
 Diaspora governance is a multi-layered matter, 
involving not just national and international but also 
local institutions and processes. In theory a jealously 
guarded prerogative of  national governments, migration 
policy often falls in practice to local institutions: the 
colleges, hospitals, banks and law enforcement agencies 
dealing with the absence of  their own people or the 
presence of  ‘others’ in their communities. At this level, 
diaspora governance involves, for example, migrants’ 
transnational enterprises and Hometown Associations 
working with consular representatives of  the origin state, 
municipal actors in both regions channeling migrants’ 
money into public good projects, and destination regions 
fostering ethnic-based support networks and improving 
migrant access to local education, healthcare, and legal 
and financial services.
 The border-crossing nature of  such activities is of  
increasing interest to an international community that 
is seeking ways to cooperate multilaterally over the 
management of  international migration in the absence 
of  a centralized global migration governance framework 
akin to the International Monetary Fund or World Trade 
Organization. Though aware of  their interdependence 
over international migration, states see it as an issue over 
which they, and no international bureaucracy, should 
exercise sovereignty. In lieu of  an international institutional 
framework, efforts are underway to link migration to the 
established international development agenda, which 
is one of  the few areas of  global governance where 
widespread consensus exists, and therefore a powerful 
vehicle for mobilizing the international community.
 Diaspora governance in the international arena 
therefore centres on humanitarian and development 
organizations helping migrants to contribute to the 
country of  origin, and on the efforts of  states – facilitated 
by multilateral institutions such as the International 
Organization for Migration and the Global Forum for 
Migration and Development, and various Regional 
Consultative Processes – to build dialogue, shared 
understandings, and cooperative approaches amongst 
states linked by international migration. A central 
problem for those seeking to collaborate in this way is 
that migration policy has traditionally fallen mainly to 
destination states, where migration is most immediate. 
They have found themselves without institutional 
counterparts in origin states where, until recently, no 
one was tasked with managing people who had spatially 
exited the national population. 
 But this governance gap is rapidly disappearing as origin 
states evolve formal institutional mechanisms to ‘engage’ 
their diasporas. Up from a handful of  states twenty years 
ago, now around half  of  all United Nations members 
have such an institution, often housed within the Foreign 
Ministry, that is responsible for coordinating relevant 
policies across government. They sometimes promote 
return, but more often build diaspora communities and 
help them contribute positively to the homeland, for 
example by establishing networks, honouring ‘model’ 
expatriates and monitoring dissident exiles, as well as 
encouraging emigrants and their descendants to retain 
‘national culture’ and refrain from embarrassing or 
undermining governments. 
 Often this kind of  ‘paying court’ entails addressing 
diaspora grievances, supporting their struggle for legal 
protections abroad or property rights, social security and 
electoral participation at ‘home’. Meanwhile, diaspora 
institutions work with and through – and occasionally 
against – diaspora networks to monitor cross-border 
recruitment and crime, and to facilitate remittances, 
investments, philanthropic donations, technology 
transfers, and connections to the centres of  world power. 
Once a violation of  the territorial basis of  international 
politics, diaspora governance is now becoming a normal 
form of  political organization. 
 Three interlocking explanations help us to understand 
why the forms of  governance described above are 
proliferating at such a remarkable rate. From one 
perspective, patriotic loyalties give origin states leverage 
over the formidable material resources of  migrants: their 
money, their scarce skills, their connections to global 
decision-makers and opinion-shapers abroad, their hybrid 
identities and chameleon-like cultural competencies that 
make them ideal intermediaries between nation states. 
From this perspective, states see diasporas as the cultural 
lubricant greasing the wheels of  globalization. 
 A second strand of  explanation focuses less on 
national interests than on ideas of  ‘nationality’ that 
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constitute these interests in the first place. Is it the case, 
for example, that racial states – where citizenship is 
contingent on ethnicity – are inclined to embrace their 
emigrants just as they malign their immigrants? Or do 
liberal democratic regimes also seek to incorporate a 
multicultural diaspora within the origin state? Is diaspora 
governance an expression of  right-wing, long-distance 
ethnic nationalism, or a brand of  post-liberal democratic 
citizenship? Either way, from this explanatory perspective, 
national identities, rather than national interests, matter 
most for diaspora governance.
 A third and final perspective on diaspora governance 
suggests that states are driven not only by national 
interests and ideas, but also by international expectations. 
From this perspective, the rush by migrants’ origin 
states to establish diaspora institutions reflects wider 
efforts by sections of  the international community to 
find cooperative solutions to the shared challenges of  
managing international migration. Viewed in this way, 
states’ diaspora initiatives are part of  wider international 
efforts to govern global migration. Advised and urged 
by experts in think tanks and international organizations 
to seek ‘migration for development’, they are steered 
towards an appreciation of  how engaging diasporas 
furthers their own interests. What began as a good idea 
gathers the moral force of  convention. 
 Diaspora governance, then, is part of  wider efforts 
to govern globalization by incorporating cross-border 
communities into the existing international system, and 
by adapting that system to a transnational world. By 
extending states’ authority and infrastructural power 
beyond their territorial jurisdictions, diaspora governance 
disrupts the neat, traditional symmetries of  place, power 
and identity that bind the modern system of  nation states, 
giving inklings of  a post-Westphalian world. Whose 
utopia is being created?
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Enforcement makes law real. Without enforcement, laws 
are empty words written down in official documents after 
undergoing a democratic process that gives these rules and 
regulations the legitimacy to exist. The law is usually enforced 
by state authorities such as police forces, border guards 
or military personnel. People who enforce law have – so 
long as they are ‘on duty’ – a range of  powers. Thus, they 
represent the executive power of  the state. Montesquieu 
argued in The Spirit of  the Laws (with reference to Locke’s 
Second Treatise of  Government) that these powers should be 
administered separately from the other two functions of  
‘government’: the legislative and the judicial. With this 
separation of  powers, one branch can check the other and 
a sort of  balanced power is created. 
 Different groups in society perceive enforcement 
and enforcement staff  differently. For some people, 
dealing with the executive power is nothing exceptional. 
Enforcement staff  are seen as keepers of  order or as 
friendly auxiliaries. For others, they can represent an 
authoritative threat that restricts their actions or behavior, 
or even questions their legal existence. This last may seem 
impossible. And yet, it is possible. The legitimacy of  a 
human being on a territory with a certain jurisdiction 
requires recognition and permission by the state. This is 
not an easy matter. It is attached to a highly complex legal 
framework and a philosophy of  citizenship that is then 
acted upon by enforcement officials. 
 This enforcement action is increasingly practised 
in liberal democracies. It demands the identification 
and the tracking down of  persons with an ambivalent 
legal existence, so-called ‘illegal immigrants’. Although 
at first sight this practice raises liberal tensions and 
contradictions, hegemonic public and policy discourses 
at different levels (national, regional and so on) have 
generated an effective discursive platform that legitimizes 
Enforcement 
Bastian Vollmer
this enforcement, not only in the UK, but across Europe 
and beyond. 
 Hirst (2000) referred to the UK system as being 
particularly endangered by Carl Schmitt’s prophecy of  
motorized legislation, whereby executives run the legislature 
and where laws do not ‘aim at the citizens but at officials in 
their capacities as regulators of  citizens’ activities’. By this, 
‘professionals have great discretion as to whether or how 
to use and to interpret’ laws and, despite contemporary 
talk of  the ‘retreat of  the state’, ‘enforcement becomes 
something of  a lottery’. Putting this claim into the context 
of  intrusive enforcement such as ‘stop-and-search’ or 
‘spot-checks’ practices taking place in liberal democracies 
like the UK or Germany, by which the legal existence is 
per se questioned and controlled ‘on the spot’, it recalls 
Schmitt’s mysticism of  the soil (in Ordnung und Ortung) 
where ‘a concrete truth is never utopian; it has a piece of  
earth under it, a soil, from which it emerges; it is located 
in the full sense of  the word’ (1995). 
 We have here not a noveau ancien regime (Beccaria, 1995) 
perhaps, but a development of  enforcement practices that 
do not suit liberal democracies and point to post-liberal 
societies. It leaves a puzzle which addresses the ethics of  
existentialism, not only in liberal democracies but in an 
universal sense: How to define the existence of  a person?
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In 2013, I was told about a North African woman 
who lived in a British city and was experiencing severe 
domestic violence. As a result of  the regulations on 
migrants’ access to public services, she faced a stark 
choice between staying in the violent relationship, 
leaving the country, or jeopardising her own legal right 
to remain in the UK. Unlike migrants entering on the 
‘family route’ as partners’ spouses, she fell into a ‘gap’ 
in the rules because  her partner was a European 
Economic Area (EEA) national, meaning she could 
not apply for immigration status under the Destitution 
Domestic Violence Concession. The concession would 
have supported her accommodation at a women’s refuge 
and given her a chance of  an independent residence, 
had she been in a partnership with a British citizen or 
‘settled person’. She could not leave the country as her 
partner had stolen her papers. At the same time, she 
had no access to a short-term welfare safety net – other 
than some NGO assistance – to escape the devastating 
situation she found herself  in.
 While much attention in migration studies focuses 
on the regulation of  entry through bordering practices, 
much less scholarly attention has been given to the 
ways in which post-entry rules and regulations influence 
migrants’ experiences. However, access to state services 
and welfare support has become a subject of  renewed 
interest within western liberal states in the current climate 
of  ‘austerity’. For years, at least in a comparative historical 
and geographical sense, migrants’ rights have expanded, 
due to human rights and equalities concerns (Soysal, 
1994). However rhetoric and policies curtailing legal 
migrants’ access to state support are growing, apparently 
emerging from a concern to regulate the costs of  public 
welfare provisions. A narrative of  welfare chauvinism 
develops to protect the welfare state ‘from those who 
have paid nothing into it’. 
 In practice, few migrants can rapidly access social 
housing and benefits in the UK; only refugees legally 
granted status and some EEA nationals may be entitled, 
with a much longer list of  migrants excluded from 
eligibility. Yet still this narrative is propagated at the 
highest level. The current UK Prime Minister David 
Cameron recently called for a purge on ‘benefit tourism’, 
claiming that ‘ending the “something for nothing” culture 
is something that needs to apply in the immigration 
system as well as in the welfare system’. 
 Within migration studies and social policy, it is 
encouraging that recent research has insisted on the 
importance of  attention not only to entry regimes, but 
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of  documenting and understanding the ‘incorporation 
regimes’ of  European welfare states that give differential 
access to welfare and public services depending on 
migrants’ entry category (Sainsbury, 2012). The current 
line of  inquiry speaks to the broader theme of  how 
borders are increasingly inside national territories, 
through the differential treatment of  legal, documented 
migrants for a significant (and extending) period of  time 
after entry. 
 Attention to this within the UK shows that – arguably 
more so than in many other European countries (Oliver, 
2013) – there is a growing complexity to the regulations 
faced by migrants once they enter state territory. As the 
case of  the North African woman demonstrates, policies 
tread a fine line, attempting to balance conflicting ends, 
from a need to ‘protect’ state resources to concerns 
around safeguarding public health or preventing domestic 
violence. The outcome is an astoundingly complex web 
of  regulations, rules, exclusions and addenda around the 
eligibility of  migrants to a range of  public services and 
benefits (Jayaweera and Oliver, 2013). ‘Complexity’ is a 
word that repeatedly crops up in interviews with local 
officials and voluntary sector workers. The opaque rules 
and legalistic formulations of  eligibility are simply not 
understandable for most service providers. As a result, it 
can be easier for GP receptionists, admissions tutors in 
colleges and Job Centre staff  to refuse migrants access 
to services rather than risk making the wrong decision. 
Access to services can be  a ‘postcode lottery’ (Oliver and 
Jayaweera, 2013). 
 In this sense, although attention to migrants’ rights 
within incorporation regimes is an important focus of  
scholarly attention, rights in law are just one part of  the story. 
The growing complexity of  regulations creates a barrier 
in itself  to the ability to exercise rights. Such restrictions, 
within contexts that seek to limit entry only to economically 
self-sufficient migrants, have been implemented without 
understanding their impact on individuals and on wider 
social cohesion and migrant integration. 
 Thus, in addition to the well-known ‘vectors of  
subordination’ of  race, class, gender and ethnicity and 
their intersections with which most social scientists 
are well-versed, there is an urgent need to consider the 
ways in which ‘immigration status’ itself  becomes a 
state-legitimated division with consequences for the 
opportunities and outcomes individuals face. This may 
occur as a result of  the legal rules created to regulate access 
to services, or the indirect effects of  the accompanying 
complexity itself.
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You’ve Got a Text from UKBA 
Les Back and Shamser Sinha
Christian’s mobile phone vibrates as he settles into his 
seat for the flight to Montenegro. Two weeks ago, the 
UK Border Agency (UKBA) informed him that he no 
longer had leave to remain in the Britain, and asked him 
to provide flight details of  when he planned to leave 
the country. On Facebook he informed his friends in 
Montenegro that he was coming home. Before turning 
his phone off  for the flight, Christian looks down and 
checks his new text message. To his surprise it is from 
UKBA, and reads: ‘have a pleasant journey’.  
 The politeness of  the British immigration officials 
that have questioned and scrutinized him is somehow 
the hardest thing to take. In a hyperconnected world, 
border control and regulation is taking more complex 
and technologically sophisticated forms. Christian’s story 
is emblematic of  the new reality that technologies of  
border control are as mobile as the people get on and off  
of  airplanes. 
 In 2010, it was estimated that there were 214 million 
international migrants in the world, representing an 
increase of  almost 40 million in the first decade of  the 
21st century. One in three of  these migrants are young 
adults. The regulation of  youth migration is producing 
new hierarchies of  belonging that order and rank the life 
chances of  a globally mobile generation. 
 It is not only that young people are moving, but 
that the border is moving also, because while it exists at 
the extremity of  the EU and UK, internal immigration 
controls now proliferate everywhere – from the lecture 
theatre, to the workplace, to the crèche – filtering by 
immigration status who can move through what spaces. 
The border itself  is being multiplied (Mezzadra and 
Nielson, 2008), and the practices required to police it are 
being moved into communities and neighbourhoods.
 This year, the controversy about the Home Office 
‘Go Home or Face Arrest’ van campaign raised 
public concern about the damage done to Britain’s 
cosmopolitan cities. The campaign invited overstayers to 
text ‘Home’ on 7870, and the Home Office used Twitter 
to offer a running commentary on the van campaign. 
Anti- immigrant racism and xenophobia is given official 
public license in both off  line and on-line worlds. It is 
not just that young migrants face institutionalised forms 
of  marginalisation – without leave to remain they cannot 
work or have recourse to public funds – they also have 
to live with a sense of  insecurity enhanced by the mobile 
phone in the palm of  their hand. 
 What is also interesting is that while the mobile 
phone is now an instrument of  border control it is also a 
connecting device. Salle, as a child in Tirana, Albania,  was 
obsessed with telephones. He took old telephones out 
of  the rubbish bins and took them to pieces only to re-
assemble them again like little mutant telecommunications 
Frankensteins. His obsession with phones was in part 
due to the fact that the telephone was his link to his elder 
brother, who would phone home every month or so with 
news of  his life in London. Today, he is still obsessed 
with phones, but now with mobile ones. 
 In 1999, as a result of  the Serbian persecutions, 7,500 
Kosovans fled into Albania, and guns were circulating in 
Tirana. Salle’s parents were relatively well off  by Albanian 
standards – his mother was a nurse and his father worked 
as a forest ranger. A kidnap economy developed where 
relatively well off  children were held to ransom. Salle was 
afraid, and his brother paid £4,000 to a pair of  smugglers 
– a man and couple posing as a family – to secure Salle’s 
passage to London. His passage through Europe is a 
remarkable story: he eventually sneaked himself  into the 
back of  a truck full of  beer and was picked up by the 
Kent police. He was 12 years old. 
 He lived with his brother in Barking and ended up 
in a school in Dagenham in Greater London. It was 
only when Salle met Harbahajan, a builder and a non-
religious Sikh with Marxist leanings, that he found his 
footing. As he put it, “All the people in the building trade 
hate the Eastern Europeans but I love ‘em.” His building 
firm is made up of  Rastafarian painters and decorators, 
Polish labourers and Albanian plumbers. Salle’s fortunes 
changed when he connected with Harbhajan’s business 
which itself  was built on a kind of  multicultural labour 
market in a sector of  the economy that is fraught with 
racism and resentment.    
 Salle’s immigration status now is stable and, unlike 
many, he can move freely around the world and return 
to London without fear of  being held or deported. He 
works mainly repairing and restoring the properties of  
London’s super rich and middle class. His mobile phone 
is his way to stay connected with his family in Tirana, 
his multi-ethnic networks in London, and the young 
Albanians who arrange to meet via text message every 
Friday night at a pub in east London. 
 The technologies of  the digital age are changing the 
experience of  living across national borders. In John 
Berger’s extraordinary study of  migration, A Seventh Man, 
the immigrant’s sense of  missing home is described as 
the ‘double pain of  absence’. Writing in the 1970s, Berger 
explains: ‘He misses everything he feels to be absent. At 
the same time, that which is absent, continues without 
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him’ (Berger and Mohr, 1975). The migrant experience 
of  this kind of  absence today has been transformed. 
 Through the mobile phone and virtual social 
networking, migrants can be technologically connected 
to the life ‘back home’ that is unfolding without them. 
They sit in a cafe in London and keep track of  the lives 
of  loved ones left behind, and even participate remotely 
through text messaging and email. Charlynne told me 
recently that she speaks to her relatives in Dominica all 
the time. “I can talk to my nephews for 45 minutes on 
Skype but I can’t put my arm around them,” she says. 
 Technological connection does not lessen the pain of  
absence: quite the contrary, it can exacerbate it. This was 
demonstrated by the case of  a young asylum seeker called 
Clifford, who participated in a study of  young adult 
migrants with my colleague Shamser Sinha. Clifford’s 
life was effectively on hold while his immigration case 
was being processed – he could not work legally or plan 
for his future. Every day, he kept up with his friends in 
Ghana who were working, falling in and out of  love, 
and building their lives. The fact that through his iPhone 
he was in contact with the unfolding lives of  friends 
and loved ones – in real time – exacerbated his own 
sense of  being trapped in the present. His immigration 
status meant he was unable to move forward or back. 
Clifford’s experience shows how the digitisation of  social 
life has transformed the relationship between here and 
there, without lessening the insecurities of  being caught 
in-between.
 It has been well established that the relationship 
between time and space is radically transformed through 
technologies like airplanes, smart phones and the internet. 
The hyper-connected nature of  our world goes hand 
in hand with the proliferations of  bordering practices. 
These no longer only happen at Heathow or Calais when 
we fumble for the passport in our bag. Rather, border 
control is being ‘in-sourced’. Doctors, health visitors, 
teachers, and university lecturers are all being asked to 
pass on information about migrants, through monitoring 
their student attendance or documenting visits to their 
homes. Willingly or not, they are enlisted as affiliates of  
immigration control. 
 Successive British governments have claimed that 
the UK points-based immigration system arbitrates 
on the basis of  what young people can do rather than 
who are they are. This is little more than an ideological 
gloss concealing the thick lines being drawn within a 
generation of  globally mobile young people. Here, the 
terms of  inclusion are set by where you are from, how 
much money is in your bank account, and whether or 
not you will be granted leave to remain as a result. The 
border itself  moves, nets, captures and expels unwanted 
or unneeded people. This becomes visible chillingly when 
Christian receives a text message from UKBA: ‘have a 
pleasant journey’. 
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Migration is a flock of  birds
who leave the last shrill calls of  summer
leave the trees and nests 
that cupped them like a hand
while they waited for their hearts 
to grow big enough to fit
the whole world in. Their wings 
sing of  a bright new future.
They pass the sound of  the sky 
feather to feather, beak to beak. 
But wherever they land, far away
in the winter that glows gold,
somewhere, back there, 
the prints their tiny feet 
left behind are still etched.
They are waiting
for the ghost of  a bird
to brush the ground.
Migration
Helen Woods, age 12
COMPAS Schools Poetry Competition 2013 
First Place
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There is much empirical evidence that suggests that, in the 
UK, immigration has little or no impact on employment 
or unemployment overall. But there’s an unfortunate 
tendency for dialogues on this topic (oral or in response 
to economists writing about this topic) to go something 
like this. First, a respondent points to an example – 
they personally, or someone they know, has lost out on 
an employment opportunity to an immigrant. Or they 
note that a particular local business or sector seems to 
employ mostly immigrants – Pret A Manger in London 
is a frequent target. For this reason, David Metcalf, who 
chairs the government’s Migration Advisory Committee, 
frequently talks of  the ‘Pret A Manger question’.  
 We economists usually respond to the question 
by saying that this is ‘anecdotal evidence’, sometimes 
(although I myself  try not to use this phrase too much) 
referring to the lump of  labour fallacy, and explaining 
again what the evidence says about overall or average 
impact. The respondent then concludes, perhaps 
understandably, that economists live in a statistical world 
which has little or no connection with reality; and worse, 
that when confronted with reality we are not interested.
 I’d like to try to explain why ‘anecdotal evidence’, in 
this specific context, is indeed irrelevant, not because it 
is anecdotal, but because it is a partial rather than general 
equilibrium concept. That is, by definition, it tells you 
only the local or partial impact of  something, which 
may or not be offset by developments elsewhere in the 
economy, which – by definition – the anecdote cannot 
tell you anything about.
 To illustrate this I think it is helpful to look at a 
different example; not immigration, but inflation. 
Suppose that the price of  goat’s cheese goes up, as it is 
doing now, because of  a Europe-wide goat cull (yes, for 
some of  us this is a crisis). Now, what can we say about 
the impact on overall inflation?  
• In the short term, consumers will adjust. They may 
buy less goat’s cheese and more of  other things;
• over time, so will other variables. The exchange rate 
may fall slightly (our terms of  trade have worsened); 
• the Bank of  England, in accordance with its mandate, 
will adjust interest rates to ensure that the impact is 
not  to push up inflation target in the medium term.
Most economists will therefore agree on the following 
points:
• There may be some impact on inflation in the short 
term. This will be less than one might expect just 
from the price rise, and the magnitude and persistence 
of  the impact will depend on how the adjustment 
process works;
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• there will be no impact at all on inflation in the 
medium to long term.
Now suppose you want to know how quick the adjustment 
is – does the adjustment take a week or a year? This is 
an empirical question for which need empirical evidence, 
and there are various ways you might think about 
finding that evidence. But the key point here is that the 
fact you’re paying more for your cheese doesn’t tell you 
anything about the answer to the initial question – the 
impact on inflation overall in the economy. It is not just 
that the price of  cheese is ‘anecdotal evidence’; it is that 
the anecdotal evidence about cheese tells you absolutely 
nothing about the question you are actually interested in, 
which is about the speed of  the adjustment process in the 
wider economy. 
  The interesting and difficult question is not what 
happens in cheese shops or supermarket cheese aisles, 
but in all shops, for all prices. The adjustment could take 
a week or a year, but looking at the price of  goat’s cheese 
alone – no matter how many shops you go into – can’t 
tell you.  This is because inflation is a general equilibrium 
concept; it is determined by the overall levels of  demand 
and supply in the economy, and looking at one price – a 
partial equilibrium concept - can’t tell you anything.
 The same is true for immigration and employment. 
Theoretically, it is quite possible that sandwich shops 
hiring immigrants increases unemployment for Britons 
in the short term, and it is equally possible that it doesn’t. 
But the point is that establishing whether it does depends 
not on what you observe in the shops themselves, but 
what is happening in the wider economy – it depends on 
the wider adjustment process. The number of  Britons 
employed in sandwich shops is a partial equilibrium 
concept, but the number employed overall – which 
depends not on sandwich shops, but overall levels of  
labour supply and labour demand, in addition to other 
factors – is a general equilibrium one.  
 So we need to know what happens to the Britons 
who are not employed in the shops, what happens to 
employment in other shops and sectors, and what happens 
to overall levels of  wages and of  consumer demand. 
Those are the factors that will determine the impact on 
unemployment. No matter how many sandwich shops 
you go into, and how many ‘anecdotes’ you accumulate 
about Poles working in them, this tells you nothing about 
the question that you are actually interested in. 
 So the point is not that anecdotal evidence is always 
invalid or irrelevant, or that it is not quantitative; it 
can often be very useful. Going into sandwich shops 
and talking to management and employees about how 
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the industry is organised can tell you a lot about the 
employment practices of  that specific industry, and how 
that might impact on migrant and native workers. And 
indeed there are many high quality research studies that 
use systematic and structured qualitative methods to do 
exactly this type of  research. It is not just condescending, 
but wrong, for economists to dismiss all evidence that 
doesn’t have numbers attached to it. But, when looking 
at economy-wide variables – inflation, unemployment – 
there is simply no alternative to looking at developments 
in the economy as a whole.
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Interdisciplinarity in the Study of  the Law of  Labour Migration 
Mark Freedland
When I embarked, many years ago, upon the study of  
the law of  the contract of  employment, I looked at the 
legislation and case law concerning settlement in parishes 
by annual hiring, because it provides one of  the most 
important sources of  early law concerning the contract 
of  employment. Many years later, I’ve become extremely 
interested in the modern law of  labour migration.
Most recently, I have come to realise that we need an 
imaginative understanding of  the long history of  legal 
regulation at the point where concerns about labour 
migration, anti-social behaviour and poverty intersect. 
Us and Them? (Anderson 2013) powerfully sums up this 
intersection to argue that legal regulation makes divisions 
between community and alienation, and that these things 
evolve and mutate, over time framing different categories 
for persons who are perceived to be alien and therefore 
undeserving of  support by the community. 
 This book, looking back through British legal history, 
shows how the idea of  the alien and undeserving 
migrant has shifted towards the non-citizen of  the state 
as a whole, having in earlier times been focused on the 
‘vagrant’ who wanders from town to town or rural parish 
to rural parish, perhaps seeking casual work, perhaps 
begging, but above all seeming to represent the presence 
or the threat of  social and economic instability and 
disorder. It gives an historical survey of  the long story 
of  the control of  ‘vagrancy’ and of  the labour market 
itself  in England from the time of  the Ordinance of  
Labourers in 1349, tracing the strings of  a cat’s cradle 
of  regulation which connected up efforts to control the 
supply and mobility of  labour, and to put pressure upon 
the wandering poor. As a lawyer, I found it interesting 
to consider the evolution of  this, our elaborate body 
of  law and administrative practice, and to be reminded 
how various terminologies that to us now sound rather 
quaintly Shakespearian – ‘sturdy vagabonds’ and the 
like – become technical legal terms, upon the nuances 
of  which depended criminal or quasi-criminal liability to 
sentences of  whipping or sessions in the stocks or the 
pillory.  
 These of  course, as Anderson suggests, are, then as 
now, all ways of  differentiating others from ‘hard-working 
people like us’. Indeed, largely from the later 18th century 
onwards, much of  that differentiating between ‘them 
and us’, another great axis of  differentiation, came to 
consist of  control of  immigration in general and labour 
migration in particular. Primarily it was from elsewhere in 
the British Empire, and then in due course from the world 
at large, as that Empire or Commonwealth progressively 
ceased to represent a zone of  even partial inclusion in 
British subject-hood.  
 In Anderson’s book, this historical platform is laid 
out in order to construct a multi-dimensional tableau of  
the modern law and culture of  treatment of  migrants as 
somewhat conjoined with ‘failed citizens’, failed in that 
they can, for example, be regarded as ‘benefit scroungers’. 
Far from being without contemporary relevance, the 
chapters in this book that describe the old law of  vagrancy 
and settlement in parishes and the early history of  
migration controls illuminate issues that we grapple with 
today. Consider the proposals apparently taking shape in 
the Department of  Work and Pensions as I write this 
late in 2013, that would further tighten the rationing of  
welfare benefits in a new system which, it seems, might 
include such mysterious prescriptive notions as ‘persons 
too committed to work’ and ‘persons not working 
enough’. Reading Us and Them? thus encapsulated for me 
one of  the special pleasures and privileges of  pursuing 
my own research work in Oxford, namely that I often 
quite unexpectedly and serendipitously derive inspiration 
from colleagues working in totally different and disparate 
disciplines.  
References
Anderson, B. (2013) Us and Them? The Dangerous Politics of  
Immigration Control, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beyond ContraCt
The Economic Impacts of  Migration 
Carlos Vargas-Silva
A well-known economist joke starts with an economist 
walking alongside a non-economist (in some versions of  
the joke it is an anthropologist, in others a sociologist). 
Suddenly the non-economist stops, looks down and says 
“There’s a 20 dollar bill on the sidewalk!” The economist, 
who has been trained under the notion of  ‘efficient 
markets’, does not bother to look down and simply says: 
“That’s impossible, if  there had been a 20 dollar bill on 
the sidewalk somebody would have already picked it up.” 
 The efficient-market hypothesis was developed by 
Eugene Fama, who was awarded the 2013 Nobel Prize 
in Economics for developing his theory. Designed 
for financial markets, it essentially states that it is not 
possible to obtain excess returns in financial markets (in 
other words, easy money). In plain terms, it reflects the 
notion that there should not be opportunities for big 
gains at small costs; that is, unless there is an exogenous 
restriction leading to a failure of  economic rationality.
 The estimates of  several development economists, 
such as Dani Rodrick, suggest that a minor reduction 
in the barriers to labour movement from poor to rich 
countries could lead to an enormous increase in global 
welfare. However, even in the face of  this potential gain, 
there is very little appetite for reducing restrictions to 
immigration in rich countries. This fact, together with 
the joke introduced above, has led to Michael Clemens, 
another development economist, using the phrase 
‘Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the 
Sidewalk?’ as the title of  one of  his papers. Clemens’ 
estimates suggest that emigration of  less than 5 per cent 
of  the population from the poorest countries of  the 
world to the richest countries of  the world would expand 
the global economy by several trillion dollars.
 If  there is really so much to gain from more 
immigration, the trillion dollar question is: Why do 
rich countries maintain such strong restrictions to the 
movement of  labour from poor countries? One of  the 
reasons is that most of  the welfare increase that results 
from additional immigration goes to migrants themselves. 
Still, we would expect migrant-sending countries to 
benefit from remittances, while host countries benefit 
from a cheaper labour force and increase productivity. 
On the surface more immigration could be seen as a win-
win-win situation or, at least, as a Pareto improvement (in 
which one person is better off  without making any other 
individual worse off), since the migrants and the home 
and host countries would all benefit in economic terms. 
However, the positive economic benefit in the home 
and host country, while likely to be true on average, is 
not true for every single person. Some people in home 
and host countries are likely to be worse off  as a result 
of  migration. If  winners could use some of  their gain 
to compensate the losers perhaps migration could be a 
Pareto improvement. However, there is no clear existing 
mechanism that can deliver this compensation, which 
in turn suggests that there will be no consensus to 
decreasing barriers to labour movement. In sum, keep 
looking down in case you happen to find a few of  those 
bills on the sidewalk.
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Child Work and Mobility 
Jo Boyden and Gina Crivello
Writing about children and ‘the politics of  culture’ at 
the end of  the 20th century, Sharon Stephens (1995) 
characterises the modern world in terms of  ‘transnational 
flows of  commodities and people; by vast numbers of  
refugees, migrants, and stateless groups; by state projects 
to redefine the threatened boundaries of  national cultures 
[...]’. Children are typically cast as unwitting and passive 
subjects of  these shifting global forces, rather than active 
participants who experience, challenge and reshape the 
world around them. Boys and girls who migrate alone 
attract particular attention internationally as victims 
whose rights have been violated, thus triggering an array 
of  protective policy and programmatic responses. Yet the 
extreme economic, social and political inequalities that 
commonly underpin this trend remain largely ignored. 
 Prevailing ideas about independent child migration 
reflect recent efforts globally to re-set the boundaries 
of  what it means to be a child; these efforts increasingly 
define and govern children’s use of  time and space. 
Growing attention is given to children’s vulnerability, 
their learning needs and dependence on adults, with 
emotional attachments formed in the context of  stable 
nuclear family structures being regarded as central to 
their development and wellbeing. In this expanding 
paradigm of  childhood, the young are portrayed as 
learners rather than earners. Global initiatives such as the 
Education for All campaign and the associated expansion 
of  formal schooling have played their part, as boys and 
girls everywhere are expected to attend school full-time 
until well into their teens. Relatedly, child migration 
for work is taken as a threat to schooling and a sign of  
family breakdown or mistreatment and is often confused 
with trafficking. As a result, the everyday experiences of  
migrant boys and girls are overshadowed by a focus on 
street and trafficked children, child sex workers, or child 
refugees, with no consideration of  the absence of  viable 
options for young people locally. 
 But then ideas about appropriate childhood are 
peppered with contradiction. Children growing up in 
rapidly changing societies find themselves balancing 
multiple, often inconsistent expectations regarding how 
and where they should spend their time. So, even though 
work-related child migration is widely condemned 
internationally, leaving home to earn an income is what 
makes schooling possible for some children, enabling 
them to save for school utensils, uniforms and the like. 
Despite the intense gaze on work-related migration, 
boys and girls relocating to access better or higher status 
schools has thus far escaped critical scrutiny; it is even 
applauded in some quarters. The recent rise in school-
related child migration responds to a dramatic escalation 
in educational aspirations across the globe. Among 
social elites it facilitates access to selective education, 
whereas among populations in poverty it is driven by 
local service shortfalls. Increasingly, schooling is seen as 
a means of  becoming somebody of  wealth and social 
significance, a way out of  rural poverty and the drudgery 
of  occupations like farming, and of  releasing the young 
from the hardships endured by the parental generation. 
Even though there is no guarantee of  an economic return, 
many families make major financial sacrifices to cover the 
direct, indirect and opportunity costs of  school-related 
migration, for example by selling their land or animals. 
 Thus, independent child migration can be 
developmental rather than detrimental, and children 
migrate under differing social and material circumstances 
and with varied outcomes for themselves and for 
their families. In weighing up the costs and benefits of  
children migrating we must consider young people’s own 
motivations and accounts. Young people often explain 
how much they appreciate the opportunities migration 
has brought them, enabling them to see the wider world, 
make new friends and access resources like libraries and 
the internet. Furthermore, many of  the children who 
migrate without their parents are in practice not alone 
but accompanied by trusted relatives or peers. Among 
populations in poverty, children commonly grow up as 
co-contributors to the household economy and decisions 
regarding their work, schooling and migration respond 
to both collective and individual considerations. Child 
relocation from poorly-resourced to better-off  households 
can mitigate family hardship and, in return for helping out 
in the host household, enables boys and girls to access 
learning and care opportunities not available in the natal 
home. In this way, children’s migration for work may 
strengthen bonds within extended family groups rather 
than create a social deficit through their physical absence.
 This is not to suggest that children’s independent 
migration for work or schooling is without risk. Being 
young and separated from family networks may increase 
vulnerability in many contexts. Whitehead and Hashim 
(2005) maintain that, ‘Many of  its positive and negative 
effects do not arise from the fact of  migration itself, 
but depend on what triggers movement, what kinds of  
circumstances migrants move to and, of  course, the 
distance moved and the length of  stay away.’ This points 
to the importance of  assessing the situations from which 
children leave and their positions within structures of  
inequality, as well as the circumstances they enter into 
through migration.
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Migration, Welfare and Citizenship 
Isabel Shutes
such as healthcare), but the ‘obligated’ who are required to 
engage in work-related activities as a condition of  access 
to benefits. Analyses of  the principles and conditions that 
underpin access to welfare thus bring to attention the 
ways in which citizenship is implicated in the stratification 
of  both citizens and non-citizens. Current reforms to the 
welfare benefits system in the UK reveal parallels with 
the principle of  ‘less eligibility’ of  the Poor Law system: 
the total amount of  benefits that a household can claim 
being capped on the basis that the conditions of  benefits 
claimants should not be more attractive than those of  
the ‘hard-working’ poor. But they also reveal parallels 
with immigration policy: the limiting of  access to welfare 
for asylum seekers and other categories of  European 
Economic Area (EEA and non-EEA) migrants likewise 
entails normative ideas about the ‘undeserving poor’ 
and ‘welfare dependency’. That is not to say that the 
principles underpinning conditions of  access to welfare 
are without contradictions across categories of  citizens 
and non-citizens. Lone parents are increasingly required 
to engage in paid work, including measures to move them 
from unconditional social assistance (income support) to 
conditional work-related benefits – underpinned by an 
‘adult-worker’ model of  welfare. By contrast, (non-EEA) 
migrant women are granted rights of  residence in the UK 
via family reunion as the dependants of  men, as wives, 
which in turn is the basis of  their exclusion from social 
rights to welfare and their dependence on the male wage 
– re-instating a ‘male breadwinner’ model of  welfare 
(Lewis, 1992) in the context of  immigration policy. 
 The conditionality of  social citizenship thus requires 
a broadening of  the focus of  debates on migration 
and welfare that considers the principles of  inclusion/
exclusion for different groups, citizens and non-citizens. 
An historical analysis of  the treatment of  paupers and 
criminals, for example, reveals both the ways in which 
citizens have been excluded from certain legal rights (for 
example, voting rights), but also the ways in which certain 
groups are normatively constructed as ‘failed citizens’ 
or non-citizens in addition to migrants (Anderson, 
2013). In the current context, in which the principles 
associated with state-guaranteed social rights in the 
provision of  welfare have increasingly been replaced by 
principles of  individual responsibility, consumer choice 
and market competition, it is important to examine the 
conditionality of  social citizenship for citizens and non-
citizens alike. This potentially facilitates the basis for 
making connections between the political activism of  
different social groups with regard to the curtailment or 
Debates about migration, welfare and citizenship are 
often framed by questions regarding the exclusion of  
migrants from the provisions of  welfare states. One 
dimension of  those debates concerns the ways in which 
migrants are excluded from rights to welfare on the basis 
of  the terms and conditions of  their legal status as non-
citizens. Another dimension concerns the extent to which 
public support (of  citizens) for rights to welfare may 
be dependent on the exclusion of  migrants. While the 
former addresses the basis for supporting an expansion 
of  universalism, to extend social rights to non-citizens, 
the latter addresses the basis for restricted universalism, 
to limit social rights on the grounds that universalism is 
premised on its exclusivity to citizens within a nation state.
 Citizenship is thus both a question of  legal status, 
with respect to the rights and obligations that formal 
citizenship confers, and a question of  normative status, 
of  ideas about who is deserving and undeserving in 
the provision of  welfare. However, debates regarding 
immigration and welfare have, arguably, been limited 
by the extent to which they revolve around a binary 
distinction between citizens and non-citizens. This 
distinction is partly due to methodological limitations: in 
the absence of  data on immigration status, nationality/
foreign nationality is the basis for distinguishing citizens 
and non-citizens. However, citizens and non-citizens 
are not unitary groups, legally or normatively. They are 
divided by class, gender, race/ethnicity, sharing common 
lines of  division which intersect with divisions based 
on nationality and immigration status. Those divisions 
underpinned the development of  welfare states over 
the course of  the 20th century. As feminist analyses 
emphasise, social citizenship, with respect to the classic 
welfare state of  the post-war era, was based on the 
gendered division of  paid and unpaid work: citizens 
(men) were granted rights to social security as paid 
workers, women were granted rights (that is, to family 
allowances) as mothers and wives (Lewis, 1992; Williams, 
1989). As feminist, along with anti-racist, disabled, lesbian 
and gay critiques have conveyed, social citizenship was 
based on a ‘false universalism’ that was both shaped by 
and implicated in the construction of  social divisions and 
inequalities (Lewis, 2003). 
 With the restructuring of  welfare states, universal 
rights to welfare have increasingly been replaced with 
conditional entitlements (Dwyer, 2004). Benefits 
claimants are not the bearers of  rights to welfare, or 
indeed the active ‘choosers’ of  welfare (as they may be 
conceived of  in other areas of  re-structured provision, 
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denial of  social rights: the activism of  disabled people 
with regard to current welfare reforms, the activism of  
low-paid workers with regard to a Living Wage, and the 
activism of  migrant rights campaigners with regard to 
increasing restrictions on access to permanent residency/
citizenship. Those connections might provide the basis 
for replacing the ‘false universalism’ of  social citizenship 
with a common basis for collective forms of  claims-
making around social inequalities. 
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Domestic Workers and au Pairs 
Rosie Cox
Domestic workers are now the iconic female migrants – 
paradigmatic symbols of  the feminisation of  migration 
and the globalisation of  care. The International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) estimates that there are at least 53 
million domestic workers worldwide, and the number 
could be as high as 100 million, 83 per cent of  whom 
are women. As the ILO (2011) puts it, even at the 
lowest estimate, ‘if  all domestic workers worked in one 
country, this country would be the tenth largest employer 
worldwide’. Domestic workers are also amongst the 
lowest paid of  all groups, often earning below minimum 
wage and largely working in the informal sector. They 
carry out a wide range of  household tasks including 
cleaning, cooking, laundry, childcare and elder care. 
 While not all domestic workers are migrants, 
international migration to carry out domestic work has 
grown rapidly in recent decades. This flow of  workers 
has been encouraged by labour export policies from 
countries such as the Philippines and Sri Lanka and the 
immigration regimes of  receiving countries that include 
specific visas for domestic workers, or other arrangements 
such as the au pair scheme, which allow entry to those 
who carry out paid domestic labour but restrict their 
rights as both migrants and workers. Such regulations 
frequently include the stipulation that domestic workers 
live in their employer’s home. This gives employers 
substantial control over their employees’ lives and makes 
domestic workers particularly vulnerable to exploitation 
and abuse.
 Migrants are favoured to carry out domestic work, 
not only because immigration regimes may make them 
pliant workers, but also because ethnic ‘others’ are often 
considered appropriate to deal with dirt. Closeness to or 
distance from dirt is a marker of  status, and migrants 
and members of  minority ethnic groups are regularly 
portrayed as inherently dirtier than more privileged 
groups and therefore better suited to so-called dirty 
work. Employers may also treat domestic workers as if  
they are innately dirty. It is not uncommon for domestic 
workers who live with their employers to be forced to 
use different cutlery and crockery from the rest of  the 
family, and not to be allowed to wash their clothes in the 
same washing machine or to bathe in the same bathroom. 
The stigma of  working with dirt traps them in a vicious 
cycle that defines domestic work as low status because 
it is done by migrant women and migrant women as 
low status because they deal with dirt. At the same time 
employers of  domestic workers are able to enhance their 
status by displaying to the world their spotless homes, 
beautifully prepared meals and stress-free lives – all made 
possible by the labour of  others.
 Au pairs carry out the same kinds of  tasks as domestic 
workers, yet rather than being seen as dirty, they are 
generally imagined as young, healthy, enthusiastic, white, 
middle-class girls having fun in a foreign country before 
settling down to ‘real life’. Au pairing is constructed as a 
form of  cultural exchange and au pairs are by definition 
migrants, young and lacking language skills. Despite this 
image, au pairs often live and work in conditions that 
differ little from those of  other domestic workers. The 
precise regulations surrounding au pairing differ from 
country to country, but nowhere are au pairs recognised 
as workers. Instead, they are ‘part of  the family’; the 
labour they carry out around the home is ‘help’, their 
pitiful pay is ‘pocket money’ and their employer is a 
‘host’. While some au pairs and hosts do use the scheme 
as originally intended, there are many others who do not, 
and au pairs are often favoured as the cheapest form of  
flexible childcare available. 
 One particularly interesting example of  how the au 
pair ‘cultural exchange’ formulation has played out is in 
the Nordic countries. In Denmark, Norway and Sweden 
there has been a rapid growth in au pairing in recent years 
supported, at least in part, by state subsidies to families 
to cover childcare costs – part of  wider ‘woman friendly’ 
welfare policies (see Isaksen, 2010). The majority of  au 
pairs in these countries come from the Philippines and 
take on the role in order to send remittances home, just 
as other domestic workers do. Yet Nordic countries have 
rejected the idea of  a domestic worker visa and allowing 
migration for domestic work because such a practice 
would be out of  sync with their egalitarian principles. 
Au pairing, as a form of  ‘cultural exchange’ rather than 
work, is acceptable and even portrayed as in keeping with 
‘feminist’ principles as it supports (some) women’s access 
to work outside the home.
 The study of  paid domestic labour has grown in tandem 
with the growth of  paid domestic work itself. Researching 
paid domestic work is appealing because it encompasses 
the major structural inequalities of  contemporary life. It 
reveals the home to be a site of  waged labour, thereby 
disrupting the public/private divide; it shows social 
reproduction to be a form of  waged work and one that 
is affected by globalisation just as much as any form, 
including manufacturing. It also exposes the subtle 
intertwining of  gender, race/ethnic and class inequalities 
within a single employment situation, and all within the 
confined space of  a family home.
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Subcontracting 
Andrew Geddes
Few aspects of  modern life remain untouched by 
the presence of  a subcontract. This is not only a key 
employment relationship for many migrant workers 
but, more broadly, an indication of  the way we live now. 
Think of  the food that is produced and packaged before 
ending up on supermarket shelves, the hotel chamber 
maid, the now ubiquitous coffee shop, the construction 
site, call centres, the hospitality business or IT services. 
In all, we encounter people employed by agencies that are 
subcontracted to provide workers. These workers may be 
migrants and, very often, they are temporarily employed.
 Any grand economic scheme or ambition for reasons 
of  both speed and efficiency is likely to depend on 
some kind of  subcontract. Indirect employment via a 
subcontract can also support direct employment. Take 
the case of  the quest for the high skilled migrant, such 
as those in working in financial services in the City of  
London. These people are unlikely to be subcontracted 
workers, but who cleans their offices? Banks may well 
directly employ their traders, but it’s likely that their offices 
will be cleaned by indirectly employed, subcontracted 
workers who are often migrants. 
 The issue here is not that migration somehow 
causes this subcontracting. Rather, the recruitment of  
subcontracted migrant workers fits with the intensified 
use of  such contracts in liberalised, deregulated labour 
markets. This is a general trend, but, as is so often the 
case when we look more closely at some facet of  modern 
life, within a general trend we can also see some specific 
effects of  migration and on migrants. It is this specificity 
that is often lost in discussions of  ‘immigration’. While 
migrants are often seen and understood as moving into 
countries, the reality, of  course, is that migrants move to 
specific places and into specific types of  employment. To 
understand and ‘see’ migration we need to understand 
this specificity. The subcontract helps us to do this.
 The point is to know where to look. We are accustomed 
to thinking that the place where international migration 
becomes visible as a social and political issue is the 
border – the land, air or sea port. This is, of  course, the 
point at which the would-be migrant can make a claim 
for admission for some purpose and for some period 
of  time. However, the subcontract and, more generally, 
the ways in which labour markets are organised, show us 
that there are other places where international migration 
becomes visible as a social and political issue. 
 International migration and migrants are present in 
the most mundane aspects of  our daily lives. Think of  
the regular visit to the supermarket and the welcome 
convenience of  washed and packaged vegetables. Think 
then about the production networks and subcontracting 
chains that involve the picking, packaging and delivery of  
these products as they make their way from field or farm 
to supermarket shelf. At each stage may well be migrant 
workers. 
 The convenience that we experience when we shop is 
not a result of  migration, but of  long-standing tendencies 
towards use of  causal and temporary labour with workers 
often mobilised by temporary labour providers, or 
gangmasters as they are sometimes known. In the 19th 
century, women and children worked in gangs to pick 
crops. Later, students often undertook such work. 
 The little bag of  washed salad suddenly attains a 
broader significance. It can signify the presence of  
migration and migrant workers in our experience of  
shopping, and, beyond this quotidian reality, we can also 
see and understand the ways in which migration and 
migrants support and sustain aspects of  modern life. For 
the migrant worker in agriculture or food processing, the 
labour they perform is distant both metaphorically and 
literally from the ‘end user’ consuming the product and 
the ‘real employer’, often one of  the major supermarket 
chains.
 The supermarket is also a key feature of  modern 
life with effects that extend far beyond migration and 
migrants. Supermarkets both satisfy and create demands 
that exert significant pressure ‘down’ production networks 
to keep prices as low as possible. This then feeds into 
the recruitment practices of  employers who are seeking 
to shift produce from fields and farms to shelves at the 
lowest cost. Subcontracted workers employed through 
agencies allow employers to differentiate pay, working 
hours and conditions. 
 How does this work? A temporary labour provider 
may be a multinational company; but may also be a lone 
gangmaster with a mobile phone and white van picking 
workers up in the early morning at a street corner. A 
gangmaster may also provide accommodation and deduct 
money from pay for this service. It is, of  course, perfectly 
legal to provide temporary labour, particularly for types 
of  employment that have long relied upon such workers. 
However, they often work in sectors that are difficult to 
regulate, and migrant workers may thus be more vulnerable 
to exploitation. This was brought into stark focus in 
February 2004 when at least 21 people from China lost 
their lives while picking cockles on the treacherous waters 
of  Morecambe Bay. They were subcontracted and their 
death did lead to efforts to better regulate gangmasters.
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 The subcontract helps us to see and understand how 
the way we live and the choices that we make all possess 
a broader significance. Even in the mundane act of  
shopping we can encounter the presence of  migration 
and migrants. We know that salad is good for us and 
that we should eat it. But the little bag of  washed salad 
also tells us something about the organisation of  labour 
markets and about the ethical and normative issues that 
flow from the choices that we make or that are made on 
our behalf.
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 International conventions call for employers to pay 
all of  the recruitment costs of  the migrant workers they 
hire. However, unless there are complaints, it is often 
hard to detect the payment of  (excessive) worker-paid 
fees.
 Wage gaps of  eight to one or more motivate labor 
migration. Most workers will not give this entire wage gap 
to recruiters, but they will pay more than the typical one 
month’s foreign wages that some governments specify as 
the maximum recruitment charge. If  workers have a two-
year contract, one month is equivalent to 4.2 per cent 
of  foreign earnings; on a three-year contract, one month 
is 2.8 per cent. Reducing recruitment costs would yield 
significant benefits. A low-skilled worker who pays $2,000 
in recruitment costs for a contract promising $7,200 over 
three years in another country may remit $5,000 of  these 
earnings. Cutting remittance costs from 10 per cent to 
5 per cent saves $250, but cutting rercruitment costs in 
half  saves the migrant $1,000. Furthermore, lowering 
recruitment costs can reduce debt peonage, trafficking, 
and the other violations of  human rights that are 
sometimes associated with international labor migration.
 Three concrete suggestions for reducing recruitment 
costs are standardizing contracts, offering incentives for 
good recruiter behavior, and encouraging the engagement 
of  established multinational companies as recruiters. 
Standardization has contributed to the decrease in 
remittance costs, which can be separated into sending 
fees, pickup fees and exchange-rate costs. Businesses can 
standardize each element of  the remittance transaction 
and use technology to achieve economies of  scale that 
lower remittance costs. 
 Standardizing job descriptions and contracts could 
help to reduce the cost of  recruitment. Agreements 
on the skills required to be a domestic worker, laborer, 
technician, or driver could increase both worker and 
employer satisfaction by getting the right workers in 
the right jobs. Governments could develop worker-held 
skill ‘passports’ that record skills acquired at home and 
abroad, thereby facilitating re-employment at home or a 
return abroad.
 Most countries regulate recruiters by penalizing those 
who violate regulations. However, enforcement normally 
depends on complaints, which may not be forthcoming 
if  workers get the foreign jobs they seek, albeit at 
high costs. Instead of  only sticks, offering carrots that 
encourage recruiters to adhere to regulations may be 
more effective to protect migrant workers, especially if  
A-rated recruiters receive faster service from government 
Recruitment matches workers with jobs, a process 
that is often complicated by asymmetric information: 
employers know more about the jobs they are offering 
than job seekers, who know more about their abilities 
than employers. Economists have developed a variety of  
models for explaining how employers screen applicants 
to find the workers best suited to fill the jobs they offer, 
and how workers signal their abilities to employers by 
degrees, certificates and references.
 International borders complicate job matching, as 
differences in language, culture, and job descriptions can 
make it harder to match workers and jobs. When workers 
are in one country and jobs in another, job matching is 
often facilitated by intermediaries, including for-profit 
recruiters. These ‘merchants of  labor’ can play many 
roles. Some receive job orders from employers and travel 
to recruit and screen workers, facilitate their move across 
borders, and interact with them while they are abroad. 
More often, recruiters in one country pass job offers on 
to recruiters in another country, relying on intermediaries 
they may never have met to recruit and screen workers. 
For-profit recruiters operate in all migration systems, 
but they are especially prominent in Asia, where they 
move several million low-skilled workers from South and 
Southeast Asia into Gulf  Cooperation Council countries 
each year. 
 Recruiters are paid for their services. Employers 
generally pay some or all costs of  recruitment of  
highly skilled workers, including managers, health care 
professionals, and engineers, because there are relatively 
few such workers and the consequences of  a poor match 
can be costly for the business. However, there are often 
more low-skilled workers than jobs in occupations such 
as domestic service and construction laborer, making 
some workers willing to pay high fees in order to move 
to the front of  the queue. 
 Low recruitment costs and good worker-job matches 
result in satisfied workers and employers, and labor 
migration outcomes that satisfy governments in both 
migrant sending and receiving countries. However, high 
costs can prompt workers to violate their permits by 
taking second jobs and overstaying. Poor worker-job 
matches can also lead to employers dismissing unqualified 
workers who are reluctant to return because they have no 
way to repay their recruitment debts. Workers who arrive 
abroad in debt are especially vulnerable to mistreatment, 
since all parties know that these workers are counting on 
higher wages abroad to repay their debts and return to 
their home countries with savings.
How to Reduce Migrant Worker Recruitment Costs 
Philip Martin
Beyond ContraCt
agencies or pay lower fees, helping them to attract 
business at the expense of  lower-rated recruiters. A-rated 
recruiters could also be favored to receive job offers from 
particular foreign countries and employers.
 Many recruiters today are relatively small, moving 
dozens or hundreds of  workers annually, without the 
knowledge or capital to make the business transaction of  
matching workers with jobs over borders cheaper. The 
third suggestion is to encourage multinationals such as 
Adecco and Manpower to move low-skilled workers over 
borders. Multinationals could speed the development 
of  standard job descriptions and contracts and achieve 
profits via economies of  scale rather than overcharging 
workers. An alternative to multinationals would be 
for unions or international organizations to become 
recruiters, using their nonprofit status to compete with 
for-profit recruiters while protecting migrant workers.
 Moving workers over borders to fill jobs is a complex 
process of  great interest both to receiving governments 
that regulate who can enter the country and what they 
can do once inside, and to sending governments that 
aim to protect their citizens abroad. Recognizing that 
recruitment is a business where costs can be lowered 
and protections for workers improved would move 
policy forward on the often overlooked R-term that links 
migration and development.
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Migrant Urbanism in China’s Chengzhongcun 
Michael Keith
Hui settled in Dafen Cun in Shenzhen after studying 
art in Guangzhou and travelling to Hong Kong and the 
USA before returning home. He described how he once 
worked on the production line of  an oil painting factory 
in Dafen, copying old masters and modern classics before 
setting up a studio and small gallery space from where he 
now markets his own work. In Dafen today you can buy 
a crate of  Van Goghs or Picassos; the oil painting city is a 
global hub of  ‘original copies’ that decorate the walls of  
hotels and convention centres across the world. Dafen 
is one of  China’s chengzhongcun (villages in the city) that 
have attracted much recent academic and architectural 
attention. They warehouse migrants, sometimes in 
notorious ‘handshake apartments’ (woshou feng), so close 
together you can lean out of  your window to shake 
your neighbour’s hand. In the words of  one member of  
Shenzhen planning office, they function as city sponges, 
saturated with migrant labour in boom times and 
squeezing people out of  the city when not needed. 
 Their prosperity and flexibility depend on and reflect 
the rural property rights they sustain. Unlike urban land, 
where full ownership is reserved by the state with limited 
use leases sold on the market, villages in the city held 
on to their facility to own, develop and trade property. 
When Shenzhen became one of  the first Special 
Enterprise Zones in Deng’s 1978 reforms, 250-300 ‘clans’ 
or villages developed into semi autonomous economic 
units, commonly organised as joint stock companies, 
with families holding formal shares. In Shenzhen, one of  
China’s fastest growing cities, it is in these villages where 
most migrants live.
 And so one day in 2008 in another chengzhongcun –
Guanlan – in the northern district of  Shenzhen, we 
drove to the edge of  the village (cun). In the space of  
a few hundred metres the landscape moves seamlessly 
from dense residential blocks to a field of  barely visible 
crops and back to brick. We talk about where the cun 
ends. Sherlock Holmes laughs. Sherlock (his ‘English’ 
nickname for himself) works for the cun’s management 
committee.  His father had been elected to the committee 
that month, turning over an old regime in the nascent 
democratic arrangement of  village affairs.  He tells a story 
about the cun’s boundaries that is hard to provenance but 
revealing.  
 At the time of  Deng’s ‘reform and opening up’, the 
villages in the city in Shenzhen and other parts of  the south 
were encouraged to develop their own economic growth 
strategies. Government inspectors had been sent to turn 
reform principle into economic practice, confirming 
the cartography of  local landholdings. The inspection 
based cadastre was to regularise those privileged in the 
first wave of  Special Economic Zones. Guanlan itself  lay 
outside the old boundary (guan nei) that separates inside 
the zone (guan li) from the outside (guan wai) and is still 
marked by old, barely used forms of  passport and identity 
control. It sits half  way to Dongguan, a city famous for 
the autonomy of  its local government, prompting several 
interventions from Beijing to rein in local government 
affairs in the 1990s and 2000s. However, proximity 
to the growth area meant the village had potential to 
attract investment in manufacturing and the facility to 
accommodate workshops and factories, a large migrant 
population, and sweated labour.
 The border of  the village defined the territory for 
Guanlan’s potential development, the limits to the 
property rights of  the village ‘clan’. Before the days of  
GIS and satellite technologies, in the wake of  moves 
to experiment with the growth of  Shenzhen, the 
cadastration process was mapped out by inspectors who 
stayed as guests of  the village’s committee. Because the 
boundaries of  villages owed more to tenure than secure 
landholdings, each cun was to be defined by the limits of  
its cultivable area. So according to Sherlock the elders 
would take the inspector out to formulate the map of  the 
cultivation based on a particular lychee tree. After a long 
lunch and hospitable dinner the inspectors went to sleep, 
at which point local families went and dug up the lychee 
trees in one set of  plots and created a new landscape of  
lychee trees in a different sector. They moved from north 
to west to south and east, ensuring on each occasion that 
the cun made a land grab based on the fictitious cultivation 
of  the lychee. And that is why – Sherlock boasted – the 
boundaries of  the cun are so extensive in comparison 
with most other villages in the region.  
 The story may be apocryphal but it invokes the 
balance between local solidarities and suspicion of  central 
authority, and valorises the wit of  the local to fool the 
state bureaucrat. It captures the sense in which Guanlan 
sees itself  as a site of  propensity, the possibility of  
generating affluence resting on the authority to develop, 
transact and leverage the potential of  the land. 
 The chengzhongcun has become an iconic urban form of  
contemporary China, bringing together property rights, 
urban fabric and migrant demography. The particular 
assemblage of  housing supply and cultural flux allows 
the city to accommodate simultaneously extraordinary 
flows of  migration and the dynamics of  urban change, 
and to allocate the externalities of  demographic change 
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through a particular configuration of  the metropolis. The 
villages accommodated massive flows of  people into 
the city, but migrant status is conditional and qualified. 
The costs of  sustaining the migrant driven change (the 
welfare externalities) are largely displaced to rural districts 
where children left behind and sometimes wives or (less 
often) husbands sustain family ties and reproduction at a 
distance in home towns (huijia).  
 In Dafen the original villagers were so successful 
that they moved out of  town altogether, creating Da 
Fen Xin Cun four kilometres away, a gated community 
with swimming pools, gym, tennis courts and penthouse 
apartments. Functionally, the chengzhongcun generate 
an institutional form mediating between the planning 
needs of  Shenzhen and the instrumental drivers of  the 
economy: the joint stock companies that characterise 
most villages in the city. As Helen Siu puts it in a study 
of  the ‘uncivil urban spaces’ of  post reform China, 
‘their main livelihood, as a villager puts it, has shifted 
from cultivating crops (gengtian) to cultivating real estate 
(gengwu)’ (2007).
 On the surface, chengzhongcun have become 
exemplifications of  a flexible city celebrated in the 
vernacular characterisation of  ‘Shenzhen speed’. But 
the map of  property rights can make this surface legible 
through another calculus – one that sees implicit trade offs 
between the rational city and instrumental self  interest, 
the logic of  the individual joint stock company, the rights 
of  the migrant and the needs of  the metropolis; these are 
the formalities of  governance and the informalities of  
migrant urbanism, China style.
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Agriculture and Food Processing 
Ben Rogaly
I work in your orchards of  peaches and prunes
Sleep on the ground ‘neath the light of  the moon
On the edge of  your city you see us and then
We come with the dust and we go with the wind
Green pastures of  plenty from dry desert ground
From the Grand Coulee Dam where the waters come down
Every state in this Union us migrants has been
We will work in your fight and we’ll fight till we win! 
Bound for Glory - Woody Guthrie
It was early in the Second World War on the US west 
coast. Woody Guthrie had hitched a ride with a bunch 
of  travelling workers. When their tyre burst next to some 
orchards of  ripe apricots they thought they would try to 
earn some money to fund their vehicle repairs so they 
could become mobile again. Guthrie mixes his own story 
as a peripatetic musician falling for a young woman in 
the group with a sympathetic account of  the workers 
as they confront the deeply entwined layers of  agrarian 
capitalism. 
 There can be no generalizing about migrant workers 
in industrialised agriculture across space and time. In 
Guthrie’s example, for example, national solidarity in 
the wartime US appears to encompass all social classes 
and both mobile and settled people. Yet the political 
economy in the story contains elements that are 
recognizable outside the specific context of  its telling. A 
woman Guthrie refers to as ‘Swedish lady’ because of  her 
complexion drives over to the workers soon after their 
arrival and explains the distinctions between the different 
qualities of  apricots in terms of  price and pickers’ pay:
Three grades of  apricots, you know… Now, the 
plain ones ripen last in the warm weather; anybody 
can pick the plain ones. Pay so much a box. Selects 
ripen earlier. Better taste, better shape, less of  
them. You get a little more money for picking 
them, about twice as much a box as the plain 
ones… Moneyed folks want the very best they can 
get, and the best is the Extra Selects.  
The connection between pay rates and the market 
conditions remains explicit as the story unfolds. The 
timing of  the apricot harvest depended not only on the 
ripeness of  the fruit, itself  affected by weather, but also 
on orders from the cannery, which in this case owns the 
orchards. 
 The workers in Guthrie’s story are enticed into a 
form of  indebtedness to the cannery. The broken down 
vehicle means there are no other employers within easy 
reach. So they take on the debt, not through naivety, but 
necessity. For now, they are resigned to the inequality 
of  the relationship. The company man ensures he has 
identified the owner of  the broken down vehicle and 
that he has signed his agreement to the debt the workers 
take on in the company store – the first time a worker 
inspected the store they found that goods were subject to 
a hefty mark up but there was nothing they could do. The 
‘field boss’ then uses the cannery’s statement rather than 
his own words to announce the delay in the harvest:
Quiet everybody… Won’t bother to read all of  this 
order. ‘DEAR SIRS: DUE TO COLD WEATHER 
OF THE PAST THIRTY DAYS, THE APRICOT 
CROP WILL NOT BE RIPE ENOUGH TO BE 
SUITABLE FOR CANNING. THERE WILL BE 
A TEN DAY WAITING PERIOD TO ALLOW 
THE FRUIT TO MATURE. PICKERS MAY 
STAND BY AND AWAIT ORDERS, AS THE 
WEATHER MAY TAKE A WARM CHANGE 
AND RIPEN THE FRUIT SOONER. USUAL 
CREDIT SLIPS MAY BE OBTAINED BY 
MAKING THE PROPER ARRANGEMENTS 
AT THE COMPANY STORE’… Hhhhmmm. 
Yes. Anybody want to ask any questions? 
The cannery/fruit grower thus accumulates wealth not 
only through production, processing and sale of  food, 
but also through making the harvest workforce indebted. 
The distribution of  land and machinery has a major role 
in enabling him to do this. Importantly,  it is backed by the 
state which, as legal enforcer, lies behind the effectiveness 
of  the credit agreement that workers sign. This does not 
mean that the state inevitably acts against the interests 
of  workers. The state can have and, at times, has had a 
protective role. However, the state may also be called in 
to crush workers’ attempts at industrial action. One of  
the women workers remarks:
I’m one that’s shore glad we quit that striking 
[when war broke out]… cause just ain’t right for 
one buncha people to up an’ quit work, an’ another 
bunch to drive down an’ shoot you full of  that 
old tear gas, crops of  all kinds-a-goin’ to waste all 
around.
Guthrie also describes coming across a younger woman 
planting stones from four apricots she had picked and 
eaten in the early morning:
I stole four of  these big pretty apricots. I had them 
for breakfast. And now I’m planting them back 
here by the side of  this old store. Grow up some 
day. Then I can rest easy knowing I paid him back.
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Bound for Glory is autobiographical, yet the very nature of  
the worlds of  agricultural workers described – spaces far 
from conurbations, fleeting associations with particular 
employers and places of  work – makes it impossible 
to establish how much of  the story is invented. It 
does, nevertheless, serve as an exemplar of  migrant 
employment in the industrialised food production sector, 
the understanding of  which, in spite of  its diversity, 
involves asking a common set of  political, economic and 
cultural questions. What is the structure of  ownership 
and control across food growers, packers, processors, 
creditors and retailers? To what extent, how predictably, 
and at what times of  year are large numbers of  workers 
required? What role do states and international actors 
have in reinforcing or challenging inequality and injustice 
in fields and food factories? How much and in what ways 
can workers act to improve their working conditions and 
wages? And, following Robert Thomas’ (1985) exposure 
of  the use of  the urban ideal of  the ‘farmer’ to obscure 
the workings of  industrialised agriculture, and Geoff  
Mann’s (2007) detailed deconstruction of  the ‘wage’, to 
what extent is this a struggle over meanings as well as 
over money, time, bodies and food? 
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In my country,
I felt the gentle grass
touching my feet
lying under the cherry tree
with flowers white and sweet.
I watched the red plate 
of  the sun going down.
And, as the shadows grow, 
so grew the quiet.
In my other country
I have grown used to the rumbling
sounds of  cars.
At night from my window
I watch the stars.
My clock ticks, tick-tock
pushing forward time.
I think of  the red plate 
of  the sun going down.
At Sundown
Vivien Urban, age 14
COMPAS Schools Poetry Competition 2013 
Third Place
keeping time
Keeping Time
Watching the sweeping second hand of  the clock, a 
certain kind of  time appears. Smooth, continuous, 
seemingly inevitable. The clock’s face promises much, 
yet it reveals little of  the work involved in producing 
time. Look more closely and one is forced to confront 
time’s precarious materiality. In a classic analogue clock, 
a quartz crystal, shaped into a small tuning fork, creates 
countable oscillations used to distinguish ‘before’ from 
‘after’. Chosen because of  their low response to changes 
in temperature, quartz crystals are laser-cut and set 
to vibrate at a frequency of  32,768Hz – such seeming 
precision, but even so, this material configuration 
represents a compromise between accuracy and cost. 
Half  a second is lost or stolen from every day. Yet even 
this is still not precise, it is only an average. Each day 
brings its own variability – the material chosen because 
of  its lack of  ability to respond still responds, after all.
 The constant battle to transcend the facility for 
response, a facility inherent within all materials, leads 
to ever more intricate methods of  fine tuning and 
calibrating. Behind the illusion of  the sweeping second 
hand, our clocks cannot actually operate like clockwork; 
they cannot live up to the metaphor they have inspired. 
Unable to escape contingencies, they make time through 
particular mediators – ytterbium, caesium, quartz, Earth, 
Sun – each only providing partial infrastructures for 
managing the varied relations that make up life. The desire 
to produce a transcendent method of  global coordination 
continues to be balanced against the contingent qualities 
and capacities of  the materials pressed into service.
 In our time of  migrations, flows and un/settlements, 
we supposedly know better than to dream of  a single 
common language, of  a universal medium of  translation. 
Yet this is belied by the short set of  numbers that grace 
the multiple screens we touch and watch throughout the 
day. Here the dream is alive and well. Twice a year this 
dream is disturbed as we make our concessions to the 
variations of  solar time. Yet even this small reminder of  
the way we humans make time collectively weakens as 
our clocks shift from our wrists to digital networks that 
synchronise our displays. We no longer experience the 
uncanniness of  being responsible for making the clock 
fall back or spring forward. Even fewer of  us are called 
upon to add the irregular leap second that is needed to 
keep International Atomic Time in synch with Universal 
Time. The variable Earth, which gives us the time we 
hubristically call ‘Universal’, is not obedient to the same 
laws that caesium atoms are subject to. So a second is 
Time 
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added here and there. Unnoticeable, it would seem, except 
for those responsible for IT systems, for whom a second 
out of  place can cause cascades of  server meltdowns. 
Like the elusive ‘mono’ of  monocultural agriculture, our 
attempts to enforce the purity of  the one become coeval 
with the creation of  ever more vigorous interlopers, even 
while most others are pared away.
 Looking more closely at clocks, we find that time is not 
an inert background. Far from encountering a pre-existing 
entity, we encounter emergent methods for moving with 
and through the different processes, speeds, delays, 
mobilities, repetitions, rhythms and transformations 
that inhere within beings, objects, networks. What is at 
the heart of  time, then, is not gears and oscillators, but 
something less tangible: the ability to respond. Time is 
something we make, as our response to finding ourselves 
always and already entwined in relations that do not all 
operate in the same way. Yet the method most often 
recognised as ‘time’, the clock, has spawned the search 
for materials that respond less and less to variations in 
context and circumstance. From these we build devices 
into which we externalise the work of  making time, with 
the risk that we become less and less able to notice the 
myriad of  sequences and successions and to understand 
how these relate to each other (see Birth, 2012). Our 
need to respond has become entangled with the pursuit 
of  freedom from response.
 Even so, as I read about the delays, the ‘fast tracks’, the 
arbitrary cut off  dates, the stagnant times of  detention 
(see Griffiths et al., 2013), I look up again at the clock and, 
for just a moment, the second hand wavers. A vibration 
runs through it, interfering with its steady sweep. Time 
washes through time. The hand waits, then resumes, but 
in that moment something is lost. Faith. Faith that the 
clock will do as it promises and free us from complicated 
forms of  response. Instead, we find ourselves in worlds 
where clocks aren’t helping us tell the time of  our lives 
and the lives of  those we encounter, in worlds where 
many are forced to experience paralysing delays overlaid 
with terrifying swiftness, in worlds where perhaps time 
itself  will be driven to respond, after all.
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Generations 
Mette Berg
The concept of  generation is central to understanding 
migration; think of  the idea of  ‘the first generation’, ‘the 
second generation’ and so on. In this sense generation 
refers to migrants and their children, and often assumes 
that particular challenges are associated with each passing 
generation: The first generation are said to put up with 
harsh conditions and low pay in the expectation that their 
children, the second generation, will have better lives 
than they themselves do, and that their grandchildren, the 
third generation, will in turn be fully assimilated into the 
country of  settlement. A voluminous body of  literature 
associating itself  with the assimilation paradigm, much of  
it based on US experiences, has tracked and documented 
the relative progress of  migrant generations, in particular 
the second generation, which is seen as a kind of  litmus 
test. 
 Notwithstanding the merits of  this body of  work, 
there are problems associated with it. As some scholars 
have noted, it has tended to assume that migrants will 
assimilate into a vaguely defined, white, middle-class 
mainstream, following the example of  the Jewish, 
Irish, and Italian migrants to the US in the early 20th 
century. Today however, many migrant groups are 
instead absorbed into an increasingly multi-ethnic, non-
white working or under class with few opportunities for 
upward mobility or even of  legalizing their residence. 
Furthermore, the assimilation paradigm assumes that 
migrants and their offspring over time will relinquish all 
ties to their ancestral homeland. Instead, globalisation is 
enabling more migrants to continue to stay in touch with 
their homelands through remittances, skype and e-mails, 
telephone calls and text messages, and visits, including 
extended holidays for children. Some migrants move back 
and forth between home and host society without ever 
settling definitively in one or the other, or move between 
several different countries. This means that the idea of  a 
neat, straight line toward full assimilation obscures more 
than it illuminates.
 Some scholars have accordingly extended work on 
the second generation to include an appreciation of  their 
continuing transnational identities and commitments, 
better suited to today’s migration dynamics and migrants’ 
border-crossing practices. Their work points to another 
problem with the conventional use of  generation in 
migration scholarship, namely that of  a missing or 
unacknowledged historical context. Could it be that 
the use of  generation in assimilationist scholarship has 
erroneously understood the experiences of  early 20th-
century European immigrants and their descendants 
as generalizable experiences, when they might be more 
helpfully understood as particular experiences embedded 
in the specific historical context of  early to mid-twentieth 
century America? 
 If  this is the case, there are other definitions and 
meanings attached to generation in sociological and 
anthropological literature that can profitably be applied 
in a migration context (Kertzer, 1983). As well as 
genealogical descent, generation can also refer to cohorts, 
meaning a group of  people who have experienced the 
same events at roughly the same point in their life course 
(most often during adolescence). An example would be 
the post-World War II cohort of  ‘the baby-boomers’ 
in the west. A cohort understanding of  generation can 
help us understand the ways in which pre-migration 
experiences may continue to influence migrants after 
they migrate. Thus, migrants who leave their homeland 
at a particular historical juncture and who arrive in a 
‘host’ society at a particular historical moment, may adapt 
differently compared to those who leave the homeland 
and arrive in the country of  settlement at a different 
point in time, even if  both are ‘first generation’ in the 
conventional sense. 
 To give an example, Cubans who left the island for the 
US in the early 1960s shortly after the Cuban Revolution, 
and who were given generous US federal support in 
integrating into the US, have tended to hold strong 
anti-Castro views, to vote for the Republican Party, and 
to oppose remittance sending and homeland visits. By 
contrast, Cubans who left the island in the 1990s after 
the economic crisis sparked by the demise of  the Soviet 
bloc, and who arrived in the US at a time when financial 
support programmes for Cuban migrants had been 
phased out, tend to hold more pragmatic views toward 
their homeland. They send more remittances than the 
earlier cohort, even though they are much poorer than 
them, and they visit Cuba to a degree unheard of  among 
the earlier cohort. Similar differences can be seen among 
Cubans in Spain, with those who arrived in the 1960s 
tending to identify more with their peers in the US than 
with more recently arrived Cubans in Spain. Both cohorts 
are genealogically defined first generation migrants, yet 
their stances toward Cuba mean that their interests are 
often in direct conflict with one another, challenging the 
idea of  migrants from the same country of  origin being 
a cohesive group (Eckstein and Berg, forthcoming). 
 This cohort understanding of  generation sees 
successive waves of  migrants as diasporic generations 
(Berg, 2011) and situates migrants in their historical 
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context, thereby enabling a better understanding of  
diversity within migrant groups, especially regarding inter-
ethnic relations, host society adaptation and homeland 
engagement. This does not mean that the genealogical 
understanding of  migrants is ‘wrong.’ In fact, it is a good 
example of  a term that has travelled from the academic 
sphere into everyday usage, and many people who are 
descendants of  migrants self-identify as the ‘second 
generation.’ Yet a historically grounded understanding 
of  generation which takes pre-migration experiences and 
the homeland context into account can provide a richer 
understanding of  migrants in historical context and help 
shed light on divisions and cleavages within migrant 
groups that the other approach leaves unexplained.
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Flow 
Sondra L. Hausner
In articulating his notion of  the global ‘imaginary’, Arjun 
Appadurai famously writes of  flows, of  scapes – medias, 
technologies, financial worlds – as well as people and 
ideologies. All these forms flow. Appadurai’s global scapes 
are powerful  –  too powerful, perhaps, in the way they 
mobilize many millions of  people in the world to aspire 
to urban life and to the golden west, where the streets are 
reputedly (but falsely) paved with money and the way to 
opportunity. Many a migrant’s tale has soured in the face 
of  reality in a new, much-sought after location that offers 
more hardship, not less, of  a new cultural variety, rather 
than a diamond-encrusted McDonald’s sign.  
 Appadurai’s point is that imaginaries are globally 
shared. True enough, but what about the everyday non-
imagined – the thoughts, the raw symbols of  the modern 
world that are not so much about aspiration and hope as 
about the way the world’s collective thought processes 
have increasingly converged upon a few choice ideals? 
Ideals are not imaginaries: they are real (if  dynamic) 
symbols of  the way things are, and ought to, work. (One 
remembers Clifford Geertz’s famous phrase defining 
worldview: ‘the picture [people] have of  the way things 
in sheer actuality are’.) Things? What things? Oh, things 
like: religion; the individual; morality; human rights; 
capitalism: these things are thought to exist, actually, and 
even eternally, although historians of  ideas can rightfully 
trace them (usually to modernity). We are so taken with 
what seems real about these seemingly fundamental, 
contemporary aspects of  human life that we forget that 
they were not always everywhere. That is what culture  – 
in this case, global culture – does: it makes us think the 
world actually is as we think it is – that there such a thing 
as an individual, or a religion. 
 How do these ideas get from one end of  the earth 
to the other, like a storm blown by the wind? They are 
not imaginaries; they are current global realities: they 
represent what it means to be human today, for most 
people, in most places. They did not always. Arguably, 
many of  them came from the west, and somehow got 
disseminated throughout the globe, as a tacit but perhaps 
definitive statement of  Euro-American dominance or 
contemporary power: we may no longer be colonialists, 
but our ideas won (and sometimes via the even sweeter 
victory of  having come back to us by way of  you), so 
there you go. Modernity means that these are now social 
forms – ethnicity, the market, peoplehood, personhood, 
free will, choice – that are globally understood, accepted, 
seen as natural and timeless and definitive. 
 These social forms have nothing to do with our 
genes, of  course, or our humanity, or maybe even the 
way we evolved, except by chance or by confluence. Yes, 
it is possible for human beings to act and to historically 
construct shared concepts – or to come to collectively 
embrace concepts that become shared over time and 
space – that have nothing to do with the evolution of  
the species, except in the temporal sense. These cultural 
formations are not natural, or real: they are our collective 
constructs, now global, having mysteriously dispersed 
themselves across the world, pan-geographically, as if  
they got on the planes themselves and got off  and sailed 
through customs: ‘Hello! I am your new global thought 
form!’ They migrated all over the planet with subconscious 
ease, unspoken, and yet they are the very terms of  global 
discourse. There is nothing definitive or final about them, 
and yet they make up the world as we know it, today, at 
this fleeting moment  – movement – in time. 
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‘Naturalisation’ refers to the acquisition by individuals of  
a state’s nationality (or citizenship) through a personal 
connection to the state established during that person’s 
life. It is to be distinguished from the acquisition of  
nationality through a connection to a state at the moment 
of  birth, typically by being born on its territory, or by 
having an existing national parent. Today, the most 
common basis for naturalisation is a period of  residence 
in the state, though other possibilities exist, such as 
military service and marriage to a state’s national. 
 The use of  the term ‘naturalisation’ reflects the historic 
view that those whose connection to a sovereign dated 
from birth were ‘natural-born’ subjects. Lacking such a 
connection by birth, other persons whose association 
with the sovereign or territory was recognised were being 
‘naturalised’. That usage is illustrated by the English Act 
of  Parliament of  1677 ‘for the Naturalizing of  Children 
of  his Majestyes English Subjects borne in Forreigne 
Countryes’ during the 1641-1666 period of  civil war and 
interregnum. Under that Act, if  both parents had been 
born in England, a child would ‘for ever be esteemed and 
taken to all Intents and Purposes to be and to have beene 
the Kings Naturall born Subject[ ]’.
 The naturalisation policies of  today’s European states 
may be characterised as moderately liberal. Naturalisation 
is likely to be available in principle to those who meet the 
requirement of  several years’ legal residence, with a large 
majority of  states setting minimum periods of  residence 
of  between five and ten years (Wallace Goodman, 2010). 
There has also been increased acceptance of  multiple 
nationality arising out of  naturalisation over recent 
decades (Faist, 2007). For example, in Germany, which 
has historically discouraged dual nationality, a legislative 
reform in 1999 introduced exceptions, particularly for 
those for whom it is impossible or difficult to divest 
themselves of  another nationality. 
 The recent trend in Europe has nevertheless been for 
the introduction of  new requirements for naturalisation 
(Wallace Goodman, 2010). Most states now require 
applicants to show familiarity with the state’s language(s) 
or culture, and to satisfy requirements of  good character. 
In a majority of  European states, it is also necessary 
to show that the person is economically active or self-
sufficient. The contemporary trend in naturalisation 
policy is therefore for states to seek to be selective on 
cultural, social and economic grounds, rather than 
restricting access to naturalisation across the board. 
 The desire to select can lead to questionable ideas 
concerning naturalisation policy. A good example is the 
Naturalisation 
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proposal announced by the British government in The 
Path to Citizenship in 2008 to require a longer period of  
residence prior to the naturalisation of  those who could 
not demonstrate ‘active citizenship’ through charitable 
or similar activity. While legislation on this point was 
adopted (in the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration 
Act 2009), it has never been implemented, because of  the 
sheer impracticality – for both migrants and voluntary 
bodies – of  a scheme to prove the requisite ‘activity’. 
 The Path to Citizenship also proposed that those 
who were eligible for permanent residence in the UK 
ought to be encouraged to naturalise, as acquisition of  
British citizenship was ‘the completion of  a newcomer’s 
journey’, and likely to aid their social integration. To that 
end, a shorter qualifying period was contemplated for 
naturalisation than for permanent residence. But that 
proposal has not been acted upon either, presumably 
because of  its inherent unattractiveness to government. 
As states retain greater freedom of  action in relation to 
the residence and protection of  permanent residents 
than of  naturalised citizens, it is somewhat difficult to 
see why they would make it easier to become the latter 
than the former. 
 These two proposals within The Path to Citizenship 
were based on the assumption that migrants could be 
asked to take specific concrete steps (voluntary activity, 
naturalisation at the earliest juncture) to prove that they 
truly belonged in Britain. Long-term migrants will, 
however, have their own calculations to make and lives to 
live. The evidence from around Europe is that migrants 
from less developed countries are far more likely to 
naturalise than those from highly-developed counties (see 
Dronkers and Vink, 2012). The implication is that those 
who actually naturalise are likely to be motivated primarily 
by practical considerations, such as the acquisition of  
a privileged passport, security of  residence, and the 
transmission of  nationality to children. Their preferences 
concerning naturalisation will also typically be influenced 
by ties to – and identification with – their state of  origin, 
as well as in relation to their state of  residence.
 Looking to the future, we may ask how naturalisation 
policy should be arranged in a world in which the migrant 
experience involves everyday forms of  transnationalism. 
It would seem preferable that politicians dispense with 
the view that naturalisation can be an instrument for 
moulding society. Even the claim that ready access to 
naturalisation is necessary to promote social and economic 
integration may now be outdated. The perspective which 
appears most appropriate to contemporary conditions is 
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one which treats naturalisation as an optional means for 
an individual to protect their rights to reside in a state, 
and to claim its protection, and nothing more than that. 
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History, Memory and Immigration Controls 
Cynthia Wright
far more concerned to control exits rather than entries into 
territories, the better to ensure a source of  labour. And 
there is an important relationship between contemporary 
controls enacted at national borders and earlier forms of  
local mobility control aimed at the poor and ‘vagrants’. 
 Yet, modern immigration controls are of  a different 
character and scale. They were (and continue to be) 
foundational, for the consolidation of  the nation and 
notions of  sovereignty, and for making the boundaries 
of  the international system itself, even including who is 
imagined as capable of  individual freedom and civilized 
government. Immigration controls arose in the context 
of  Atlantic slavery’s aftermath and in direct relation to 
complex debates over the indenture of  South Asian 
and Chinese labourers and the meaning of  ‘free’ labour 
and ‘free’ migration. In the process, ‘free’ migrants were 
distinguished from Asian ‘coolies’/indentured labourers 
and the enslaved – those supposedly without the self-
governing capacity that entitled them to mobility rights. 
Thus, liberal notions of  freedom and of  mobility were 
centrally articulated against the figure of  the naturally 
unfree Asian. Moreover, the association of  the enslaved 
and the indentured with private control and with brokers 
who assisted their movements, further constituted them 
as ‘unfree’ as, increasingly, all actors but the nation were 
de-legitimized when it came to the facilitation (or not) of  
movement. 
 Linked to this was the principle that a self-governing 
nation ought to be able to exercise the absolute right to 
control who entered and what happened at the border 
– to draw the line at the so-called uncivilized, the non-
white, the economically dependent, and all those in the 
grip of  ‘traffickers’. 
 Historians broadly agree that, between the 1880s 
and the interwar period, most of  the key elements of  
the current immigration control regime were developed 
and extended on a global basis. The post-independence 
states that emerged soon after World War II largely failed 
to challenge this regime and often contributed to its 
consolidation. Today, this state of  affairs remains largely 
taken for granted, and migrants are ‘illegalised’ on a 
grand scale and often depicted as criminals or trafficking 
victims – or both. But any historical analysis must 
attend to how diverse modes of  resistance – clandestine 
migration, smuggling, anti-deportation campaigns, legal 
challenges, boycotts, use of  fraudulent papers, anti-
colonial resistance to mobility controls within the British 
Empire – also shaped the architecture of  controls. Within 
the British Empire, several dramatic challenges led by 
Can history and memory be mobilized as part of  the 
struggle against immigration controls? If  so, how? What 
does the historical literature have to say about passports, 
immigration bureaucracies, the international nation state 
system, and the global regulation of  migration? Who is 
the ‘migrant’? In Deportation is Freedom! The Orwellian World 
of  Immigration Controls, Steve Cohen calls for a Museum 
of  Illegal Immigration to remember those who fought 
immigration controls, and those detained and deported. 
It is an intriguing idea, especially when contrasted with 
existing museums of  immigration. Like the historical 
literature, museums may pre-suppose that migration 
is a problem, and work to (re)construct sedentary 
populations – and singular ethnicized identities. They 
are often nation-building projects, turning potentially 
threatening ‘migrants’ into ‘immigrants’. 
 Our historical retrievals, like our social movements, 
need to do more than remember. Important as that 
work is, we also need to grasp how controls came to be 
– and why it is that history is so often naturalized and 
forgotten. What if  we argue that the movements of  
people – in all their range and complexity – make up the 
foundation of  world history? Julia Clancy-Smith, in her 
re-conceptualization of  Europe and North Africa from 
the standpoint of  people and mobilities, writes against 
the grain of  a long tradition in historical production that 
has been shaped by a deep sedentarist bias, a focus on the 
nation state as a primary unit that largely assumes border 
controls rather than explaining how and why they came 
to be. The rich classics of  anti-colonial historiography 
– a potentially important resource for conversations on 
the origins of  immigration controls – have not always 
been able to adequately account for migrant figures that 
do not fit the binary of  colonizer/colonized. There is an 
important historical literature that exposes the racist, class-
biased and patriarchal character of  modern immigration 
regimes, and tracks the administrative strategies for 
keeping people out of  (or in) diverse settings. But it does 
not necessarily help us understand how exclusion came 
to be fundamental to modern practices of  sovereignty, 
law, identification – and to notions of  modern freedom.  
 Here is where recent historical research might 
contribute to re-thinking migrant justice projects – and 
indeed to troubling the category of  migrant itself. While 
the history of  immigration controls on a global scale is 
complex, they are, in fact, surprisingly recent, and not an 
inevitable outcome of  international arrangements among 
political communities. Certain kinds of  controls over 
mobility do have a long history, but rulers were initially 
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anti-colonial Asians in the early 20th century had as their 
outcome the entrenchment of  the principle that white 
settler nations such as South Africa and Canada had the 
sovereign right to admit or exclude – thereby ending 
the principle of  free movement without a colour bar 
within the Empire. Resistance to immigration controls 
frequently shifted how they were administratively 
deployed, often making them less overtly racist, so that 
challenging them frontally became far trickier because 
so much was left to the ‘discretion’ of  officials and 
bureaucracies. By examining the history of  immigration 
controls, together with the fascinating archive of  resistance 
to them, we have a renewed resource for challenging 
distinctions of  ‘legal’/’illegal’ and ‘citizen’/’alien’; for 
radically re-imagining our relationship to space, place and 
one another; and for challenging borders, nations and the 
institution of  citizenship.    
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Migration Goals 
Stephen Castles
People migrate for many reasons: to seek work, to 
escape persecution, for marriage, for education, to find 
better conditions for retirement and just in search of  
other lifestyles. In each case, the migrants have varying, 
complex and often mixed motivations. Here I will only 
discuss one issue: temporary migration for employment.
 In the late 1970s, the German Federal Government 
commissioned a survey of   ‘guestworkers’. Seventy per 
cent of  those interviewed had originally intended to stay 
in Germany for less than five years. Yet about three-
quarters of  the respondents had in fact already stayed 
over five years. Only 17 per cent had not changed their 
original plans. The survey went on to ask about future 
plans. The majority said they intended to leave within 
four years (Forschungsverbund, 1979 cited in Castles et 
al., 1984). By the 1980s, it was clear that many of  those 
who planned to return home had not done so: former 
‘guestworkers’ were settling in for the long haul and 
bringing along their families. Germany had acquired 
new ethnic minorities, despite the creation of  a whole 
legal and administrative system designed to keep labour 
migration temporary and to prevent family reunification.
 What does this tell us about the migration goals of  
the workers concerned? First, that just as governments 
and employers planned, migrant workers did originally 
intend to come only temporarily to Germany. They 
wanted to work hard and live frugally, to be able to 
quickly save enough to improve the livelihoods of  the 
family back home, for example by developing their farms, 
by starting a small business, or just by improving their 
housing, education, health care and nutrition. Second, 
that it can be very hard for migrants to face up to the idea 
of  permanent settlement, even when they realise that 
they are going to have to stay much longer than originally 
expected. Third, that there are many factors that lead 
migrants to change their original objectives, and that it 
is very hard for governments – especially in countries 
with democratic principles and strong legal systems – to 
prevent this.
 To avoid misunderstandings, it is important to 
emphasise that millions of  migrant workers who went to 
Germany and other western European countries during 
the boom years of  the 1960s and early 1970s did return 
to their homelands. This applied particularly to those 
from countries such as Italy, Spain and Greece that joined 
the (then) European Community, which was committed 
to evening out economic conditions and implementing 
democratic freedoms. But many did stay on after the 
1973-74 recruitment stop; those most likely to remain 
were Turks in Germany and the Netherlands, and North 
Africans in France and the Netherlands.
 What are the factors that lead them to change their 
goals? In the case of  Turkey, the 1980 military coup and 
the repression of  labour organizations caused many 
to stay away. Growing unemployment and the failure 
of  many farms and small businesses meant that many 
migrants found their savings insufficient to offer security 
upon return. Return had to be postponed again and 
again. 
 A more general factor relates to life-course: most of  
the early migrants were young men and – increasingly – 
young women, who hoped to be away for only a few years. 
They had been attracted by the good wages in western 
Europe, but had not been informed about high living 
costs and tax and social insurance contributions. Saving 
was much slower than expected. It might be acceptable to 
live frugally in a migrant workers’ hostel for a few years, 
but as time went on, people wanted to live with their 
spouses and children. Family reunification and formation 
– and life itself  – got under way. Once migrants’ children 
went to school and began to speak German (or French 
or Dutch) better than their parents’ languages, parents 
realised that if  they went home, their children might not 
come with them. Since giving a better future to their 
children was a powerful motivation for migration, the 
idea of  seeing the family dissolve was anathema: many 
parents began to realise that their future lay in the new 
country.
 Today there is a world-wide trend towards temporary 
labour migration. In the early 20th century, Germany, 
Spain and other European countries began introducing 
temporary migration schemes, such as seasonal 
recruitment for agriculture and tourism, and fixed-term 
work permits for construction. Traditional immigrant 
settlement countries, notably the USA, Canada and 
Australia now have large temporary worker programs. 
The Gulf  Cooperation Council states and Asia’s emerging 
industrial economies also recruit temporary workers. The 
European Commission uses the euphemism ‘circular 
migration’ in its advocacy of  such schemes, describing it 
as a ‘triple win’: destination countries get a steady supply 
of  workers for both skilled and less skilled occupations, 
without any long-term integration costs; countries of  
origin benefit from remittances and return of  skills; 
while the migrants benefit from an increase in safe, legal 
mobility opportunities.
 All this sounds too good to be true – and it is. 
Highly-skilled personnel may move around repeatedly 
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within international employment markets and enjoy 
cosmopolitan expatriate lifestyles – and they may also 
decide to shift to permanent settlement, a decision often 
encouraged by destination states. But governments do 
all they can to prevent the settlement of  lower skilled 
workers, even though the labour demand for construction 
workers, hospital personnel and care-workers, for 
example, is anything but temporary. The lessons from 
the failure of  the guestworker system of  the 1960s and 
1970s remain relevant: whatever the original intentions 
of  the migrants, a certain proportion of  them will change 
their goals in the course of  the migratory process. Some 
will stay permanently, often leading to a growth in ethnic 
diversity in the destination country. You cannot have 
workers without people.
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Global Migration 
Dirk Hoerder
Global mobility, said to be a recent phenomenon dating 
from the 1990s, is currently raising fears among many who 
want state borders closed and jobs protected. Consider 
an apparently unrelated recent issue in the media, the 
decline of  coffee prices in world markets. Like mobility, 
coffee growing, prices, and consumption are global. 
However, analysis cannot proceed in terms of  bordered 
states but rather in terms of  globally spread economic 
regions. The route from producer to consumer includes 
the requirement for globally mobile transport workers 
in container shipping, often men from the Philippines, 
and also for labour to unload air cargos, often migrant 
men from regions where wages are low and life projects 
difficult. At the producers’ end of  this commodity chain, 
peasant families or men and women on plantations lose 
their jobs or their land. They have to migrate when they 
cannot make ends meet. On the consumers’ side, no 
migration seems to be involved. Historically, however, 
consumption had to be introduced to Europe and 
elsewhere. Coffee, native to Ethiopia and Yemen, was 
brought by 17th-century migrant entrepreneurs, often 
Armenians, who established coffee houses and the 
coffee house culture with it. With increasing demand, 
the ‘East India Companies’ – multinationals of  the time 
with migrant personnel from the core – established 
mass production in the global plantation belt and forced 
migrant labourers to these worksites.
 Global migrations, entwined with investments, 
imposition of  power and regionally concentrated 
resources, have a long history. Migration and trade across 
the (known) world dates back millennia – in the Indian 
Ocean 5000 years, between China and other sections of  
the Asian world several thousand years. The expulsion 
of  parts of  the Jewish population and their diaspora 
formation began in 70 CE. Those expelling them were 
powerful Roman administrator and immigrant soldiers. 
Often overlooked, women were also part of  all such 
moves.
 Modern globalization began with the 15th-century 
linking of  the Eurasian-African world with that of  the 
Americas, both of  which are criss-crossed internally 
(across the continent, in other words) by migration 
routes. Tiny numbers of  heavily armed Europeans 
colonized the Americas and, after population collapse 
through unwittingly introduced germs, set in motion 
vast migrations. This Atlantic-centred view, however, is 
narrow. Large Chinese fleets connected East Asia with 
East Africa, and Chinese population growth involved vast 
settlement migrations. In the Levantine and Anatolian 
regions – the hinge between Asia and Europe  – advancing 
Muslim Turkish armies, settlers, and whole populations 
established themselves. Into this ‘new’ global world, 
English and other ‘merchant adventurers’ penetrated as 
migrants armed with guns, capital, and an overbearing 
sense of  superiority and whiteness. Mass migrations 
– local, meso-regional and macro-regional – resulted: 
regionally to plantations and mines and transoceanically 
to plantation regimes based on the labour power of  
enslaved African men and women.
 By the 19th century, the small numbers of  colonizer 
migrants across the world, and resulting or resource-
induced uneven economic development, set in motion 
five macro-systems of  migration: the forced migration 
of  slaves out of  Africa continued with the last two 
million of  12.5 million men and women; some 50-55 
million men and women migrated transatlantically, north 
and south, from 1815 to the 1930s; another 12-20 million 
moved from European Russia to the Transcaspian and 
southern Siberian agricultural belt and to the empire’s 
far eastern cities; another 48-52 million, often labelled 
‘coolies’ in racist parlance, moved from the British and 
other colonizer powers’ Asian possessions in free and 
involuntary migrations in the 1830s to 1930s; and 46-
51 million moved in the north China-Manchuria-eastern 
Russian migration system during the 1880s-1930s. The 
20th century world wars of  European origin and the 
drawing of  ‘nation’ state borders through regions of  
mixed settlement made Europe the largest refugee-
generating region on the globe. From the 1950s, state-
formation, often resulting from ‘nationalist’ movements 
in the formerly colonized world shifted a refugee-
generation southward. At the same time capitalist neo-
colonialism – often in conjunction with local elites – 
decreased options for sustainable lives or projects for 
a better future for children, and thus increased global 
disparities and the potential for migration.
 Thus evolved the 20th-century global migrations. In 
the 1880s, migrants to the vast plains from North America 
via southern Russia to Australia, as well as to colonized 
rice-growing Burma, began to mass-produce grains as 
world market prices collapsed. Family farming in many 
regions had to be abandoned and the dislocated men and 
women with their children migrated to urban industrial 
jobs whether in Harbin, the Ruhr District, or Cleveland. 
Such migrant and immigrant industrial labouring families 
lived residentially segregated near factories. With the 
present growth of  the service sector, and gendered 
domestic and caregiving labour in particular, migrants 
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work across urban spaces in middle-class neighbourhoods. 
Ever more come from colonized/neocolonized peoples 
and, in white societies, are thus doubly visible. Rural 
and small-town migrants in metropoles like Shanghai or 
Nairobi are equally discernable because of  dialect, dress, 
and class position.
 Globalization is not new. Nor are global migrations 
suddenly ‘feminized’ – women have always been an 
integral part of  migration. Had migration across the 
globe not always been gendered, immigrant communities 
with children would not have emerged in British North 
America, in Spanish and Portuguese South America, 
or in China’s many cities. All migrants connected their 
local place of  socialization with a distant local space of  
life-course options. Migration was and is translocal and, 
in regional socio-economic contexts, transregional. In 
transnational or, perhaps better put, transstate migrations, 
borders merely present an additional obstacle in the 
glocal movements of  people.
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Waiting 
Shahram Khosravi 
Waiting is a particular experience of  time. Waiting is 
inescapable. It is a feature of  human relationships. In our 
daily lives, we wait at airports, offices, and shops. Waiting 
is a common feature of  bureaucracy; when in contact with 
organizations, individuals wait their turn and officials’ 
decisions. Waiting is expecting something coming from 
others. Keeping others waiting is also a technique for 
the regulation of  social interactions.  It is a manipulation 
of  other’s time. Waiting, as Pierre Bourdieu puts it, is a 
way of  experiencing the effect of  power. ‘Making people 
wait… delaying without destroying hope is part of  the 
domination’ (Bourdieu, 2000). To keep people waiting, 
without ruining their hope, is an exercise of  power over 
other people’s time. Waiting is a common experience for 
the less powerful groups in society, producing  ‘subjective 
effects of  dependency and subordination’ (Auyero, 
2012). The ‘punitive’ aspect of  waiting is when a person 
is ‘kept ignorant as to how long he must wait’ (Schwartz, 
1975). Waiting generates feelings of  ‘powerlessness and 
vulnerability’. Marginalized and unprivileged groups, to 
use Crapanzano’s words, ‘wait for something, anything, 
to happen. They are caught in the peculiar, the paralytic, 
time of  waiting’ (1985). Another consequence of  waiting 
is the feeling that one is not fully in command of  one’s 
life. To be kept waiting for a long time ‘is to be the subject 
of  an assertion that one’s own time (and therefore, one’s 
social worth) is less valuable than the time and worth of  
the one who imposes the wait’ (Schwartz, 1975).
 The arbitrariness and precariousness of  waiting is best 
depicted in literature. Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot is 
about endless waiting for someone who never comes, and 
for something that never happens. Frantz Kafka’s Before 
the Law is about a man from the countryside permanently 
waiting before and for the law. His entrance is deferred, ‘not 
yet allowed’. This ‘not yet’ illustrates the abstractedness 
and inaccessibility of  the law that keeps people waiting 
without having their hopes dashed.    
 Large numbers of  displaced people – undocumented 
migrants, refugees and asylum seekers – spend extended 
periods waiting in camps, in transit lands, or in search 
of  papers. Lack of  information on how long they have 
to wait, or what exactly they have to do to get their 
permits, makes their lives unpredictable and uncertain. 
This is most palpable in the case of  asylum seekers, and 
in detention centres where migrants can often be kept 
indefinitely before deportation.
 Prolonged waiting, for papers or deportation, means 
‘not being in-time with others’. For many others, Mondays 
represent ‘moving forward’, the first day of  a meaningful 
week of  work. In contrast, for undocumented migrants, 
Mondays mean ‘remaining at the same point’. Their time 
is not that of  ‘ordinary’ people. Undocumented migrants 
use terms like ‘dead time’ or ‘a time of  death’ when 
talking about their lives kept waiting.
 In western societies, people approach time in terms 
of  how it can be used most efficiently. Time is associated 
with success and money. It is presented as a form of  
capital, which, similar to money, can be ‘counted, saved, 
spent, lost, wasted or invested’ (Schwartz, 1975). Hence 
waiting symbolizes waste, emptiness and uselessness. 
There is a discrepancy between the speed, mobility, and 
temporalities in modern societies, and the experiences 
of  individuals forced into a prolonged act of  waiting. 
Waiting by the poor, the unemployed, asylum seekers, 
undocumented migrants or youngsters can result in a 
weakening of  a sense of  social function, and of  their 
connections to the larger society, generating a feeling of  
purposelessness and ‘rolelessness’.  Furthermore, asylum 
seekers and undocumented migrants are constantly 
waiting for decisions and assistance coming from others: 
the state, churches, NGOs, legal firms, labour unions or 
employers. The dependence on others’ decisions and 
help leads to a patronizing relationship, with the migrant 
surrendering to the authority of  others. 
 Waiting is often an experience of  what Victor 
Turner (1969) calls liminality, the transitory stage 
between two social positions, between two stages of  
life. Undocumented migrants have left their legal status 
in their homelands and are waiting, hopefully, for a new 
status. Meanwhile, they are caught betwixt and between, 
their status socially and structurally ambiguous. The 
loss of  social status and role generates vulnerability. 
For Turner, there are similarities between liminality and 
marginality and inferiority. 
 When liminality is turned into protracted waiting, 
the underpinnings of  social life are temporarily/
temporally suspended. Accordingly, asylum seekers and 
undocumented migrants find themselves in a situation 
Hage calls ‘stuckedness’ (2009); characterized by 
invisibility, immobility, uncertainty and arbitrariness. The 
ambiguity about the duration of  waiting generates a sense 
of  uncertainty, shame, depression and anxiety. This can 
lead to sleep disorders and psychosomatic pain. Dread, 
angst or guilt are all components of  the experience of  
waiting. But waiting can be an act too, a strategy of  
defiance by the migrants. Failed asylum seekers and 
undocumented migrants who wait in hiding may do so 
in hope of  a regularization programme or with plans for 
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moving on.  Waiting does not have to mean  passivity, and 
can be an element in a strategy by migrants to improve 
their situation.  
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Ageing Futures  
Chris Wilson
than the native-born population, they do not ‘solve’ the 
problems of  ageing. Only if  migrants have higher fertility 
than their hosts will they help alleviate the consequences 
of  ageing. From this point of  view, it is clear, more or 
less everywhere, that the fertility of  migrants tends to 
converge with that of  the host population. The speed 
of  convergence varies but assimilation occurs sooner or 
later. In short, migration cannot be regarded as a ‘one 
off ’ solution to the problems caused by ageing. In so far 
as it can help, it can only do so if  there is a continuing 
large stream of  immigrants. 
 It is important to realise, however, that ageing per se 
is not necessarily a problem. The difficulty arises because 
Europe’s social and economic institutions are not well 
set up for coping with it. Particular attention has been 
focussed on pensions and other age-related welfare 
benefits. Europe’s welfare state regimes were mostly 
designed in the 25 or so years between the end of  World 
War II and the first oil shock, and reflect the character of  
the economy and society at that time. However, this was 
a most unusual period. The baby boom led to substantial 
population growth, and economic growth was at record 
levels. Between 1948 and 1973 the GDP per head in 
continental western Europe grew by more than 5 per 
cent a year. This was far higher than ever seen before 
or since. The long-run trend is about 2 per cent a year, 
and we have struggled to reach even that level over the 
last five years. The pensions and welfare state systems 
that we have today were based on assumptions that both 
the population and the economy would continue to grow 
rapidly. Only now, over 40 years after these assumptions 
ceased to be true, are governments slowly coming to 
terms with the changes needed to make Europe’s welfare 
state systems sustainable. 
 While attention to the impact of  ageing has tended to 
focus on the costs, especially pensions, in a more general 
sense what matters is the size of  the labour force. Pensions 
and other welfare benefits represent a form of  claim on 
the stream of  wealth being created by the people who are 
at work. Thus, it is the relative size of  the working and 
non-working populations that is most relevant. All other 
things being held constant, the low fertility of  recent 
decades implies a marked shrinking of  the working 
population over the next 25 years. The impact will, of  
course, be greatest in the countries where fertility has 
fallen most. Barring some miraculous discovery of  how 
to return to rapid productivity gains, there are essentially 
only two ways in which the impact of  this shortfall of  
workers can be mitigated. Firstly, the proportion of  the 
From reading media discussion of  demographic issues, 
one could get the impression that the ageing of  European 
society is an impending disaster of  almost apocalyptic 
proportions. It is easy to lose sight of  the fact that ageing 
is both inevitable and, in certain respects, desirable. The 
only ways to avoid demographic ageing are to either 
greatly worsen health conditions or to have substantial 
and continuing population growth. Given that most 
Europeans prefer long lives to short, mostly want few 
children, and do not wish there to be endless population 
increase, demographic ageing can be seen as a logical 
consequence of  these preferences, and could be judged a 
measure of  our achievement in extending life. However, 
Europe will experience a form of  ‘super-ageing’ in the 
coming decades; the baby boom cohorts (born in the 
1950s and 1960s) are very large, and when they get old 
this will greatly exacerbate any problems that ageing 
generates. What should be the response of  European 
societies? The most sensible goal is to stabilise the base 
of  Europe’s population pyramid, making the number of  
entrants to the labour market each year roughly constant. 
If  each birth cohort is substantially smaller than the 
one before, as was the case for the last third of  the 20th 
century, it will be very hard in the long run to sustain the 
economic base of  our present social systems. However, 
this policy goal is more easily stated than realised. 
 To some extent, immigrants can fill gaps in the age 
structure caused by low fertility. A shortfall in births in, 
say, 1990 can in principle be made up for by recruiting 
migrants aged 25 in 2015 (and most migrants are young 
adults, generally aged 15-35). The number of  migrants 
needed for such a balancing trick to work can roughly 
be gauged with reference to the replacement level of  2.1 
children per woman. In the EU over the last 20 years, 
fertility has been about 1.4 or 1.5 (around two-thirds 
replacement level. In order for the cohorts born around 
the turn of  the millennium (1995-2005) to be as large 
as the cohorts of  their parents, one migrant would need 
to be recruited for every two births. This is a much 
higher ratio than has ever been observed for a sustained 
period in any large European country. In general terms, 
migration on such a scale may be possible, but it will 
require a radical change in policies and attitudes. 
 Moreover, the long run effect of  this approach 
depends not just on the scale of  the immigration but 
also on how many children the migrants have. The logic 
of  intergenerational replacement applies to migrants 
just as much as to the native born. Since migrants grow 
old too, unless they replace themselves more effectively 
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population who are actually engaged in paid employment 
(and thus are paying taxes) can increase. Second, more 
workers can be imported by immigration. Neither of  
these two policy choices is universally popular. The 
former option involves persuading more women to work 
(especially in southern Europe) and delaying retirement 
for both sexes. Such changes may be just as controversial 
as advocating large scale immigration. 
 In short, future ageing is not a problem to be solved, 
but rather a predicament that we must learn to live with, 
and significant migration flows are likely to be one of  the 
mechanisms that enables us to do so.
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Migration, Death, Islam 
Nazneen Ahmed
My father is buried in a little cemetery in the heart of  
Old Dhaka, next to a 400-year-old mosque, surrounded 
by palm trees and watched over by a little white cat who 
knows not to walk on the mounds of  earth that are the 
only markers of  the graves.
 His final journey there, several years ago now, is one 
that is typical of  his generation of  Bangladeshi migrants, 
who, having carved out a life in England for over forty 
years, still wish for their final resting place to be ‘back 
home’.
 For my father, the consequences of  living as a 
member of  a diaspora were key to his thought when, 
grasping my hand on his hospital bed, he asked me 
to organise for his body to be buried in the capital of  
Dhaka. His resting place in Bangladesh should be where 
he was born: a small village in a tangle of  jungle, remote 
from the capital, on an island in the middle of  a river. 
Instead, he is, quite remarkably, buried in in a tiny urban 
cemetery in the burial plot of  my mother’s family. He 
wished for this when he first heard his diagnosis, and with 
great kindness, the imam of  this mosque agreed for this 
prodigal son-in-law to rest with his father and mother-in-
law, so that his British born children could visit with ease, 
and thereby maintain their emotional ties to a homeland 
that was not their birthplace. My grandmother’s grave is 
lost. It has been reclaimed by the jungle that spreads lush 
and green through my father’s village. My father feared 
the same happening to him, that we would not be able 
to visit, pray, remember. A Maoist activist to the last, he 
also wanted to have a Muslim funeral, to rest in hallowed 
ground, and for my uncles and cousins to visit his burial 
place every Friday to offer prayers for his departed soul.
 Migrant lives, and deaths, are thus woven from 
contradictory and complex yearnings – for home, for God, 
for tradition and remembrance. These can also shift with 
time, and the passing of  successive generations. The wishes 
of  male first generation migrants such as my father to be 
buried back in the homeland are not necessarily shared by 
the majority of  first generation women – or if  they are, 
these wishes are not generally carried out. Nor are they 
shared by many second and third generation Bangladeshis 
in Britain, who increasingly wish to be buried here. 
 As the Muslim community in Britain has grown, 
increased calls for Islamic burial space provision within 
Britain have come as a challenge for local authorities, 
under pressure to find land for new Muslim cemeteries 
or room within existing burial grounds where graves 
can be aligned to face Mecca and bodies can be buried 
without coffins, as the Qu’ran decrees. Responding to 
the community’s changing needs, fundraising by the 
East London Mosque and various religious associations 
resulted in the opening in 2002 of  the Gardens of  Peace, 
Britain’s first private, purpose built Muslim cemetery, 
with space for over 10,000 graves.
 We cannot simply attribute this shift in choice of  
burial location to a generational dilution of  attachment 
to the homeland or to Islam. Rather, this change is 
happening due to shifts in migrants’ religious practices 
and affiliations. Muslim clerics in Britain have begun 
emphasising over the past decade that repatriation is not 
in compliance with the Quranic requirements for burial 
within twenty-four hours, arguing that burial in Britain 
can actually constitute a more purely Islamic death than 
when a body in embalmed and taken abroad. Here, in the 
debate about death and migration, the interplay between 
religion, nationalism and diaspora produces unexpected, 
unpredictable results.
 At the same time, some migrants still wish to be buried 
back in Bangladesh because they adhere to particular 
Islamic sects that have locally specific practices which 
may not be followed accurately in the UK. So, while some 
clerics in Britain call for burials to take place in British soil, 
the fact that, in Ceri Peach’s words, the Muslim community 
is not one homogenous migrant group, but a ‘community 
of  communities’ means that migrant interpretations of  a 
‘good Muslim death’ are also multiple, heterogeneous and 
different for each individual (2006).
 My father’s burial wishes show him to have been an 
unusual kind of  Muslim, an unorthodox political activist, 
migrant and patriarch, with deeply individual but also 
familiar ideas of  where he and his family were meant to 
belong - and what home meant. Each British Muslim’s 
deeply personal decision regarding their own burial, and 
the final home in which their body will rest, is similarly 
informed by his or her own conceptualisation of  faith, 
nation, and family, framed by the experience of  migrating 
from one home and making another elsewhere.
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Smooth and blue and creased
like an unironed shirt,
it is for a split second
warming, and then freezing
needles-in-the-palm cold.
I pass through a vault
in the azure ice
into a courtyard of  light
and look up to see two
shards almost-but-not-quite
touching: they are meeting,
yet they are also parting.
By the same degree
I am here, in Iceland,
watching a glacier melt
in Katla’s molten glare;
and in my imagination
there, in Kew Gardens,
where Henry Moore’s bronze,
Oval with Two Points,
holds the light in tension.
Which is to say:
‘I am here.’
Field Notes from an Icelandic Glacier
Robin Boothroyd
COMPAS Poetry Competition 2013 
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representAtions: powers And pitfAlls
RepResentations: poweRs and pitfalls
If  migrants in the 19th and early 20th centuries 
remembered migration primarily as physical journeys 
that were marked by the smell of  the ship, the sound of  
the train, and the heat of  the desert, their 21st-century 
counterparts may experience migration as dealing with 
various windows: the window for visa application, the 
window at the immigration checkpoint, and the windows 
on the computer screen for booking appointments, 
submitting information, and applying for verifications of  
documents.
 Migration is no longer pursued or regulated ‘on the 
road’, but is done so ‘through the window’. As Adam 
McKeown (2008) has established clearly, while migratory 
journeys were the main target of  the US regulation of  
immigration in the 19th century, by the turn of  the 20th 
century the policy focus had decidedly shifted to the 
migrant’s identity as proved by documents at checkpoints 
(the window).
 In contrast to Georg Simmel’s (1997) meditation 
which took bridge and door as central symbols of  social 
divide and connectedness, Catherine Liu (2011) suggests 
that in the contemporary era, ‘disembodied and virtual 
freedom and trespass have made the window a critical 
feature in thinking about differentiation and separation’. 
The physical movement of  a body across a borderline 
may have become a rather insignificant moment in 
international migration, whereas what happens at the 
windows can be far more consequential. 
 Central to such ‘through the window’ management 
is the idea of  multi-two-dimensionality. This form of  
migration management is two-dimensional in the sense 
that the interaction between regulator and regulated is 
confined to clearly defined interfaces, based on information 
prepared and presented in designated manners, especially 
in flat forms and tables. The interaction aims to reach 
an unambiguous conclusion: approve or reject, yes or 
no. It allows for no contingency or grey zone. Would-
be migrants need to ‘flatten’ themselves into a particular 
shape or shade in order to pass scrutiny.
 Two-dimensionality creates a sense of  transparency 
and predictability. Kafkaesque gates, which condemn 
people to endless waiting in the dark and block 
communication and mobility, are no longer acceptable in 
the liberal world. In contrast, windows allow for partial 
freedom and negotiation space. Windows do not aim 
to block mobility, but seek to screen, differentiate and 
channel mobility. In this sense the window may be a 
more accurate metaphor than the gate for contemporary 
international borders. Unlike a gate that is either open or 
shut, the border is both open and closed.
Windows: The 21st-Century Migration Experience 
Xiang Biao
 Two-dimensionalisation is not a new phenomenon; it 
is an integral part of  modernity. Bureaucratic forms, legal 
files and statistical tabulations are all about flattening. 
Flattening makes individuals legible to the state and 
governable from the center (Scott, 1998). But the 
window is somehow different. A window does not flatten 
the world itself  into two-dimensional presentations. A 
window view is not an aerial view, or a representation 
of  cadastral maps, nor does it ‘collapse the life of  each 
person into a single point, which is connected to other 
such points by lines’ as lineage trees entail (Ingold 2000). 
The two-dimensionality of  the window is a specific means 
of  interaction in the multi-dimensional world. Instead 
of  fixing fluid reality, windows are like the buttons that 
engineers press in order to move intricate machines, or 
dams that are strategically placed on rivers to regulate the 
unruly water.
 The two-dimensionality of  windows is always multi-
two-dimensionality. Windows have to work with other 
windows. Effective regulation over mobility must create 
and monitor the linkages between the passport, the 
visa, domestic population registration, criminal records, 
migrant quotas, and so on. The interconnections between 
windows are systemic yet invisible. It is these connections 
that shape movements virtually and structurally, unlike 
what traffic police or border patrol teams do. Microsoft 
Windows – a system in which one two-dimensional 
interface leads to another in ways that seemingly follow 
the users’ free will but are preconfigured – may become 
the ultimate (and perhaps most apt) symbol of  how 
migration is managed and how we experience migration.
 The window is thus not only about two-
dimensionalisation. The key is the dialectics between 
‘flattening’ and ‘embedding’, or between the processes of  
two-dimensionalisation and processes of  creating multi-
faceted connections. Things always start being multi-
dimensional; it takes highly complex social processes 
to flatten them. Furthermore, in order for the flattened 
artifacts and relations to work, they must be related to 
each other and beyond in multi-dimensional ways.
 The window resembles the Foucauldian notion of  
power – diffusive, invisible, ubiquitous and capillary-like – 
but it also gives definite shape to power. Windows are the 
strategic sites where authority is tangibly presented and 
power is directly exercised, experienced and negotiated. 
As such, the window not only presents a particular logic 
of  how mobility is regulated, but also provides us with 
a methodological window through which power can be 
examined ethnographically and institutionally at the same 
time.
RepResentations: poweRs and pitfalls
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RepResentations: poweRs and pitfalls
Migration and Culture
Robin Cohen
Why is it important to connect ‘culture’ (such a capacious 
and abstruse word) to migration? In a long essay from 
which this entry is partly derived, I argue along with 
Gunvor Jónsson (2011) that the arrival of  cultural 
analysis into migration studies is somewhat overdue, and 
a logical outcome of  the cultural turn across much of  
the human sciences. That said, we are at the beginning 
of  a cultural focus in migration studies, which has 
hitherto been commandeered by demography, sociology, 
human geography and, more recently, by neoclassical 
economics. We live in a political climate where anxious 
politicians, fearful of  many long-standing residents’ 
response to further immigration, demand estimates of  
future migration flows, often on the flimsiest evidential 
base. Cultural analysis not only adds a necessary layer of  
complexity to simple statistical models of  migration, but 
also provides a necessary component to those interested 
in post-settlement questions.
 Western cultures predominantly understand migration 
as driven by flight or the search for work. However, 
in the Pacific, oscillating population movement is 
characteristically seen as sustaining kin relationships over 
space. For example, Va is an indigenous moral imperative 
obliging Samoans to migrate in order to sustain a web 
of  social networks and relationships, despite dispersion 
(Lilomaiava-Doktor, 2009). This is an unusual example, 
as it illustrates that the connotation of  migration to social 
actors may differ vastly from the meanings and motives 
ascribed to such migrants. More recently, western 
scholars have added ‘lifestyle migration’ to the ‘flight 
and work’ paradigm, wherein movement is predicated 
on enhancing or perhaps retaining ‘a better way of  life’ 
with richer cultural choices (Benson and O’Reilly, 2009, 
Benson, 2011).
 More amply covered in the literature is the notion of  
‘a culture of  migration’ or a ‘migration culture’, namely 
the growth, at a number of  levels (family, village, region 
or nation), of  dispositions and predilections that favour 
migration as a solution to social stasis, unemployment 
and relative deprivation. In certain communities with 
long-standing movement, culture and migration have 
become mutually constitutive. In such settings, migration 
becomes so deeply rooted that young people expect to 
live and work abroad, sometimes in complete defiance 
of  known market signals and political restrictions. 
Cultures of  migration have been described in many parts 
of  the world, including Cape Verde, Morocco, Mexico, 
India and Mali, while many other studies include similar 
observations, even if  these are not explicitly labelled 
‘cultures of  migration’. We should not assume that 
such predilections are static. The migration aspirations 
of  young people today are modified by greater global 
connectivity, and are not just a replica of  the ideas 
and values of  previous generations. The existence of  
sophisticated transport technologies, access to global 
media, schooling and, increasingly, unequal distribution 
of  income and wealth around the globe, are factors that 
shape current migration aspirations and fantasies.
 The migration-culture nexus is also addressed in the 
‘culture contact’ literature, encounters that may antedate, 
accompany or post-date the migration experience. 
Migration aspirations arose when people of  different 
heritage learned to speak to others and engage in a range 
of  creolizing social practices. A further crossover occurred 
through syncretism in religious rituals. Intensifying 
cultural contact and the subsequent intermingling of  
peoples, languages and religions were embedded in 
asymmetries of  power and privilege, usually inscribed 
through racial markers. The enslavement of  11 million 
Africans provides a clear example. The transatlantic trade 
deposited Africans in the USA, Caribbean, Mexico and 
Brazil to work on tropical plantations. Their suffering has 
been embellished on the consciousness of  Europeans 
and Americans partly because of  their historical 
complicity in owning and exploiting slave labour, 
but also by the extraordinary success of  New World 
Africans in conveying a sense of  their plight through art, 
literature, music, dance and religious expression. Forced 
migration has forged powerful cultures of  resistance and 
affirmation.
 Early historical and anthropological accounts 
describing separate cultures have given way to the 
idea that all cultures have permeable edges and shared 
traditions arising from history and, more notably, from 
a step change in connectivity, the set of  social changes 
loosely described as globalization. These changes include 
the movement of  images, ideas, music, goods, money and 
people – whether as migrants, visitors, tourists, students 
or football fans. Moreover, the connections (through 
remittances, by telephone or via the internet) between 
the stay-at-homes and the movers are now so intense that 
the experience of  mobility, directly or indirectly, affects 
most of  the world’s population. The consequence is that 
old cultures have become ever more permeable. While 
many authors have accepted the notion of  indeterminate 
boundaries, James Clifford (1997) suggests that culture 
itself  has become ‘a borderland, a zone of  contacts – 
blocked and permitted, policed and transgressive’.
RepResentations: poweRs and pitfalls
 Migrants construct migrant imaginaries that are 
spread to surrounding societies and communities. Even 
people who are immobile are profoundly affected by 
these imaginaries. Culture itself  becomes mixed and 
creolized. Popular forms of  culture travel with migrants, 
where they become means of  authentication, but also 
mutate, influencing surrounding cultures in unexpected 
ways and taking on fresh cultural freight from their new 
ambiance. The origins, journeys and experiences of  the 
migrants are presented, represented, performed and 
expressed. Novels, film, poems, dances and music and 
digital media provide a moving wallpaper, a succession 
of  opaque and pellucid screens that surround everyday 
activities. Because of  the possibility of  living in bilocal or 
transnational space, diasporic practices connecting home 
and away, origin and destination, established or newly 
acquired cultural practices, can thrive simultaneously. In 
short, culture and migration have become folded into 
each other in forms of  social behaviour, thus constituting 
what Mauss and later Bourdieu called the habitus, the 
nexus of  dispositions governing normal social practices 
and aspirations.
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Media and Migration 
Robert McNeil
There are few subjects that seem to consistently vex the 
British press like migration. Conversely, there are few 
subjects that seem to consistently vex migration scholars 
like the British press. 
 But the British press, like migration, is a messy and 
complicated subject. This short piece is designed to give 
an insight into the factors that make the British press so 
antipathetic to migration, and to help migration scholars 
to deal with the country’s pugnacious media more 
effectively.
 Let’s start with a facile truism: a free press is a necessity 
for any real democracy. Voters must be informed about 
current events and developments; institutions must be 
scrutinised; public servants taken to task on their decisions 
and people’s rights protected and championed – and this 
must be undertaken without onerous interference from 
the institutions or the public servants who face criticism. 
 These noble ideals can seem a million miles away 
from the regular outpourings of  celebrity scandal and 
ill-informed, ideologically-charged rants that often 
seem to dominate the British news media, particularly 
newspapers.The problem occurs because a free press 
comes at a price; that price is the abuse of  the freedom 
of  the press.
 Anyone who reads newspapers in the UK will know 
that many of  the headlines and images associated with 
immigration are designed to shock and anger. The 
Migration Observatory’s recent empirical media analysis 
showed that immigrants are generally framed by negative 
language – most commonly, as ‘illegal’ – and words 
associated with migration tend to highlight the costs, 
pressures and risks associated with immigration (Allen 
and Blinder, 2013).
 The appetite of  many sections of  the British press 
for anti-immigration stories is seen by some migration 
scholars as disingenuous, even egregious. The subject was 
discussed by the Leveson Inquiry into media standards, 
and is the subject of  considerable discussion on social 
media.
 But the approach taken by the press to migration 
is a largely inescapable consequence of  the business 
considerations of  media organisations, so understanding 
the motives and approaches of  these organisations in 
dealing with the subject is valuable. 
 Most news organisations (terrestrial broadcasters 
aside) don’t have any responsibility to be balanced in 
their coverage of  any issue. They are businesses, not 
public servants, and their primary responsibility is to sell 
their content effectively enough to keep the business 
functioning, and to make a profit. 
 For a newspaper, this means understanding who 
buys your product and what they want, giving it to 
them, and building a relationship where they like and 
trust the content that you provide. This segmentation 
of  the market means that if  newspapers are selling their 
products to people who are likely to be broadly opposed 
to immigration they are not going to start challenging 
their readers’ views. 
 Instead, they will try to tell their readers what they 
want to hear, and to help those readers feel that their 
positions are justified and sensible. Of  course, it’s never 
quite that simple – in order to be ‘trusted’ they will also 
have to make some (at least cursory) efforts to present 
counter arguments, and to present some of  the shades of  
grey.
 But there is a basic business case for anti-immigration 
news content. Repeated surveys, including that of  the 
Migration Observatory, have shown that, for decades, a 
majority of  British people have been concerned about 
levels of  immigration (Blinder et al., 2011). So stories that 
dwell on the negative aspects of  immigration are more 
likely to resonate with readers than stories that push the 
positive ones. 
 Of  course there are also media outlets that champion 
liberal policies, but like the anti-immigration ones, they 
are presenting what will be appealing to their readers. 
The Financial Times takes a liberal line on immigration 
because business leaders tend to see immigration as a 
key tool in a global free market; The Guardian does so 
because its readers – such as teachers and university staff  
– are often concerned about human rights.
 Reinforcing your relationship with your readers (or 
viewers/users) is key for media outlets. Bringing them 
together as a campaigning community allows news outlets 
to do this effectively. With a campaign to rally behind, 
this community can feel it is on the side of  the angels, 
battling for righteous goals against a tide of  villains and 
enemies – those who oppose the world view that you 
(encouraged by your newspaper of  choice) espouse.
 In one section of  the press, these ‘villains’ are often 
immigrants, but they are also often the opposing media 
and political camps. For the right wing media this often 
means wooly-minded ‘Guardianistas’; or the polenta-
eating Islington élites of  the Labour Party who ‘opened 
the floodgates’; or the EU apologists of  the Lib Dems.
 But it cuts both ways: on the other side the ‘villains’ 
are painted just as cartoonishly. Migrants may be broadly 
seen as victims, but their place as villains is replaced by 
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the small minded ‘little Englander’. ‘Mail readers’ take 
the place of  ‘Guardianistas’ as a shorthand for people 
who read the wrong newspapers, and the Labour Party 
and Lib Dems are replaced as the political bad guys by 
boorish, fox-hunting old Etonian Conservatives and the 
middle-management radicals of  UKIP.
 Anti-immigration media outweighs the pro-(or at least 
‘non-anti’) immigration media by a substantial margin 
because more British people are concerned about levels 
of  migration than not, so it makes business sense for 
more of  the press to capitalise on it. 
 Will this change? It’s pretty hard to see how, at least 
in the immediate future, but any migration scholars 
interested in participating in the media debate on 
immigration in the UK need to acknowledge the nature 
of  the market and work with it rather than against it. 
 ‘Working with it’ means thinking about the needs, 
concerns and lives of  the people who buy and use 
different types of  media, rather than trying to pander 
to what you think a journalist or newspaper might want. 
The uncomfortable truth is that the concerns may well 
differ greatly from your own, but if  you can acknowledge 
and anticipate them, you may well find that parts of  the 
media that you may otherwise have avoided can be, if  not 
an ally, then at least less of  an adversary.
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Global Networks Revisited
Alisdair Rogers
Twelve years ago, Robin Cohen, Steve Vertovec and I 
penned the editorial for a new journal, Global Networks: 
a Journal of  Transnational Affairs (2001). Here, in part, is 
what we wrote:
Global networks are a hallmark of  the evolving 
world of  the early 21st century and in recognition 
of  this fact we are launching an ambitious new 
journal … We see global networks as constituted 
by dynamic and flexible types of  connection 
between individuals, groups or organizations 
that criss-cross the world. The structure of  such 
global networks conditions the interactions, 
strategies and identities of  their members. These 
networks have begun to burst across territorial 
borders, further rupturing the degree of  cultural 
and economic integrity once prized by nations, 
regions, and places. The cumulative impact of  
these interconnections has meant that societies, 
along with their cities and regions, have tended 
to spread outwards so as to merge and become 
coextensive with other societies. This has vast 
implications for the way we understand the world 
and how it is governed.
 At the same time, the once clear-cut 
separation between the domestic sphere of  
national life and the external or international 
sphere shows unmistakeable signs of  breaking 
down. Transnational processes present profound 
challenges and opportunities to states, corporations, 
cities, and territorially based actors of  all kinds. 
People and firms, places and communities, can be 
switched in and out of  the global circuit board. For 
those who are beneficiaries of  global corporatism 
or have cosmopolitan preferences, this erosion 
of  the world we have known is to be welcomed. 
But there is a dark side of  globalization and 
transnationalism beyond the desire for universal 
humanism and behind the corporate rhetoric. 
A critical journal should never lose sight of  the 
costs of  globalization. But at the same time we 
acknowledge the many openings and opportunities 
for human agents to shape or re-direct events and 
processes.…
 … The rise of  global networks has both 
drawn upon and fostered innovative ideals of  
human solidarity that now often shape world 
political agendas, particularly surrounding the 
environment, peace, the status of  women, 
corporate responsibility, human rights, minorities, 
and indigenous peoples. Some of  these actors 
resist globalization; others find alternatives within 
its compass. It is likely that new transnational actors 
will play an ever more important role in shaping 
the first decades of  the twenty-first century.
The choice of  our journal title, Global Networks, 
reflects the movement away from general 
macroscopic views on globalization towards 
an intense study of  networks and networking 
as the lineaments of  the new world … Though 
differing and even clashing in many respects, 
these fields share a sense of  networks as human 
accomplishments, social forms that may be 
enduring or brittle, according to circumstances. To 
achieve connections across distance involves the 
risk-laden mobilization of  labour, trust, kinship, 
and the full repertoire of  social and cultural 
resources…
 …Globalization has a long and complex 
historical geography. In many cases, new networks 
are layered upon and interwoven with older ones. 
These networks have been greatly accelerated 
during the period of  increasingly unrestricted free 
trade experienced during the last two decades. 
However, whatever the rhythms of  global 
economic change, global networks have begun to 
assume an autonomous life. They are increasingly 
organized at a planetary scale, fundamentally 
transforming the long-established cognitive maps 
and social conduct of  citizens throughout the 
world.… Is it too ambitious to claim that, just as 
the twentieth century was an age of  international 
affairs, so the twenty first century heralds an era of  
transnational affairs?
Looking backwards from the perspective of  2013, at least 
three thoughts occur by way of  self-critique. Network 
thinking is often supported by diagrams, whose lines and 
links convey a greater sense of  rigidity and permanence 
than is warranted. One thing obviously understated is the 
sense of  networks rupturing, communication systems 
collapsing or supply chains snapping. Written during a 
spectacularly expansionist phase of  neoliberal capitalism, 
there is no hint of  the economic turmoil to come. The 
consequences of  the global recession include much more 
than the selective ’switching off ’ of  ‘people and firms, 
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places and communities’. There are also systemic tremors 
and failings, not engineering by those actors resisting 
globalization, but bred internally. 
 Second, the word ‘care’ is also conspicuously absent. A 
great number of  the journal’s most accomplished articles 
concern global care chains, the transnationalization of  
care relations and the implications of  care practices in 
state, market and family. Some of  the most acute insights 
into the journal’s core themes have been inspired by 
feminism and post-colonialism. This research has helped 
place the practices that sustain and nurture bodies of  all 
kinds at the heart of  our critical understanding of  early 
21st-century life. In so doing, it heightens the sense of  
what we termed, in perhaps overly economistic language, 
‘the costs of  globalization’.
 We wrote then of  how networks were ‘human 
accomplishments, social forms that may be enduring 
or brittle’. Perhaps this description of  social relations 
is too physical. Networking is never simply a binary 
matter, strong or weak, on or off. The pulses and 
modulations of  flows animating networks are to some 
degree better captured by an alternative metaphor or 
idea of  assemblage. The looser sense of  things hanging 
together while retaining some recognisable form is an 
equally good description of  many of  the phenomena in 
which we were, and remain, interested – whether it be 
global social movements, long-distance family relations 
or transnational communities. 
 Global Networks arose from the collision between 
Castells’s theories of  the network society and the new 
work on transnational communities by anthropologists 
and sociologists. In my view, its core ideas remain highly 
generative, but that does not mean to say that nothing 
needs adding. The fragility of  networks (even corporate 
ones), the significance of  care, and the sense of  flows as 
modulating are just three such extensions.
References
Roger, A., Cohen, R. and Vertovec, S. (2001) ‘Editorial 
Statement’, Global Networks, 1(1) iii-vi.
RepResentations: poweRs and pitfalls
Migration today features a bewildering variety of  
forms and types of  movement. The term ‘migrant’ can 
encompass highly diverse types of  people on the move, 
both within and between countries: permanent emigrants 
and settlers; temporary contract workers; labour, 
professional, business and trader migrants; students; 
refugees and asylum seekers; people who move from 
rural settings to cities, or from smaller towns to larger 
ones; people moving for marriage and family reasons; and 
people who seek safety from conflict within their own 
countries. Moreover, people often shift between these 
categories: they may enter a country as students, tourists 
or visitors, for example, but then overstay, work, ask for 
asylum, or seek permanent settlement, and eventually 
become naturalised as citizens. Likewise, internal migrants 
driven by conflict or in search of  opportunity may in time 
cross state borders and become international migrants. 
How is this great diversity of  migratory trajectories to be 
made sense of?  
 In the analysis of  migration, a basic distinction is 
often made between those who chose to move and those 
who are compelled to – that is, between ‘voluntary’ and 
‘forced’ migrants. The distinction is particularly salient 
in the policy world, where governance of  international 
migration is shaped by the conceptual distinction between 
‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’ migration as mutually exclusive 
categories; this is reflected not least in the different 
institutional architecture for refugees and other kinds of  
migrant. In reality, of  course, the distinction is far from 
clear-cut:  scholars have long pointed to a continuum 
between ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’ migration (Richmond, 
1994; Van Hear, 1998). For those who are conventionally 
classed as ‘voluntary’, especially towards the lower levels 
of  the socio-economic scale, there may be only limited 
mobility choices – as is often the case for labour migrants 
from lower income backgrounds with little option but 
to migrate to make a living. Conversely, those classed 
as refugees or asylum seekers – ‘forced migrants’ – may 
look to expand their life opportunities, especially once 
they have reached a place of  relative safety. In a way they 
may transmute from refugees to economic or betterment 
migrants once a measure of  security has been found. 
 Over the last 20 years there has been increasing 
recognition that much mobility has mixed motivations 
of  these kinds, and that many migration streams include 
both people who move to escape conflict or distress 
and those that are seeking better lives (Van Hear, 2009). 
Mixed Migration 
Nicholas Van Hear
This is partly because poverty, inequality and conflict 
often coexist: those who flee a country where conflict, 
persecution, discrimination and human rights abuse 
are rife, for example, may also be trying to escape dire 
economic circumstances – which may themselves feed 
into such conflict, persecution, discrimination and human 
rights abuse. People may then move to escape life or 
death circumstances; they may move to escape intolerable 
living conditions; they may move to better themselves; 
or they may move for a combination of  these and other 
reasons. Migration can be mixed in several senses, which 
to some degree relate to stages of  the migratory process: 
motivations may be mixed at the point of  making the 
decision to move; different kinds of  migrants may make 
use of  the same agents and brokers; they may travel 
with others in mixed migratory flows; motivations may 
change en route and after arrival; and people may find 
themselves in mixed communities during their journeys 
or at their destination. 
 Increasing recognition of  these complex migration 
dynamics, and the challenges they pose for migration 
policy, has led to growing purchase in policy circles of  
the notion of  ‘mixed migration’. Managing such diverse 
migratory populations presents obvious policy challenges. 
Who should be admitted, and on what grounds? What 
rights and entitlements should different types of  
migrants have once admitted?  The problem remains that 
policy regimes still tend to classify migrants by discrete 
categories based on a single motivation for migration – 
labour, highly-skilled, refugee, family, student, and so one 
– and organise entry and entitlements accordingly. As has 
been suggested here, in reality migration may be driven 
by a combination of  these kinds of  motivations – the 
search for livelihood, for safety, to rejoin family members, 
for study and so on – which points to the need for a 
correspondingly variegated policy approach to address 
them. 
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From Communication to Impact 
Emma Newcombe
When COMPAS started in 2003, our funders wanted to 
know how we planned to ‘communicate’ our research. 
This later became a concern with how knowledge was 
‘transferred’ or ‘exchanged’. More recently the emphasis 
is on research that has ‘impact’. This means not only 
showing that we have been working with research users 
and providing them with data and analysis that they can 
use for ‘evidence’, but also that our work has been of  
benefit to them. Having an impact beyond the academy 
is now regularly measured by many organisations funding 
research in order to demonstrate a practical return on 
their investment.
 The study of  migration is not exceptional in this. 
Indeed, it seems as if  those who study it are extremely 
well placed in this regard, as migration issues are high 
on policy and political agendas, and are of  interest to a 
wide range of  stakeholders, including the general public. 
Asking for usefulness is, in our field, I think justifiable. 
As someone responsible for communicating research, I 
have been encouraged by the growing enthusiasm for 
communications work driven by the impact agenda. 
I believe migration research (and arguably all state 
funded social research) should be useful. Indeed, if  
we are examining a highly politicized subject, it is not 
unreasonable to expect a contribution to public debates. 
But the clamour for impact can go too far. What if  
research doesn’t come up with answers that anyone likes? 
And how do we prove impact? Can we ever really know 
if  anyone has actually changed their practice because 
of  our evidence? What about the impact we have that 
we don’t know about? Furthermore, significant impact 
can result from fortuitous timing or a chance meeting. 
Proof  is fragile, and much gets crushed in its pursuit. 
Perhaps what we do is not so different from what we 
were doing ten years ago, only now we spend precious 
time measuring and proving impact.
 These concerns go beyond migration studies to social 
sciences more generally.  The impact model’s roots in the 
hard sciences could be to blame. For example, it is easy to 
see how a drug that cures millions of  people of  sickness 
can be defended and justified by pointing to its impact – 
even if  it did have to be tested on animals along the way. 
So is there any particular impact challenge when it comes 
to research on migration? One problem is the intense and 
polarised nature of  the migration debate, and the way in 
which any commentator is seen to be on one ‘side’ or 
another. Research evidence can be considered tainted if  
the researcher has personal views and affiliations outside 
their academic work. Researchers may try to remain 
neutral and apolitical, but this does not protect them 
from judgemental categorisation that places them as for 
or against. It is interesting to me that migration is a topic 
that most people have an opinion on, and yet we expect 
researchers to remain aloof.
 Academic research on controversial topics has the 
opportunity to impact on public and policy debate, but 
migration issues can be so highly politicised that data 
and analysis have limited power to shift debate. Thirty 
years of  polling have always found the UK public to be 
wary of  immigration, and yet this has no correlation with 
actual numbers of  people entering the country, just as 
public opposition to migration is not focussed on the 
largest groups (Blinder et al., 2011). Oftentimes, when it 
comes to media coverage, the academic is wheeled in to 
respond to a fast, furious and contested argument where 
complicated, nuanced analysis doesn’t really fit. 
 Academics working on less attention-grabbing topics 
might argue that migration studies is lucky to have the 
impact bandwagon pass its way, because it is often 
pulling money along behind it. There are dangers that 
come with this though; for example, it is easy to fall into 
a state-defined agenda. Take ‘trafficking’, a concept that 
regularly features in funding calls, political debate and 
policies. It has been subject to a great deal of  intellectual 
scrutiny and yet remains misunderstood in public debate. 
The complicated analysis is ignored in favour of  the term 
that can be adopted to fit lots of  very different situations. 
Although there is definitely appeal in a simple story over 
a complicated tale, it does make you wonder how many 
devils are being ignored when the details are ditched.
 As someone who helps deliver research to potential 
publics, my job is easiest to do when the research is good, 
and not blinkered by only trying to achieve relevance and 
impact. In migration, as in other fields, we should do 
research that has integrity, is faithful to its sources, aims, 
methods and evidence, and walks the fine line between 
relevance and bombast. 
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How We Laughed… 
Ida Persson
VIDEO LINK INTRO OF A DELIGHTFUL 
STORYBOOK, OPENING UP TO REVEAL 
THE WORDS ‘TALES OF ST PANCRAS 
BEAR’. LIGHTS UP. A DISHEVELLED, 
ANTHROPOMORPHISED TEDDY BEAR 
ENTERS STAGE RIGHT HOLDING A 
CRUMPLED SHOPPING BAG CONTAINING 
TAT AND A ‘BOOK’
ST PANCRAS: ‘ello kids. Remember me? It’s 
your old friend, St. Pancras Bear. Don’t know 
who I am? Well, I’m not surprised. Bet you know 
who Paddington Bear is though don’t you?! 
[…] You want to hear a story about Paddington 
Bear? One sunny day two bears made their way 
to popular London train stations in the hope of  
being taken in by a nice family. One of  them set 
off  to Paddington station, got taken home by the 
Browns, managed to secure himself  a lucrative 
book deal, and became the nation’s darling. The 
other bear [INDICATES HIMSELF] went to St. 
Pancras Station and was forced to make the best 
of  a bad situation by becoming an independent 
procurement specialist in the area of  urban 
pockets. 
[HE COUGHS VIOLENTLY, GIVES AN 
AUDIENCE MEMBER HIS BAG TO HOLD, 
THEN SNATCHES IT BACK]
Now, don’t get me wrong. I wish people well, 
[SHOUTS] I’m a well-wisher. But the question 
is, does Paddington deserve the luck he had? 
[…] Who’s the real bear behind the duffle coat? 
Because you have a right to know just who it is 
featuring in the bedtime stories of  your darling, 
fat, little children. You want to know the sordid 
truth about your precious Paddington? Well, he 
brazenly admits on his own website – that’s right, 
he’s got a website! It’s pretty good actually – that 
in order to get to England he ‘stowed away’ on a 
ship’s lifeboat. Illegal immigrant. Not only that but 
Paddington is not even his real name, it’s Pastuso! 
And most shocking of  all, Paddington describes 
himself  as originating from ‘darkest Peru’. Racist. 
[SITS CENTRE STAGE] So Paddington is a 
racist, illegal immigrant who is living in England 
under an assumed name. “What other dark secrets 
might he be harboring, St. Pancras?,” you ask. Well, 
ever wondered just how Pudsey Bear got that eye 
patch? Well, he never talks about it. Or anything, 
in fact. Very troubling. Traces of  marmalade 
found in the wound apparently, I’ll leave you to 
draw your own conclusions…. 
- Extract from St Pancras Bear, by The Dead Secrets, first 
performed 2013
The disgruntled St Pancras Bear, who feels hard done by 
the success of  his contemporary, Paddington Bear, tries 
to vilify Paddington by making him the untrustworthy 
‘other’ in as many ways as he possibly can.1  The analysis 
and break down could very easily go on. It’s also just a 
part of  a funny sketch. Comedy is a powerful tool. It can 
ridicule, deride, degrade and dismiss, and it is important 
to recognize when a damaging route is taken in comedy. 
It can also uplift, encourage, and highlight the shared 
human experience. That is crucial.
 All forms of  art are capable of  transcending the 
physical by touching the individual on an emotional level 
and crossing boundaries and differences. There are, of  
course, aspects of  all art, and comedy specifically, where 
a person’s enjoyment can (and on occasion should) be 
affected by his or her understanding of  language, culture 
and shared social experiences, all key influences in the 
migrant experience. 
 You could argue, perhaps, that although you might 
enjoy Monty Python’s well-known ‘The Four Yorkshire 
Men’ sketch, where they compare and try to out-do 
each other with the social and financial deprivation 
of  their youth, you do not fully understand it without 
having an awareness of  the socio-economic and cultural 
context. There would be truth in this. But if  you enjoy 
it for whatever reason (quality of  performance, your 
own interpretation of  the joke, your understanding of  
it within your own social or cultural perspective), does it 
always matter? 
 The joy of  laughter is a shared global human 
experience. We may all find different things funny, but 
we all (well, most of  us, anyway…) find things funny. 
Much comedy is universal. Non-verbal physical humour, 
for example, can in a single moment communicate a 
ludicrous but shared human experience (the pratfall, the 
farcical entrance/exit, the run in with a lamp post). There 
is a reason why quiet but physical characters have often 
been the most internationally loved and understood, such 
as Buster Keaton, Charlie Chaplin and Rowan Atkinson’s 
Mr. Bean. 
 A lot of  talk about migration is focused (rightly) on 
the individual experience, and the many differences to 
be considered (culture, movement, status) when looking 
at a migrant’s journey. But it’s important, I think, to 
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also remember the shared human experiences and the 
moments where these can be found. Although much can 
be said, validly and importantly, about power struggles, 
perspective and context in comedy, it is important not 
to lose sight of  the fact that a genuine smile or laugh 
will always be universal. This goes a long a way toward 
eliminating ideas of  ‘us and them’, migrant and non-
migrant, and any other divisions - if  only for the moment 
it takes to giggle or heartily guffaw. 
Notes
1 Something done to great humorous effect by the creator 
of  Paddington Bear himself, Michael Bond, in his book 
Paddington Here and Now (2008) where Paddington has to 
decide where ‘home’ really is, based on his immigration 
status.
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Slovakia, the German state of  Brandenburg, the border 
province of  Limburg, Manenberg township in Cape 
Town, and the city of  Enshi in China.
 In a rough typology, we can see at least six ways that 
‘super-diversity’ has been read (so far). (1) Some social 
scientists have understood ‘super-diversity’ as meaning very 
much diversity, or more pronounced kinds and dimensions 
of  social differentiation – particularly cultural identities. 
(2) In a more limited way, many writers invoke ‘super-
diversity’ merely to mean more ethnicity – that is, that new 
migration processes have brought more ethnic groups 
than in the past. (3) Such a reading stands in contrast to 
another sense in which authors refer to ‘super-diversity’ 
in order to move beyond a focus on ethnicity as the sole or 
optimal category of  analysis. (4) This understanding is 
extended by those who describe and elaborate what I 
would say is the original meaning of  the concept, that is 
to say a changed set of  conditions and social configurations which 
call for a multi-dimensional approach to understanding 
contemporary processes of  change and their outcomes. 
(5) Recognizing this understanding, other scholars have 
urged a methodological reassessment of  their respective field 
or discipline. (6) Finally, there are numerous academics 
who, although invoking the term ‘super-diversity’, actually 
mean something rather different (though often not wholly 
unrelated) to what was originally intended: examples 
include theories of  non-linear social trajectories, mixed 
motivations for migration, broader geographical dispersal 
of  migrants, blurred distinctions of  racial categories, 
multifarious networking, multiple discursive practices 
and polycentricity of  semiotic resources.
 Across all of  this emergent literature, furthermore, 
‘super-diversity’ has turned into an adjective to describe 
a set of  circumstances within which scholars want to 
describe some phenomena, process or topic with which 
they are respectively concerned. Hence we can read of  
‘superdiverse characteristics of  groups’, ‘super-diverse 
places’, ‘super-diverse circumstances’, and ‘super-diverse 
settings’; scaled up, some describe one or another ‘super-
diverse population’ , ‘a super-diverse society’ or ‘the 
super-diverse nation’; on yet a broader canvas, still others 
write of  ‘a stage of  super-diversity’, ‘the era of  super-
diversity’, ‘super-diverse realities’, and ‘a super-diverse 
world’.
 What’s going on here? Why has there been so much 
attention, and such varied readings and uses, of  ‘super-
diversity’ – leading to what has been called the emergence 
of  a ‘super-diversity lens’ and ‘a super-diversity turn’ in 
the social sciences? Rather surprised by the wide and 
In 2007, I published an article that introduced the concept, 
or what I called a summary term, ‘super-diversity’. Since 
then, in both the worlds of  academia and public policy, 
the concept has been subject to some interesting (and 
some downright weird) interpretations and usages. The 
following piece traces some of  these readings of  ‘super-
diversity’ across a range of  social science literature.
 First, to briefly recap the idea: ‘super-diversity’ 
was intended to address the changing nature of  global 
migration that, over the past thirty years or so, has brought 
with it a transformative ‘diversification of  diversity’. This 
has not just occurred in terms of  movements of  people 
reflecting more ethnicities, languages and countries of  
origin, but also with respect to: 
a multiplication of  significant variables that affect 
where, how and with whom people live. In the last 
decade, the proliferation and mutually conditioning 
effects of  a range of  new and changing migration 
variables shows that it is not enough to see 
‘diversity’ only in terms of  ethnicity, as is regularly 
the case both in social science and the wider 
public sphere. In order to understand and more 
fully address the complex nature of  contemporary, 
migration-driven diversity, additional variables 
need to be better recognized by social scientists, 
policy-makers, practitioners and the public. 
These include: differential legal statuses and their 
concomitant conditions, divergent labour market 
experiences, discrete configurations of  gender and 
age, patterns of  spatial distribution, and mixed local 
area responses by service providers and residents. 
The dynamic interaction of  these variables is what 
is meant by ‘super-diversity’. (Vertovec, 2007)
Since 2007, the term has been picked up by a wide variety 
of  scholars from an array of  disciplines and fields. (This 
is shown in a recent review of  300 publications that 
invoke ‘super-diversity’; see Vertovec, 2014.) These go 
beyond the expected ones – sociology, anthropology, 
geography, political science, migration and ethnic 
studies – to include linguistics, history, education, 
law, business studies, management, literature, media 
studies, public health, social work, urban planning and 
landscape studies. Moreover, while the original article 
described phenomena in London and the UK, the term 
has been used subsequently to describe social, cultural 
and linguistic dynamics in such widespread contexts as 
Brussels, Venice, New York, Jerusalem, the Baltic states, 
Italy, Cyprus, Egypt, Nigeria, French Guiana, Zimbabwe, 
Hong Kong, Hokkaido, Oaxaca, villages of  south-west 
Reading ‘Super-Diversity’ 
Steven Vertovec
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multiple readings of  the original article, I would suggest 
that – for a range of  good reasons – social scientists 
are avidly seeking ways of  describing and talking 
about increasing and intensifying complexities in social 
dynamics and configurations at neighbourhood, city, 
national and global levels. We are getting better, I would 
argue, at developing what Nando Sigona has called ‘ways 
of  looking at a society getting increasingly complex, 
composite, layered and unequal’ (2013). However, we 
are still struggling to describe it. Indeed, addressing ‘the 
super-diversity of  cities and societies of  the 21st century’, 
Ulrich Beck (2011) suggests that the rise of  these are 
‘both inevitable (because of  global flows of  migration, 
flows of  information, capital, risks, etc.) and politically 
challenging.’ However, Beck adds:
It is in this sense that over the last decades the 
cultural, social and political landscapes of  diversity 
are changing radically, but we still use old maps 
to orientate ourselves. In other words, my main 
thesis is: we do not even have the language through which 
contemporary super-diversity in the world can be described, 
conceptualized, understood, explained and researched. 
[italics in original]
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that a new notion like 
‘super-diversity’ has been widely taken up – albeit in a 
variety of  (sometimes unintended) ways. It is likely a – 
hopefully useful – placeholder until we develop more 
enhanced terms, theories and perspectives with which to 
depict and interpret the multiple modes and impacts of  
current forms of  societal complexification. 
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RepResentations: poweRs and pitfalls
Stories of  Migration, the Migration of  Stories 
Nazneen Ahmed
Each migrant has a unique tale to tell of  the home left 
behind and the home(s) carved out elsewhere, the people 
met on the way, the experiences of  hostility, welcome, 
isolation and community. Edward Said wrote of  exile 
(one form of  migration, though with no possible return) 
as producing an awareness of  ‘plurality’ that fosters 
creativity and artistic expression (2001). So it is perhaps 
unsurprising that migrant tales have provided rich stuff  
for novels, particularly in the post-colonial era, when 
many have been written by authors who are either 
migrants or children of  migrants.
 Central to novels of  migration is the question of  
what constitutes home and how home is remade. M. G 
Vassangi writes of  home being a gunny sack, comprised 
of  things that are portable (memories, rituals, languages) 
that can be schlepped from place to place (1989). But is it 
so easy? Can everything be taken along for the ride? What 
is lost in translation?   
 Stories of  migration are as old as the journeys 
themselves. For Jean Rhys, writing in the interwar years, 
loss and pain are central to the migrant’s experience. 
Isolation, alienation and the sensation of  being out of  
place characterise Anna’s life in 1930s London in Voyage in 
the Dark. In this telling, the migrant’s journey, framed by 
colonisation, is a path to madness and despair. Trapped in 
colonial London, Anna is Said’s exile, the fragile stranger 
in the heart of  the colonial metropolis, who can never 
belong or make a home, yearning for the Caribbean, a 
place of  warmth and a home that cannot be returned 
to. Abandoned by her lover, longing for home and her 
childhood, Anna spirals into a decline from which it is 
suggested there will be no return, in which patterns of  
exploitation and alienation will repeat themselves ‘all over 
again… all over again’.
 In contrast, Sam Selvon’s exuberant stories of  West 
Indians in 1950s London depict young men having 
adventures, seducing English women, going hungry 
and looking for work. His novels, written in a joyful 
patois, celebrate through their very language the positive 
products of  the colonial encounter: hybridity, the meeting 
and melding of  languages, cultures, identities and bodies. 
Yet his protagonists also struggle in the city, contending 
with racism, poverty and cold. In The Lonely Londoners, 
newly arrived Galahad becomes so hungry that in an 
episode balanced delicately between comedy and tragedy, 
he attempts to kidnap a pigeon, much to the horror of  
an elderly white passerby: ‘“I must find a policeman!” the 
woman screech, throwing her hands up in the air, and she 
turn back to the road. Galahad make races through the 
park, heading down for Lancaster Gate.’ 
 Overwhelmingly, post-Windrush London is a male 
world. But the few women Selvon writes into his stories 
are very different from Rhys’s Anna 20 years earlier. They 
are resourceful and refuse to be dominated by men, black 
or white. Tanty braves the tube and bus: ‘She was so 
frighten that she didn’t bother to look out of  the window 
and see anything, and when she get off  at the Prince 
of  Wales she feel relieved. Now nobody could tell she 
that she ain’t travel by bus and tube in London’. Selvon’s 
stories are migrant love letters to the city which, despite 
all the setbacks his characters face, does become home. 
 For Rushdie, the process of  migration entails a 
more carnivalesque hybridisation of  cultures, languages 
and identities, so both ‘host’ and ‘traveller’ are forever 
changed by their interactions. The Satanic Verses is a novel 
much discussed for events that it provoked, but it is often 
overlooked as a work of  fiction. It is a novel that depicts 
post-1970s travels to Britain vividly in all their violence, 
excitement, adventure and pain. Both Gibreel Farishta 
and Saladin Chamcha experience the transformative 
potential of  migration, as well as disorientation and 
violence. The novel’s chaotic, hybrid English, and its 
layering of  cultural references, pay testament to the ways 
the migrant encounter forges a ‘third space’ of  cultural 
hybridity, where anything, at least in theory, is made 
possible (Bhabha, 1994).
 Chamcha desperately tries to assimilate rather than 
celebrate his difference. Alas, his attempts to out-English 
the English are hampered by his physical differences 
(transformed into a devil at the start of  the novel, he has 
hooves), which leads to a gruelling interrogation by the 
police: 
“Who’re you trying to kid?” inquired one of  the 
Liverpool fans, but he, too, sounded uncertain. 
“Look at yourself. You’re a fucking Packy Billy. 
Sally-who? – What kind of  name is that for an 
Englishman?” 
Chamcha’s abuse, and the riots of  Brickhall that 
fictionalise the conflicts between ethnic minorities and 
fascist gangs in east London, represent a shift from the 
1950s to the 1970s, when the relatively ‘polite’ racism 
represented in Selvon’s stories gave way to physical 
attacks and systematised racist abuse. The Satanic Verses 
records how the migrant’s journey is often scarred with 
incidents of  humiliation, violence and unwelcome.
 Three novels, and a whisper of  the stories that 
migration has produced, a plethora of  tales that, 
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collectively, could be considered a subgenre of  fiction. 
Just as the tellers of  these stories have travelled, the 
stories themselves circulate beyond their places of  origin. 
The positive reception of  Monica Ali’s Brick Lane in 
Bangladesh stands in strong contrast to the controversy 
it caused amongst British Bangladeshis. Amongst the 
anglophone elite in Dhaka, the novel was received with 
pride, its author viewed as a daughter of  the nation ‘done 
good’ overseas: 
But beyond all these considerations, of  course, 
is the fact that she has openly embraced us. We 
should embrace her in turn. She is one of  us. She 
is a gifted and sincere daughter of  Bangladesh. She 
has written a novel in English and succeeded at a 
level the rest of  us should aspire to (Islam, 2003).
The transnational publishing market and the development 
of  e-books, as well as the explosion of  international 
literary festivals, further enable migrant fictions to travel 
‘back home’ where they are read with interest, as the 
experiences of  distant, scattered sons and daughters of  
the homeland.
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RepResentations: poweRs and pitfalls
When I returned to Oxford after a year and a half  of  
doctoral fieldwork in Kathmandu, the jokes began: I had 
chosen to study a community of  western expatriates so 
that I could have a year or two of  holiday; conducting 
research in bars and restaurants among expats who 
swanned around in SUVs and earned 40 grand a year was 
hardly serious anthropology; my formative experience 
with ethnographic fieldwork must have been really hard 
on me. 
 It was all just jestful taunting, of  course. But many a 
truth is said in jest. The presumption my colleagues were 
playing off  was that if  you are, as the saying goes in the 
US, ‘free, white and 21’, then you should have nothing 
to complain about. Lifestyle migrants, if  they suffer at 
all, suffer from ‘first world problems’, minor frustrations 
and complaints that are only experienced by privileged 
individuals in wealthy countries. But it may be that, to 
paraphrase Billy Joel, the good ol’ days aren’t always as 
good as they seem.
   Lifestyle migration has come to encompass a range of  
different people who move around the world for different 
reasons: international students, domestic downsizers, 
backpackers, gap yearers, retirees, corporate expatriates, 
humanitarian workers, second-home owners, and people 
who have married across cultures and borders. In fact, 
many of  the authors in this volume are lifestyle migrants, 
having chosen a foreign land for work – perhaps because 
we couldn’t find employment in our native countries, or 
perhaps because we wanted to experience a life different 
from home. Such people often see migration as a route 
to a better and more fulfilling way of  life than the one 
they have decided to leave behind – the pursuit of  the 
‘good life’ (O’Reilly and Benson, 2009). Sometimes this 
is escapist; sometimes it is due to necessity. Across the 
UK and elsewhere in the global north, lifestyle migrants: 
international students and highly-skilled workers – 
foreign consultants, freelancers, expatriates and other 
members of  the so-called ‘mobile elite’ – currently make 
up one of  the fastest growing migration phenomenon in 
the world. 
 But while these people have typically been 
characterised by high levels of  social, economic and 
geographic mobility, in recent years the opportunities for 
some have been slipping. Globalised, neoliberal forms 
of  employment have made limited-term jobs and zero-
hour contracts – to say nothing of  that grand euphemism 
for free and eager labour, ‘work experience’ – the norm 
for many. As budgets are reduced and organisations do 
away with long-term investment in the people that help 
The (Un)Bearable Precariousness of  being a Lifestyle Migrant 
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them function, people who once experienced stable 
occupational identities and social protections are now 
encountering novel experiences: insecurity, instability, 
vulnerability, precarity and risk (Korpela and Nagy, 2013). 
As responsibilities are shifted from public and private 
institutions onto individuals, the welfare and wellbeing 
of  workers and their families, still often thought of  
as privileged and immune to such problems, are often 
ignored by states, policy makers and organisations. 
Precarious labour is almost always organised beyond the 
structures of  social welfare and benefit systems. As a 
result, those who labour often exist outside provisioning 
for unemployment benefit, social security, health 
insurance, and mechanisms for maternity and paternity 
leave. Though they are frequently seen as the drivers and 
beneficiaries of  globalisation, their relatively privileged 
positions may not shield them from its discontents 
(Standing, 2011). The ‘precariat’ thus cuts across many 
lines in society; precariousness no longer discriminates.
 The zero-hours contract controversy that rocked 
many of  Britain’s educational institutions in late 2013 
drew attention to some of  these issues. ‘Highly skilled’, 
it seemed, was no longer a guarantor of  ‘highly paid’. 
In the ivory tower, of  course ,‘highly educated’ rarely 
implied high pay, but the erstwhile prevalence of  tenure 
track academic posts at least guaranteed a lifetime of  
employment, if  not one of  six figures. Today, however, 
these insecurities may force many people to significantly 
alter their lifestyle. It may lead foreign correspondents 
to moonlight as babysitters, under employed academics 
to work in High Street retail shops, and on-the-bench, 
thirtysomething development consultants to live at 
home with their parents as they await being flown off  to 
Addis Ababa for a two-week secondment. Such moves 
show that the implications of  limited work tenure and 
the expectations of  flexibility and mobility run deeper 
than surface-level categorisations of  people might make 
visible. It also elucidates some of  the limitations of  how 
human welfare is often conceived of  and provisioned 
in modern economies. As atypical and irregular work 
relations such as project or product-based jobs become 
typical and regularised, the institutional social structures 
around such work require changing too. 
 The zero-hours debate also served as a reminder 
that precariousness in labour, welfare and migration has 
tended to be discussed in terms of  lower skilled workers 
and low-income earners – people who are clearly also 
affected by neoliberal changes in society, often to a much 
greater degree than those who can normally command 
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higher incomes. Still, research into lifestyle migrants and 
highly skilled workers comprises a unique and important 
aspect of  globalisation that is often disregarded. Such 
scholarship can serve to contest common presumptions 
that experiences of  the privileged are vastly different 
from those without access to education, funds or social 
mobility. 
 Is this lack of  research due to the fact that 
precariousness among the upper classes in the global 
north is a relatively new phenomena? Perhaps. But I 
suspect it is also a result of  a distaste among many social 
scientists for studying so-called like-minded people. 
Anthropologists, we know, have rarely ‘studied up’ 
(Nader, 1972) – or even studied ‘sideways’ (Hannerz, 
1998), for that matter – and academic engagements with 
human welfare have often focused on those traditionally 
understood as underprivileged. 
 More research on the experiences of  precarity and 
welfare among lifestyle migrants and higher skilled 
workers would raise a number of  interesting comparative 
questions. For example, in what ways are the determinants 
of  low  and high-skill precarity similar or different? How 
do imagined lifestyles of  migrants conflict with lived 
realities? How do the responses to instability vary among 
different types of  workers across different industries? 
Do the vicissitudes of  globalised ‘neoliberalism’ affect all 
people low in the labour pecking order in similar ways? 
And why should we care about the highly skilled anyway 
if  they are more privileged? Considering the roles and 
positions of  those with (perceived) privilege and power 
would enable us to reconsider what is meant by centre 
and periphery, and would allow us to better understand 
how our models of  human welfare work. Framed within 
the rise in the (im)mobile precariat across countries in the 
global north, these questions also lend credence to the 
notion that there is value in research into the subjectivities 
of  those who already have, or who once had, a voice. 
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RepResentations: poweRs and pitfalls
One of  the challenges of  research in the social sciences is 
maintaining boundaries, and this is particularly true when 
working on asylum and deportation. The following case 
illustrates some of  the challenges faced during fieldwork 
investigating what happens post-deportation.
 My research has brought me into contact with a 
number of  activists and campaign organisations who act 
as gatekeepers, putting me in touch with young men pre-
deportation or recently deported from Europe. In return, 
I try to provide advice and information that will be 
helpful to activists and asylum seekers around Europe.  I 
work closely with Abdul1, a young man, himself  recently 
deported, who has become a deportation activist. 
Together we meet some of  those who arrive at Kabul 
airport, often alone and distressed. 
 In November 2013, I received a call from Abdul. He 
was worried about Asmat, an Afghan deported from 
Norway in 2012. Since Asmat’s return, he has been moving 
from one hiding place to another as he is discovered and 
attacked, and at the time he was in hiding near Jalalabad 
with a close friend of  his father’s, preparing to flee again. 
Those who have sheltered him have paid a high price: 
at least one of  his own brothers had been killed, two 
others have disappeared, as have the son and three of  the 
bodyguards of  one of  his hosts. At least one of  the safe 
houses has been partially destroyed.  
 I originally heard about Asmat from a Norwegian 
activist. She had written asking if  I could approach 
embassies in Afghanistan who might grant Asmat a visa 
to leave the country again, unaware that no embassy 
would. I had recommended that Asmat try to gather 
as much documentary evidence as possible, cross the 
border to Pakistan, and approach UNHCR there, since 
I knew UNHCR in Kabul couldn’t/wouldn’t help. But 
the activist told me that Asmat had already tried to get 
to Pakistan, and had been arrested and held for 15 days 
before being deported back to Afghanistan. He had to 
find an alternative place of  safety.
 The call in November was urgent – Asmat had 
phoned his supporter in Norway in a state of  terror. His 
hiding place had again been discovered and a large group 
of  Taliban were on their way to seek him out. She had 
called Abdul to ask if  he knew anyone in the province 
who could intervene. But Abdul’s Afghan contacts were 
limited – he had been deported to Afghanistan, but in 
fact he had grown up in Pakistan and had no family or 
networks in Afghanistan.
 I racked my brains – we needed someone senior in 
the Afghan army or police. Some months earlier, I had 
interviewed the deputy minister of  the Ministry for 
Refugees and Repatriation2, and we had stayed in touch. 
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I called him and asked if  he knew anyone who could 
help. I gave him Abdul’s number so he could get Asmat’s 
exact location to send the security forces. However, in the 
meantime Asmat had phoned Abdul to say the men had 
arrived in the village, but then the phone had gone dead. 
Abdul had no other way of  contacting him, and didn’t 
know from where he had been calling. 
 Sometime later, Asmat managed to call Abdul again. 
The Taliban had come in to the house where he was 
hiding, but didn’t recognize him. They had asked him 
if  he had seen ‘Asmat’ and he said no, he didn’t know 
anyone like that, but that he would let them know if  
he found anything. As soon as they had gone, two of  
his host’s bodyguards took him across the mountain to 
another village.
 When Abdul brought me up to date, he told me that 
the area where Asmat is hiding is, like many rural areas, 
completely under Taliban control. Asmat is afraid to leave 
because of  the Taliban checkpoints on all roads leading 
out of  the area. He asked the police for help, but was 
told, “Look, there are ten of  us in this area – what can we 
do against the Taliban?” 
 Later, my Norwegian contact emailed me. She had 
been Skyping with Asmat when the Taliban came. He 
had put his phone to the window so she could see them, 
but turned it off  when they came to the door. The next 
time they spoke, he told her he had a gun and that he 
would use it on himself  if  they came for him because 
he is afraid of  being tortured. He cried. She sat with 
him until the connection was broken. For now, there is 
nothing any of  us can do. 
 Of  course, this story will inform my research. And 
I will use it in expert reports for asylum appeals. But, 
given the opportunity, I will try to get Asmat out of  
Afghanistan, and do what I can to help his supporters get 
him to a place of  safety. Boundaries, of  whatever kind, 
may be necessary, but they should not be fetishized – 
especially not at the cost of  human suffering.3
Notes
1 Abdul writes a blog under his own name (Kabulblog) and 
wishes his real name to be used. Asmat’s name has been 
changed.
2 MoRR is responsible for Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs) and the six million refugees who have returned to 
Afghanistan since 2001. However, it has no resources of  its 
own and relies on international agencies.
3  Following the last attack, the friend of  Asmat’s father sent 
Asmat back to Kabul with a bodyguard. He is currently 
waiting to leave for Turkey and will try again to get to 
Europe – this time with sworn documentary evidence that 
his original claim was valid, and that events since his return 
give him grounds for a new claim.
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Third Place
My Children’s Mothers
Frances Nagle
We three have never met
but there is always a place
set for you at my feast-days.
One day you will arrive
weary after long years of  travel
through the kind of  hardship
that begins deceitfully small.
We will sit together 
and tell our stories –
of  a land struck dead
by a curse, by a baby.
Of  an ache – for something 
so missing, that the sun
turned its face to the wall
and earth turned to winter.
When it is time for your leaving
I will lend you a child
to light your journey home:
a son to defend you
from the forest phantoms;
a daughter with her 
dragon-soothing kisses.
troubling bodies
Troubling bodies
How Do you Recognise a Victim of  Trafficking? 
Bridget Anderson
And I have known the eyes already, known them all –
The eyes that fix you in a formulated phrase,
And when I am formulated, sprawling on a pin,
When I am pinned and wriggling on the wall,
Then how should I begin
The Love Song of  Alfred J Prufrock - T.S. Eliot
“How do you recognise a victim of  trafficking?” I 
once asked a senior immigration officer. This person 
headed a team at that time responsible for the majority 
of  referrals into the recognised UK anti-trafficking 
support programme. Since I had spent several months 
exploring the tensions, ambiguities and contradictions 
around definitions of  ‘force’, ‘exploitation’, ‘coercion’ 
and ‘position of  vulnerability’ papered over by the 2000 
Palermo Protocol, I was expecting a long answer. I 
thought she would say something about how difficult it 
is in practice to distinguish whether or not young women 
have been ‘forced’ into prostitution, when they are often 
faced with such limited options. How this is made even 
more difficult when sex work is so stigmatised that even 
acknowledging that it is ‘work’ that women and men can 
choose to do is highly contested. Her response took me 
aback: “You just look into their eyes,” she said, “and you 
can tell.” When pressed, my interviewee asserted the 
importance of  experience on the ground, of  gut feeling 
over academic hair-splitting. Practice trumps theory. 
 Trafficking is a rare patch of  common ground where 
migrants’ rights organisations and states can agree.  Even 
special interest groups and media outlets, generally 
hostile to migrants’ rights and ‘illegal immigration’, 
support victims of  trafficking, and call for an end to 
‘the modern day slave trade’. Indeed, calls for a more 
nuanced approach to trafficking can sound ridiculously 
over-privileged and removed when confronted by the 
heart-rending testimonies of  migrants who have endured 
the extremes of  human cruelty and abuse, and who 
have been ‘rescued’ by the committed graft of  NGOs, 
ordinary people, and immigration officers who genuinely 
are horrified by some of  the situations they come across. 
It is all very well talking about complexity and definitions, 
but what are we going to do? 
 In fact, academic concern with the challenge of  
definitions is experienced by frontline workers as a 
challenge of  identification. Put at its crudest, when is 
a migrant woman ‘forced’ to work as a sex worker, and 
therefore a victim of  trafficking, and when does she 
‘consent’ to work as a sex worker? NGOs frequently 
criticise states for not having proper systems in place 
to identify victims of  trafficking, and point to the high 
numbers claimed in the political rhetoric, and the low 
numbers actually granted any stay or compensation. For 
both states and NGOs, identification can be fraught, 
and it is easy to see how people might be thrown back 
on ‘gut feeling’. For the fewer one’s options, the more 
genuinely one will consent to a situation that might be, by 
others, labelled ‘unfree’. Getting caught up in definitions 
of  ‘consent’ and voluntariness, and identifying whether 
individuals really were in a position to make certain 
choices can risk forgetting important questions of  
justice. That is while questions like “Did Ayesha consent 
to being a live-in domestic worker in a household where 
she knew the family abused their employees?” must go 
alongside, “Is it just that these working conditions offer 
a relatively attractive option for Ayesha and is it just that 
these circumstances are allowed to persist?” What is 
just, of  course, is a question that is both theoretical and 
eminently practical.
 Trafficking is an important laboratory in migration 
studies. Firstly, it demonstrates the importance of  theory 
to practice. Too often, the relation between academics 
and practitioners is reduced to access and lobbying along 
such a formula as: you give me access to interviewees and 
data, and I’ll give you a lobbying document. Trafficking 
demonstrates that theory matters, and that academics 
have a responsibility to debate this with practitioners. 
This is not because practitioners and the general public 
have no theories. In my interview with the senior 
immigration officer it was clear that she was deploying 
theories of  embodiment, of  contract, of  emotion and 
reason. The challenge was that she did not think that she 
was deploying any theories at all; rather she felt she was 
simply stating the obvious. Familiarity with the theories 
made them unquestionable. It is an important part of  
academic work to defamiliarise, and the very obviousness 
of  trafficking, its uncontestability, should invite critique. 
And this relates to the second way in which trafficking is 
a laboratory. The victim of  trafficking is, like the migrant, 
a policy subject, a figure to be enumerated, a problem to 
be solved, a bundle of  circumstances and relations that is 
captured and enumerated in data. But a policy subject is not 
the same as political subject. Acknowledging the political 
subjectivity of  policy subjects can entail challenging 
those very policies and studies, the ‘formulated phrase’ 
that defines them in the first place. This is particularly 
difficult in the case of  ‘victims of  trafficking’, who are 
defined by victimhood and by lack of  political agency. 
But it is not confined to this topic. How both to work 
with the policy subject of  ‘the migrant’ and ‘the victim of  
trafficking’, and challenge the reification of  this subject, 
is a constant challenge for critical migration scholars, for 
activists, and for ‘migrants’ more generally. “Then how 
should I begin?”
Troubling bodies
Social Determinants of  Migrants’ Health 
Hiranthi Jayaweera
The size and diversity of  present day global human 
mobility have significant implications for population 
health. According to the United Nations, there are around 
214 million people crossing borders to live in countries 
other than those they were born in, and more than three 
times this number moving within countries. Migrants, 
whether workers, students, refugees, asylum seekers, 
undocumented, or family members, like people in both 
sending and receiving countries who do not migrate, 
are characterised by diverse factors affecting their health 
status and health needs. It is also important to recognise 
that the relationship between migration and health is a 
two way process. While it is more commonly considered 
that migration impacts on people’s health, health is also 
implicated in migration motivations and processes – for 
example, it plays a part in determining who is allowed 
into or out of  a country.
 There are two broad interrelated considerations that 
are important in thinking about migrants’ health. The 
first has to do with what are the determinants of  migrants’ 
health, while the second relates to the scope within which 
the health of  migrants is considered, that is, going 
beyond a receiving country perspective to include the 
entire migration process. 
 Generally, social – as distinct from genetic or 
biological – determinants of  people’s health refer to 
the impact of  social factors on health outcomes, or on 
health inequalities/disparities between different groups. 
Traditionally, the focus has been on an observed socio-
economic gradient in health, whether measured by 
individual socio-economic position or social class, or 
by area deprivation indicators: for instance, higher and 
widening obesity rates over time among men and women 
in unskilled manual jobs compared to those in professional 
jobs in England; and higher rates of  premature mortality 
for cancer, heart attacks, strokes, lung disease and liver 
disease in areas of  social deprivation (Marmot et al., 
2010). Considering ethnicity or migration variables (for 
example, country of  birth, length of  residence in the 
receiving society and legal status) in relation to socio-
economic factors in health outcomes complicates the 
picture. As critics have pointed out, simply conflating, 
say, ethnicity and social class on the basis that once 
social class is adjusted for in analysis, ethnic inequalities 
in health often disappear or are reduced, fails to fully 
unravel the relationship between ethnic (or country of  
birth) differences, socio-economic position, and health 
inequalities (Lorant and Bhopal, 2011). In exploring 
the social determinants of  migrants’ health and health 
inequalities, studies have shown that it is imperative 
to consider, both conceptually and empirically, the 
interaction (intersectionality) between a variety of  factors 
affecting  health status, health behaviour, and access to 
healthcare, including: 
• Demography – for example, sex, age, age at migration 
and life cycle stage;
• Socio-economic position – for example, educational and 
occupational background and present circumstances, 
income, housing and living situation;
• Place – not just level of  area deprivation, but also the 
importance of  social support provided by co-ethnics 
in the locality: the ‘ethnic density effect’ (see Pickett 
and Wilkinson, 2008);
• Immigration and integration policies – for example, rules 
governing entry, access to health and other services, 
and to economic and social opportunities which 
impact on health;
• Direct and indirect racism and discrimination;
• Ethnic and cultural background - including religion, 
languages and health-related practices;
• Migration histories - including sending contexts (see 
below), length of  residence in receiving societies, and 
transnational connections.
Social determinants of  migrants’ health should not be 
viewed simply from a receiving society perspective. 
All stages of  the migration process – pre-departure, 
migration journeys, destination, return to sending 
countries/areas – contribute determining factors for 
migrants’ physical and mental health, and health and 
social protection (Zimmerman et al., 2011). The ‘healthy 
migrant effect’, linking sending and receiving contexts, is 
one framework that is used in some studies. It explores 
selectivity in the migration of  healthier people that is 
associated with positive health outcomes, which in turn 
change/deteriorate over time as migrants adopt ‘risky’ 
health behaviours (for example smoking patterns or diet) 
characteristic of  receiving society populations, which are 
associated with a high prevalence of  non-communicable 
diseases, such as heart disease, stroke and diabetes among 
some first and second generation ethnic minority groups. 
However, other evidence has challenged the explanatory 
value of  linear health ‘acculturation’ models, which do not 
take into account the complexity of  social determinants, 
including structural constraints in achieving healthy life 
styles, health behaviour and disease patterns in countries 
of  origin, and the pre-migration health status of  those 
who migrate, in understanding patterns of  migrants’ 
health over time (Jayaweera and Quigley, 2010).
Troubling bodies
 Overall, evidence suggests that a comprehensive 
understanding of  migrants’ health must be based on 
a conceptual framework that explores the dynamic 
interaction of  a variety of  social determinants within a 
context that encompasses the entire migration process 
from origins to destinations and back again.
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Skills 
Linda McDowell
The idea that skills are an objective measure typically 
associated with attributes that are rewarded by market 
mechanisms is a central argument in conventional 
economic analyses of  the labour market. Skills are 
regarded as a measure or reflection of  competence to 
perform a particular task or range of  tasks, often acquired 
through education and training, but also by experience 
during one’s working life. The notion of  a skill may also 
encompass less clearly identifiable characteristics, such 
as the exercise of  judgement or discretion, as well as 
what have been termed ‘tacit’ skills, such as emotional 
intelligence. 
 Skills may be generic or job-specific, and are associated 
with distinctions in the labour market. Thus, in the UK, 
it is common to distinguish between skilled, semi-skilled 
and unskilled workers. Indeed, this distinction is the 
basis for the definition of  class positions in industrial 
economies, and is associated with moral worth.  The 
unskilled – those without recognised credentials – tend 
to be the lowest paid, and often the least secure, in the 
labour market. Among their ranks are essential blue collar 
workers and public employees, from refuse collectors to 
street cleaners, without whom cities would not function 
efficiently, as well as what used to be termed ‘factory 
hands’. 
 Skills such as judgement and organisational ability, 
even authority – the tacit skills that are important in the 
‘knowledge economy’ – are more typically mapped onto 
high status forms of  work, and so those who exhibit such 
traits are defined as highly skilled workers. As manual 
employment in manufacturing industries began to decline 
in advanced industrial economies from the early 1970s, a 
claim that older ‘craft workers’ were being deskilled by 
new technology (as computer-based technology replaced 
hot metal typesetting in the printing industry, for example) 
was advanced by Harry Braverman. A nostalgic sense of  
loss lay behind this claim and behind a related argument 
about the decline of  regionally specific ‘traditions of  
skill’ that geographers had identified in post-war Britain 
– skilled metal workers in South Yorkshire, for example, 
or gifted women textile workers in Lancashire. 
 The most significant challenge to the notion that skill 
is an objective measure is found in feminist analyses of  
the labour process. In studies of  the patterns of  gender 
segregation in the labour market in both advanced industrial 
economies in the north and developing economies in 
the south, the connections between skill classifications, 
gender, and low pay have been made plain. Women in 
economies across the world find themselves undertaking 
tasks that are classified as low-skilled, whether the ‘caring’ 
labour of  childcare and care of  the elderly, of  nursing and 
primary school teaching, or working in shops, cafes and 
bars, providing ‘service with a smile’ in the USA, UK and 
other states, or the low-waged work in export processing 
zones, where women’s ‘nimble fingers’ made them ideal 
workers for assembling transistors or the components 
of  iPhones. In all these jobs, the ‘natural’ attributes of  
femininity – empathy, service, emotional literacy, dealing 
with bodily fluids and emissions, sewing, knitting and 
weaving – albeit on an industrial scale, make them ideal 
employees, and as these skills are seen as natural, rather 
than acquired by training or long experience in the labour 
market, then they were not well-remunerated. Decades 
ago, Jane Jenson (1989) captured this differentiation in 
her argument about ‘the talents of  women’ compared 
to ‘the skills of  men’, but recognition of  women’s skills 
in terms of  higher pay still remains elusive. As labour 
market segmentation between men and women is so 
significant, policies such as equal pay for equal work have 
had little effect, as women often find it hard to find a 
male comparator when making a claim for equality. This 
has been recognised in the UK, for example, in a shift to 
legislation based on equal pay for equal value work, when 
it has been argued, for example, that the skills of  a female 
cook match those of  a male painter. 
 The argument that there is an association between 
skill, value, pay and gender that disadvantages women 
workers has become increasingly important in the growing 
dominance of  service sector employment, where both the 
provider and purchaser of  a service must be present in 
the exchange. What is known as interactive employment 
– undertaken by shop assistants, waiters, airline crew and 
personal trainers – has been termed ‘emotional labour’ 
or ‘body work’, to capture the significance of  a labour 
market performance in which the service providers must 
be attentive to the feelings and demands of  consumers. 
The embodied attributes of  an employee, such as facial 
expression, accent, weight, age and skin colour, as well as 
deference, must be pleasing to customers so that they will 
return and repurchase services. By and large, a woman is 
the typical employee in these jobs.
 The recognition that the definition of  skill is not 
independent of  the workers who perform different types 
of  labour has been extended into a more general analysis 
that links gender, nationality, skin colour and migrant 
status to distinctions between workers on the basis of  their 
‘skills’. Analyses of, for example, migrant Filipina women 
working as nurses in Canada have shown that stereotypical 
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assumptions about their docility and deference means that 
they are often excluded from the training programmes that 
lead to promotion. Women of  colour are often tracked 
into inferior positions in the care sector on the assumption 
that they lack skills, and the training they receive often 
mirrors assumptions about their ‘natural’ capacity to care. 
As a carer in a nursing home in Chicago once told an 
investigator, “I am not sure if  they are training me to be a 
nursing assistant or a black woman.”
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A Global Care Crisis 
Fiona Williams
My Mommy gone over de ocean
My Mommy gone over de sea
she gawn dere to work for some money
an den she gawn sen back for me
one year
two year
three year gawn
four year
five year
six year come
The Arrival of  Brighteye - Jean ‘Binta’ Breeze
The increase in migration and particularly female 
migration – half  of  the world’s 190 million migrants 
are women – means that care has become a global issue. 
Caring for children or ageing parents may stretch across 
continents. At the same time, many women who migrate 
from poorer regions go into paid care or domestic work, 
looking after children, older people and households in 
richer nations. In parallel to these ‘global care chains’ is the 
increased transnational recruitment of  nurses and doctors 
from developing countries to work in the care homes and 
hospitals of  the health services in the developed world. 
The care industry has become big international business, 
as providers move their operations across the globe and, 
in a countermovement, financial organisations transfer 
an annual US$500 billion of  migrants’ remittances back 
home. How is it that care has become a transnational 
commodity? And what are the consequences? 
 The connection between migration and care work is 
linked to two aspects of  social change. First is the global 
increase in women’s involvement in the labour market. In 
developed countries, this is marked by a shift away from 
the ‘malebreadwinner’ model of  family life to one which 
assumes that all adults, men and women, are in paid work 
– out of  necessity as much as women’s emancipation. 
In poorer regions of  the world, the destruction of  local 
economies, unemployment and poverty have pressed 
women into assuming a greater breadwinning role.
 Second, this means that care has become a central 
social, political, and economic concern. How can 
responsibilities for care be reconciled when women are 
employed? How can support for care be paid for? In the 
richer regions an ageing society and declining fertility have 
made these questions critical, along with greater political 
and financial pressure to cut back on social expenditure 
costs. These issues of  a ‘care crisis’ are no less pressing 
in developing countries, where at its extreme, in Africa, 
AIDS, chronic illness, natural disasters and a high child 
dependency ratio, place enormous burdens on women, 
who are expected to care and earn with very little 
infrastructural support. Migration, often into domestic 
and care work, is one way that women can find earning 
opportunities, even though this intensifies the caring 
responsibilities of  those left behind.
 Increasingly, the employment of  migrant care and 
health workers has become, directly or indirectly, one 
way in which richer nation states and their citizens can 
meet their needs for care and work/life balance at lower 
cost. While this might look like a symbiotic relationship, 
in effect it reproduces profound problems. 
 To begin with, care work has traditionally been 
devalued and considered to be more of  a female ‘attribute’ 
than a skill (in spite of  the fact that it often demands 
considerable people skills and physical strength), and 
where it involves paid work within private households, 
it is less open to collective bargaining. This, combined 
with their relative lack of  citizenship rights, means that 
migrant workers usually command low wages and poor 
conditions.
 This is accentuated by the ways in which, across most 
developed welfare states, the private market has become 
a central feature of  care provision through contracting 
out state or local authority services to the private sector, 
and by providing families with vouchers, cash benefits, or 
tax credits to meet their household, children’s and older 
relatives’ care needs through the private or voluntary 
sector. Care is labour-intensive work, but companies and 
agencies seek to make a profit through cutting labour 
costs, often compromising on the quality of  care. 
 In addition, while the immediate problem women 
face in trying to combine paid work with household and 
care responsibilities can be resolved by paying women 
from poorer classes or countries to do that work, this 
detracts from the wider issue of  men’s responsibility to 
share domestic and care work.  
 Furthermore, when we consider the fact that states 
have become global employers recruiting their health 
care staff  from poorer countries, the geopolitical 
inequalities then become apparent in the draining of  
care resources from poorer countries. In Norway, almost 
a quarter of  workers in health and community services 
come from abroad – from places like Poland, Latvia and 
the Philippines. In the Philippines, structural adjustment 
policies have increased foreign debt and reduced the state’s 
capacity to improve its own health, care and education 
infrastructures. This instability drives migration, along 
with an export-oriented economy in which nursing and 
care labor provide, through remittances, the largest 
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source of  foreign currency. Yet overall, this situation 
perpetuates geopolitical inequalities and the gendered 
inequalities associated with care responsibilities, as well 
as the devaluation of  care as an activity. 
 Is there an alternative? Global strategies include 
in 2010 the International Labour Organisation’s 
convention for the rights of  domestic workers and the 
World Health Organisation’s endorsement of  an ethical 
code for countries to follow in the recruitment of  
migrant health workers. These are important, but there 
is a bigger challenge. Common to both developed and 
developing countries is a logic of  policy-making that 
focuses on productivism, the facilitation of  markets, 
and on drawing women into the labour market on ‘male’ 
terms, where care needs have to be organized around 
paid work. Although care is central to national and global 
economies, and to wellbeing and human sustainability, its 
activities are subsumed under economic competitiveness 
and are often invisible in calculations of  gross domestic 
product. Recognising care as a collective social good 
means prioritizing the needs of  care providers and care 
receivers in political and economic strategies. This would 
be a start to tackling a global care crisis in which the care 
needs of  households and countries are being resolved 
through a hidden dependence on the unequal gendered 
and geopolitical relations of  care work. 
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Illustrating Migration 
Mikal Mast
The old adage ‘a picture is worth a thousand words’ may 
be a cliché. Still, web and social media practitioners are 
encouraged to use images to entice readers to written 
content. Studies show that web pages and social media 
posts with images are visited significantly more often than 
those without (see MDG, 2012). Quite clearly, if  we want 
to promote academic work successfully on the web, we 
need to use images. But with a complicated subject like 
migration, an important question arises: which images 
can we safely use? 
 In writing for the web we often take our cue from 
journalism. Attention-grabbing headlines, the inverted 
pyramid structure (information placed in decreasing 
order of  importance) and short paragraphs can help 
readers absorb information. When it comes to imagery, 
however, journalism has a poor record.
 Scan the media for immigration stories and you 
will find a uniformly negative or oversimplified visual 
representation of  migration. The tabloids sensationalise 
with vaguely menacing pictures of  crowds in foreign 
dress, often with the faces blacked out, ostensibly for 
privacy reasons, but with the ultimate result of  furnishing 
them with a somewhat criminal look. Also common are 
images of  women wearing the burqa, which obviates 
the need to censor faces, but helps convey a sense of  
something foreign and unknown. The broadsheets, by 
contrast, tend to go safe and boring with pictures of  lines 
at immigration control.
 It is often said that people remember only 10 per cent 
of  what they hear, 20 per cent of  what they read, and 30 
per cent of  what they see. Although there is no actual 
research backing these numbers (Genovese, 2010), the 
fact remains that images have a powerful impact. Tabloid 
readers are left with the impression that immigrants are 
poor and possibly criminal, while broadsheet readers 
might assume that immigration is merely about border 
control.
 Bias in images is reinforced in newspaper content. 
Research conducted by COMPAS’s Migration 
Observatory has demonstrated that there is a textual 
bias in newspaper coverage of  immigration, with ‘illegal’ 
being the most common descriptor of  immigrants across 
all newspaper types (Allen and Blinder, 2013). 
 So how do we, as communicators of  academic 
research, push back against this bias? When COMPAS 
first started, we didn’t use images on the website, simply 
because we didn’t have access to an image collection 
varied enough to represent the multifarious aspects of  
migration. One solution was to source images from 
the public. In 2008, COMPAS started an annual photo 
competition. The competition invites photo submissions 
from UK residents on various themes involving migration, 
from ‘Life in Motion’ to ‘Traces of  Belonging’. Prizes are 
offered for the winning entries, with the condition that 
any submission can be used in COMPAS publications and 
promotional materials. This competition has provided us 
with a large pool of  quality images, some of  which are 
included in this anthology.
 Even with this varied collection of  images, however, 
we must still select carefully. An image chosen for a pop-
up banner once drew comment from an attendee at one 
of  our seminars. The image was of  a white man, and the 
interlocutor wondered why we had not used an image of  
a member of  an ethnic minority. This person represented 
a civil society organisation working with migrant groups, 
and as such was concerned about the general dearth of  
positive representations of  ethnic minorities in the media. 
However, migration is not solely an issue of  ethnicity. 
In order to present a nuanced view of  immigration we 
need to include ‘invisible’ migrants as well, namely those 
who are white, wealthy and sometimes even British, and 
who feature far less prominently in the popular media 
as ‘migrants’. For example, while London has a larger 
population of  French residents than Bordeaux, and 
could be considered France’s sixth largest city in terms 
of  the population of  French migrants, as of  2010 there 
were some 44,000 more British migrants living in France 
than the reverse (Vargas-Silva, 2012).
 At COMPAS we try to promote staff  research 
using images that pique the reader’s interest in the ideas 
expressed, rather than confirming existing bias. We use a 
wide variety of  images, some sourced from the COMPAS 
photo competition entries, some purchased from stock 
photography providers. In doing so, we strive to illustrate 
the complexity of  migration and the wide variety of  
migration research conducted at COMPAS.
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Troubling bodies
Ageing and Migration 
Russell King
Ask anyone in Britain or Europe to think of  a typical 
migrant and the image that most likely floats into their 
mind is the Polish plumber or the Somali or Kurdish 
asylum seeker; or, from an earlier era, the Irish ‘navvy’ 
or the Turkish factory worker. Images, in other words, 
of  young, mostly male, working-age ‘foreigners’ who are 
economic migrants, ‘guestworkers’, or refugees. Older or 
‘later-life’ people have been excluded from the thinking 
and the literature on migration, unjustifiably so.
 Ageing is less about life-stage and more about process. 
Whilst ‘age’ is a biological reality that may be measured 
in years, the meaning and experience of  age, as well 
as the process of  ageing, are socially, culturally and 
historically situated and constructed. In some societies, 
maturity and old age are related to life experience, being 
a grandparent, even using a walking stick; ‘elderly’ people 
may be venerated and looked after by the family circle. 
Elsewhere, older people are marginalised, rejected, 
hidden away; or the ‘culture of  ageing’ may favour 
independence, individualism and attempts to remain 
physically and mentally active for decades beyond any 
notional retirement age.
 Notions of  relationality and intersectionality also 
enter the debate over the conceptualisation of  ageing, 
especially in a context of  migration and transnational 
familyhood. Older people are part of  families and 
networks; intergenerationality is often the keystone of  
these relational structures of  age. Whilst some research 
has documented the intergenerational ruptures and 
connections that migration and transnational living entail 
(King et al., 2006), less work has been done to explore the 
intersectionalities of  ageing, including those brought out in 
a migratory setting; the ways in which later life intersects 
with other markers of  social difference such as gender, 
‘race’, class, sexuality, disability, and so on.
 We can identify three strands of  research on ageing 
and migration. First, there are older people who are 
left behind by migration. As younger age cohorts 
migrate, for work or lifestyle reasons, their parents and 
grandparents remain in the home country and a cross-
generational rupture results within the family and the 
wider community. King and Vullnetari (2006) used the 
term ‘orphan pensioners’ to describe the plight of  older 
generations in rural Albania, abandoned by the mass 
exodus of  young adults in the 1990s. The challenges of  
the long-distance transnational care of  the elderly have 
been thoroughly researched by Baldassar (2007) in the 
context of  post-war Italian migration to Australia.
 Second, there are people who migrate in later life, 
often at or around retirement. International retirement 
migrants are classic lifestyle migrants, seeking out 
pleasant rural or seaside locations. From the colder 
climes of  northern USA or Canada, wealthy retirees 
head to the sunshine states of  Florida and California, 
or further south into lower-cost Mexico. For some, the 
move is permanent; for others it is seasonal – they are 
‘snowbirds’. Parallel flows of  retiree migrants exist in 
Europe: Britons, Scandinavians, Germans and Dutch 
migrate to the Spanish coasts and islands, or to rural 
idylls such as Provence or Tuscany (King et al., 2000).
 Our third category is those who migrate as younger 
people and who then age abroad. Given the histories 
of  labour migration in post-war Europe (as well as 
North America, Australia, and so on), when millions of  
young men and women migrated to work in factories, 
on construction sites, and in services during the 1950s, 
60s and 70s, this ‘ageing in place’ is currently a mass 
phenomenon. True, some have return-migrated to 
countries of  origin upon leaving the labour market, 
but most have stayed, anchored by children and 
grandchildren who have been born, brought up, educated 
and socialised in the host societies. But there are other, 
more problematic, outcomes too. Hunter (2011) has 
written of  the plight of  labour migrants who went to 
France in the post-war decades as single migrants, leaving 
their families behind in North and West Africa, and who 
are still living sad, isolated lives in the hostels built to 
temporarily accommodate them as workers fifty years 
ago.
 These three typologies are not discrete categories, 
and I return to the Albanian case to demonstrate this. 
Looking at the evolution of  this migration stream, which 
in little more than two decades has seen more than a 
million Albanians – one-third of  the country’s population 
– emigrate to Greece and Italy, the following sequenced 
interactions between age/ageing and migration can be 
observed (King and Vullnetari, 2006). Early departures 
– trekking over the mountains to Greece or crowding 
into boats to southern Italy – primarily comprised young 
men seeking temporary work. Following ‘regularisation’ 
schemes in both destination countries in the late 1990s, 
this short-term, irregular migration evolved into family 
settlement, leading to the abandonment of  the older 
family members in Albania. Next, migration of  the 
older generation started to occur, for several reasons. 
Grandparents could undertake childcare and home 
management, thereby releasing the migrant mother 
full-time into the Greek or Italian labour market. The 
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three-generation migrant family also kept the Albanian 
language and culture alive within the household. But 
the isolation of  the older generation then became a 
problem, as they were dependent solely on their families 
for social interaction; moreover, as the Greek and Italian-
born second generation became older, the grandparents’ 
childcare role was diminished. Return migration of  the 
older generation to Albania often ensued. Recently, 
however, the Greek financial crisis has destabilised the 
family settlement of  Albanians in the country, and new 
necessities of  transnational living and return migration 
are unfolding, lessening the isolation of  those older 
people left behind.
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Troubling bodies
Body Work 
Carol Wolkowitz
Migration and bodies are linked: it is embodied persons 
who migrate, and who experience gains and tragedies in 
embodied forms. Our bodies are physical, biologically-
based entities, but they are also our way of  being in the 
world and of  experiencing ourselves, other people, and 
the world around us. 
 Gender analysis has for some time challenged taken-
for-granted notions about migration, but we often forget 
how closely the roots and consequences of  gender 
ideology are linked to gender-inflected racist assumptions 
about bodies. The lens of  embodiment brings out starkly 
the intractability of  the issues facing migrant women, 
whose paid work is frequently limited to forms of  
intimate ‘body work’ on and with other people’s bodies 
(Wolkowitz et al., 2013). The consequences include not 
just the low wages but the vulnerability – sexual and 
otherwise – of  employment in socially and physically 
isolating work. 
 Paid ‘body work’ focusing on the bodies of  others 
includes work in hospitals, nursing homes and crèches, 
as well as care work in people’s homes, where it blends 
almost imperceptibly into the defined tasks associated 
with paid domestic work,  pictured quite explicitly in the 
housewifery training given to Indonesian women before 
they travel to work as maids in the Gulf, as documented 
by Susan Meiselas’ photographic essay Costly Dream, 
produced in collaboration with Human Rights Watch 
(www.hrw.org/features/costly-dream). Migrant women 
are also recruited into household ‘body work’ through 
highly commodified forms of  marriage. 
 The constructions of  bodies which tie women to 
most forms of  ‘body work’ (and excuse men from 
participation) can be understood in several ways. There are 
economic reasons why migrant women are sought out as 
cheap labour in modern economies. The focus of  much 
reproductive work on human bodies is consequential 
for how it is organised and the downward pressure on 
wages (Wolkowitz et al., 2013). Not only is it labour 
intensive (one person can work on only one body at a 
time, so economies of  scale are difficult), it also has to be 
performed in the presence of  the recipient, so exporting 
it to lower-waged economies is not an alternative. (The 
bodies of  consumers can travel abroad, as in the case 
of  sex and medical tourism, but this is never going to 
be sufficient to deal with the care crisis in the global 
north nor day-to-day reproductive work.) Moreover, 
employers have few incentives to invest in a higher paid 
labour force: ‘body work’ output cannot be stockpiled, 
nor resold at a profit, and customers are state agencies, 
insurance companies and families seeking substitutes for 
their own unpaid childcare or care of  the elderly. 
 There are also important cultural assumptions about 
bodies which render men less suitable for intimate work 
than women. The ideological roots of  racialised migrant 
women’s association with reproductive labour go back to 
the Victorian age and beyond. Bodies, especially if  they 
are naked or vulnerable, are coded as feminine, linked 
to nature, emotions, something to be exposed only in 
private. Moreover, the construction of  male bodies as 
sexually predatory means that both men and women 
often prefer to be attended by women. 
 Below these everyday, relatively conscious 
assumptions, some argue that the ‘leakiness’ of  the 
human body is a source of  unconscious anxiety, especially 
for men (Widding Isaksen, 2002). Bodily fluids are cast 
out of  consciousness because they trouble both the 
boundaries of  the body and of  those of  social groups 
and categories: identity, system and order, as the French 
psychoanalyst and writer Julia Kristeva puts it. There 
is considerable tension between the demands of  ‘body 
work’ and the construction of  men’s bodies as dry, solid, 
firm and contained. 
 However, these psychoanalytical readings rarely 
recognise that, as Bridget Anderson stresses, our 
understanding of  the body is deeply racialised. From 
slavery onward, forced and voluntary migrants have been 
involved in ‘body work’. Anderson (2000) argues that 
the relationship between ‘hatred of  women … hatred of  
the body … and hatred of  racialised groups … is played 
out in the use of  racialised female labour to do the work 
of  servicing the body and in the treatment of  domestic 
workers by their employers’. These assumptions also play 
out in sex work, and in other workplaces (nail salons, 
spas) where migrant women’s body labour is at risk of  
being read as sexual, the more especially when undertaken 
by racialised women whose bodies are already coded as 
particularly sexual (Kang, 2010). 
 Not all features of  ‘body work’ are negative, especially 
as it provides opportunities for highly skilled migrant 
workers in, for example, medicine, dentistry and nursing. 
Some intimate ‘body work’ takes place within satisfying 
long-term, caring relationships - although these may lead 
to exploitative fictive kinship relations, reliance on gifts 
rather than proper wages, and incursions into workers’ 
own time and bodies. The cared-for also have different 
experiences of  bodily interaction. The experience of  
being ‘cleaned up after’ may confer ‘a certain magical 
weightlessness and immateriality’ (Ehrenreich, 2003) on 
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the employer, epitomised in beauty salons, where workers 
are obliged to defer to clients in ways that sustain both the 
enchanting myth of  customer sovereignty and racialised 
and classed hierarchies. On the other hand, working with 
low-status clients does not enhance the social power 
of  the ‘body worker’: caring for ageing, ‘leaky’, and 
disempowered bodies seems only to stigmatise those 
who care for them.
 Gendered and racialised assumptions about bodies also 
play out in understandings of  men’s bodies. For instance, 
South Asian men building the facilities for the 2022 
World Cup in Qatar face appalling working conditions. 
Neglect of  male workers’ health and safety is connected 
not only to migrants’ disposability, but also to particular 
understandings of  male bodies (vigorous, capable, and 
offering, rather than requiring protection) that have long 
justified employers’ shrugging off  responsibility for male 
workers’ safety.
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Racism and Migration 
John Solomos
From one vantage point, the development of  research 
agendas on race and racism have been inextricably 
linked to questions about migration, asylum and refuge. 
Certainly, in the scholarly debates of  the past few 
decades, accounts of  migration have also often explored 
patterns of  racialization, racist hostility and xenophobia. 
In the British context, by way of  example, the work of  
scholars such as John Rex and Sheila Allen encompasses 
both the study of  immigration and the politics of  racism. 
Scholars working in this tradition have tended to see the 
two sub-fields as closely interlinked, and they have used 
similar theoretical tools to approach empirical research 
questions. And yet, at the same time, research and policy 
debates about race and racism have remained somewhat 
separate from the growing bodies of  scholarship on 
global migration and movement. In some ways, this 
separation can be seen as reflecting the trend by scholars 
within the academy to create space both for the study 
of  race and of  migration. It also reflects wider political 
and policy agendas that seek to separate questions about 
immigration from those about race and ethnic relations.
 Perhaps one way to begin addressing this separation 
is to seek to understand the focus of  studies of  race 
and racism, as compared to studies of  migration. The 
study of  race and racism has a historical focus as well 
as a contemporary research agenda. In particular, it 
developed out of  efforts to understand the social 
significance attached to social groups that differ in terms 
of  physical attributes that are defined through a language 
of  race. Thus, we have seen a range of  studies for over 
a century now about the social significance of  race in 
the USA both during the period of  slavery and in the 
century and a half  since its abolition. In this context, 
racism as a concept is much more closely tied to the 
concept of  race, and is a reminder that, where members 
of  a society make distinctions between different racial 
groups, at least some members of  that society are 
likely to behave in ways which give rise to racism as a 
behavioural and ideational consequence of  making racial 
distinctions in the first place. Within the context of  
British society, the study of  what came to be called race 
relations grew out of  research on immigration and the 
political and social responses to the arrival and settlement 
of  racial and ethnic minorities. Thus, John Rex’s early 
attempt to define the study of  race relations highlights 
the positioning of  migrant labour as an underclass, 
unusually harsh class exploitation, strict legal intergroup 
distinctions and occupational segregation, differential 
access to power and prestige, and cultural diversity and 
limited group interaction (1970). This framing of  race 
relations was seen in somewhat different terms from 
American scholars but was still premised on the ways in 
which social groups were defined as occupying racially 
defined social positions.
 The study of  global migration has its roots in efforts 
to comprehend the role of  the wider context of  changing 
patterns of  migration and refugee movements that have 
done much to reshape the global order that has emerged 
from the late 20th century onwards. Although the study of  
migration has longer term historical roots, it has become 
more significant in the period since the 1960s and 1970s, 
and has become a more established field of  research in 
recent years. Both the theoretical and empirical focus of  
migration research is thus different from the influences 
that helped to shape the study of  race relations. Although 
some accounts of  migration emphasize the complex 
social and political debates that result from processes of  
migration and minority formation (Castles et al., 2014), 
major strands of  migration research have tended to focus 
on the experiences of  particular migrant communities or 
sections of  those communities. From this perspective, 
the broad phenomenon of  migration and mobility, 
particularly in all its varied global and geopolitical forms, 
is a field of  scholarship and research that can be seen as 
differentiated from the study of  race and racism in both 
conceptual and empirical terms.
 The development of  both scholarly and policy agendas 
in the period since the 1990s has tended to accentuate a 
trend towards a differentiation between studies of  race 
and racism and those concerned with global migration. 
Yet over the same period, it has also become evident 
that there are important linkages between the study of  
race and racism and migration. Both race and racism and 
migration are shaped by, and in turn shape, the changing 
patterns of  globalization and neoliberal economic and 
social policy agendas that have become evident over the 
past two decades. It can be argued, in this context, that 
we need more engaged dialogue by scholars working 
in these sub-fields, in order to better comprehend the 
changing role of  race and racism, as well as complex 
patterns of  migration and diversity in contemporary 
societies. Scholars working in both fields can learn from 
each other by exploring issues such as global economic 
transformation, political mobilization, multiculture and 
urban life, and racist movements and ideologies. Such 
an exploration needs to move beyond a national frame 
and situate the importance of  comparative analysis. In 
investigating such issues it will also be possible to address 
the question of  the relevance of  the conceptual frames 
that can be used to address both sets of  phenomena.
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This summer, upon returning to Malaysia, where I was 
born, I was greeted pleasantly by immigration officers. I 
was surprised.  Previously, former citizens, upon re-entry, 
could expect thinly veiled hostility for having left the 
country. Have Malaysian immigration authorities put into 
practice their motto of  ‘Malaysia, truly Asia’, I wondered, 
by welcoming Asians of  all shades, regardless of  their 
citizenship? Things were different in the 1970s when I 
was a young (ethnic Chinese) Malaysian citizen attending 
university in New York. During my visits home, my 
stomach would churn as I approached the immigration 
counter. The display of  my Malaysian passport did not 
deflect the barely concealed disdain of  border officials. 
The resentment, perhaps, was of  my privilege of  having 
gone abroad for higher education. Class hostility was 
also tinged by ethnic and gender bias. In one startling 
reception, a customs officer searching my bags ripped 
open a box of  Tampax and scattered tampons across his 
desk. To avoid possible vile encounters thereafter, I made 
sure to wear batik dresses and speak Malay when meeting 
immigration officials. Minimally, such performance of  
cultural citizenship, a token display to some ideal of  
nationalism, seemed to ease my transit through Malaysian 
airports, even after I became a US citizen in the early 
1980s (Ong, 2003). 
 But on my most recent trip back, I was warned by 
relatives living abroad that ethnic Chinese returnees 
speaking Bahasa or wearing batik are more likely to incur 
scorn than smiles, and at the airport, a locally-born ethnic 
Chinese person acting ‘foreign’ may be more welcome 
than one acting ‘Malaysian.’ Immigration authorities seem 
to sift through a constellation of  ethnic, legal, cultural and 
economic forces as they screen ethnic Chinese subjects 
for multiple associations, some desirable, others not. This 
politics of  ethnic identification and performance at the 
arrival point induces disorientation in the former Chinese-
Malaysian citizen who has to decipher and mirror the 
shifting perception and reception of  the border guard. 
 As nodes of  international passage, airports have 
a charismatic place in the semiotics of  contemporary 
vertigo. Different accounts tap into a tension between 
a placeless cosmopolitan freedom of  movement, or a 
site of  national checkpoints through which identities are 
evaluated, vetted, or dismantled. Anthropologists give 
opposing views on airport arrivals and the experience 
of  identity. Marc Auge (2001) paints a schematic picture 
of  the modern traveller who, after moving through the 
anonymous ‘non-space’ of  the airport, upon arrival 
regains his identity along with his luggage, and sense of  
The Enigma of  Return1 
Aihwa Ong
place. Ethnographic attention to specificity, however, 
reveals that for certain ‘kinds’ of  persons, the airport 
arrival is the beginning of  confusion or an unravelling 
of  identity. Sara Friedman (2010) observes that mainland 
Chinese ‘marital migrants’ to Taiwan are interrogated by 
immigration officials as to the ‘truth’ of  their claims. For 
travelers perceived to have ambiguous affiliations (for 
example where ethnicity blurs the link to citizenship), the 
immigration encounter dissolves identity into an enigma.
 In postcolonial upheavals, multi-ethnic worlds created 
under colonialism were forcibly reshaped into the policed 
politics of  new nationalisms. ‘Ethnic’ categories were 
re-constituted and incorporated as minority modes of  
national belonging. More than in other postcolonial 
countries, citizenship in Malaysia rests on maintaining 
a particular multi-racial composition, a set-up that still 
considers the diminishing Chinese minority as a political 
thorn in its side. In Malaysia, the national structure of  
feeling, favours, and fortunes is carefully calibrated 
to maintain and expand the demographic majority of  
ethnic Malays (bumiputras). The special status of  Malay 
bumiputras makes Chinese, Indian and other racial 
minorities second-class citizens. Maintaining this ethnic 
ranking, the immigration regime screens the racial ratios 
of  returns and arrivals. But compared to earlier forms 
of  ethnic intimidation, today we find a slick, perhaps 
neoliberal style at play when it comes to managing the 
back and forth flows of  Chinese persons.
 What to make of  the neutral or even cheery reception 
of  previously disdained former citizens?  Former citizens 
of  Chinese ancestry once faced an icy welcome at 
Malaysian immigration counters, but a new calculation 
of  political advantages shapes their welcome now. By 
emigrating, they are doing the country a favour, by 
reducing the size of  the minority community, and they 
are welcomed back, not as visitors to a beloved homeland 
their ancestors played a major role in building, but as 
bringers of  cash. Still judged as never Malaysian enough, 
the Chinese minority transmutes into a blur, between 
building a nation as citizens and building its economy as 
former citizens.
 In these global times, Chinese ethnicity is glossed with 
wealth and recoded as potential human infrastructure 
for channeling resources. With China looming in the 
background as an economic giant, former hostility 
to returning citizens of  Chinese ancestry has been 
supplanted by the welcoming of  money associated with 
Chinese peoples (of  various ethnicities and nationalities) 
from the world over. Next time I visit, I would be sure 
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to bring more dollars, and eschew Bahasa in favor of  
Mandarin. This intricate maneuver in flexible citizenship 
(Ong, 1999) illuminates the paradox that the impersonal 
and international style of  airports does not banish the 
enactment of  the personal and the particular required of  
travellers by immigration regimes.
 As I rush through Asia’s supermodern airports, I note 
that the Malaysian tourist map of  ‘truly Asia’ is plaiting 
together ethnic and investment flows, and is not a political 
expression of  genuine multiculturalism. This window 
dressing of  Asian diversity shapes the ritual performance 
of  ethnic citizenship in airports, while the ethnic belonging 
to the nation remains in doubt. Envisioning my next return 
home, I run through options for playing the ‘truly Asian’ 
game; brace for rejection or misidentifications; project a 
wealthy demeanor; or display the dubious identity of  an 
overseas Chinese? It is the expectation of  such historically-
generated stereotypical rituals that strangely de-positions 
the returning person, thus extending her motion sickness 
into the existentialist realm.
Notes
1  I humbly invoke V.S. Naipaul’s richly compelling novel, The 
Enigma of  Arrival (1988). In this melancholy memoir, Naipaul 
ruminates on how the perceptions of  the immigrant shape 
his sensitivity to new surroundings. The mysterious sense of  
self  and belonging for the immigrant is further troubled by 
his love of  a country that has been deeply transformed.
2  For a brief  account of  that fraught experience, see Ong 
(2003), xiii-xix.
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I Don’t Remember
Ismail Akthar, age 12
I don’t remember the place
where the only colour I saw was green
where the blazing heat would challenge me – 
not even the tall twisty trees
which they tell I used to climb.
I have forgotten
the mangy dogs I used to bark at
or the snakes I waited to pelt rocks at,
the fish I caught by hand-
even the dragonflies I trapped-
also the taste of  the just ripe mangoes
which I would climb the trees to pick
and the giant fish which would not fit 
in the kitchen; and the chickens
which would be slaughtered
in front of  me, and the birds, 
sling-shotted out of  the sky,
that would all end up in a pot filled with spices
which would soon be empty unless I got there first…
I don’t remember the taste of  dried dates
or the mangoes, the peaches, the jackfruit, the pineapples, 
the juiciness of  it all. 
I don’t remember the smells 
the market filled with men just waiting for a customer
or the smell of  the cut grasses being stored for the livestock.
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I don’t remember the view from those 
huge hills which were so hard to climb.
Or the eagles soaring high in the sky waiting 
to pull something out of  the green
the cows grazing on the grass
all year continuously munching, munching away
not even the painted fences standing there in neat rows.
No, I don’t remember the day my life
was taken away.
I don’t remember the fearless boy I used to be.
I don’t remember my country…
Bangladesh.
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Men and the Emotional World of  Immigration Detention    
Melanie Griffiths
The refused asylum seekers and immigration detainees 
involved in my doctoral research differed from each 
other in almost every way, except, that is, for their gender. 
Examining the interplay between masculinity and emotion, 
and how people working in the immigration system speak 
of, treat and expect these men to behave, offers insights 
into the imagery of  noncitizen and refugee men, and 
the place of  this within the operation of  Immigration 
Removal Centres (IRCs). It was meeting one particular 
detained man that illuminated for me these gendered 
assumptions, the dissonance between expectations and 
practice, and the institutionally problematic place of  male 
anger. 
 In 2011, an Oxford charity asked me to urgently visit 
a Libyan immigration detainee who I will call Basam. 
Unusually, Basam had been referred to the charity by 
concerned IRC welfare officers. I was warned that he was 
highly emotional and potentially suffering from mental 
health problems. A day or two later, I went to the centre 
to meet Basam. As I approached the visits hall, a Detainee 
Custody Officer (DCO) came over to reiterate concerns 
over Basam and the hope that my visit might help him. 
Shortly afterwards, a thin man in his mid-20s came and 
sat down. 
 Basam was an intense and agitated individual. He 
was clearly shocked to be detained, insulted by repeated 
accusations from the Home Office that he had lied, and 
deeply afraid of  their threats to remove him from the 
UK. He was also beset with guilt and worry about being 
far from Libya, a country descending into conflict and 
whose plight played out on the television in the corner 
of  the visits hall. Lost in his emotional turmoil, Basam 
gesticulated wildly and spoke in an increasingly loud 
voice, oblivious to the ripples his shouts caused in the 
IRC’s anodyne visits hall. 
 Although I was relatively experienced at visiting 
detainees, the fierceness of  Basam’s fury shocked me. I 
could feel the stares from the DCOs, visitors and other 
detainees, and felt pressure knowing I was expected to 
prevent Basam’s outbursts from escalating. At that first 
meeting, I could do little more than listen. It was not until 
the second, equally intense visit that I suddenly realised 
Basam’s response was not dysfunctional but immensely 
rational. His family were trapped in a country entering 
war, he had no legal representation, his asylum claim 
was failing, he was being called a liar and he had been 
indefinitely deprived of  his liberty. Basam had every 
reason to be incensed. 
 In fact, I realised that rather than being shocked by 
Basam’s furious reaction, I should instead be surprised 
by how rare such responses are amongst immigration 
detainees. More commonly, people turn inwards, 
becoming passive and despondent. So I stopped worrying 
about the watching eyes and instead reassured Basam 
that his anger was reasonable. Although I was treating 
him as an adult with a valid emotional response to an 
awful situation, I felt guilty. I knew I was expected to 
quieten Basam, and hoped the DCOs did not overhear 
my ‘irresponsible’ words.
 Meeting Basam and becoming aware of  my complicity 
in a system that needs detainees to constrain their splenetic 
emotions made me conscious of  the institutional fear of  
angry men. The DCOs seemed genuinely worried about 
Basam, but also feared he might be a trouble-maker 
and sought to restrict his anger. They checked on him 
throughout the day, they apparently encouraged him 
to take sleeping pills and started each conversation by 
imploring him to ‘calm down’. Even Basam’s suggestion 
they move him to a single room, so that he could have 
some private space in which to shout and let out his 
aggression, was refused. 
 However, the same DCOs that constructed Basam as 
being dangerously angry, also repeatedly emasculated him. 
After a few weeks of  escalating tensions, for example, 
I arrived at the IRC to be told by the receptionist that 
I could not visit Basam because ‘he’s been a naughty 
boy’, telling me, in a patronising tone: ‘he’s had a bit of  
a protest in one of  the yards, had a banner up and a bit 
of  a shout.’ When I later telephoned, Basam explained 
that he had written down the name of  a murdered 
journalist and had shown this to other detainees, albeit 
– as he acknowledged – in an agitated state. This had 
been interpreted as a protest and resulted in him being 
‘removed from association’ and the next day transferred 
to a higher security IRC, before being removed from the 
UK. His nonviolent but outward focused actions were 
treated heavy-handedly, at the same time as they were 
viewed condescendingly. 
 Basam’s treatment provides insights into the 
sometimes contradictory gendered expectations and 
institutional needs operating within IRCs. Managerially 
speaking, introspective emotions are easier to manage 
than outbursts. The Foucauldian institutional requirement 
for docile bodies means small acts of  dissent or non-
cooperation threaten the wider IRC. There is little room 
for the anger of  detained men.
 The problematising of  the agency and emotions 
of  migrant men goes beyond institutional concerns, 
Towards EmoTions
however, to imbue the whole asylum system. As a 
counsellor I interviewed in 2010 explained: ‘There is very 
little space [for asylum seekers] to be bad, in a healthy 
way’, claiming that Social Services regularly referred 
asylum seekers in the community for counselling because 
their anger was considered pathological. Men (especially 
those of  certain ethnicities and age groups), are prone 
to being conceptualised as active agents: capable and 
strong, but potentially criminal and threatening. This 
disadvantages male asylum seekers, who imperfectly fit 
the feminised and victimised imagery generally employed 
by refugee advocates (Judge 2010). 
 Despite the systemic fear of  the outward display of  
strong negative emotions from male detainees, however, 
and although some men are clearly angry about their 
treatment, depressive responses are much more common. 
Furthermore, the same discourses that construct refused 
asylum seeking and detained men as dangerous when 
angry, are also emasculating, a tension I have explored 
elsewhere (Griffiths 2013). In parallel to being construed 
as a ticking time bomb, Basam’s emotions were dismissed 
and his actions belittled. As such, he was Othered as 
simultaneously dangerous and infantile. Recognition 
of  detained men’s emotional lives helps illuminate the 
ambiguity of  these spaces, ones in which problematic 
assumptions regarding gender, age, race and immigration 
status converge.
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The Dynamics of  Settlement
Deborah Phillips 
At the college he had to re-learn everything that he knew. 
He had to learn how to eat in public. He had to learn how 
to greet people… Yet something strange was happening … 
Willie began to see in a new way the rules he had left behind 
at home. He began to see – and it was upsetting, at first – that 
the old rules were themselves a kind of  make-believe, self-
imposed. And one day, towards the end of  his second term, he 
saw with great clarity that the old rules no longer bound him.
   Half  a Life - V. S. Naipaul
Migration and settlement are emotive subjects. The 
migration journey brings hopes, fears, excitement and 
anxieties, the balance of  emotions depending on the 
circumstances of  migration, country of  origin and 
pathway to settlement in the receiving country. Whilst 
professional new arrivals may find that occupational 
networks help to smooth the passage of  adjustment, 
those moving as poorer economic migrants, asylum 
seekers, refugees, marriage partners or young single 
migrants such as Willie can often find that the process 
of  settlement, and attendant feelings of  security and 
belonging, are not always easily or quickly achieved. The 
early stages of  settling for the most vulnerable migrants 
may mean multiple moves, perhaps through transit 
camps, reception centres, hostels or the streets before 
arriving at a place with some security. Others, making 
use of  family and other connections, may join earlier 
migrants in established areas of  immigration that offer 
elements of  familiarity, comfort and support, and, for 
some, a microcosm of  the life-world left behind. 
 To the receiving population, distinctive areas of  
minority ethnic settlement evoke mixed emotions. 
They can hold exotic allure, become places of  curiosity, 
entertainment and excursion for curious outsiders; a small 
world that can be entered, sampled and left at the end of  
the novel experience. Many western cities have actively 
sought to commodify their Chinatowns or equivalent of  
the ‘Curry Mile’ in Manchester, and capitalise on their 
multi-cultural diversity through investment in newly 
emerging cultural landscapes. The persistent clustering 
of  minority ethnic groups in areas of  deprivation can, 
however, also generate fears in the receiving population. 
Such spaces can become symbols of  difference and a 
reminder that migration brings new identities, lifestyles, 
inequalities and social divisions that can give rise to 
(often exaggerated) national anxieties around integration, 
citizenship and nation building. 
 The pattern, process and outcome of  immigrant 
settlement have all too often become politicised. National 
concerns about the supposed risks of  minority group 
concentration in particular areas, variously articulated 
through anxieties around civil unrest, ghettoization, 
uneven use of  services, and the ‘swamping’ of  the 
indigenous population, have promoted diverse state 
interventions in the settlement process. The regional 
dispersal of  refugees is not uncommon in western 
European countries and is often linked to welfare 
benefits entitlements. At the local scale, quotas have at 
times been used to shape the pattern of  allocation of  new 
migrants to social housing, and migrant children have 
been bussed from their home areas to dispersed schools 
in an attempt to ‘spread the burden’ of  immigration. 
Fear of  the negative effects of  residential concentration, 
for both migrants and the receiving population, is often 
accompanied by a politicised discourse on the dangers 
of  persistent segregation and the development of  
disconnected, parallel lives between host and migrant 
groups that have seemingly failed to learn ‘the rules’. 
In the post-9/11 era of  global insecurity, the clustering 
of  new as well as settled. Muslim minorities in western 
European countries, for example, has widely been seen 
as an indicator of  poor assimilation and weak citizenship. 
Popular explanations for segregated lives often rest on 
immigrants’ apparent unwillingness to adjust and engage 
in the host society rather than the racism and structural 
constraints that migrant communities often face. 
Although scholars agree that the relationship between 
social and spatial assimilation is contested (and likely to 
take different forms for different populations in different 
places), government policies promoting integration and 
social cohesion have often seen migrant deconcentration 
and dispersal, as well as acculturation, as integral to their 
programmes. 
 Migrants’ lived experiences and geographies of  
settlement are contextualised and differentiated. They 
reflect the way that their personal characteristics and 
individual biographies cross-cut with wider structural 
opportunities and constraints, and how they are shaped 
by the dynamics and micro-politics of  particular places. 
In addition, migrants’ own senses of  citizenship and 
belonging are complex and multi-scalar. Transnational 
connections now enable immigrants and settled minorities 
to maintain strong ties with remote places they have left 
behind, to selectively blend socially constructed rules, 
and create identities rooted in both their old and new 
homes. However, people’s everyday lives are still greatly 
influenced by experiences, associations and life-chances 
at the local scale. Immigration status, the social and 
political rights accorded to migrants, positive or negative 
encounters with social difference, an understanding of  
the migrant’s place in the receiving nation, and individual 
constructions and imaginings of  home will all help to 
shape the complex pathways to immigrant settlement 
and belonging.
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Community 
David Feldman
“We have a right to keep out everybody who does not add 
to the strength of  the community – the industrial, social 
and intellectual strength of  the community,” asserted 
Arthur Balfour, speaking in the House of  Commons in 
support of  the 1905 Aliens Bill, the first modern legislation 
designed to restrict immigration to the United Kingdom. 
This imagined the nation as a whole as a community, and 
immigrants, in this case east European Jews for the most 
part, as outside its boundaries. Today, too, immigrants 
are set outside of  the parameters of  the community. In 
July 2013, the immigration minister called for stronger 
controls on immigration, as without them, ‘communities 
could be damaged.’ He was especially concerned that 
immigrants were generating overcrowding, anti-social 
behaviour, and longer waiting times at GP’s surgeries. 
 In his 1976 compendium Keywords, Raymond Williams 
writes, ‘unlike all other terms of  social organisation’, 
community ‘seems never to be used unfavourably.’ It is, 
‘a warmly persuasive word.’ As he noted, ‘community 
politics’ suggest a form of  organisation not only distinct 
from national politics but also from formal local politics. 
In contrast to bureaucratic and hierarchical types of  
governance and mobilisation, community activists 
claim to represent the unmediated voice of  the people 
in a particular place. This idea of  community, as the 
expression of  authentic bonds which develop from 
everyday experience, continues to thrive. We have 
community councils, community care, community 
centres, community workers, community groups, 
community spokesmen and women. 
 It is one indication of  the benign, yet vague, meaning 
of  community that governments too have adopted the 
term, not least when they seek to invest an unpopular 
measure with legitimacy. In 1990 when the Conservative 
government introduced a fiscally regressive form of  local 
taxation – when the property based tax, known as ‘rates’, 
was replaced by a levy placed on the head of  almost 
every adult – it labelled the new and much reviled tax ‘the 
community charge’. Since 2006, the British government 
has included a Department of  Communities and Local 
Government. The department’s website attempts to 
infuse the arid system of  local administration with the 
nurturing juices of  community. Its mission, it states, is 
to support local government and in doing so to ‘put 
communities in charge of  planning’. 
 These connotations of  community run deep. The 
Oxford English Dictionary traces the etymology of  
‘community’ to the Anglo-Norman and Middle French 
term communité meaning joint ownership or association. 
By the late fourteenth century it indicated ‘a body of  
people who live in the same place, usually sharing a 
common cultural or ethnic identity’. These meanings, 
concerned with ownership, association, culture and 
ethnicity, do not exhaust the semantics of  community – 
it can describe a body of  people practising communal 
living on religious or ideological grounds, or be applied 
to a group that follows a sport or hobby, such as the 
‘football community’. Nevertheless, in the second decade 
of  the 21st century they remain central and powerful. 
 These historical roots reveal why the term is so often 
used in relation to migration and indicate its subtly 
manipulative qualities. In 1603, Chester City Council 
objected that “strangers… not only take away… the 
maintenance and relief  which belongs to the poor born 
in the said but… impoverish the state of  the commoners 
of  the said City.” Yet, in early 17th-century England only 
a minority of  people lived and died in the same town 
or village. The population was a collection of  migrants. 
Moreover, access to common land was far from common. 
It was distributed unequally and, at times, a point of  
bitter conflict. The welfare system – parochial poor relief  
– was discretionary, grudging and sometimes penal, as 
rate payers strived to minimise their obligations. The 
language of  community was a fiction disguising economic 
inequality and institutional power. It was also a vital social 
force when mobilised to exclude poor migrants. 
 An emphasis on shared ownership and origins can 
be used to promote a sense of  solidarity that is also 
exclusionary. At this point, community assumes a less 
benign aspect. In this register, the language of  community 
is liable to place people who have a different culture or 
ethnicity, or who do not have a pre-existing share in the 
common fund of  goods, or who have not qualified for 
membership, outside the community of  solidarity. The 
17th-century complaint – that migrants were draining 
the welfare system and other collective resources – has a 
familiar ring. Only now, the complaints are not directed 
at people who have walked ten or twenty miles, but at 
the growing number of  international migrants who are 
placed beyond the boundaries of  collective solidarity, 
both as they strive to enter contemporary Britain and 
also, for those who manage to settle, once they arrive. 
 There is one other usage of  community in relation 
to immigration that we must mention: namely, the use 
of  the term ‘community’ to denote an immigrant, ethnic 
or religious group. In the 1960s, many towns established 
Community Relations Councils as they tried to manage 
the arrival of  immigrants from the Caribbean and South 
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Asia. They expressed an assumption that the immigrant 
and the established population comprised separate 
‘communities’. Their founders were well intentioned 
people who wanted to promote and manage integration. 
The same language can also be found, however, in Enoch 
Powell’s infamous ‘Rivers of  Blood’ speech delivered 
in Birmingham in 1968. Here, Powell condemned ‘the 
Sikh communities’ campaign to maintain customs 
inappropriate in Britain’. The idea that immigrants and 
ethnic or religious minorities comprise ‘communities’ 
remains commonplace in the present. It pays no regard 
to the fractures, hierarchies and conflicts within these 
populations, nor to the bonds of  interest and association, 
through trade unions,  tenants’ associations or chambers 
of  commerce, for example, that might unite immigrants 
with others born in the country. In this respect, the use of  
the term community to classify immigrant groups is the 
regrettable yet predictable counterpart to its use to try to 
exclude them. In both cases ‘community’ erases divisions 
of  wealth and status, and transforms a potentially unruly 
and contentious population into an imagined united 
whole.  
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Diasporic Converging Cultures? 
Iain Walker
There’s a line from an old Tom Waits song – ‘the merging 
nexus back and forth’ – that often runs through my head 
as I chase Hadramis across the Indian Ocean. A cynic 
may say that I’m just suffering travel fatigue, but there are 
groups of  Hadramis who are both particularly mobile, 
individually and collectively, and well-connected, who 
could easily be described as nexuses. 
 In Abu Dhabi recently, I met up with a member of  an 
Hadrami family whose house I had lived opposite when 
doing my doctoral fieldwork in the Comoro Islands, 
during which time I came to know several of  them 
quite well. They are descendants of  one of  East Africa’s 
great religious leaders, and I meet them in places all over 
the world: in the Comoros, Zanzibar, Dar es Salaam, 
Hadramawt, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Paris and London. This 
sounds more like divergence than convergence, but the 
fact that they themselves (and there are others like them) 
have more than one place of  attachment, or ‘home’, if  
you like, suggests that things are a little more complicated 
than that. Indeed, the last time I wrote about them I 
called them ‘Comorians’; but I was working on a different 
project then. 
 Shifting political economies, as well as religion, 
marriage and sentiment, prompt people to move; they 
find themselves in different places at different times, and 
in different political and cultural contexts. The Hadrami 
diaspora is scattered across the Indian Ocean, principally 
in three regions – East Africa, Southeast Asia and the 
Arabian peninsula (there are Hadramis in India too, 
but they seem to have dropped out of  the networks, 
and other Hadramis call them ‘the lost people’) – and 
although links between East Africa and Southeast Asia 
are limited, many Hadramis in both regions have strong 
links with those in the Arabian peninsula. Here there 
are two types of  Hadrami: the ‘old’ families, most of  
whom are citizens, and whose presence predates the oil 
era, and the ‘new’ Hadramis, who have come both from 
Hadramawt and other parts of  the diaspora, drawn by 
the economic opportunities offered by these prosperous, 
oil-fuelled economies. Most of  the former are in Saudi 
Arabia; the latter are also in the United Arab Emirates 
and Kuwait. 
 Wherever they are, Hadramis maintain their culture. 
This is widely recognised: it is part of  the skill of  being 
Hadrami, and time and time again I hear the refrain, ‘we 
integrate, but we keep our culture’. Hadramis – and we 
are talking about men here, as the women rarely move 
in this way – emigrate and take local wives; they send 
their sons back to Hadramawt for education, but the 
girls stay behind to absorb more of  the host culture. The 
next generation then intermarries: Hadrami Zanzibari 
men (for example) marry Zanzibari Hadrami women. 
Transmission of  cultural practices therefore occurs 
both in the male (Hadrami) and female (Zanzibari) lines 
and are woven into a culture that sits astride home and 
host, belonging in both when all is well, but sometimes 
belonging to neither when cleavages occur. Indeed, if  
the cohesive character of  Hadrami social structures and 
cultural practices both encourages integration and hinders 
assimilation, this is as true at ‘home’ as it is in diaspora. 
The latter seems intuitive: Hadramis, well integrated but 
still slightly different, always seem to be identifiable as a 
group, even if  only on rather unrefined criteria such as 
family name or skin colour. But returning to Hadramawt, 
the foreign-born always remain slightly apart.
 In the Arabian peninsula, Hadramis converge. 
However, since these Hadramis are products of  
diasporic sites and practices, and although they believe 
themselves to be Hadrami, Hadramis from Indonesia are 
not Hadrami in quite the same way that Hadramis from 
East Africa, or from Saudi Arabia or, of  course, from 
Hadramawt might be. This places certain constraints on 
interaction, as Saudis of  Hadrami origin, despite claims 
of  kinship and shared cultural practice, find that they 
may not have as much to share with Kenyan Hadramis 
as they might have thought, while Kenyan Hadramis are 
more at ease with Somali Hadramis than with kin from 
Hadramawt. Some members of  the community – often 
those who are more mobile, or whose families have been 
less ‘localised’, such as my Comorian friend – serve as 
mediators between different groups, usually belonging 
(even if  only partially) to more than one group.
 The weaving metaphor seems apt here: dispersal 
from a homeland produces divergences, but subsequent 
mobilities produce convergences, as diasporic groups meet 
and reinvent themselves elsewhere, and so the process 
continues. But if  it seems intuitive that divergence is a 
prerequisite for convergence, what I suggest here is that 
the inverse is also true: divergence requires convergence. 
The convergence of  diasporic groups who believe they 
have a single identity is a prerequisite for recognising 
that this singular identity is (and must be) illusory: the 
cultures therefore diverge. In Saudi Arabia, ‘Hadramis’ 
from Saudi Arabia, Kenya or Java become (revealed as) 
Saudi, Kenyan and Javanese Hadramis, negotiating both 
their commonalities and their differences – constituting a 
merging nexus.
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Devotional practices and imagery have always been both 
portable and subject to reinvention in new contexts. 
They have served not just to define sacred cartographies, 
but to propel mobile worlds beyond formal institutional 
spaces. This has been true of  different world religions 
– Christians who re-enacted Jerusalem in medieval 
Wakefield or near Moscow in the 17th century; Yorkshire 
Hindus who since the late 20th century have reconceived 
the River Aire as the holy waters of  the Ganges; early 
medieval Irish monks who, seeing Christian life itself  
as a journey, kept on the move across Europe and the 
Atlantic, founding monasteries which became the nuclei 
of  urban settlement; or 21st-century Pakistani Muslim 
emigrants to Canada who visit a network of  shrines in 
India, London, South Africa and Turkey, reinforcing 
diasporic connections by carrying devotional material 
back to North America with them.  
 In Catholic culture, images – of  Christ, the Virgin 
or the saints – have constituted a rich devotional focus, 
which at once evoke very particular associations of  place 
and also transcend space and time in the imagination 
of  the individual devotee. These qualities have given 
them a special significance for migrants shaping new 
communities and forging links with old ones.  Millions 
of  Italian, Spanish and Portuguese migrants to North 
and South America over the centuries took with them 
copies of  their local cult images, which reinforced 
spiritual confidence, on small and sometimes much 
larger scales. Churches in New York, Boston, Rio and 
Buenos Aires were dedicated to Madonnas of  European 
sanctuaries. Processions with statues marked the bounds 
of  new parishes on patronal feast-days, and migrants 
set up domestic shrines and carried small reproductions 
for daily personal prayer. Some cults acquired wider 
resonance. The Virgin of  Guadalupe, rooted in a 16th-
century fusion of  Mary with a Native American goddess, 
became a dynamic embodiment of  Mexican nationalism 
from the 19th century, and of  Filipino Catholicism 
in the 20th. Retaining these cultural and potentially 
countercultural connotations, and providing a point of  
interconnection for Hispanic and Filipino communities 
worldwide, the cult has been given universal status 
by a Catholic hierarchy repeatedly striving to benefit 
Devotion 
Jane Garnett
by popular association. A younger, still controversial, 
and even more extensively diffused devotion is to 
the Divine Mercy, an image of  Christ deriving from 
visions experienced in the 1930s by Faustina Kowalska, 
a young Polish nun. Spread initially by Polish post-war 
migration, the cult, officially banned worldwide from 
1959 to 1979, was rehabilitated by Pope John Paul II 
in a process leading to Faustina’s beatification in 1993 
and canonisation in 2000. Now a global phenomenon, 
the devotion sits alongside established image cults within 
churches worldwide, drawing both visually and culturally 
on existing popular characterisations of  Christ (such as 
the Sacred Heart), and structuring the private prayer lives 
of  millions of  Catholics. Many of  these faithful have not 
grown up with the devotion, but have encountered it in 
new contexts, where it has helped them to make different 
connections, often across ethnic, cultural and sometimes 
even religious boundaries.
 Recent diversification in migration patterns and 
communication media have complicated, but not 
fundamentally transformed, the ways in which devotional 
cultures work. Many cults that once travelled by word 
of  mouth and through print reproduction now move 
electronically; but Facebook and Skype mirror and 
complement familial, group and community solidarities 
and physical displacement. A woman from Sierra Leone 
now in east London has adopted 3 pm GMT (the time 
associated with Christ’s death and instituted as part 
of  the devotion to the Divine Mercy) as the hour on 
Sundays when her dispersed family around the world 
join in prayer: a modern connective ritual built on very 
traditional bonds of  emotional affinity and shared 
memory.
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Contemporary Anxiety Towards Irregular Migration 
Joaquín Arango
Irregular migration is as old as the regulation of  
migration itself. Yet it has not always been at the fore of  
our attention, and it has not always aroused the degree 
of  anxiety that surrounds it today. Admittedly, ‘anxiety’ 
may seem too strong a word. But ‘concern’ falls short 
of  describing the stance towards irregular migration that 
prevails in Europe and the United States. The rejection of  
unauthorized migration often borders on stigmatization 
and demonization. Some countries have made it a 
criminal offense. Measures introduced to combat it go as 
far as the humiliating and demeaning practices of  Sheriff  
Arpaio in Arizona and the threat to confine asylum 
seekers in camps in Nauru or Papua New Guinea. Non-
governmental actors often share in the current escalation, 
including examples such as a well-known Texan actor’s 
weekend hobby of  picking up a gun to chase irregular 
migrants, or the debate about whether the fence on the 
US-Mexico border should be doubled or electrified.
 That such obsession is eminently contemporary 
suggests it might not be genuine. Things were quite 
different in the past. In the North America of  the Bracero 
Program, during the middle decades of  the 20th century, 
the stance towards undocumented migration was one of  
benign neglect, if  not of  Olympian indifference. Similar 
was the case in Europe of  the trentes glorieuses: irregular 
migrants were as a rule tolerated, when not easily 
legalized. At that time, immigration was seen as necessary 
and desirable on both sides of  the Atlantic. Rather 
than in substantive shifts in irregular migration, the 
explanation for the ensuing transition from indifference 
to demonization is to be found in a dramatically altered 
evaluation of  immigration. 
 Irregular migration doubtless has deleterious effects. 
Yet, whether they are sufficient to justify the current 
climate of  opinion and the severity of  the measures to 
combat it is questionable. It certainly implies a breach 
of  sovereignty, but not necessarily more significant 
than others that are easily accepted by governments. Its 
negative effects do not generally extend to the economy, 
as most irregular migrants are workers needed by the 
labour market, and who lend valuable services to many 
families, especially in terms of  care, which in turn benefits 
welfare systems. The drastic removal of  migrants would 
be likely to generate chaos. 
 One reason often mentioned for the harshness of  
practices which counter irregular migration is that it 
constitutes a security risk. Were this indeed the case, the 
reasons for granting irregular migration a high priority 
could arguably be more understandable and justifiable. 
But the opposite could also be argued. Irregular migration 
can be seen as a security risk only if  a very broad concept 
of  security is used. There is no evidence of  irregular 
migrants being more likely to commit crime – as long 
as a distinction is made between immigrants committing 
crimes and transnational criminal activities. San Diego and 
El Paso, two US cities with high proportions of  irregular 
migrants, are among the safest large urban areas in the 
US, according to the FBI. And let us remind ourselves 
that the major terrorist attacks of  the first decade of  the 
21st century – those of  New York, Madrid, and London 
– were not the deeds of  unauthorized immigrants. 
Irregular flows do have serious impacts in critical entry 
points, such as Lampedusa, several loci in Greece, the 
Canary Islands, or Ceuta and Melilla, but this is in terms 
of  emergency situations and local disruption rather than 
security per se. And most countries are unaffected by 
such impacts. The relationship between international 
mobility and security is a complex and delicate one, but a 
better balance than the present one could be found. 
 Do the policy correlates of  the present state of  
anxiety lead to reasonable policy outcomes? Are 
harsher control policies, including those aiming at 
‘self-deportation’ effective? The answers are opaque 
and hard to measure. But the available evidence, both 
objective and impressionistic, suggests they are not, 
despite the high and ever increasing costs of  control 
policies. Furthermore, there are a number of  unintended 
consequences, including displacement of  crossing points, 
more casualties, and higher fees for clandestine crossings. 
Mobility and legal migration may be negatively affected 
and made more cumbersome, not to mention the moral 
and political costs and negative impacts on societies that 
are increasingly inevitably more diverse. The often given 
justification that severe control policies help contain the 
rise of  the far right hardly resists the test of  reality, if  
the fortune of  multiple populist, xenophobic parties and 
movements that have flourished and prosper in dozens 
of  countries is taken as a measuring rod. In sum, if  harsh 
control policies are costly, generate many unintended 
effects, and are of  limited effectiveness, is the high 
priority accorded to them reasonable? How many would 
withstand a cost-benefit analysis? 
 Do the negative effects of  irregular migration 
really justify the current levels of  anxiety and their 
policy correlates? Do they justify the unprecedented 
politicization of  migration? Do they sanction practices 
that sometimes impinge on human rights and civil liberties 
and test at times the limits of  democratic politics?
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 In light of  the above, common sense would 
recommend exploring alternative control strategies, ones 
that might possibly prove more reasonable and humane, 
and with fewer side effects than those in vogue at the 
moment. These might not secure large benefits, but at 
least they would entail lower costs, whether these be 
financial, social, or political. They would stem from a 
revised stance toward irregular migration that would 
recognize that, while it poses considerable problems, 
it is unavoidable and not so harmful. Learning to live 
with irregular migration in a calmer, more civilized way 
potentially offers considerable benefits. Unfortunately, 
there are plenty of  reasons to be pessimistic. 
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Some English people they just don’t like us. If  you argue with 
them they just tell you “go back to your country, why are you in 
England”… they don’t understand why you’re here, so there is 
no point of  talking about it. - Farouq, Year 101
Farouq, an Afghani refugee boy, is well aware of  public 
representations of  refugees in the UK. He is an outsider, 
the ‘other’, and he is unwanted. In today’s world, refugees 
and asylum seekers are physically and symbolically 
‘out of  place’ – the ‘other in our midst’, or as Bauman 
(2004) describes them, the ‘human waste’, the ‘flotsam’ 
of  humanity who are pushed or wafted across national 
boundaries. They are living what Agamben (1998) 
describes as a state of  ‘bare life’. 
 Asylum seeking in the UK (and elsewhere in Europe) 
has become a matter of  public debate. The media 
describe asylum seekers as scroungers and criminals who 
are flooding ‘our’ country, posing a threat to ‘our’ security, 
and draining ‘our’ resources; successive legislation makes 
Britain less welcoming for asylum seekers. Historically, 
the concept of  asylum was associated with compassion. 
However, growing numbers and the changing makeup of  
asylum seekers at the doorstep of  western countries have 
led receiving societies to readdress issues of  membership, 
rights and belonging and their moral obligations towards 
them. The ways in which asylum seekers are defined 
as ‘deserving’ or ‘undeserving’ of  state support and 
protection form a central part of  the material and 
symbolic boundary-making activity of  western nation 
states. The asylum-seeking and refugee child is positioned 
between this draconian political-economic discourse and 
the discursive idea of  childhood vulnerability, although 
the UK government has repeatedly ignored the UN 
Declaration of  the Rights of  the Child when it comes 
to asylum seeking children and increasingly restricts their 
access to welfare services.
 But what happens when these children enter the 
education system? Can schools offer a ‘safe haven’? 
Schools cater for the complex emotional and educational 
needs of  asylum-seeking and refugee children, sustaining 
their professional duty to educate and care for all 
children whatever their legal status. From the perspective 
of  teachers, political distinctions between ‘deserving’ 
or ‘undeserving’ migrant families are anti-educational 
and irrelevant to schools. The UK Home Office sees a 
migrant child as first and foremost a migrant, while for 
teachers, they are children first and thus equally entitled 
to respect and help. An assistant headteacher in a city 
school comments: 
I don’t think we’ve ever refused somebody 
Seeking Asylum in Schools 
Halleli Pinson, Madeleine Arnot and Mano Candappa
admission if  we’ve got a place, simply because they 
haven’t had the right documentation.... Because 
to be honest even if  it turned out that they were 
here illegally, in a way that’s not our concern.... We 
would still not refuse because… that’s not for us, 
the school, to judge.
Asylum-seeking and refugee children are offered 
different versions of  compassion by their teachers. One 
version expresses compassion as the need to care for and 
help those who have suffered in their lives and who seek 
help and shelter. This notion is based on concern (whether 
empathy, sympathy or pity) for those who are victims of  
circumstance. Another version of  compassion is based 
on a sense of  justice – offering help to those who are 
in trouble on the basis of  notions of  equality and human 
rights and recognising a shared humanity with others. 
Nussbaum (2001) argues that such compassion occurs 
at the level of  individual psychology and of  institutional 
design. Compassion becomes not just an emotion, a 
motivation or a form of  reasoning, but a form of  social 
solidarity, especially in relation to diversity. 
 There is evidence for both types of  compassion 
in schools. Here an inclusion coordinator in a large 
predominantly white school rejects the notion of  pity in 
favour of  ‘equal treatment for all’:
...the word pity always has a connotation of  almost 
being condescending, doesn’t it?  [...]  All the 
children I work with, whether they have a learning 
difficulty, a behaviour difficulty, they are just 
children with English as an additional language, 
or they’re asylum-seeking and refugee children, 
or they’re looked after children, or they’re abused 
children … will come to you with a level of  need 
… and my response is to react to [those] needs ... 
in the best way I can. 
These individualising discourses allow teachers to see ‘a 
child’ who is entitled to learn and to be safe from violence. 
 Different compassionate responses result from 
schools’ first-hand experience of  immigration policies, 
especially detention and deportation. Child deportation 
reverberates around the school and community and 
forces teachers to manage crises of  grief  and loss in the 
classroom: 
…other children [do] not necessarily understand 
why someone’s gone... well they were happy here, 
why have they been moved? There’s obviously 
something wrong with us. Is that why they’ve 
moved them? (headteacher, predominantly white 
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Such experiences lead certain teachers to be involved 
in  anti-deportation campaigns which bring them into 
contact with immigration authorities, police, and a 
range of  professional bodies. Such action is morally 
and politically significant since it unites concerns about 
child-centred compassionate approaches with egalitarian 
concerns about peace and fairness. Witnessing the politics 
of  immigration first-hand reshapes the relationship of  
teachers to the state.
 Immigration policy repositions educational institutions 
which value diversity and which critically engage with the 
denial of  social and human rights. Such humanistic and 
critically-aware school cultures could easily be made to 
appear unpatriotic or out of  line in increasingly fortress-
like nation states. 
 Teachers represent the front line of  a democratic 
society, creating the conditions for compassion to 
flourish within young generations. They can validate 
asylum-seeking and refugee children’s resilience and 
extraordinary ability to survive by offering them a chance 
to take control of  their futures. This task is not getting 
any easier.
Notes
1  All quotations are drawn from Pinson et al., 2010. Thanks to 
Mano Candappa for permission to quote from the book.
References
Agamben, G. (1998) Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Bauman, Z. (2004) Wasted Lives: Modernity and Its Outcasts, 
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Nussbaum, M. C. (2001) Upheavals of  Thought: The Intelligence of  
Emotions, New York Cambridge University Press.
Pinson, et al. (2010)  Education, Asylum and the Non-Citizen 
Child: The Politics of  Compassion and Belonging, London: Palgrave 
MacMillan.
Towards EmoTions
Dating back to the earliest survey research on public 
attitudes toward immigration, the overwhelming majority 
of  people in Britain have always agreed that there are 
too many immigrants. In the mid-1960s, opposition to 
immigration registered between 80 and 90 per cent of  
those polled. Little has changed on this front: according 
to consistent findings from surveys and opinion polls, a 
clear majority of  members of  the contemporary British 
public would like to see immigration to Britain reduced. 
Depending on the precise question asked and the choices 
respondents are offered, the number favouring less 
immigration typically falls between 60 and 80 per cent.
 But, while the belief  that there is too much immigration 
goes back to the 1960s, the high level of  political salience 
is much more recent. Prior to 2000, immigration rarely 
registered as one of  the issues of  greatest public concern. 
Since then, in monthly polls asking people to name the 
most important problems facing Britain, immigration has 
been among the top three.
 The belief  that there is too much immigration is so 
widespread that it can be found in virtually every sub-
group of  the British population. Still, some groups are 
particularly likely to oppose immigration. There is some 
correlation with education and income levels, but even 
in the most educated and highest earning sub-groups, a 
majority support less immigration. Similarly, opposition 
to immigration does not run as high among London 
residents as in the rest of  the country (even among UK-
born white London residents), but still a majority believe 
immigration levels are too high.
 Sources of  news are also correlated with attitudes 
to immigration, although without further research we 
cannot say if  media use causes people’s views to change, 
or if  people simply select news sources that reflect their 
views. Nonetheless, the correlations are fairly striking – 
readers of  tabloids and local newspapers, and viewers 
of  ITV news are more likely than others to prefer 
reducing immigration, and most often would like to see it 
reduced ‘a lot’ rather than ‘a little.’ But clear majorities of  
broadsheet readers and BBC TV news viewers are also in 
favour of  reduced immigration.
 At least three basic explanations of  attitudes toward 
migration have been researched extensively.
• Contact theory holds that sustained positive contact 
(such as friendships) with members of  other ethnic, 
religious, racial, or national groups produce more 
positive attitudes toward members of  that group.
• Group conflict theory suggests that migrants or 
minority groups can appear to threaten the interests, 
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identities, or status of  the majority (as a group), and 
that those who feel this sense of  threat most acutely 
will be most likely to oppose migration.
• Economic competition theories suggest that 
opposition to migration will come from native-born 
(or citizen) workers who compete with migrants 
with similar skill sets, or (conversely) from wealthier 
locals who feel (or perceive) a financial burden for 
tax-payers if  migrants use public services such as 
hospitals or schools.
Evidence is generally strong for contact theory, but it does 
not necessarily account for opposition to immigration. 
Rather, it suggests that this attitude can be changed by 
interactions, especially friendships, across group lines.
 Group conflict theory has a great deal of  support 
in the academic literature, but it leads to further debate 
about the nature of  group conflict: is it more ‘realistic’ (for 
example, if  it involves competition for scarce resources), 
or is it more ‘symbolic?’ In the latter version, group 
conflict is more closely related to a sense of  national 
identity that large scale immigration seems to threaten.
 Economic competition theory has found inconsistent 
support in the literature. Perceptions of  one’s own 
economic security and of  migrants’ impact on jobs and 
wages are related to anti-migrant attitudes. But these 
perceptions are themselves only loosely tied to individuals’ 
actual economic position. So, perhaps surprisingly, it 
is not clear that economic factors are actually driving 
attitudes for most people.
 New research from the US, however, finds that workers 
in direct competition with migrants appear particularly 
likely to oppose the granting of  visas to migrant workers. 
Malhotra et al. (2013) examine high-tech workers in 
the US facing competition from highly-skilled Indian 
workers; these Americans are particularly likely to want 
fewer visas granted to these sorts of  migrant workers. 
This supports the economic competition model, but 
in revised form: these pressures may be highly relevant 
for migration attitudes, but only for a small subset of  
the public. Others who lack direct competition with 
(potential) migrant workers are not affected by this 
dynamic; their views on immigration are determined by 
other factors.
 My work with Elisabeth Ivarsflaten and Robert 
Ford (2013) points to the importance of  anti-prejudice 
social norms in shaping majority groups’ attitudes 
toward immigration and the impact of  these attitudes 
on broader political behaviour. We argue that there is 
a widespread social norm against prejudice in western 
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Europe. The norm coexists with negative beliefs and 
stereotypes about migrants and minorities, and, we 
argue, acts as an independent motivating force in shaping 
political choices and responses to campaign messages 
and political parties. Its power to shape behaviour, 
however, varies greatly across individuals and across 
situations. Some people are more motivated to follow 
this norm than others; equally important, some political 
situations place the norm directly at stake, while other 
situations are more ambiguous and allow greater scope 
for acting on biases (often hidden or even unconscious 
ones) without the feeling that one is violating the anti-
prejudice norm. Thus, the impact of  immigration on 
politics can be highly complex and volatile. In particular, 
new anti-immigration political parties founder on these 
dynamics more often than not. Parties formed with the 
sole purpose of  mobilizing anti-immigrant sentiment 
usually fail; existing parties with established reputations 
in other issue domains are more successful as vehicles for 
anti-immigrant sentiment, as they can campaign on this 
issue while credibly claiming to be about something more 
than simple xenophobia.
References
Blinder, S., Ford, R and Ivarsflaten, E. (2013) ‘The Better 
Angels of  Our Nature: How the Antiprejudice Norm Affects 
Policy and Party Preferences in Great Britain and Germany’, 
American Journal of  Political Science, 57(4): 841-857.
Malhotra, N., Margalit, Y. and Mo, C. (2013) ‘Economic 
Explanations for Opposition to Immigration: Distinguishing 
between Prevalence and Conditional Impact’, American Journal 
of  Political Science, 57(2): 391–410.
Towards EmoTions
Comfort Zones 
Nina Glick Schiller
“So, are any of  your friends Jewish? You know people 
feel more comfortable with their own kind.” Interested in 
my life in England where I had settled several years prior, 
my 93-year-old aunt had begun our conversation by 
asking about what she felt was the most basic component 
of  feeling at home. Several months later, when I again 
returned to south Florida to visit, Ida continued, almost 
as if  I had not been away. “You know,” she said, “I 
only feel comfortable with Jewish people.” She spoke 
about her simultaneous love of  the United States, her 
‘country’, and of  Israel, ‘her homeland’, whose internal 
rifts, treatment of  the Palestinians, and foreign policy she 
knows nothing about.
 Yet by all conventional measures, Ida is among the 
assimilated, not the ghettoized. Although her mother 
was a Russian Jewish immigrant, Ida was born in the 
United States. She knows Yiddish but she has spent 
most of  her long life speaking English. She spent her 
childhood in poverty in a New York City multi-ethnic 
neighborhood, and as an adult lived in a quintessentially 
middle-class multi-ethnic suburb. She was not religious 
and her husband, a prosperous lawyer, was an atheist 
with a wide professional and personal network of  people 
of  all backgrounds. 
 My aunt’s statements cannot be dismissed as irrelevant 
to current debates about identity, belonging, nationality, 
and religious difference, because they contain many of  
the contradictory tensions that pervade contemporary 
debates about immigration. She narrated her identity to 
me in the same year that Angela Merkel, Prime Minister 
of  Germany, declared that immigrants in Germany 
lived in ghettos, and David Cameron stated that British 
Muslims live in ‘these segregated communities behaving 
in ways that run counter to our values’. 
 What does Ida’s admission of  who she feels 
comfortable with say about whose comfort zones are 
highlighted in public debate and how people actually live 
their lives? Whose comfort zone is typical, Ida’s or my 
mother Evelyn’s? Evelyn came from the same Russian-
Jewish American second generation, and also grew up 
speaking Yiddish and English. During her New York 
City childhood her parents’ networks were German 
Protestants and Italian Catholics as well as Russian Jews. 
Throughout her life Evelyn had close affective relations 
with Jews and non-Jews. However, while in her childhood 
her closest friends were a circle of  Jewish girls who 
formed their own club, complete with motto and jewelry, 
Evelyn’s adult comfort zone was a group of  parents – 
Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish – who were active in 
the local primary school. For my mother, as for many 
others, life cycle changes reconfigured her networks of  
sociability. 
 Most rhetoric and policy statements about 
assimilation, integration and social cohesion tell us little 
about how immigrants and their children live their lives, 
including the multiplicities of  identities and comfort 
zones various immigrants and their descendants inhabit. 
Thinking about the variety of  ‘ways of  being’ that people 
who claim, or are categorized by, the same public identity 
inhabit, allows us to explore the differences among how 
people live their lives in terms of  daily cultural practices, 
their public identities, and their personal comfort zones. 
For example, Ida and my mother share forms of  dress, 
speech, culinary preferences, and décor that reflect 
the regional middle-class culture of  the New York 
metropolitan area of  their generation. They also have the 
same public ethnic identity: Jewish Americans. But they 
have had different kinds of  social networks, which have 
given them different kinds of  social capital, knowledges, 
and comfort zones.
 The concept of  comfort zone needs to become part 
of  both the vocabulary of  migration studies and daily 
life. Social geographers have begun to examine the 
factors that shape a personal identity, best understood 
as a psychic sense of  being spatially at home, rather 
than ethnicity (McCreanor et al., 2006). However, 
comfort zones, while influenced by locality, should not 
be conflated with space. They exist within human social 
relationships and practices, and can involve particular 
physical locations, but can also exist within social relations 
mediated by letters, phone calls, or cyberspace forms of  
communication from a Facebook page to an email.
 Comfort zones express histories of  specific childhoods 
shaped by class, gender, family history and the cultural 
practices and sensibilities of  a particular city and place, as 
well as intergenerational patterns of  belief  and custom. 
Comfort zones also embody life circumstances including, 
for many people, their past and continuing racialization, 
stigmatization, discrimination and prejudice. We all have 
comfort zones: a set of  people with whom we like to 
spend time, and, at times of  our day or week or life, we 
actively seek out.
 However, as we live our life and make choices about 
who inhabits our comfort zone, we learn that not 
everyone’s choices are equally visible, normalized, or 
judged acceptable according to national categorizations 
of  belonging and difference. If  our ancestors are seen 
as belonging to the core of  the nation, then our comfort 
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zone is not publically visible or remarked upon in public 
debates, even if  we chose ‘our own kind’. But if  we are 
categorized through an ‘ethnic lens’ as different from the 
national cultural/racialised/religious core and we make 
the same choices about our comfort zone, we are seen 
as refusing to integrate and a threat to the social fabric 
of  the nation (Glick Schiller et al., 2005). Moreover, 
if  because of  the ethnic lens of  national discourse we 
are seen as the ‘other’, even when our comfort zone is 
a domain of  sociability built on common interests or 
affinities with those understood as belonging to the 
nation, social scientists and politicians fail to notice. 
 Every day and without fanfare, recent migrants to 
Europe and North America and their children find 
pathways of  local emplacement despite stigmatization. 
They settle by building comfort zones. Some, like 
Aunt Ida, settle on the basis of  their shared ascribed 
identities. Others, like my mother, become part of  a 
locality by establishing domains of  commonality despite 
difference. If  we put aside the public obsession with 
cultural difference and recognize that social life is lived 
by all of  us within variations of  personal comfort zones, 
we could reject the anti-immigrant fear mongering 
of  political pundits. Then we could embrace common 
human concerns… and perhaps also save our planet 
from environmental destruction before it gets too hot to 
be a comfort zone.    
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Transnational Families 
Leslie E. Fesenmyer
‘Transnational’ families are families who live apart but 
who create and retain a ‘sense of  collective welfare and 
unity, in short “familyhood,” even across national borders’ 
(Bryceson and Vuorela 2002). They include transnational 
couples (for example, migrant spouse/partner and non-
migrant spouse/partner), migrant parents and their non-
migrant children who remain at ‘home’, and migrants 
and their elderly non-migrant parents and siblings. They 
mark the intersection, on the one hand, of  individual and 
familial aspirations and needs, and on the other hand, 
structural opportunities and constraints. Such families are 
an inevitable consequence of  migration and are hardly a 
recent phenomenon. 
 Transnational families cannot be counterposed with 
those whose members remain in one country. Instead, 
these families encourage us to problematize (implicit) 
assumptions about relatedness. For instance, is co-
residence a necessity for family-making? And, is physical 
co-presence the primary means of  showing care and 
affection?  If  some people migrate in order to make 
particular lives possible in their country of  origin (Sørenson 
and Olwig 2002), then physical separation cannot be 
taken a priori to be culturally problematic. Equally, the 
transnational aspect of  families may only be a temporary 
phase in the lives of  specific families, as they ultimately 
seek to be reunited in the country of  destination.
 These families offer a unique lens through which 
to explore processes and experiences of  transnational 
migration. They are often formed through the coming 
together of  individuals with different linguistic, cultural, 
social, and/or religious backgrounds. In doing so, they 
may contribute to processes of  creolization whereby 
selected elements from the various backgrounds of  
family members and the places where they live are 
brought together in ways that give rise to new identities 
and cultural practices (Cohen, 2007). 
 Today, communication and travel across vast distances 
are cheaper, and technologies more widely available, 
than in earlier periods of  migration. Phone calls, text 
messages, and emails offer ways to stay in touch quickly, 
frequently, and easily, while Skype with video allows 
transnational kin to approximate a sense of  physical co-
presence. Safer, cheaper modes of  travel make family 
visits more accessible. These technologies have been 
incorporated into a repertoire of  familial practices that 
enable kin to sustain a sense of  relatedness across space. 
Despite such practices, living apart can be an emotionally 
painful experience and contribute to a sense of  alienation 
and disconnectedness among both those who move and 
those who stay. It can also give rise to gendered moral 
criticism that reflects specific cultural norms around what 
it means to be a good parent, child, or relative. 
 Moreover, being able to stay in touch brings with it 
the expectation of  communication. Yet familial relations 
are complex. Affection can be accompanied by irritation, 
happiness by anger, and shame by guilt. The distance 
generated by migration can further complicate the mix 
of  sentiments. Perhaps, for some family members, the 
physical distance has welcome (if  unacknowledged or 
unacknowledgeable) consequences. Living apart can 
give rise to a greater freedom and autonomy, as well as 
opportunities to negotiate obligations and reconfigure 
familial relations.  
  Regardless of  dynamics within transnational families, 
these so-called family-making technologies are not 
equally accessible to every family. (In)accessibility has 
both micro dimensions that relate to individuals and their 
families, as well as more macro structural dimensions. 
Wealthy families can easily travel to meet each other. Yet 
poorer families may be constrained in their movement 
not only by limited financial resources, but also by a lack 
of  social capital to, for example, navigate bureaucratic 
visa procedures. Depending on the country in which they 
live, families of  every social background may struggle 
to move around the world to visit their kin because of  
where their country is positioned socio-politically in the 
nation-state order, or what Massey (1991) refers to as the 
‘global power geometry’. Meanwhile, family members 
traveling from other countries invite less scrutiny. Thus, 
transnational migration can also be a vector through 
which social stratification is articulated or compounded.
 Much of  the preceding discussion could be framed 
as a debate about translocal families. More specifically, 
family members live in particular places, whether they 
are villages, towns, or cities, and relate to each other 
from those locales, which occupy positions lower on the 
geographic scale than the nation state. Accordingly, it is 
important not to privilege a priori the nation state or the 
‘national’ when trying to understand the lives of  families 
who live apart.
 Nonetheless, the nation-state system can exert a 
powerful influence over the shape such families take 
and how they live their lives. State regulations limit who 
can move (or visit), under what conditions, and for how 
long. It is important to place the tightening of  regulations 
within a given (particular) social and historical moment, 
a time when much attention is directed at the issue of  
(im)migration in many countries around the world. Family 
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reunification is a migration channel over which states 
have little control. Though the state may be constrained 
in its ability to stop family members from settling in the 
destination countries of  their kin, such regulations can 
still interpenetrate their intimate relations such that laws 
differentiate kin on the basis of  their migration status. 
Increasing state regulation will likely only contribute 
both to the rising prevalence and to the persistence of  
transnational families. 
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Affinities in Multicultural Neighbourhoods: Shared Values and their Differences 
Ellie Vasta
Claims that Australian and British social cohesion is 
crumbling due to ethnic differences tend to highlight 
worst-case scenarios. In some multi-ethnic and 
multicultural countries of  immigration, there is still 
an underlying drive for assimilation of  people who do 
not share the same history or cultural traditions of  the 
majority population. Post 9/11 in Britain, three successive 
prime ministers have publically noted the importance of  
‘British values’, implying that some communities’ values 
are inferior to British values. It has been argued that the 
loss of  common values challenges western democracies 
and that the promotion of  cultural diversity only 
exacerbates the problem (Goodhart, 2004). Recently, 
both the British Prime Minister Cameron and German 
Chancellor Merkel have declared that multiculturalism 
has failed in their respective countries. In Australia, there 
have been similar debates around the consequences of  
diversity, especially for social cohesion, citizenship and 
national identity. Australian multiculturalism remains 
highly contested, ambivalent and unsettling, and elicits 
contradictory reactions. Apart from a citizenship test, 
Australia includes an ‘Australian Values Statement’ in the 
booklet provided to people applying for visas to live in 
Australia. 
 Such concern about the extent of  cultural/ethnic 
diversity ignores social divisions far wider than those 
of  ethnicity including differences between generations, 
between religious and secular Australians, between those 
with differing education and different class backgrounds. 
Affinities denotes conditions of  being alike, based on 
values, histories or comparable circumstances. This does 
not mean people are the same, but that they find aspects 
of  their lives which identify a commonality: living in the 
same area, being migrants, having children, and so on. 
Values such as self-direction, compassion, conformity 
and respect for difference are important mechanisms 
for guiding people’s behaviour and actions. However 
commonalities might be less about shared values than 
comparable experiences, circumstances and histories. 
 The most significant research on values is the World 
Values Survey (2010-2012). Using this, Inglehart and Baker 
found both ‘massive cultural change’ and the ‘persistence 
of  distinctive cultural traditions’ (2000). This is apparent 
when examining differences and changes between the 
generations of  migrant background in Sydney. Whether 
economic migrants or refugees, the first generation often 
experience extraordinary levels of  uncertainty and must 
contend with numerous types of  risk. People migrate 
precisely to provide a sense of  security and belonging, 
for themselves and their children. One young Indian 
Australian claims that in his community there is 
a strong emphasis on maintaining your culture, on 
keeping it strong. The group I come from, there’s 
a strong emphasis on that … ‘This is how you’re 
supposed to be’, because they want to protect it, 
and they want to make sure it survives … And 
they don’t know how they’ll cope or how they’ll 
adapt … whereas in the Australian culture, broadly 
speaking, there’s less emphasis on that because 
everybody is secure in who they are and what 
they’re doing, and the people around them. 
Those born and bred in Australia have a certain sense 
of  security inherent in that status, where ‘survival is 
taken for granted, instead of  the feeling that survival 
is uncertain’ (Inglehart, 2000). In addition, Inglehart 
suggests that ‘age and economic circumstances (rising 
economic and physical security) bring about changes to 
value orientations between generations due to different 
experiences in their formative years’ (2000). This is 
similar to the findings of  Hussain and Bagguley (2005) 
who report that second generation British Pakistanis 
draw upon citizenship rights to assert their identity 
and sense of  belonging. Our young Indian-Australian 
respondent exemplifies how many younger and second 
generation Australians assert their sense of  belonging 
and Australianness by constructing and claiming certain 
Australian values and identities, however different from 
the mainstream, as their own … 
So, Australian values – it’s the same values I’ve 
described before about myself  and my community, 
because I’m an Australian … I’ll tell you how I 
would like to define [Australian values]. I’d like 
them to be defined by being a multicultural society 
of, you know, people being vegetarian or going to a 
temple or going to a mosque or going to the beach 
or going for a walk … that’s the sort of  Australian 
values that I hold. 
In other words, he highlights ‘respect for diversity’ 
as an important value that is sometimes forgotten in 
multicultural Australia.
 Family is described as one of  the universal values, 
although it comes in different shapes and sizes. People 
compared and contrasted their notion of  family and 
family practices with what they thought it meant to other 
ethnic groups. They mention various ethnic groups they 
think they may have more in common with. For example, 
a young Lebanese-Australian Muslim woman claims 
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Christian Lebanese, Greeks, Italians and Macedonians 
have similar child-rearing practices to Muslim Lebanese 
and that these are different from Anglo-Australians. 
Examples she gave included not allowing their children 
to work in paid-employment while they are studying, 
not expecting their children to pay rent while living at 
home and encouraging them to live at home until they 
get married. 
 The same Lebanese-Australian woman claimed that 
although Asian Australians may have different ways of  
bringing up their children from her community, there 
was one strong similarity; ‘You know, actually, maybe they 
are similar because they do value their boys a lot more 
than the girls’. While child-rearing practices are positively 
similar to some European groups, the poor treatment 
and inequality of  women has a negative similarity with 
‘Chinese Asians’. Indeed, Norris and Inglehart (2002), 
using results from the World Values Survey, find that 
contrary to the Samuel Huntington thesis about the core 
clash of  values between western democratic values and 
Islamic religious values, the cultural faultline is much 
more concerned with gender inequality.
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How are sexuality and migration shaped and reshaped by 
one another? Varied definitions of  sexuality have made 
this a challenging question to answer. Until recently, 
sexuality was frequently conflated with gender, or else 
addressed under rubrics like crime, deviance, morality, 
or disease (Manalansan, 2006). Moreover, sexuality was 
commonly understood as a private matter and irrelevant 
to the ‘big’ questions about migration. Studies of  sexuality 
were often framed around the modernist belief  that 
everyone has an individual sexual identity – even though 
this belief  is not applicable to other times and places. 
 Queer theory, which emerged in the early 1990s, 
challenged these approaches and opened up new 
possibilities for thinking about the connections 
between sexuality and migration. Refusing essentialist 
and transhistorical constructs of  sexual identities, 
queer theory instead explores the production of  sexual 
subjectivities, how distinctions between normal and 
abnormal get created, and the relations of  domination 
and subordination involved. It addresses sexuality as 
a regime of  power that thoroughly shapes families, 
communities, state institutions, and economies; and it 
underscores that sexual norms, struggles and forms of  
governance always articulate hierarchies of  gender, race, 
class and geopolitics. 
 Concomitantly, accelerated globalization processes  – 
that extend histories of  colonialism and global capitalism 
– produced a new ‘age of  migration.’ The field of  
migration studies, which had naturalized the framework of  
the sovereign nation state that controlled its own borders, 
began to acknowledge the impact of  globalization, 
the fact that migrants often lived transnational lives, 
the need to question nationalist analytic frameworks, 
the continuing impact of  (neo)colonialism, and the 
significance of  diasporic experiences. It also recognized 
that immigration policing has multiplied and dispersed 
national borders both inward into national territories, 
and outward to extraterritorial locations.
 In this context, exploring connections between 
sexuality and migration often begins with the recognition 
that today’s global order emerged through colonial 
processes. According to Ann Laura Stoler (2002), sexual 
arrangements were never just metaphors, but also material 
mechanisms, for creating and maintaining racialized, 
gendered, economic and geopolitical distinctions 
between ‘colonizer’ and ‘colonized’. Consequently, 
‘who bedded and wedded whom in the colonies… was 
never left to chance,’ and migration possibilities were 
organized accordingly (Stoler, 2002). With the shift to a 
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world of  nation states that supposedly controlled their 
own borders, sexuality retained its importance in creating 
and naturalizing inequalities, this time through constructs 
of  nation, citizenry, social ordering, and economy – and 
enforced by expanding state migration controls. 
 These processes variously shaped migration. For 
instance, sexuality has impelled migration by individuals 
such as: lesbians, gay men, and unmarried pregnant 
women seeking to avoid discrimination or stigmatization; 
married people seeking employment to support children; 
women and men using marriage as a strategy for legal 
migration; those going abroad to sell sex; individuals 
seeking HIV/AIDS treatment; sex tourists; and others. 
Sexuality also shapes people’s access to social networks 
that provide the information, resources, and contacts 
that enable migration. Nation states, in turn, often 
decide whether to admit or refuse entry to migrants 
based on sexual considerations that cross-cut racial, 
gender, class, and geopolitical calculations. For instance, 
legal admission often depends on fitting into normative 
definitions of  family, kinship or marriage, or claiming 
fear of  persecution that takes sexualized form or is based 
on sexuality. Conversely, migrants are often denied legal 
status when they cannot fit into normative definitions 
of  family, or are believed to present sexual danger (for 
example, as supposed carriers of  sexual diseases, or loose 
women, or men who might sexually prey on others, or 
sexual ‘perverts’). Migrants continue to be governed in 
sexual terms after entering the nation state, especially 
through their interactions with economic, health, welfare, 
and education systems. Moreover, citizens respond to 
migrants through a sexualized lens, often seeing them as 
exotic, sexually backwards/traditional/repressed, highly 
fertile, bearers of  perversion and disease – or as models 
of  sexual and moral values that the citizenry should 
emulate. Through these processes, binaries of  us/them, 
citizen/migrant, normal/deviant become expressed, 
mapped onto bodies and places, and struggled over. 
 Migrants respond in complex ways to prevailing 
assumptions about their sexual practices and beliefs. 
Their sexualities are often evaluated in terms of  their 
supposed success or failure in ‘assimilating’ to dominant 
cultural sexual norms (which are held to be superior to 
migrants’ cultures), and the presumption that exposure 
to dominant culture causes change. But new scholarship 
suggests that gender, racial and economic discrimination; 
housing and occupational segregation; precarious legal 
status; language barriers; transnational ties; and migrants’ 
own creative adaptations provide better explanations 
Towards EmoTions
for change. These frameworks reorient readers away 
from Eurocentric models of  linear progress and 
assimilation, toward complexity, multiplicity, hybridity, 
transnationalism, and multiple modernities – that involve 
not an uncritical celebration of  difference, but rather the 
negotiation of  colonial legacies and power inequalities. 
The works also provide models of  global flows that 
decenter the west, deconstruct binaries like local/global 
and traditional/modernity, and rethink what borders do.
 Recent studies also explore how individual feelings 
of  love and desire interact with large-scale social and 
economic structures that condition migration. Analyzing 
how migrants refashion their selves and subjectivities, 
scholars have paid particular attention to the role of  
mass media, virtual flows, and the internet. Scholars have 
also explored connections between migration, sexualities 
and the second generation (especially daughters); 
experiences of  migrant sex workers; the politics of  
migrants’ childbearing; migration and HIV/AIDS; 
sexuality, migration and asylum claims; experiences of  
transnational intimacies and families; and to some extent, 
the lives of  migrant gay men and transgender people 
(lesbians have received little attention). 
 Given that both migration and sexual controls 
are intimately tied to histories of  colonialism, global 
capitalism, and slavery, scholars have posed challenging 
questions about interconnections among sexuality, 
migration, and struggles to end inequalities. Some explore 
how the criminalization of  unauthorized migrants, the 
rise of  the prison industrial complex, and sexual norms 
that articulate racial, gender, and class hierarchies, work 
in tandem to legitimize subjecting diverse populations 
to exploitation, violence, and shortened lives. Others 
problematize how global human rights discourses used 
in asylum cases, including those involving sexuality, may 
at once reinscribe colonial, racial and gender inequalities 
but nonetheless present opportunities for change. These 
and other analyses ask us to question critically how 
the connections between sexuality and migration may 
reinforce, or offer opportunities to transform, multiple 
inequalities at different scales.
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Bliss in Capetown, 1921
M. J. Oliver
I done find Jim in dockyard lyin on shed floor. 
He look scare, I close door gentle. No worry, I say, 
I call Bliss, an I kiss him rose flower mouth. 
Pleasure sailor that my job, but this diffrent. 
I only fourteen, done forget, he fifteen, sixteen most. 
Old sailor done rape him cabin boy every day, he tell me, 
so he jump ship. I like you yellow hair, I say.
I bring him string beans an a pear from my step-daddy plot, 
cassava an rice from ship I work nights, 
a mango, a plum an a small pickle fish one day.
He love Table Mountain peek upside li’l window 
wile we eat an laugh lot, roll round. Oh Bliss!
he say, Marry me, then you not do this nice thing 
with bad men you not love – never gain.
You mad sugarbush, No! I say an throw him white arm far way.
You desert ship, you got no right, no pass. Law here hang you. 
Liberty Belle she in dock an I know she sail tonight. You go.
 
Soon as dark Jim an me we go quiet from shed we lay. 
Crew on waterfront all busy, all girls an boys they say bye-bye. 
Jim he fly like mosquito round me, here, there, he kiss me.
Then short time hush, him sweet head in Bliss black hands.
Up gang plank he zig zag. Gone.
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Making Politics
Migration, Suffering and Rights 
Julia O’Connell Davidson
About suffering they were never wrong,
The old Masters: how well they understood
Its human position: how it takes place
While someone else is eating or opening a window or just 
walking dully along
Musée des Beaux Arts - W. H. Auden
In an essay about suffering which takes Auden’s Musée 
des Beaux Arts as its starting point, David Morris 
observes that we witness other people’s suffering from 
a distance, ‘as if  through a pane of  thick glass’ (Morris 
1997). The poem, he says, speaks to the fact that our own 
lives are necessarily ‘more immediate and absorbing’, and 
suggests that our capacity for detachment is ‘the outcome 
of  a structural position we cannot help but occupy’. 
However, Morris continues, there is a difference between 
this kind of  detachment and an ideological blindness to 
the suffering of  those groups of  people who are excluded 
from our ‘moral community’. It is not the same to turn 
away from news reporting a tragedy affecting people far 
away and continue to butter the breakfast toast because 
there is nothing you can do to help, as it is to imagine 
that ‘people like them’ do not suffer as you would if  
affected by a similar tragedy. The recognition of  a person 
or group’s suffering is linked to their inclusion in the 
moral community, Morris argues: ‘Suffering… is not a 
raw datum, a natural phenomenon we can identify and 
measure, but a social status that we extend or withhold’.
 I was reminded of  Morris’s essay when I read about 
the series of  shipwrecks in the Mediterranean in October 
2013, in which some 400 people are believed to have 
drowned whilst attempting to make the crossing from 
Libya to Lampedusa. Media reporting of  the disasters 
noted that humanitarian agencies estimate that 20,000 
lives have been lost in similar circumstances over the past 
20 years, and that there are many thousands more men, 
women and children currently in North African countries, 
waiting to attempt the crossing (Davies, 2013). People in 
Europe heard this news and continued with the prosaic 
business of  daily life, just as the ship in Auden’s poem 
continued on its way after witnessing Icarus fall into the 
sea. The comments sections beneath newspaper articles 
on the tragedies provide an insight into their thoughts as 
they did so.
 Some certainly recognized the suffering of  the 
migrants concerned, but comments beneath a Daily Mail 
article included the following: ‘Isn’t it about time these 
people stayed to sort out the mess in their own countries 
instead of  running away?’; and ‘Hard as it may seem, the 
only solution is to send all of  them (without exception) 
back to the port where they came from’; and ‘As much 
as this is a sad story, the UK cannot accommodate the 
world and it’s wife in such a small island, this is unfair 
for the population’ (Robinson, 2013). These are not the 
comments of  people simply too absorbed in their own 
lives to dwell on the suffering of  distant people. They 
express an active resistance against the ethical claim that 
these migrants’ suffering might make upon the authors.
 Suffering occupies an important place in refugee and 
forced migration studies, for in international refugee 
and human rights law, those who are understood to 
have suffered are often afforded special status in terms 
of  rights and protections. But much as the connective 
tissue between suffering and rights appears as a humane 
counterbalance to the rather callous comments above, 
it also presents us with a quandary. Though Morris is 
without doubt correct to say that the status of  suffering 
is more readily afforded to those who are perceived as 
members of  the moral community, suffering is neither 
a necessary criterion for community membership nor 
the usual route to inclusion. Indeed, perhaps what the 
Daily Mail readers were really concerned to contest is the 
idea that distant others should be able to secure rights 
of  inclusion in European countries on the basis of  their 
suffering. And on this question of  whether rights and 
recognition as a morally considerable person should be 
tied up with suffering, I find myself  in agreement with 
them, albeit for very different reasons. 
 Because suffering is not raw datum, it can be selectively 
recognized. Thus, states acknowledge that people can be 
forced to move as a consequence of  suffering purposefully 
inflicted by private or state actors (‘traffickers’, actors 
who persecute on the basis of  political or religious belief, 
race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality etc.) or consequent upon 
war and armed conflict, but not as a result of  suffering 
that stems from impersonal factors, such as poverty. Such 
distinctions even came into play in commentary on the 
October shipwrecks – the High Commissioner of  the 
UNHCR ‘expressed particular worry that Syrians, who 
are fleeing a frightening conflict, are resorting to this 
dangerous route and drowning as they were seeking a 
safe haven in Europe’ [emphasis added] (UNHCR, 2013).
 Unfortunately, it is perfectly possible for states 
simultaneously to recognize some kinds of  suffering as 
a qualification for community inclusion, but continue 
to operate the lethal immigration regimes and border 
controls that both deny and generate other kinds of  
suffering. In Auden’s poem, the fact that the ship ‘sailed 
calmly on’ expresses an existential truth. But until rights 
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are afforded on the basis of  humanity, not nationality or 
claims to suffering, even this depressing ‘human position’ 
is not universally shared. We are not all free to sail on by.
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Making Politics
Amnesty 
Linda Bosniak
The politics of  immigration are often fought out through 
debates over amnesty. Restrictionists seek to delegitimize 
various forms of  protection of  irregular migrants by 
branding them as ‘amnesty’. In contrast, immigrants’ 
rights advocates talk about amnesty aspirationally 
to signify the rightful incorporation of  previously 
marginalized noncitizens. Some worry that the concept 
has been too successfully commandeered by the right 
and have therefore substituted other terms, including 
‘regularization’ and ‘legalization’. Nevertheless, for many 
progressives, the idea of  amnesty continues to represent 
just and necessary policy. 
 Arguments over amnesty are about the forms that 
immigration policy should take regarding responsibility, 
fault, victimization and accountability. Amnesty shares 
an etymological cognate with amnesia and is often 
characterized as a kind of  (official) forgetting of  a 
transgression or offence. Inevitably, then, the debate 
begins with a threshold question: should the act at 
issue be regarded as transgressive at all? Assuming a 
transgression, amnesty’s ‘forgetting’ has a variety of  
valences. Broadly, amnesty arguments tend to come in 
three versions: forgive-and-forget, administrative reset, 
and vindication.
 The forgive-and-forget version presumes that the 
recipient has perpetrated an offence, with amnesty 
then pardoning the perpetrator and erasing the penalty. 
Notice, however, that granting amnesty performs a kind 
of  expressive indictment, meaning the symbolic cost to 
the beneficiary may be steep. In some settings, amnesty 
has been opposed by potential beneficiaries for just this 
reason. Critics of  forgive-and-forget amnesty, in turn, 
claim that it produces impunity by tolerating rather than 
punishing offenders’ conduct, is unjust to those who 
played by the rules and, at the least, must be coupled 
with conditions or penalties (fines, public apology, 
probation) to underline that fault still attaches. Others in 
the transitional justice context object to what they view 
as amnesty’s ‘enforced forgetting’ altogether. 
 In amnesty’s administrative reset version, the state 
likewise views itself  as responding to an offence, but 
instead of  focusing on fault, the premise is that the law 
is unenforceable. Amnesty is treated as a response to 
administrative failure,  and is undertaken in the interests of  
forward-looking, systemic functionality. This conception 
is applied in a variety of  contexts, both politically charged 
and mundane, including those of  firearms, narcotics, 
tax collection and parking fines. Associated discourse 
sometimes suggests that the transgression was not so 
bad, or its badness was counterweighed by the cost to 
society of  widespread noncompliance, or that de facto 
amnesty is the unacknowledged policy in any case, 
and that it’s better to govern transparently rather than 
inadvertently. Critics complain that the consequentialist 
approach rewards the activity in question (for example, 
tax amnesties are said to ‘enrage compliant tax payers’).
 A third version treats amnesty as vindication. Here, 
amnesty is portrayed as protecting victims, rather than 
indicting wrongdoers (the name of  the organization 
‘Amnesty International’ conveys this understanding). 
This approach entails a moral reframing: the claim is that 
the violated rule was unjust, or that the beneficiaries’ 
prosecution was not justifiable, and that at the least, 
the very policies defining the transgression now need 
interrogation. For example, in debates in the US during 
the Vietnam era, some supporters of  amnesty for draft 
avoiders maintained that the true transgressors were the 
war-makers, not the resistors. In this view, prosecuted 
draft avoiders deserved protection from indefensible 
penalties imposed in an unjustified war. This was the 
understanding of  amnesty advanced by Jean-Paul Sartre 
in a 1973 essay: In calling for ‘amnesty’, he wrote, war 
resistors and deserters  
… did not mean ‘pardon,’ nor even forgetfulness. 
Certain of  the justice of  their cause, they simply 
wanted their rights recognized. And this could 
not be done unless the government was to reverse 
itself  publicly, and, so to speak, say, ‘If  these men 
have the right not to wage this war, then we on our 
side had no right to declare it’.
The point thus far is that political actors argue about 
matters of  accountability through amnesty-talk, and yet 
the amnesty concept offers no consistent understanding 
of  what accountability entails, and stands for no 
consistent approach for achieving it. 
 In the immigration context, the idea of  amnesty 
cuts in various directions. Current debates tend to 
feature forgive-and-forget and/or administrative reset 
versions of  amnesty. The role of  vindication arguments 
is more equivocal. Most immigrants’ rights defenders, 
including academics, seem ambivalent about them. On 
the one hand, amnesty advocates often portray potential 
recipients as victims of  exploitative employers and callous 
governmental actors, and amnesty as a means of  releasing 
beneficiaries from the vulnerability of  unauthorized status. 
On the other hand, amnesty advocates rarely claim that 
amnesty emancipates immigrants from unjust border laws 
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– those same laws which defined them as ‘undocumented’ 
in the first place – nor that immigrants were justified in 
violating the existing law. It is more common to hear that 
the immigrants’ earlier ‘wrongdoing’ has been superseded 
by circumstances – usually, by accrual of  time and ties in 
the receiving state. Such arguments continue to assume 
that the immigration law was just, and that the initial legal 
violation was wrong, but that something subsequent has 
changed the moral calculus. Indeed, advocates often link 
their call for amnesty with a commitment to heightening 
the enforcement of  borders going forward. This kind of  
argument, protective in intent as it is, has led more radical 
immigrants’ rights advocates to repudiate amnesty as a 
political goal, viewing it as effectively tarring immigrants 
and legitimizing the border laws that produce their 
unauthorized status. 
 However, such legitimation is not inherent in the idea 
of  amnesty. More thoroughgoing, vindicatory amnesty 
arguments are at least conceivable. The most radical 
position would be that the state’s border laws are unjust 
ab initio, so entry without inspection or overstaying 
cannot properly be deemed a wrong. This argument 
could be made via a liberal-cosmopolitan Rawlsian 
critique, a humanitarian ethos-of-hospitality critique, or 
a left-anarcho-libertarian critique of  the kind advanced 
by organizations like NoBorders. Alternatively, one 
could make a historically-based argument that, where the 
receiving state has a coercive or exploitative history with 
the sending state, exclusionary laws in relation to nationals 
of  those states are unjustified. With all the arguments, 
the upshot is the same: if  the laws are unjust, then the 
immigrant is not culpable for violating them; instead, 
the state was wrong to enforce them. An alternative 
vindicatory amnesty position might maintain that, even 
if  border laws are not themselves immoral, unauthorized 
immigrants should not be regarded as culpable because 
their actions are excusable. The excuse position could be 
expressed in duress terms – by invoking the immigrant’s 
need to feed self  and family, or escape suffering; or in 
inducement terms – the state was inviting or tolerating 
immigrant presence (or with regards to demand for 
labour, failing to enforce the employer sanctions laws); 
or, in the case of  undocumented youth, by invoking 
incapacity – lack of  choice and control – at the time of  
the illegal act (though note that this last tack ends up 
indicting the ‘culpable’ parents by contrast). 
 In sum, ‘amnesty’-talk need not serve as a diversion 
from ultimate justice questions. It contains vindicatory 
and emancipatory elements as well as legitimizing ones. 
There is no true and single meaning of  ‘amnesty’; what 
matters is the uses to which the idea is put.
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EU Citizenship, Roma Mobility and Anti-Gypsyism: Time for Reframing the Debate? 
Nando Sigona
Given the limited results achieved to date by the EU and 
EU member states in addressing the multiple exclusion 
of  the Romani people in Europe, it is time to rethink 
some of  the assumptions on which past initiatives have 
been built. Here I would like to suggest, very briefly, 
some ways to reframe the current debate on the Roma 
in Europe.
 In a recent article, trying to answer the question ‘Why 
have the Roma become a target and a scapegoat in France 
today?’ the French sociologist Éric Fassin reminded 
us that the ‘object of  phobia is not to be mistaken for 
its source’ and that the ‘explanation of  politics is of  
political nature’ (Fassin, 2010). These remarks suggest 
that, in order to understand what is happening in the 
EU today in relation to Romani communities, we must 
turn our gaze away from the Roma. Instead, we need 
to examine the broader picture: more particularly, the 
EU, an institutional and political construction that has 
undergone two decades of  transition, enlargement, and 
institutional, economic and social restructuring, and that 
is currently under incredible pressure as a result of  the 
financial crisis and rampant nationalism. We can then try 
to locate the Roma within these processes.
 The Roma are a testing ground and an opportunity 
for the EU political project. Attempts to portrait them 
as exotic and other to the imagined EU community hide 
a centuries long history of  bans, forced migration  and 
expulsion, but also cohabitation and conviviality. The 
Roma are one of  the peoples that makes the European 
Union, much like the Swedes or the Danes (including 
numerically), and not some kind of  alien body from a 
remote elsewhere; yet they are nonetheless a people 
without adequate institutional representation. The current 
attempt to curb their mobility (as well as their right to 
establish themselves in another member state) challenges 
one of  the key pillars of  the European Union and, at a 
time of  major structural tensions, calls into question the 
capacity of  the EU to fully embrace its mandate vis-à-vis 
the mounting nationalist demands of  member states. The 
Roma ‘threat’ is manipulated and used by Eurosceptic 
political actors to score points against the overall EU 
project. 
 As I have shown in Romani Politics in Contemporary 
Europe (Sigona and Trehan, 2009) apart from structural 
tensions resulting from rapid economic transformation, 
the transition of  formerly socialist states towards 
capitalism has been characterised by a search for 
foundational myths to redefine the relationship between 
state and nation. In such a context, nationalist movements 
have grown stronger, and so have numerous far-right 
racist and xenophobic groups that have marked out 
for themselves increasingly large spaces in the political 
life of  most European countries. This overall shift to 
the right, exacerbated by the existing confusion in the 
social-democratic camp, has turned the Roma, a minority 
without significant political representation, into an easy 
target for racist campaigns that at times culminate in 
violence.
 In contemporary Europe, racism against Roma is 
not just confined to a few extremist fringe elements. 
Successive Eurobarometer surveys1 underline just how 
widespread prejudice and stereotypes about this minority 
are. Interestingly, despite this widespread intolerance 
towards the Roma, terms such as anti-Gypsyism and 
Romaphobia only entered EU’s political vocabulary 
in the mid-2000s. To be effective, any solution has to 
acknowledge the ‘mainstream’ nature of  anti-Romani 
sentiments; this is not the case for example in the EU 
Framework for national Roma integration strategies.2 
 The history of  Romani communities in Europe is 
marked by episodes of  mass persecution, violence and 
discrimination perpetrated by both institutional and 
non-institutional agents. The mass killing of  hundreds 
of  thousands of  Roma systematically carried out by the 
Nazi regime before and during World War II was the 
culmination of  a process, not an isolated episode. The 
construction of  the Romani communities as a ‘race of  
criminals’ genetically inclined to crime was a central 
component of  the ideological apparatus that provided a 
‘justification’ for the genocide of  European Roma.
 To understand the contemporary spread of  anti-
Gypsyism in neoliberal Europe and the link between the 
racial criminalization of  the Roma and discriminatory 
policy and practice, we should bear in mind that anti-
Gypsyism is not a new phenomenon; nonetheless, in its 
current configuration, it is inextricably intertwined with 
the transformations that followed the breakup of  the 
Soviet Union, the consolidation of  liberal democracies 
and neoliberal economic principles in the European 
Union, and processes of  pauperisation experienced by 
many Romani communities.
 A new critical approach addressing the root causes 
of  Roma exclusion is urgently needed. This must include 
an understanding of  the Roma history of  exclusion 
within the history of  Europe, and place the successful 
participation of  the Roma in European polity at the core 
of  the EU project. This is where the Roma belong.
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1 For more information: http://ec.europa.eu/public_
opinion/index_en.htm. 
2 For more information: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/
discrimination/roma/national-strategies/index_en.htm.  
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Making Politics
A Spirituality of  Migration? 
Michael Nausner
Ever since the Enlightenment, the question of  whether 
spirituality is a necessary or even viable aspect of  social 
life has been raised. Faith, understood as a set of  beliefs 
in more or less authoritarian rules imposed from above, 
has met with increasing suspicion. In a world in which 
the rights of  individuals and democratic social systems 
were evolving, religious systems seemed to be backward-
looking obstacles to the progress of  western nations. 
At the same time, religious systems often supported the 
colonial and imperial ambitions of  western states. They 
mirrored the construction of  the world in terms of  ‘the 
west vs. the rest’, by propagating a world view based on 
the division of  the world into a Christian and a non-
Christian sphere. 
 The strength of  the legacy of  such a cultural 
epistemology can be seen in the frequent attempts on 
the part of  theologians and politicians to argue for the 
protection of  a ‘Christian Occident’ or a ‘Christian 
Europe’. An extreme example of  such a mindset was 
the campaign of  the Austrian Freedom Party during 
the run-up to elections in 2013. All over the country, 
large billboards broadcast the blue-eyed leader of  the 
party in friendly conversation with healthy people of  
light skin colour, with accompanying text reading: 
‘Love your neighbour. For me this means our Austrians’. 
Notwithstanding protests by mainstream Christian 
churches in Austria, the Freedom Party garnered almost 
a quarter of  the votes of  the Austrian people. Obviously, 
for this party known for its aggressively xenophobic 
campaigning, the trick of  ‘positive’ advertising had been 
successful. The implication seems to be: what is wrong 
with loving our Austrians? There is nothing wrong with 
protecting a Christian inside from the migrating non-
Christians flooding Europe from the outside. 
 From a theological point of  view, of  course, this 
logic is utterly flawed with respect to the key text on 
neighbourly love in the New Testament. The parable 
of  the Good Samaritan is still known, I believe, by large 
portions of  the secularized European population. It may 
still belong to Europe’s ‘Christian heritage’, but it most 
decidedly is not a story that is attached to one particular 
religion. It is the story Jesus tells an interlocutor who 
had asked the question: ‘Who is my neighbour?’ The 
story ends with two surprises: firstly, the person who 
shows neighbourly love is a migrating foreigner, a hated 
Samaritan passing through Jewish territory. Secondly, it 
is not the person rightly inhabiting the homeland, but 
rather this migrating foreigner, who extends a helping 
hand. The theological outcome is ambiguous. One aspect, 
however, can be summarized by saying that neighbourly 
love materializes not just by providing support to the 
outsiders, but, importantly, by acknowledging the agency 
of  these outsiders in order to be helped by them. Thus, 
theologically speaking, to restrict neighbourly love to 
‘our Austrians’ is to distort the parable recounted by the 
ancient Greek writer of  Luke’s Gospel.
 Religious systems, including Christian missionary 
activities through the ages, have been misused to deny the 
agency of  the ‘other’. However, using the parable of  the 
Good Samaritan as a point of  departure, I would say that 
a grounded spirituality brings together an expectation 
of  the agency both of  the divine and of  the human 
‘other’. In the case of  the Good Samaritan, this ‘other’ 
was a migrant. Such spirituality has political implications. 
If  a political system takes seriously the notion that the 
sedentary view is not necessarily the view that best serves 
the common good, a new openness may emerge towards 
the multiple ways in which a migrant’s perspective can 
help to shape a society to be a more constructive part of  
the global village. A society that continues to understand 
its relation to migrating people as a matter of  unilateral 
adaptation to an (often fictitious) sedentary culture is 
missing out on an indispensible political resource: the 
perceptive quality of  the migrant’s vision. After all, as 
Homi Bhabha (1994) has said in reference to Salman 
Rushdie’s work, ‘the truest eye may now belong to the 
migrant’s double vision’.
 A spirituality of  migration has less to do with ‘being 
nice to refugees’, and more to do with an awareness that 
spirituality itself  has a migratory character. Taking clues 
from the parable of  the Good Samaritan, it is a spirituality 
that continuously is prepared to travel, so to speak, into 
the contact zones between cultures. And in contrast to all 
attempts of  religious empire-building through the ages, 
it knows that it does not have a ‘permanent dwelling’ in 
the world, but is looking for a ‘future dwelling place’, 
as the letter to the Hebrews in the New Testament has 
it. This future dwelling, however, is not to be imagined 
just as a lofty realm beyond social coexistence. Rather, 
I understand the imagining of  a more just dwelling as a 
process that is simultaneously spiritual and political. And 
it needs migrants’ perspectives in order to be inclusive.
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Migration and Population Growth: Future Predictions and Contemporary Politics 
Alessio Cangiano
Although migration policy-making remains mostly driven 
by short-term economic objectives and human rights 
frameworks (for example, for the admission of  family 
migrants and asylum seekers), demographic arguments 
are gaining grounds in migration debates in some of  the 
major immigrant-receiving countries where population 
growth has been (and is expected to be) largely driven 
by net migration. In the UK, the rise in immigration 
levels over the past decade has fuelled the idea that 
Britain’s demography is not ‘sustainable’. The impact 
of  immigration on population growth has become a 
ubiquitous issue in public debates about growing housing 
needs, congested road networks and public transport, 
loss of  countryside to eco-town developments, and 
public service provision. In the Australian election of  
2010, both major parties fuelled a heated public debate 
about population growth, linked to widespread public 
anxieties about migration, asylum seekers, and the 
‘failure of  multiculturalism’. The association between 
immigration and population growth has also featured 
strongly in US debates where vocal population control 
and environmentalist lobbies advocate immigration 
restrictions.  
 Without entering into the merits of  the costs and 
benefits of  immigration and population growth – a 
polarised debate that is typically informed by partial and 
highly contested evidence – it is legitimate to ask whether 
it is desirable to prioritise demographic objectives 
in migration policies. And, if  so, is it feasible to use 
migration policies to achieve predetermined levels of  
net migration and thereby manage population growth? 
Taking the achievement of  a particular population size 
as a goal of  migration policies is beset with practical and 
ethical challenges, and there are numerous constraints on 
attaining a net migration target. 
 Demographic sustainability is a notoriously imprecise 
concept and demographic objectives (for example, a 
‘desirable’ pace of  population growth or a stable age 
structure) only make sense when their broader economic, 
social and environmental implications are taken into 
account. Competing priorities exist between these policy 
domains: for example, a migration policy aiming at 
maximising economic growth may look very different 
from one prioritising environmental sustainability. There 
is no evidence of  an ‘optimum’ population size that 
maximizes general wellbeing. An obvious risk in setting 
such a number is that a complex series of  issues affecting 
virtually every area of  public policy are reduced to an 
arbitrary, round number. 
 The scope for managing migration as a policy 
instrument to meet ‘desirable’ demographic objectives 
raises ethical questions: not only in the functional logic 
underpinning the use of  migration policies to achieve 
exclusively the receiving country’s national interests, but 
also in the risk of  putting the blame on migrants for 
making population growth ‘unsustainable’. It also has 
numerous constraints. An important challenge for long-
term demographic planning is that migration trends are 
subject to a high degree of  uncertainty and are extremely 
difficult to predict. Governments have little or no control 
over significant parts of  the flows that make up the net 
migration aggregate. In liberal democracies, emigration 
of  nationals cannot be limited. For EU member states, 
the regime of  free circulation of  EEA citizens and non-
EEA permanent residents, combined with considerable 
diversity in demographic trends across the EU, means 
that it would be difficult to adopt an immigration policy 
inspired by demographic objectives within a shared system 
of  European migration governance – an argument that is 
often put forward by far-right anti-immigration lobbyists 
as a rationale for the UK to leave the EU. Internal mobility, 
which can have major implications for infrastructure and 
public service provision, is also difficult to manage in 
many states, though China, for example, has tried. Some 
categories of  foreign immigrants can be controlled, 
but not without economic and social costs. Restricting 
highly skilled workers’ and students’ mobility might have 
detrimental implications for the competitiveness of  the 
economy and for the country’s geopolitical influence. 
Limiting rights to family reunification and international 
protection can undermine compliance with international 
human rights frameworks and ultimately clash with some 
key liberal values.
 One constructive element of  introducing population 
growth into migration debates is that it marks a move 
away from a narrowly-framed migration debate focusing 
on short-term labour market objectives and considering 
migration in isolation, to a broader, long-term perspective 
that sees migration as a structural phenomenon and 
emphasises the need for an integrated policy framework 
considering migration in relation to other socio-
demographic trends. However, given the difficulties both 
of  formulating desirable demographic objectives and of  
achieving them by managing the net migration aggregate, 
it is reasonable to wonder whether the emerging rationale 
to reduce net migration in order to curb population 
growth is a genuine policy objective or another rhetorical 
argument to justify exclusionary immigration regulations. 
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The British Labour Party, backed by the trade union 
movement, fought a great, honourable battle in the last 
century for dignity of  labour and fair pay. This is all being 
lost, thanks in part to the arrival of  waves of  cheap labour 
from the east. 
- Peter Oborne, 2013
It would ordinarily be hard to imagine a Daily Telegraph 
columnist as defender of  trade unions and their 
achievements. Harder still when one considers that only 
four years previously, the same Peter Oborne had praised 
Margaret Thatcher’s defeat of  the unions in the pages 
of  the Daily Mail. As Emerson put it, ‘the louder he 
talked of  his honour, the faster we counted our spoons’ 
(Emerson, 1860).
 But Oborne is pursuing a well-worn strategy of  
divide and rule. He presents a sort of  hierarchy, in which 
workers are encouraged to identify themselves (and 
perhaps their unions) as being a step above migrants. 
This is as crude as religious bigotry in Northern Ireland, 
which was derided by Eamonn McCann as a ‘tuppence 
ha’penny looking down on tuppence’. McCann went 
on to point out the function of  sectarianism, citing 
former Northern Irish PM Brian Faulkner praising 
factory owners marching shoulder to shoulder with their 
workforce, thus guaranteeing themselves, ‘the feeling 
of  security that the wage earners wouldn’t be marching 
against them’ (McCann, 1986).
 Some expect unions themselves to continue to fall 
for this; in 2007, one Labour leader even called for 
British jobs for British workers at the Trade Union 
Congress (TUC) Conference. Trade unions are essentially 
economic reformist organisations – they seek to organise 
and represent the maximum proportion of  workers 
in a workplace or industry. This means that they can 
encompass a membership which has a wide diversity of  
opinions, but (in reality) a narrow range of  economic 
interests. At the same time, members may expect that, 
as well as protecting ‘vested interests’ (that is, those of  
existing members supposedly privileged by their insider 
status), unions will also act as the ‘sword of  justice’, 
seeking to combat injustice and inequality (Flanders, 
1970). The apparent contradiction between the two roles 
is displayed when it comes to migration. Migrants may 
be regarded as victims, as competitors (and agents of  the 
bosses), or comrades, and we do not have to look very 
hard to find examples of  all of  these in our history. 
 For example, ex-international West Indian cricketer 
Learie Constantine worked for the British Labour 
Ministry during World War II as a welfare officer dealing 
with black migrant workers in factories in the north 
Unions, Migration and the Road Less Travelled 
Nick Clark
west. He reported that the Boilermakers’ union, soured 
by the experience of  post-World War I unemployment 
amongst their members, were refusing to admit black 
workers into membership, but went on to report: ‘The 
electrical unions, on the other hand, were most helpful, 
and allowed coloured representatives to take places on 
Union Committees’ (Constantine, 1954).
 More recently, the sword of  justice was evidenced 
by General Secretary Bill Morris of  the Transport and 
General Workers’ Union, in his outspoken opposition 
to New Labour’s introduction of  vouchers for asylum 
seekers, and also in the TUC’s support of  the Committee 
to Assist Refugee Academics’ guide on education for 
refugees in 2005. 
 It might be argued that adopting such positions 
is easier over general principles than over matters of  
economic competition. A member of  the Executive 
Council of  the National Union of  Seamen made the 
reasoning for hostility to migration explicit at the NUS 
General Meeting in 1958: ‘I am a very democratically 
minded man; I have no objection to an Asiatic seaman or 
a West Indian earning a living, but when my own standard 
of  living is jeopardised then it is a different matter’. This 
is not a million miles away from the position recently 
proposed by current RMT (National Union of  Rail, 
Maritime and Transport Workers, successor to the NUS) 
General Secretary Bob Crow: ‘Free movement within the 
EU impoverishes workers in a race to the bottom and 
creates a “brain drain” in eastern European countries, 
condemning them to a future of  underdevelopment and 
decline’ (2013).
 Yet alongside the history of  protectionism is another, 
much more honourable one based on solidarity. Unions in 
both public and private sectors (including the RMT) have 
chosen to draw in members from migrant communities, 
often seeking out organisers and activists from those 
communities in order to resist the race to the bottom. 
In this context it is worth noting that in a workplace, the 
presence of  trade union organisation is a better predictor 
of  higher wages and conditions than the presence of  
migrant workers is a predictor of  poor ones.
 We are better placed now than we were in the 1960s 
and 70s with regards to ideas of  equality, although further 
back in terms of  the means to deliver them. Unions 
remain places where ideas and strategy are contested, and 
who wins those contests matters. A fight against low pay 
or zero hours will benefit all workers, but cannot be won 
without the participation of  all: not by appealing to what 
divides, as Oborne does, but to what unites. 
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To be a citizen is to be a member of  a political community. 
For the Greeks, the relevant political community was 
the city, although Diogenes did consider himself  to 
be a citizen of  the ‘cosmos’. As the world is currently 
constituted, citizenship amounts to membership of  a 
nation state, although regional organizations may give 
rise to other forms. For example European Union 
citizenship is additional to national citizenship of  an EU 
member state (although dependent on it) and gives rise 
to additional rights.
 Citizenship is defined both internally, in terms of  the 
rights and duties citizens hold as members of  the state, 
and externally, by the rules which distinguish members 
from non-members. While much debate concerns internal 
membership, the external boundary of  citizenship cannot 
be overlooked, as it determines who has access to the 
goods and burdens of  internal membership, and defines 
the journey people have to undertake if  they want to 
traverse the boundary from the outside to the inside.
 The external rules of  membership vary between 
states, but there are general features that most systems 
have in common. The most straightforward method is 
birth, either being born within the state’s territory (jus soli) 
or being born to someone who is already a citizen (jus 
sanguinis). Here, citizenship is not chosen by you or the 
state you are a member of: you simply find that you are 
a member of  a particular state, and the state finds that 
you are a member. The other main method is migration: 
travel from one state to another and the aquisition of  
residence according to legal conditions for membership. 
Here, membership is through choice, and the choice 
can run in either direction: you may be able to choose a 
particular state to join, and the state may have the choice 
of  whether to accept you as a member. The scope for 
choice here, though, can be limited. In the end, it is 
the state which retains the position of  power, in that it 
decides the rules and can vary them in any way it wishes. 
So when it comes to birth, it can decide whether jus 
soli or jus sanguinis holds, can define its territory, or can 
vary the relations you must have with people who are 
already citizens. When it comes to migration, it can close 
the door on would-be citizens entirely, or can vary the 
conditions would-be citizens must meet to qualify, or it 
can retain the right to choose even when migrants have 
met all conditions.
 Journeys to citizenship can therefore be complex and 
filled with obstacles and dangers, and it is the migration 
route that is the most complex, as the would-be citizen 
negotiates the national border. We tend to think of  
borders as simple binaries with an inside and an outside, 
but borders as the external markers of  membership are 
multidimensional, and identify different obstacles and 
spaces where the journey may come to a premature end.
 The first boundary the migrant must cross is to 
gain access to the national territory as a physical space. 
In Europe, this part of  the journey is becoming more 
difficult and dangerous, as states put up more barriers to 
make access to territory harder to achieve. Immigration, 
especially across Europe’s southern borders with Africa, 
has become increasingly criminalized, forcing migrants 
to take ever more perilous routes which, for many, end 
in death. So one space where the journey may come to 
a premature end is the sea. Those that do make landfall 
may find themselves in the space of  detention camps 
scattered across the Mediterranean and southern Europe, 
a space they may struggle to escape. 
 If  they do escape into the national territory, they 
may, if  they are poor, need to exist within it in a fragile 
form, as undocumented or ‘illegal’ migrants, inside the 
territory, but outside legality, vulnerable to exploitation, 
persecution and deportation. If  they establish legal 
presence within the territory, it may be in a temporary 
form, as a guest worker or with a limited visa. This is still 
a vulnerable and unpredictable space, and they may find 
themselves travelling backwards, away from citizenship, as 
the presence they thought was legal becomes questioned 
and revised by the state. If  they achieve indefinite leave to 
remain, they can exist as ‘denizens’ rather than ‘citizens’, 
but this is becoming an increasingly narrow option, as 
states continually revise and tighten the conditions 
attached to ‘denizenship’. This is because it provides the 
gateway to the final stage of  the journey, full citizenship.
 Here, we might think, the migrant-citizen has found 
safety and stability – here we have a predictable space in 
which they can develop their life stories and enjoy the 
same rights and responsibilities as their fellow citizens. 
But there are two challenges that remain. The first is that 
their ‘belonging’ as citizens may be questioned as they ‘fail’ 
to fit a national identity, and the state and other citizens 
refuse to accept them fully. They may suffer harassment 
and persecution from other citizens and from political 
authorities who constantly examine and question their 
presence.
 The second is that states are increasingly claiming the 
right to withdraw citizenship, and the migrant citizen is 
particularly vulnerable to this. In the European Union, 
while 14 countries can withdraw citizenship based on 
behaviour contrary to the interests of  the state, eight of  
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them apply this to only naturalized citizens, and seven 
have no safeguards against this resulting in statelessness. 
Although the UK does not discriminate in this way, from 
2003 citizenship could be withdrawn from those with 
dual citizenship on grounds of  behaviour prejudicial to 
the national interests, and from 2006, if  this is considered 
to be ‘conducive to the public good’. This power is held 
by the Home Secretary. Although this can happen to 
citizens by birth, the majority of  people who have had 
their citizenship withdrawn in this way since 2002 have 
been citizens by migration, and even where they are 
citizens by birth, their parents have been immigrants. 
  The danger is that migrant citizenship remains a 
distinct space of  fragility and uncertainty, rather than an 
equally valued and secure way of  being a citizen.
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On 25 May 1948, Garry Davis turned in his American 
passport at the US Embassy in Paris and declared 
himself  a ‘citizen of  the world’.  He then created his 
own passport, rarely recognized at national borders, and 
found that, the more nation states harassed him about 
his status as a true cosmopolitan, the more publicity 
his One World Movement received. Six months after 
renouncing his citizenship, he stormed a session of  the 
United Nations General Assembly in Paris: “We, the 
people, want the peace which only a world government 
can give,” he proclaimed. “The sovereign states you 
represent divide us and lead us to the abyss of  total 
war.” Davis recreated himself  in public as the good 
cosmopolitan, to no little extent because of  the impact 
that he felt nationalism had had in the world (1961). The 
viewing of  the cosmopolitan, the world citizen and the 
citizen without borders as corrosive, had been a pillar of  
Nazi ideology against which Davis fought as a pilot. In 
1935, the Nazi ideologist Alfred Rosenberg railed against 
the ‘international swarm of  Jewish orators and literati 
from the cosmopolitan centers of  increasingly racially 
degenerate cities… ’ 
 From the Enlightenment, radical nationalism claimed 
to be rooted in the land or a people, as a concrete expression 
of  a homogenous society against the rootless nomad. In 
1784, the German theologian J. G. Herder defined the 
nation state as ‘a group of  people having a common 
origin and common institutions, including language’. 
For Herder, as for most Europeans after him, the Jews 
personified the rootless nomad. Jews ‘in the land of  their 
fathers, and in the midst of  other nations, . . . remain as 
they were; and even when mixed with other people they 
may be distinguished for some generations downward’. 
In fact, Herder suggested that, ideally, ‘if  every one of  
these nations had remained in its place, the Earth might 
have been considered as a garden, where in one spot 
one human national plant, in another, another, bloomed 
in its proper figure and nature’. Cosmopolitanism goes 
against the ‘nature’ of  human beings who are rooted and 
should be unchangeable. He was of  Jewish descent and 
his call for the elimination of  borders simply rejected the 
Cosmopolitanism 
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fascist idea that borders and peoples were uniform and 
static (Davis, 2001). The reality is that the cosmopolitan 
is simply another way of  speaking about the potential 
for movement, for movement across borders, class 
boundaries, and cultural norms. All of  recorded human 
history speaks of  such movement all over the world, from 
ancient Greek city states to the expansion of  the Han at 
the same period into what is now considered to be China. 
But must one be opposed to the nation state if  one sees 
oneself, as Davis did, as a citizen of  the world? Recently, 
the philosopher Anthony Kwame Appiah argued that 
‘whatever obligation I might have to another, especially 
a foreign other, that obligation does not supersede the 
obligations I have to those people most familiar to 
me’ (2007). Being cosmopolitan does not cancel being 
national, regional or ethnic in the 21st century, as it 
did for Davis after World War II. Being cosmopolitan 
simply means that you have the potential for movement, 
transformation and change, not that this must take place.
 We often think of  cosmopolitanism as a form of  
multiculturalism. But there is a model that sees the nation 
state as groups of  peoples from throughout the world 
living, functioning, competing, and collaborating with 
one another. These groups may shift and transform, 
and may come to speak the language of  the nation 
state (and then in the third generation rediscover the 
language that their grandparents spoke, and learn it). 
What cosmopolitanism promises us today is the potential 
for change and movement, not to spite the claims of  
the nation state, but to ever renew them, to make them 
flexible. Garry Davis died in the summer of  2013, still a 
citizen of  the world. But he died in Burlington, Vermont, 
not terribly far from his birthplace in Bar Harbor, Maine, 
a citizen of  the world but very much a New Englander.
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On 18 December 2013, Sami Moussa Abdallah died in 
Bamako, Mali. He had spent many days with a fever, 
and was so thin and weak that he could no longer stand 
up. He was young, deaf  and dumb. Nothing was known 
about him other than his date of  birth and the names 
of  his parents. These were written on a safe conduct 
pass issued by the Malian consulate in Jeddah when he 
was expelled from Saudi Arabia. He had been supported 
by the Malian Expelled Migrants Association (AME), 
founded in 1996 in Bamako by Ousmane Diarra, a Malian 
trader expelled from Angola for helping undocumented 
migrants (Lecadet, 2012). AME had searched for his 
parents for months, through the good offices of  the 
Malian authorities in Bamako and Jeddah, but to no 
avail. However, through their work with him, AME had 
discovered several places in the centre of  Bamako where 
expelled migrants from Saudi Arabia had settled. Like 
him, they were ‘Malians’ who had been born or grown up 
in Saudi Arabia, but who had been expelled as part of  the 
Saudi government’s ‘Saudization’ policy, an attempt to 
move away from private sector dependence on migrant 
workers and to restrict employment to Saudis. After 
expulsion they found themselves in Bamako, rootless and 
without bearings, and not speaking any of  the languages 
most commonly spoken in Mali. Their inaudible or silent 
voices belong to their segregated existence.
 The day of  Sami Moussa’s death, those Malians who 
had shared a large house in the Kalambancoura area of  
Bamako went with him to the annual meeting of  AME 
to testify to the appalling predicament in which they 
found themselves. They spoke Arabic, and almost no 
one in the room understood their language, but they did 
understand their anger. In his speech, Amadou Coulibaly, 
head of  social action at AME, deplored the death of  this 
young man. Without a voice and without relatives, he had 
nonetheless borne witness to the existence of  a forgotten 
group, and by his death had become their emblem:
Mr Moussa’s case allowed us to make contact with 
other expelled migrants who are here today. These 
migrants are a special case because they were 
almost all born in the country where their parents 
still live. Furthermore, they have been sent back to 
Mali where the majority of  them have no secure 
family ties. In addition, they don’t speak either 
Bamanan or French, which are the languages most 
commonly used in Bamako. These migrants speak 
Arabic, Tamasheq or Songhay. Their situation 
forces them to regroup in isolated areas, usually 
building sites or abandoned buildings.
For all the talk about globalisation, the prerogatives attached 
to the nation state remain as strong as ever. Expulsion, 
increasingly standardised and internationally legitimised, 
can lead to brutal absurdities. Because they had migrated 
to Saudi Arabia a long time ago, and their families were 
firmly settled there, these Malians saw their nationality 
as a mere formality. It was, however, this ‘formality’ that 
enabled their expulsion without any legal process. Formal 
citizenship can be an empty shell, and expulsion on that 
basis leads to whole groups of  people being uprooted 
from their land and isolated from their language. 
 Bamako hosts many expelled people. Malians expelled 
from Algeria, Libya and Mauritania wander the area 
around Sogoniko station, and sleep in cardboard boxes 
in Bamako Hall, a disused indoor market. Moreover, this 
phenomenon is not confined to Bamako: in Tinzawaten 
on the Malian border with Algeria, in Agadez and Arlit in 
Niger, and in Kye-Ossi on the border of  Cameroon with 
Equatorial Guinea, ruined houses, abandoned or lent 
by their owners and often linked to people smugglers, 
provide migrants with temporary shelter. 
 Amongst themselves migrants refer to these places 
as ghettos. Unobtrusively hidden away and isolated even 
when in the centre of  a town, these ghettos are stopping 
places where people are blocked, and the weak – or those 
driven mad by expulsion, violent treatment and loss – 
are a hidden, utterly destitute population. Ghettos are 
marked by exhaustion, lack of  resources, illness and 
sometimes death. However, the abandonment in which 
many expelled migrants find themselves pushes them to 
regroup and organise, and ghettos are also places where 
a collective life can be rebuilt. Those who have financial 
assistance from friends or family can use them as transit 
points and set off  again, negotiating their journey to a 
new destination.
 Thus, while the proliferation of  expulsion across the 
world is creating new forms of  political hegemony, it is 
also generating new modes and spaces of  organising. 
Ghettos respond to a need for shelter and for regrouping 
immediately following expulsion, but they also make 
up an underground geography of  places where people 
organise themselves, amid hardship and ordeals, to 
circumvent constraints imposed by the state. One could 
liken this ‘shifting localisation’, used by Agamben to 
describe the heterogeneous nature of  contemporary 
forms of  camp, to a poor form of  politics: the ghettos 
and post-expulsion self-organisation show how expelled 
migrants rely on the resources of  the group and their 
national identity, that is on the very methods of  politics, 
to endure the rigours of  the post-expulsion period and 
to organise their future mobility. State politics may create 
ghettos as places of  deportation without a voice, yet they 
are also home to a subversive and demanding language. 
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Many studies have highlighted the consequences of  the 
exclusion of  irregular (‘undocumented’) migrants from 
essential services, not least COMPAS’ own research on 
children (Sigona and Hughes, 2012). Perhaps, however, 
our surprise should be that, at a time when welfare states 
are being reined in and migrants most likely to feel the 
squeeze, those without permission to be here are granted 
entitlements to any services at all. 
 We are familiar of  course with the idea that while 
irregular migrants are formally excluded from most 
services, they may in practice get access through the 
informal practices of  local service providers: doctors who 
sympathise with their situation or head teachers who 
think the priority is to get all children into school. When 
the state itself  grants those rights, however, what we see 
is formal exclusion versus formal inclusion; in effect 
the state is validating breaches of  its own sovereignty 
(Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012). Why would a 
state do that?
 There is a stream of  analysis in migration studies 
that explores the competing imperatives that states face 
when attempting to manage migration and the trade-
offs implicit in the policy choices made (Spencer, 2011). 
Analysis of  the politics of  the migration policy-making 
process itself  reveals another insight: that inclusive 
policies are more likely to be found where a low visibility 
reform can be made, minimising the risk of  blame for an 
unpopular decision – characterised as ‘shadow politics’ in 
contrast to the ‘sunshine politics’ of  popular measures to 
restrict immigration (Guiraudon 2004). This suggests that 
at least part of  the explanation for granting entitlements 
to irregular migrants may be found in conflicting policy 
imperatives which in effect trump those of  immigration 
control. These decisions may be more likely to be taken 
when the authorities can avoid the full glare of  public 
debate, even a ‘non-decision’ where practice shifts with 
no debate at all (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970).
 A COMPAS study1  on official responses to irregular 
migrants across Europe has found that this is indeed 
the case: national, regional and municipal authorities 
are driven by legal, economic and social imperatives to 
provide services, with those imperatives felt most keenly 
at the local level. European and domestic human rights 
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legal obligations are among the constraints they face but 
there are also many pragmatic reasons cited for granting 
entitlements, including the need to achieve competing 
policy objectives like public health, social cohesion, 
crime prevention and a reduction in street sleeping. 
Furthermore, there is a need for effective management 
of  public services: providing access for an undocumented 
child to a birth certificate means accurate population 
statistics, while access to primary health care reduces the 
pressure on emergency services. Where those decisions 
can be taken by adjusting the rules, reinterpreting the 
breadth of  an exclusionary provision or by overlooking 
the fact that the clientele of  a service has shifted over 
time from regular to irregular migrants, inclusion is more 
likely to be found. 
 Humanitarian and ethical concerns certainly play their 
part in the uneven geography of  service provision to this 
section of  Europe’s population, helping to explain why 
the vast majority of  states, for instance, do allow access 
to school education and at least to emergency health care. 
Recognising the pragmatic necessity of  inclusion if  an 
authority’s broader objectives are to be achieved, however, 
brings us closer to explaining patterns of  inclusion to be 
found at the municipal level.   
Notes
1 Undertaken under the auspices of  an Open Society 
Fellowship in 2012-2013 and ongoing at the time of  writing. 
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Everyday Multiculturalism 
Amanda Wise
… well-grounded and illuminating analytic points flow only 
from bringing concepts into a relationship with the messiness 
of  ordinary life, somehow recorded.
The Ethnographic Imagination - Paul Willis
Angela Merkel’s 2010 declaration that ‘multiculturalism has 
failed’ resonated among conservatives across the world. 
It played into the naive idea that multiculturalism could 
be discarded in favour of  integration and assimilation 
just by ‘declaring it so’. Those who are different would 
magically learn to blend in with the dominant majorities 
in the societies in which they settled. These ideas flourish 
in the muddled semantic terrain that is multiculturalism. 
At the state level, multiculturalism is understood as a set 
of  policies and programmes of  migrant integration and 
settlement that allow migrant and minority communities 
to retain, maintain and develop cultural and religious 
practices and belief  systems. It also signals questions 
of  national identity in settler societies like Canada and 
Australia. Comments like Merkel’s imply that these 
policies encourage minority cultures to live un-integrated 
‘parallel lives’ to the mainstream, and multiculturalism 
is to blame for a myriad of  social ills from terrorism to 
urban crime and poor school performance. In part such 
views gained traction because the everyday lived reality 
of  diversity remained absent from public, political, and 
scholarly discourse.
 Everyday multiculturalism emerged as a concept 
in the 2000s to mark out the ‘fact of  diversity’ as a 
separate, though related, empirical object. Everyday 
multiculturalism (Wise and Velayutham 2009) is a situated 
approach to understanding the everyday dimensions of  
multiculturalism as it is lived. As opposed to policy-oriented 
multiculturalism focused on group based rights, service 
provision and legislation, the everyday multiculturalism 
perspective explores how cultural diversity is experienced 
and negotiated on the ground in everyday situations 
such as neighbourhoods, schools, and workplaces, and 
how social relations and social actors’ identities are 
shaped and reshaped in the process. While the focus is 
on everyday interactions, the everyday multiculturalism 
perspective does not exclude wider social, cultural and 
political processes, institutions and structures. Indeed, 
the key to the everyday multiculturalism approach is 
to understand how these filter through to the realm of  
everyday practice, disposition, encounter and meaning-
making. The term ‘multiculturalism’ is used in favour of  
‘interculturalism’ to capture these intersections and avoid 
the trap of  equating interculturalism to interpersonal 
interactions across difference. 
 The everyday multiculturalism perspective is both a 
way of  observing and a way of  conceiving diversity as it is 
lived on the ground daily by people. It challenges ‘ethnicity’ 
as a singular, contained unit of  analysis and starting point 
for research. Instead, everyday multiculturalism research 
takes an interactional, typically place-situated approach to 
understanding the dynamic nature of  urban multiculture. 
It incorporates a particular set of  qualitative methods 
where people’s everyday experiences and encounters 
with difference are placed into the larger cultural, 
political, economic and social contexts in which they are 
occurring. Operationalising everyday multiculturalism 
calls for a thoroughly interdisciplinary approach, 
drawing on work from sociology, cultural studies, human 
geography and anthropology. Some of  the sub-themes 
explored by those working in this field include the rituals 
and everyday practices that underpin the development of  
communities of  difference; how (intercultural) habitus 
and embodied dispositions interact with lived diversity, 
emotions, affect and the senses; material cultures; 
everyday cultural exchange and transformation; cultural 
hybridities; civility and incivility; networks, reciprocity, 
solidarity and gift exchange; everyday scripts, speech 
practices, code switching and humour, and their role 
in drawing and overcoming racial boundaries; how 
space and place mediate encounters with and meanings 
made of  difference – and how relations of  power and 
wider discourses and politics and institutions interplay 
through all of  these. A focus on the everyday includes 
documenting positive signs of  an emergent openness to 
difference as well as everyday racisms. Understanding the 
multifaceted lived complexity of  super-diversity is at the 
heart of  this approach. 
 The sites of  study include any domain of  life 
where everyday encounters with difference occur. This 
includes most prominently studies of  how encounters, 
interactions with, and negotiations over difference occur 
in the everyday places of  neighbourhoods, including 
urban spaces like shopping centres, high streets, public 
spaces, parks, markets, public housing estates, public 
transport, and ‘micro-publics’ like schools, workplaces, 
sport teams or neighbourhood associations. Resonant 
terms in circulation include ‘mundane multiculturalism’, 
‘commonplace diversity’, ‘vernacular cosmopolitanism’, 
and ‘everyday cosmopolitanism’. They share with 
everyday multiculturalism an orientation towards 
qualitative methodologies, particularly ethnographic 
approaches.
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Acts 
Engin Isin
The tragedy of  Lampedusa unfolds in three acts. All 
three are acts of  citizenship. A fourth must come. 
 The first and original act is the embarking on a journey 
to the other shore. When a group of  several hundred 
primarily Somalis and Eritreans got on board a ship, they 
became migrants. Why ‘migrants’? By seeking better lives, 
these Somalis and Eritreans were subjecting themselves 
to a regime of  truth that rendered them migrants because 
their journey crossed frontiers. This was their act of  
citizenship. For more than 300 on 4 October 2013, it 
became the ultimate sacrifice for it. In another regime of  
truth, they could have been heroes. 
 The second act was the announcement by Italian Prime 
Minister Enrico Letta that those who lost their lives were 
to be given posthumous citizenship. He declared, ‘The 
hundreds who lost their lives off  Lampedusa yesterday 
are Italian citizens as of  today’. The day was also declared 
an official day of  mourning for the victims. Was it an 
act of  hypocrisy to give posthumous citizenship to those 
who were no longer ‘migrants’ but had become ‘victims’? 
Why not give citizenship to those who survived? Instead, 
those who survived were now ‘illegal immigrants’ destined 
to be charged, detained and deported. In another regime 
of  truth, they could have been patriots.
 The third act was when the Italian city of  Treviso 
joined a network of  200 cities granting honorary 
citizenship to the children of  foreigners born in Italy. It 
is an important act ‘to award honorary citizenship in a 
spirit of  solidarity with their neighbours, and frustration 
with rules that refuse to acknowledge modern Italy’s 
multiethnic social fabric’ (Davies, 2013). Still, I wonder if  
this ‘gesture of  hope’ falls well short of  granting what all 
those who arrive at the frontiers of  Europe themselves 
hope for: European citizenship. Instead, implicitly this 
act strengthens the rule of  autochthony, birth and status. 
Yet what it recognizes is the principle that those who 
remain and establish themselves in the social fabric of  
the city do have a claim to citizenship. 
 This may be a symbolic act of  citizenship, albeit 
with far-reaching consequences. Why are Somalis and 
Eritreans not given what they demand, European 
citizenship? If  citizenship is about a chance to make 
ourselves anew, what better way to recognize them than 
with European citizenship? Not Italian citizenship, not 
Greek citizenship, not Spanish citizenship, not European 
citizenship as a benefit of  national citizenship, but non-
derivative European citizenship (that is, not dependent 
on prior citizenship of  one of  the 28 member states of  
the EU). This would be a recognition of  the fact that our 
common humanity deals us citizenship as birthright lottery 
(Shachar, 2009). Nobody is born under circumstances of  
their choosing. Somalis, Eritreans and countless others 
risk their lives for a chance to prove themselves, a chance 
to make a living for themselves and their families, and 
overcome what that birthright lottery has dealt them. 
That one can die in the act is the tragedy, as those nearly 
20,000 deaths at European frontiers attests. 
 If  Europe cannot give those who arrive at its frontiers 
an unconditional citizenship, it can offer a conditional 
citizenship. Europe has a history of  conditional 
citizenship. The condition is about contribution, taking 
that chance and making a new beginning. For a long time 
European cities granted citizenship to anyone who stayed 
in the city for a year and a day. Being granted citizenship 
meant receiving the liberty of  the city, hence the German 
saying, ‘the city air makes one free’. 
 It would be folly not to recognize the complexity of  
global migration. There are many scholars who study 
aspects of  this complex issue and its equally complex 
history. There are disagreements about approach, 
methods, data, findings, and interpretations. There 
are journals dedicated to migration studies and its 
many dimensions. There are more books on migration 
than any scholar can follow let alone read. Yet, can we 
not summon a fraction of  the courage of  migrants 
to draw one conclusion: as global inequality spreads 
(something to which Europe contributes massively and 
disproportionately) it creates more pressure on millions 
of  people to migrate. Can we not accept that migrants 
are people who are seeking better lives for themselves 
and their families? Isn’t dividing them into economic 
and political migrants as cruel as dividing the poor into 
deserving and undeserving (Bosniak, 2006)? Migrants are 
citizens not by fortune, but by deed (McNevin, 2011). 
When such pressure is met with frontier security regimes 
of  surveillance, deterrence and detention, the risks of  
crossing frontiers become higher. The more migration 
becomes intractable, the more it spawns further security 
measures (Guild, 2009). 
 Nation-state citizenship, which the European Union 
both sanctions and strengthens, is in a vicious death 
cycle. Unless Europeans commit member states and the 
EU to reducing global inequality and offering conditional 
but non-derivative European citizenship, the frontiers of  
Europe will engender more death, more suffering, and 
more tragedy. 
 As a final (redeeming) act of  this tragedy, Europeans 
must now establish a European network of  cities that 
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grant European citizenship to those who arrive at the 
continent’s frontiers. Each city can decide on a period 
of  growing into the social fabric of  the city, learning 
and following local customs, norms, and sociability, and 
democratic deliberation with the network. This act would 
honour not only the dead but also the living. It would 
also honour a particular European history of  citizenship. 
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Recognizing Migrants’ Practices of  Citizenship and their Impact 
Davide Però
In a context characterized by the curtailing of  migrants’ 
rights and tighter border controls, migrants tend to 
feature in the political arena mainly as political objects. 
They are routinely made into political and policy ‘targets’ 
to control, count, contain, deter, detain and deport. Their 
often disadvantaged and precarious conditions favor 
exploitative and exclusionary treatments by employers 
and politicians alike, and their representation in public 
discourse is increasingly hostile.
 In this short piece I want go beyond this approach 
and look at migrants as political actors and subjects of  
policy. While many questions could be considered in 
this respect, here I will focus on only two. Firstly, I am 
interested in highlighting how migrants can articulate 
their agency in adverse contexts such as the ones just 
outlined. Secondly, I want to consider the impact of  their 
engagements. Can policies be transformed from below 
by migrants and their civil society allies (unions, NGOs, 
social movements and community organizations)?  
 Despite usually lacking the right to vote and sometimes 
even the right to stay in the receiving country, there are 
several indications of  migrants’ civic and political vitality, 
even though these have received scant scholarly and 
media attention. In recent years, migrants throughout 
Europe have struggled against irregular status and the 
vulnerability and exclusion it produces, seeking papiers, 
papeles and pathways to citizenship (see Mc Nevin, 2011; 
Anderson, 2010). They have demonstrated in the streets, 
occupied churches, undertaken hunger strikes, and formed 
alliances with labour, civic and community organizations. 
In the UK, examples include the Justice for Cleaners and 
the Living Wage campaigns where precarious migrant 
workers joined forces with unions and community 
organizations to engage multinational companies and big 
business on the issue of  fair pay and conditions (Però, 
2014). In addition to fighting exploitation, abuse and 
discrimination at work, migrants have struggled across 
a range of  other issues such as fairer access to health 
care and housing. They have also mobilized for respect 
and recognition. This has been an important element 
in the struggles of  Latin American migrants in London 
who felt invisible and thus perceived themselves to be 
an unsupported minority in superdiverse Britain (Però, 
2008).  Migrants have also fought against the violation of  
their human rights, as was recently the case in Italy, where 
a group of  migrants sewed their lips in protest at being 
detained.  
 Clearly, when examining and assessing migrants’ 
political engagements, we need to factor in their subaltern 
and marginalized conditions to fully appreciate their 
agency and impact. We also need to adopt an inclusive idea 
of  policy change that extends beyond formal changes. 
As I have argued elsewhere, this more comprehensive 
idea of  policy change should comprise ‘smaller’ changes 
produced by the everyday practices of  citizenship that 
migrants deploy to cope with, neutralize or resist adverse 
policies, and to demand the enforcement of  favourable 
policies and laws when these are not being implemented. 
For example, I have elsewhere discussed how a group of  
sin-papeles in Barcelona obtained regularization through a 
combination of  hunger strikes and a well organized and 
supported occupation of  churches. While not repealing 
the immigration policy that had originally illegalized 
them, these migrants did successfully manage to suspend 
its enforcement and negotiate an amnesty. I have also 
illustrated, on the matter of  exploitation and rights at 
work, how a group of  new migrant workers from Latin 
America succeeded in their demand for the application 
of  existing British employment law through establishing 
a migrant workers’ organization, LAWAs, within the 
British trade union movement. This initiative not only 
made a significant number of  migrants with a poor 
command of  English aware of  their employment rights, 
but also supported them in demanding compliance from 
exploitative employers (see Però, 2011). 
 Given the significance of  the kinds of  migrants’ 
practices of  citizenship outlined above, it is important 
for engaged scholarship to pay attention, in research and 
teaching, to both the practices and their impact. Likewise, 
it is time for community and labour organizations to 
represent more systematically the interests of  this new 
and marginalized sector of  the population. Finally, as part 
and parcel of  their role as guardians of  pluralism and 
fairness in a context of  growing inequality, nationalism 
and xenophobia, it is important that the liberal and 
cosmopolitan media give more visibility to the struggles 
for justice involving these new members of  society that 
we call migrants.  
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Belonging 
Nandita Sharma
Belonging is often associated with a search for a sense 
of  being at home. It is, however, more than an individual 
state of  mind: our ideas of  belonging connect us to each 
other, and to the social worlds we inhabit in quite specific 
ways. The dictionary tells us that to belong, we need to 
‘fit in a specified place or environment’. It is not enough 
to just be in a particular place; one must fit in and, in order 
to fit in, one must be seen to belong by others. Belonging 
is, in other words, relational. 
 Lurking within ideas of  belonging, then, is the 
idea that some do not belong: ‘s/he is a stranger, and 
doesn’t belong here’. This is especially the case for ideas 
of  national belonging. Nationalism uniquely sets limits 
to belonging (Anderson, 1991). Nationalism not only 
creates an ‘us’ with a sense of  being ‘at home’, it also 
creates a sense that there are persons who not belong. 
David Morley argues that a nationalist discourse ‘allows 
us to imagine that we do not have to share our space 
with anyone else unless they are of  exactly our own 
kind by virtue of  consanguinity’ (2000). The legitimacy 
for subjecting those said to ‘not-belong’ to differential 
treatment under the law or to outright exclusion is 
created by such ideas. ‘They’ should not, ‘we’ feel, 
have the things (rights, entitlements or even a sense of  
belonging) believed to be exclusively ‘ours’. Nationalist 
ideas of  belonging, thus, draw lines of  difference. Such 
lines are drawn not only between nation states but within 
nation states. 
 ‘Nationals’ and ‘foreigners’ exist not only in separated 
national territories but, in reality, coexist within any 
nation state. Nationalist imaginations work to construct 
hierarchies between people differently classified as either 
‘nationals’ or ‘foreigners’ within any given nation state. 
Those constituted as ‘foreigners’ can include those with 
varying legal statuses of  ‘migrant’ (‘permanent resident’ 
to ‘temporary foreign worker’ to ‘illegal’) as well as co-
citizens seen as not ‘fitting in’.
 The process of  sorting out who belongs and who 
does not is not a natural, timeless process. Nor is it 
random. Nationalist ideas of  belonging are historically 
situated in a global context of  capitalist competition, and 
they are informed by the intertwining of  normative – and 
normalizing – ideas of  ‘race’, gender and sexuality with 
those of  ‘nation’. Hence the idea that any given ‘nation’ 
can best be defined through ‘genealogy’, ‘bloodlines’, and 
‘family ties’. The very first national controls were highly 
racialized, gendered and sexualized. They also favoured 
the free movement of  elites, particularly the bourgeoisie, 
over workers. Indeed, state restrictions against free human 
mobility were central to the creation of  nation states and 
to the creation of  national belonging (Mongia, 1999). 
Indeed, it was only as monarchical or imperial states 
became nation states – a process begun in the late 18th 
century and, arguably, only secured at the end of  World 
War II – that state sovereignty and societal membership 
came to be defined by border controls. Consequently, in 
contrast to new ‘national subjects’, ‘migrants’ came to be 
thought of  as not belonging and, therefore, as not having 
the ‘right to have rights’ (Arendt, 1951).
 The growing number of  regulations and restrictions 
against human mobility enacted by nation states over 
the past century or so have helped to produce the view 
that human migration is always already pathological. In 
today’s world of  nation states, there is a deep sense that 
migration – and those classified as ‘migrants’ – produce 
nothing but crises. Tellingly, this (state) category does 
not include everyone moving across national boundaries, 
but usually only those who come to be seen as ‘foreign’ 
to the ‘nation’, those whose lives have been devalued 
by the close association of  the ideology of  nationalism 
with the ideologies of  racism, sexism and heterosexism. 
Nationalist ideas of  belonging are particularly and 
profoundly dangerous for these persons, regardless of  
their citizenship or immigration status.
 Such ideas are, however, very helpful to some. Along 
with producing certain people as national subjects, 
national ideas of  belonging produce a group of  persons 
who can be treated in ways that would be deemed 
unacceptable – illegal even – were they applied to those 
‘belonging’ to the ‘nation’. For example, those categorized 
as ‘temporary foreign workers’ are tied to their employers 
in conditions not unlike those of  indentured servitude, 
conditions considered illegal when applied to ‘citizen’. 
The consequences of  denying ‘migrants’ mobility, 
labour, social, and political rights – and the consequence 
of  the glaring lack of  solidarity between ‘migrants’ and 
citizen workers – is that those classified as ‘foreigners’ 
receive lower wages and less social services. They are 
also subjected to a relentless degradation of  every aspect 
of  their being. Far from trying to keep ‘foreigners’ 
out, then, nation-state immigration and citizenship 
policies are best viewed as a means of  ensuring the 
subordination, oppression and heightened exploitation 
of  those imagined to not belong. From the perspective 
of  the state and employers, ‘migrants’ are best wanted 
as unwanted (Hage, 2000). Nationalist ideas of  belonging 
do not protect ‘nationals’ or ‘citizen workers’, as they are 
thought to. The fact is that the global system of  capitalist 
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competition depends on there being persons who can be 
made to work for lower wages or under more dangerous 
conditions. Restrictions on human migration are one, 
very significant, way that this competition is organized. 
It is indeed difficult to overestimate the significance of  
ideas of  national belonging and the differences that they 
materialize to the capitalist world economic system and 
the political formation of  nation states within it.
 The route to ending this cut-throat competition does 
not lie in the erection of  more borders against ‘foreigners’ 
but in the elimination of  borders. We cannot indulge in 
the fantasy that states (or vigilantes) can stop human 
migration: there are too many good reasons for people 
to move, and no amount of  walls or guns or vitriol is 
going to prevent this movement. Instead, by enacting a 
world in which we all equally belong, we might – all of  
us – be in a stronger position to protect ourselves from 
ongoing displacement, dispossession and our resultant 
impoverishment.
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In January 2014, The Guardian newspaper reported that 
UK Border Agency (UKBA) staff  received financial 
rewards for winning appeals against asylum seekers 
challenging negative decisions. This generated public 
controversy, because it suggested that the Home Office 
had a systematic bias against individuals being granted 
refugee status. No one who has followed asylum’s travails 
in western states could have been surprised. Academics 
have long described a ‘culture of  disbelief ’ pervading the 
UK government’s asylum decision-making processes, 
in which asylum claims are met with incredulity and 
cynicism. This culture seems merely an extension of  the 
battery of  measures and mechanisms – including visa 
regimes, carrier sanctions, and interdiction – that western 
states have put in place over the last three decades to 
stop forced migrants from places like Bosnia, Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Syria arriving to access asylum. If  the 
UKBA’s offer was remarkable, it was only as the reductio ad 
absurdum of  states’ current restrictive responses.
 Yet for all this hostility to asylum seekers, no western 
state has publicly entertained the idea of  doing away with 
the institution of  asylum altogether. On the contrary, 
the UKBA website lauds Britain’s ‘proud tradition’ of  
offering asylum for those who need it. Nor is Britain 
alone. The US, Australia, and Canada all claim to 
have similar admirable histories. Their claims are not 
entirely without substance. As restrictive measures have 
developed across Europe and North America, the legal 
grounds on which individuals can claim asylum have 
expanded significantly. Far from confining themselves 
simply to the 1951 Convention on Refugees, western 
countries now accept a range of  human rights grounds 
as a basis for asylum, including the threat of  torture 
and inhuman and degrading treatment. Moreover, EU 
countries granted refuge (or similar protection) to almost 
80,000 people in 2011 alone. Even Australia, surely the 
cynosure for asylum restrictive practices, granted almost 
14,000 refugee and humanitarian visas in 2009/10. What 
needs to be explained is why, in the midst of  antipathy 
towards asylum seekers, the institution of  asylum has not 
only survived, but expanded.
 One possible answer is that the continued existence 
of  asylum helps affirm the legitimacy of  immigration 
controls. Fundamentally, asylum works as an exception – 
founded on conditions of  necessity – to the normal rule 
that states have the right to decide who can enter and 
reside in their territory. As an exception, asylum supports 
the general rule of  state discretion. Border controls are 
intuitively difficult to justify in a world of  egregious 
Asylum: Principled Hypocrisy 
Matthew Gibney
inequalities between states, where one’s state of  birth is 
likely to determine whether one lives to be 85 (Monaco’s 
average life expectancy) or 47 (Sierra Leone’s). Justification 
is harder still because the territorial boundaries of  states 
are typically arbitrary, artefacts of  power rather than right. 
The provision of  asylum for those who would face death 
or persecution takes the edge off  these harsh realities, 
and so helps affirm the legitimacy of  a bounded world. 
In this view, the institution of  asylum exists not to limit 
the prerogatives of  states, but to validate them.
 A somewhat different explanation for asylum’s 
resilience is that it reinforces the state as community. 
Contemporary states do not portrary themselves simply 
as random collections of  people sharing a legal status, 
but as communities of  value, who share some common 
principles that provide a reason for them living together. 
The construction of  the state as a community facilitates 
effective rule and makes the division of  the world’s 
population into states appear less arbitrary. One obvious 
way of  affirming such collective values is through exclusion. 
For example, the practice of  deportation illustrates that 
certain non-citizens are not worthy of  residence or 
membership in the state because, unlike honest, hard-
working nationals, they are ‘fraudsters’, or ‘takers’. But 
the significance of  state membership can be affirmed 
equally well through inclusion. By offering asylum, a state 
can fashion a vision of  its citizens as ‘generous’, ‘rights-
respecting’, or ‘sympathetic’, thereby (re)constituting 
the idea of  a national community.  Once again, asylum 
is less about protecting the vulnerable than bolstering a 
bordered world.
 Each of  these explanations helps explain why states 
might need asylum even if  they don’t want asylum seekers. 
But there is another explanation for the current responses 
of  western states, one that takes values seriously. This 
focuses on the fact that the states we are discussing are 
liberal democratic states.
 Liberal democratic states are simultaneously 
legitimised through the values of  liberalism (with its 
respect for the individual as the bearer of  human rights) 
and democracy (with its animating ideal of  collective 
self-rule). These values tend to pull in very different 
directions on the issue of  asylum. On the one hand, 
respect for human rights demands the provision of  asylum 
by the state, for if  there are any human rights at all, the 
right to asylum (which ensures that individuals can meet 
their basic security needs) is surely one of  them. On the 
other hand, this right is always potentially controversial in 
democratic political systems, where the demos (electorate) 
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are likely to judge the entrance of  significant numbers 
of  non-citizens in need as costly to their own interests 
(for example, in terms of  the job market, housing, and 
public services). This is particularly true when political 
entreprenuers (and sections of  the media) whip up 
grievances and racist anxieties against newcomers. 
 The result is the schizophrenic response evident across 
western states, where the importance of  the principle of  
asylum is not denied, but the costs of  respecting it are 
resented by the public and often evaded by governments. 
This conflict is built into the institutional fabric of  western 
states. Courts often find themselves as the defenders of  
asylum seekers’ human rights because of  their role in 
interpreting human rights law, while politicians – who 
claim to represent the demos – bitterly criticise judicial 
attempts to constrain their efforts to deter refugee claims. 
Some argue that this conflict is not inevitable. If  it 
weren’t for tabloid newspapers or cynical politicians, the 
public would accept the value of  asylum, and the tension 
between what human rights require and what the demos 
wants would evaporate. While there is no doubt that the 
media and some politicians make the environment more 
toxic, I believe that the tension is fundamental and close 
to irresolvable within the international state system as we 
know it (at least as long as it continues to generate huge 
numbers of  people in need of  protection). Ultimately, 
universalist claims to protection will make heavy demands 
on democratic communities, and these communities will 
want to resist them.  
 This leaves us with a question: how do we reconcile 
the moral claims of  non-citizens in desperate need with 
a meaningful democratic politics, which requires some 
degree of  closure and a privileging of  the claims of  
insiders over outsiders? I don’t know of  any compelling 
answer to this question, though one can perhaps take heart 
from the fact that more people (including academics) are 
now thinking about it than ever before. In the meantime, 
the paradoxical response to asylum continues: states 
continue to embrace asylum but spurn the asylum seeker.
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Landing
Claudine Toutoungi
Before they emerged from their capsule
they never imagined birdsong or the sound 
of  the ocean crashing upon the shore.
The jerk of  recognition it induced 
in the pit of  their spacesuits;
so many harmonies courting each other
across the coldest of  stratospheres. And even if
it later proved a simulation, designed to reduce
cortisol in the blood-stream of  long-haul voyagers,
no-one could explain the salt on their lips,
the soft specks of  sand on their lashes.
resCAling And re-plACing
Rescaling and Re-placing
Steal Away, Steal Away Back Home 
AbdouMaliq Simone
“Steal away, steal away home, I ain’t got long to stay here,” 
was the lament of  African slaves situated in between 
the urgency to run away and resignation that spiritual 
redemption was the only escape. It could also be the 
lament of  many urban dwellers faced with the immanence 
of  dispossession. For slaves, the act of  running away was 
always fraught with dangers, not only of  recapture, but 
uncertain alliances with other marginalized people of  all 
sorts – Amerindians, outcasts, vagabonds, and felons. 
Hastily assembled kinships, ‘nations’, and roadshows 
sometimes managed to stay off  the radar for long periods 
of  time, but were most usually prone to betrayals and 
misunderstandings that prompted further dispersal. Still, 
there was always something fecund in the imagination of  
such constellations, amplified by the dense entanglements 
of  bodies with diverse rivers, streams, bush, earth, 
animals, and foliage. Here, sustaining life was not a 
process of  striving and fruition, but an intermixing of  
decay and generative forces, of  inexplicable events and 
monstrous circulations.
 If, as Anna Tsing (2012) claims, the plantation was 
the initial model for projects that can expand without 
changing their form and function, the contemporary 
spread of  the mega-development – with its standardized 
integration of  residence, shopping, leisure and services 
– is its continuation and aftermath. The product is no 
longer sugarcane, or any product in particular, but rather 
the control of  freedom – the ability to control the 
process where life can become anything at all. For the 
mega-development signals the end of  the myth that the 
city was interested in creating particular kinds of  persons, 
particular kinds of  life. 
 Rather, it seizes upon the conceit of  self  generation, 
inserts itself  as the machine that enables individuals to see 
themselves as, what Claire Colebrook (2010) calls ‘that 
which feels and knows itself  as nothing other than self-
affecting life’. Disentangled from diverse material and 
social environments, and stripped of  the skills needed to 
intermingle with creatures and formations of  all kinds 
that once circulated across urban spaces, residents must 
calculate their every move through constant exposure 
to and enfoldment in proliferating networks, but where 
these instances of  contact do not really affect much of  
anything. Meanwhile, individuals are encouraged to ‘steal 
away’ as much as they want. For the only place to circulate 
is in abstracted, media-saturated exchanges incapable of  
eliciting either desire or dread.
 When people returned to Phnom Penh once the failed 
Khmer Rouge laboratory had finally run its course, for 
most it was not really a return home.  Emptied of  almost 
all of  its inhabitants, the subsequent vacancy was also 
an erasure of  claims, memories and orientations. Bereft 
of  its intricate interweaving of  ties, the recuperation of  
place had little meaning, and with no authority or records 
to back them up, securing a place often meant uncertain 
alliances with those whose very continued survival 
rendered them outcasts of  a particular sort. The return 
to the city was then an extension of  running away, and 
the need to revise expectations continuously was only 
tempered by the initial period where the Vietnamese ran 
the city as a camp.
 Under such circumstances it was understandable 
how residents stuck closely to family connections even 
when these were ridden with mutual suspicions. Family 
members had to stay close to each other, but also at a 
distance, so this meant spreading out. If, for example, a 
family needed to secure a plot in a not yet built up area, 
it was usually important for them not to carry too many 
members with them, so as not to be seen to be trying 
to consolidate too much. Rather, they found a quick 
way of  inserting themselves, staying under the radar as 
much as possible and scouting for other places on which 
to take a chance. This did not mean that consolidation 
was not taking place, that securitizing family interests did 
not operate through various forms of  expansion. Rather, 
spreading out, as a means of  consolidating family interests 
and ties, was also predicated on subjecting these projects 
to a process of  being affected by those undertaken by 
others – of  being turned around, altered, revised, and 
redirected. Since not everything the family had was then 
staked on any one project, if  things got out of  hand, not 
all would be lost. One could always steal away.
 Sometimes neighbours would silently agree not to 
interfere with each other’s efforts. Still, at other times, 
residents would run smoke screens for each other – 
pretending that certain conditions, events or projects 
were not underway, when in reality they were, in order 
to control how much attention outsiders paid to them 
and to ward off  any harmful intrusions. In all of  these 
practices and strategies, more than one thing is occurring 
at once, and often what looks to be the reality of  the 
situation is really something else. People look like they are 
cooperating, but in reality they are just acting as if  they 
are doing so in order to win themselves the freedom to do 
their own thing; or conversely, people may look like they 
are running all over each other, stabbing each other in the 
back, pursuing their own strong-willed aspirations when 
in reality they are implicitly learning from and adjusting 
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to each other, affecting each other without it looking like 
they are doing so.
 The intense demonization of  the poor that has been 
underway in Phnom Penh for the past decade in part 
reflects the inability of  the urban elite to know what 
to do with all of  the surreptitious, inexplicable, and, to 
them, monstrous circulations and consolidations that 
have been at work in remaking the city. A population 
supposedly traumatized by genocide and largely seeking 
refuge in spiritual quietude nevertheless has carried on 
constructing viable residential quarters such as in Prek 
Pra or Boeng Salang. As the Gang of  Hun Sen and other 
oknha (big men) go out of  their way to prove that the 
Khmer Rouge were right about urban life – filling it with 
mega-developments of  dubious economic viability – it 
is not far-fetched to think about this demonization as a 
form of  capture; a way of  breaking up the circulations 
of  effort and experimentation that have underpinned 
everyday efforts to resettle the city. And this effort 
towards breakage is not unlike a seemingly interminable 
preoccupation with demonic possessions, illicit networks, 
vectors of  disease transmission, and dangerous 
circulations.
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Integration 
Ben Gidley
Integration – the stuff  that happens after migration – 
has an ambivalent relationship to migration studies. The 
integration question has historically been posed in relation 
to the context of  reception and, therefore, within the 
disciplinary boundaries of  the sociological tradition. The 
sociological tradition was born with the emergence of  
the modern city; the question of  the stranger within the 
city – the stranger who comes today and stays tomorrow, 
as Georg Simmel put it (1950) – has been one of  its 
constitutive problems. 
 Classically in this tradition, though, the question has 
been posed in a way that brackets out and renders invisible 
the migrant journey. 
 Three problems for the classical sociological approach 
follow from this. First, it takes a receiving society 
perspective, as noted by migration scholars developing a 
more transnational or cosmopolitan perspective. Second, 
as the national state’s role is redefined by the turbluence 
of  globalisation, an integration discourse which ‘sees like 
a state’ is increasingly inadequate. And, third, it raises the 
question of  what it is that migrants integrate into. 
 All three of  these problems were present in Emile 
Durkheim’s reflections at the start of  the 20th century. 
For Durkheim, in an age defined by mass rural-urban 
migration, without some mechanism for integration, 
society ‘is no more than a pile of  sand that the least jolt or 
the slightest puff  will suffice to scatter.’ Forms of  organic 
solidarity were required, and the civil religion of  the nation 
was the answer, binding strangers to the abstraction of  the 
state. 
 The concept of  integration was introduced to the 
UK’s political agenda in the 1960s by Home Secretary 
Roy Jenkins, who defined it in a far less functionalist way: 
‘not as a flattening process of  assimilation but as equal 
opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an 
atmosphere of  mutual tolerance’ (1967). This definition 
emerged at a particular historical moment, that of  the 
Windrush generation of  (post-)colonial citizen migrants. 
This generation’s first struggle was with its designation as a 
generation of  immigrants. Hence the emergent anti-racist 
movement (and later the academic consensus informed 
by that movement) rejected the notion of  integration as 
insufficiently distinct from assimilation. Thus the concept 
was for a long time largely absent from political and 
scholarly debates in Britain. 
 This changed in the wake of  the mill town riots and 
terrorist attacks of  2001, and also as a result of  European 
Union debates. This has happened, however, at a time 
when integration is in danger of  becoming a zombie 
concept, stumbling after its lifespan has passed. 
 The British integration debate has been characterised 
by a profound lack of  clarity. Too often, politicians and 
pundits unconsciously freight the term with the baggage 
of  Durkheimian functionalism. ‘British values’ and 
commitment to the ‘British way of  life’ have taken the 
role of  Durkheim’s civil religion of  the state, betraying a 
melancholic nostalgia for a monochrome Britishness that 
probably never existed. As across Europe, integration 
debates have had a punitive streak: imagining migrants 
‘not really wanting or even willing to integrate’ (as Prime 
Minister David Cameron put it), politicians have made full 
participation in citizenship contingent on the migrant duty 
to fit in. 
 Sarah Spencer, in her book The Migration Debate (2011), 
proposes a useful alternative definition: integration refers 
to the processes of  interaction between migrants and the 
individuals and institutions of  the receiving society that 
facilitate the socio-economic, cultural, social and civic 
participation of  migrants and an inclusive sense of  identity 
and belonging. This definition emphasises the multi-
directional nature of  integration: it is not something which 
migrants do, but rather about interaction. It acknowledges 
integration as a series of  processes across a number of  
related, but ultimately autonomous, domains, at a range of  
different scales.  
 This definition challenges the authoritarian drift of  
an integration debate focused solely on the migrant 
responsibility to fit in. It presents us with a policy agenda 
on integration which I will summarise here as seven key 
questions. 
 First, how can we go beyond the limits of  
methodological nationalism to understand the local scale 
on which integration occurs? Migrants move between 
countries, but people move between places. Different 
domains of  integration take place on different scales, and 
most often on a scale smaller than the nation-state. We 
need to attend better to new geographies of  settlement, to 
local variations in attitudes, to neighbourhood effects, and 
to local policy. 
 Second, how can we escape the methodologically 
nationalist receiving country perspective, to develop 
comparative research and policy transfer around 
integration? The nation state is the wrong scale to consider 
integration, yet the terrain is striated by differences at 
the national level: definitions of  key terms, philosophies 
of  integration, histories of  migration, of  race and of  
colonialism, structures of  governance. These open up 
profound translation problems which EU-funded officials 
Rescaling and Re-placing
and researchers have often glossed over in what Hannah 
Jones and I (2013) have called a ‘soupy transnationalism’ 
which glibly boosts putative ‘good practices’ rather than 
rigorously engaging with difference. We need a more 
contentious transnationalism to develop more meaningful 
comparisons.
 Third, if  integration is a set of  processes occurring in 
multiple domains, how can we understand the intersection 
of  these domains? Both inter-ethnic friendships and 
feeling at home in a neighbourhood are strong predictors 
of  identification with Britain – but not of  each other 
(Gidley et al., 2012). Similarly, you can be civically active 
while excluded from the labour market, or residentially 
segregated while socially integrated. There are multiple 
paths to integration. Social science understands little about 
how these different domains influence each other.
 Fourth, how do (restrictions to) entitlements impact on 
migrants’ possibility for integration? Our legal rights and 
responsibilities are the foundations on which integration 
– in all domains – is built. Yet policy debates on these 
rights and responsibilities rarely consider the integration 
trade-off. 
 Fifth, what is the responsibility of  the public and 
institutions of  the receiving society? If  integration is not 
just the duty of  migrants themselves, whose responsibility 
is it? We don’t know enough about how much public 
attitudes matter, and what shapes them. We don’t know 
enough about what difference leadership by public 
authorities and civil society can make. 
 Sixth, how can we do integration research without 
using a reductive ethnic lens? Anthropologists have been 
accused of  methodological ethnicism: the assumption that 
migrants from a particular nation state or region constitute 
an ethnic group (‘the Bangladeshis in London’, ‘the Turks 
in Germany’, and so on) before their identity, actions, 
social relations and beliefs are studied. Only by shifting our 
attention from ethnicity to sites and spaces of  integration can 
we overcome this addiction. 
 Finally, how can we attend to the lived experience of  
integration?  Especially given the gap between what people 
say in interviews and what people do in real life: there may 
be deep, meaningful interactions between migrants and 
settled people in places where the interviews with settled 
people suggested high levels of  xenophobic attitudes 
(Jensen and Gidley, 2013). This is a methodological 
challenge, and suggests the importance of  ethnographic 
research, hitherto relatively neglected in the integration 
field. 
 I suspect that an ethnographic approach to integration 
as a mundane, unremarkable feature of  today’s complex 
societies, might reveal – contrary to the politicians’ rhetoric 
of  dislocated communities and migrants unwilling to 
integrate – that migrants and non-migrants are getting on 
with it without us. 
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The Multilevel Governance of  Migrant Integration 
P. W. A. Scholten 
Public debate on migrant integration has often fixated 
on how and why different countries approach migrant 
integration differently: the German welfare state 
approach, the British race relations approach and the 
French assimilationist or Republicanist approach. It 
has strengthened the idea that migrant integration is 
primarily national. In their depiction of  ‘methodological 
nationalism’, Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002) showed 
that this preoccupation with the ‘national’ dimension 
of  integration had also pervaded, or was even being 
reproduced by, academia. 
 One of  the strongest challenges to national models has 
come more from the local level than from the European 
level, where the involvement with migrant integration 
has remained weak and mostly intergovernmental rather 
than supranational. Big cities have taken a leading role 
in this policy area and developed their own integration 
philosophies. From a sociological perspective, this 
development makes sense, as it is at the local level that 
migrants meet others, find a job, have children, and so on. 
It is also at this level that negative as well as positive sides 
of  diversity are experienced most concretely. Finally, we 
know from research that migrants identify much more 
easily with the city they live in than with the nation. 
 It is increasingly obvious that cities in different states 
have more in common than national models would suggest 
(see Caponio and Borkert, 2010). Hyperdiverse cities like 
Berlin, Amsterdam and London embrace diversity as part 
of  the city’s identity and as a positive anchoring point 
for local policies, sometimes in spite of  their respective 
national models. Industrial cities like Manchester and 
Rotterdam have connected their traditional emphasis on 
work and housing to the new challenge of  diversity. This 
supports what the sociologist Benjamin Barber (2013) 
suggests, that it is precisely the inability of  national 
democracies to develop effective responses to migration 
and diversity that prompts cities to develop their own 
strategies with a much greater emphasis on pragmatism, 
trust and participation. 
 This local turn in migrant integration policies, 
combined with the continued salience of  the national 
level and the nascent European dimension, lies at the 
heart of  what policy scientists describe as the multilevel 
governance of  migrant integration (Scholten, 2013). It 
involves a challenge in terms of  policy coordination and 
policy coherence. If  there are different policies at different 
levels in one single policy domain, this risks conveying 
conflicting messages to migrant groups. Recent research 
shows that in several countries local governments feel they 
have to repair some of  the centripetal forces unleashed 
by national political and policy discourses: politicized 
debates on the national level can have a performative 
effect at the local level as well. This multilevel challenge 
is becoming especially relevant as migration policy is 
becoming increasingly Europeanized, whereas migrant 
integration is becoming increasingly localized. European 
and national decisions in terms of  the regulation of  
migration often have distinctly local consequences in 
terms of  integration. 
 One way to ensure that policies do not conflict is to 
establish relations between them that are not simply top-
down. Indeed we are increasingly witnessing bottom-up 
relations, where local governments set political and policy 
agendas at other policy levels. Take, for instance, the 
advocacy of  the Greater London Authority for a refugee 
integration strategy, Glasgow’s agreement with the UK 
Border Agency on dispersal of  asylum seekers to the 
Glasgow area, and Rotterdam’s successful lobbying for a 
special law enabling it to adopt a more effective strategy 
toward gentrification. Cities have ventured beyond the 
role of  policy implementer to that of  policy entrepreneur. 
 Cities are also exchanging knowledge and experiences 
in national and international horizontal networks. 
Over the last decade, various European networks have 
developed, including Eurocities, Integrating Cities, 
Intercultural Cities, and Cities for Local Integration 
Policies for Migrants (CLIP). These networks have 
become institutionalized and are an important motor 
of  policy learning. Their definitions of  best practices 
have significant effects on local policies. Interestingly, 
especially from a multilevel governance perspective, 
many of  these networks are supported through European 
funding programmes. 
 There is a welcome local turn in academic interest 
in migrant integration, but we need a better theoretical 
understanding and more empirical research on multilevel 
governance challenges that this local turn produces. 
Observing that there is a local turn and that this leads 
to a multilevel policy setting does not mean that we can 
immediately speak of  effective multilevel governance. In 
contrast, this multiplicity of  levels may just as well add yet 
another dimension to this already wicked policy problem.
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Construction, Migration and Urbanisation 
Michelle Buckley
Who builds our cities, and under what conditions? Over 
the last few years, this question has been at the forefront 
of  my research as a geographer. Answering it has led me in 
two broad directions. The first has been to explore the roles 
that construction workers play in everyday city-building. 
The second includes the conviction that the question 
above, while answerable in a whole manner of  ways, 
ultimately requires some engagement with the process 
of  migration, and the lives and livelihoods of  migrants 
themselves to the city. Migrants to cities have very often 
played a central role in building them. Irish and Italian 
immigrants of  19th and 20th-century New York formed 
the backbone of  the workforce that produced its skyline. 
Today, rural migrants to rapidly urbanising Chinese cities 
comprise a construction workforce numbering in the 
tens of  millions. In addition to bringing crucial skills and 
expertise to the construction labour markets of  many 
cities, immigrants and temporary migrants employed in 
the trades have often been important to city-building 
because they have taken jobs that no one else wants to 
do – a great deal of  construction work has long been, and 
continues to be, dirty, dangerous and low status.
 In cities across the globe, construction is not just a 
significant sector for the incorporation of  migrant and 
immigrant workers, but a rapidly growing one (Erlich 
and Grabelsky, 2005; Wells, 2012). This trend has 
gone hand-in-hand with the deepening insecurity and 
casualisation of  construction work internationally over 
the last three decades. In Europe and North America, 
segments of  the urban construction labour market such 
as residential construction have been subject to heavy 
de-unionisation. The sector both within and outside 
Europe and North America has also become heavily 
polarised, comprising highly-skilled professionals such 
as engineers, cost estimators or construction managers 
at the top of  the wage scale, and workers employed 
in lower waged and more insecure manual jobs such 
as concrete finishers or general labourers. In a diverse 
range of  cities, meanwhile, ranging from Kuala Lumpur 
(Abdul-Rahmana et al., 2012) to Singapore (Debrah 
and Ofori, 2001), construction sector deregulation 
has led to increased inter-regional migration flows into 
the sector and the subsequent emergence of  a highly 
flexibile, insecure and internationalised workforce in the 
construction trades. Intranationally, urban construction 
jobs have provided an important income supplement 
for rural workers in some countries. In parts of  India, 
for example, contemporary pressures eroding agrarian 
livelihoods (of  which urbanisation is itself  one) have led 
both men and women to seek out temporary and seasonal 
work in urban construction markets. As a result, patterns 
of  seasonal, circular migration between the construction 
site and the farmer’s field have become increasingly 
common in countries where rapid urbanisation is fuelling 
both formal and informal construction markets. 
 Taken together, factors such as the growing 
prevalence of  long subcontracting chains, ongoing de-
unionisation, increasing international competition among 
contractors, and the casualisation of  employment at 
the lower end of  the wage scale have in many cases led 
to poorer employment conditions and job security in 
construction’s lower paid occupations. This process has 
disproportionately affected temporary (im)migrants over 
the past decade: their work can be unstable and insecure, 
offer limited rights, protections, and benefits, and allow 
workers limited autonomy, recourse, or control over 
their working conditions. This reality was starkly visible 
following the 2007-08 financial crisis, when construction 
markets worldwide not only posted the highest aggregate 
job losses of  any other sector, but precariously employed 
migrant workers were consistently at the forefront of  
these layoffs. 
 In addition to waged formal and informal work in 
construction, urban migrants also take part in many kinds 
of  ‘illegal’, non-waged or non-profit-oriented building 
activities that play a central role in the physical production 
of  neighbourhoods, streetscapes, marketplaces and 
infrastructure in cities. With global estimates forecasting 
that by 2020, over one billion urban and suburban 
residents in the world will be living in ‘informal’, 
‘unauthorised’ and/or ‘substandard’ dwellings, self-built 
or informally-waged construction activities both by and 
for new arrivals to the city are some of  the most important 
ways that the cities of  tomorrow are taking shape. Within 
these acts of  construction, productive and socially 
reproductive activities are often closely interlinked; 
not only does subsistence construction address urban 
migrants’ needs for shelter, but they also form an integral 
part of  informal construction economies, tying migrants’ 
building activities to flows of  steel, cement and other 
aggregates, corrugated tin, plywood and other materials in 
the city. With governments often ‘producing’ informality 
among urban migrants by designating certain kinds of  
construction activity as ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’, unauthorized 
building activities can often cement unequal access 
to urban resources, infrastructure, and amenities. As 
a result, illegal or unauthorised construction is often 
closely connected to the formation of  unequal forms of  
urban citizenship among migrants. In its many different 
forms, construction by migrants is at once a material and 
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political act, one that has important implications for both 
the physical and social contours of  the 21st-century city. 
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Warren Buffett recently maintained: “There is class 
warfare, all right, but it’s my class, the rich class, that’s 
making war, and we’re winning.” I describe here how this 
rich class is indeed waging class war through the striking 
new strategy of  going offshore (Urry, 2014).1 
 It had been thought, especially in the 1990s, that the 
massive ratcheting up of  movements of  money, people, 
ideas, images, information and objects was economically, 
politically, and culturally beneficial. Most aspects of  
contemporary societies were believed to be positively 
transformed through increased cosmopolitanism and 
borderlessness. But the 1990s were not the harbinger 
of  an optimistic and borderless future. Migrating across 
borders are not just consumer goods and new services, 
but terrorists, environmental risks, trafficked women, 
drug runners, international criminals, outsourced work, 
slave traders, asylum seekers, property speculators, 
smuggled workers, waste, financial risks, and untaxed 
income.
 There are many ‘secret worlds’ of  offshored 
manufacturing work, waste, energy, torture, pleasure, CO2 
emissions, property ownership, and taxation. Offshoring 
involves moving resources, practices, peoples and monies 
from one territory to another, hiding them within secret 
jurisdictions. Offshoring involves evading rules, laws, 
taxes, regulations or norms. It is all about getting around 
rules in ways that are illegal, or going against the spirit of  
the law, or using laws in one jurisdiction to undermine 
laws in another. Offshore worlds are often based upon 
secrets and lies.
 Offshore worlds have been made possible by the 
development of  new sociotechnical mobility systems, 
of  container-based cargo shipping; aeromobility; the 
internet and virtual worlds; car and lorry traffic; electronic 
money transfer systems; the growth of  taxation, legal 
and financial expertise oriented to avoiding national 
regulations; and the proliferation of  ‘mobile lives’.
 The offshoring world is dynamic, reorganising 
economic, social, political and material relations between 
societies and within them, and more and more resources, 
practices, peoples and monies are made or kept secret. 
The global order is the opposite of  a simply open world – 
it is one of  concealment, of  many secret gardens mainly 
designed by and for the rich class and its casual patterns 
of  migration. 
 Since the rise of  neoliberalism in the later 1980s 
there has been an astonishing growth in the movement 
of  finance and wealth to and through the world’s 60 to 
70 tax havens, which entail one-quarter of  contemporary 
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societies. These tax havens, or ‘treasure islands’, include 
Switzerland, Jersey, Manhattan, the Cayman Islands, 
Monaco, Panama, Dubai, Liechtenstein, Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Gibraltar, the City of  London, and Delaware. The 
development of  ‘secrecy jurisdictions’ are core to the 
neoliberalisation of  the world economy from around 
1980, and the ending of  many exchange controls. To be 
offshore is to be in paradise, contrasted with the high-
state, high-tax life experienced onshore. Tax havens are 
places of  escape and freedom, a paradise of  low excises, 
wealth management, deregulation, secrecy, and often nice 
beaches. 
 This rich class is the beneficiary. Almost all major 
companies have offshore accounts/subsidiaries, more 
than half  of  world trade passes through them, almost 
all high net worth individuals possess offshore accounts 
enabling tax ‘planning’, and 99 of  Europe’s 100 largest 
companies use offshore subsidiaries. As a consequence, 
one-quarter to one-third of  all global wealth is held 
‘offshore’. Offshored money has grown from US$11 
billion in 1968 to US$21 trillion in 2010, or a sum 
equivalent to the combined GDPs of  the United States 
and Japan, about one-third of  annual world income. 
Fewer than 10 million people currently own this offshore 
fortune. This is the source of  power and wealth of  the 
super rich who almost all owe their fortunes, in part 
at least, to the rapid and secret moving of  money and 
ownership.  
 Offshore is how the world of  power now works. 
Money staying onshore is almost the exception, suitable 
only for the ‘little people’ still paying tax. Most big money 
is offshored. Nicholas Shaxson describes how the US is 
by far the world’s most important ‘secrecy jurisdiction’ 
(2012). In the diminutive state of  Delaware there is a 
single building which houses 217,000 companies, the 
largest and most (fiscally speaking) unethical building 
in the world. The annual loss of  taxation is hundreds 
of  billions of  US dollars. The offshore world makes it 
hard for small and medium-sized companies to compete, 
as revealed by protestors, NGOs and charities who 
increasingly engage in ‘tax shaming’.
 One commentator reports how, for billionaires, 
‘you don’t live anywhere, and neither does your money’ 
Meek, 2006). Place, property and power are intertwined 
in forming and sustaining such a networked rich class: 
homes dotted throughout the world, first class travel, 
private schools, family life structured around episodic 
get-togethers, private leisure clubs, airport lounges, 
private jets, luxury destinations, and places of  distinction 
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for encountering other super rich and extending one’s 
‘network capital’. 
 Central to these offshore worlds is water. Seven billion 
humans are crowded onto one-quarter of  the earth’s 
surface. Almost all the ocean world is out of  sight. The 
oceans contain many unregulated ‘treasure islands’; ships 
sail oceans flying flags of  convenience, with conditions 
of  work driven to the bottom; many poor migrants lose 
their lives in oceans; oceans are a global rubbish dump 
with the ‘Great Pacific Garbage Patch’ twice the size of  
France. The sea is a neoliberal paradise for the rich class, 
a vision of  the world almost without government, taxes 
and laws, and where only the powerful ships and their 
companies survive, with the rest often literally sinking 
to the bottom. The outlaw sea also subjects humans to 
heightened unruliness: more intense storms, hurricanes, 
tsunamis, rising sea levels and flooding.
 The social sciences neglect these offshore worlds 
at their peril. Can what has escaped offshore ever 
be reshored? Offshoring and the associated lack of  
transparency is bad for democracy, and for the possibility 
of  societies moving towards a low carbon future. 
Notes
1 See http://www.morphstudio.co.uk/work/offshoring/ for 
a short video on offshoring.
References
Meek, J. (2006) ‘Super Rich’, The Guardian (17 April), http://
www.theguardian.com/money/2006/apr/17/tax.g2.
Shaxson, N.  (2012) Treasure Islands: Tax Havens and the Men who 
Stole the World, London: Vintage.
Urry, J. (2014) Offshoring, London: Polity.
Rescaling and Re-placing
In days gone, when people lived in settled communities 
and identified strongly with the locality, neighbours knew 
each other and were expected to behave in certain ways: if  
not in a friendly manner or through reciprocal exchanges, 
then as part of  a world with familiarities and ties 
mediating local animosities and disputes. Neighbouring 
was a way of  life and a compulsion, a habit or a reason 
to get out, or an ordeal for the outsider. Today, this is 
not an expectation of  neighbouring. People live next to 
each other largely as strangers, in places that hardly hold 
together as communities of  common fate or interest, 
without much contact, often moving on to somewhere 
else. In an age mediated by all manner of  real-time 
intimate contact with people far away, even the most 
sedentary subjects dwell in worlds of  multiple affiliation 
and feeling. This is what travel, the internet, television, 
mobile phones and advertising, alongside the intimacies 
of  materialism, religion and ideology have permitted. 
Neighbours or strangers who find themselves in the 
same space can ignore each other, avoid being inquisitive 
except in indifferent or suspicious ways, or even up sticks 
when necessary. 
 The neighbour is just the person next door, and 
neighbouring is no longer a required art of  living with 
others. This is all the more so when private ownership 
makes people proprietary. The intensity of  neighbourly 
self-interest and indifference is probably particularly high 
in cities, where the majority of  people, living as they do 
in suburbs, high-rise flats, or inner city areas, dwell in 
multiple worlds of  connectivity, move on frequently, and 
work hard at negotiating the complexities of  urban living. 
Should we allow neighbouring to become a culture 
of  self-interest and social avoidance, an ethic of  
indifference towards cohabitants? The danger here is to 
court isolationist ways of  living with difference, turning 
neighbourhoods into zones of  discipline. Additionally, 
this way of  living provides a further excuse to accept the 
9/11 culture of  aversion to difference, which tells us to 
be wary of, discipline, or eject the disruptive neighbour: 
the asylum seeker, the Muslim, the beggar, the welfare 
scrounger, the dissident, the immigrant, the one who does 
not fit. The logical extension of  this culture – backed by 
elaborate systems of  surveillance and vilification of  the 
stranger – is that the neighbourhood becomes a place of  
fear and suspicion of  the other. 
 It is this kind of  possibility that has prompted a 
policy quest for neighbourliness and mixed community, 
for places where people from different backgrounds 
can meet and perhaps even build interdependencies. 
Urban Neighbours  
Ash Amin
Emblematic of  this desire is a policy turn towards mixed 
neighbourhoods, twinned schools, housing schemes that 
promote visibility and contact, and projects to build 
bridges or facilitate contact between strangers. I have 
my doubts about whether such engineering can work in 
a society of  multiple identities and affiliations. Greater 
exposure to neighbours could breed more intimacy but 
also more hate, while designing environments of  shared 
interests and sympathies strays uncomfortably close to 
the ethos of  gated communities that we tend not to like. 
However, an ethic of  good neighbouring that builds 
sensibilities around real habits of  modern urban living 
may be worth exploring. Three such sensibilities come to 
mind. 
 The first is a sensibility of  respectful distance. 
Immediate neighbours who share a garden fence or a 
common entrance should learn to ignore difference – 
bodily, cultural and ideological – and also not to expect 
too much from each other. Instead, they could learn to 
keep the peace, by understanding that they share a fragile 
dividing line. A politeness of  the party wall or privet 
hedge can be structured around small things: respectful 
greeting, taking in the neighbour’s mail, keeping the 
noise down. Of  course, the reality is often the opposite, 
punctuated by complaints of  unruly behaviour, disputes 
over who pays for common repairs, and sly encroachment. 
Reversing this is not easy, and bad relations are often a 
quirk of  fate (you cannot choose your neighbours), but 
the combination of  being able to call in the authorities 
as a last resort, schooling in the manners of  the party 
wall, and social regulation through the two additional 
sensibilities discussed below, might do the trick. Who 
knows, respectful distance might even lead to studied 
care.
 The second sensibility has to do with care for the 
neighbourhood. Bad relations are pushed to the margins 
when people in a neighbourhood feel strongly about 
the local patch, especially when they work together to 
protect it. This is what happens when volunteers work 
to clean up public spaces, make streets safe, or set up 
local amenities for children. Through these acts, people 
take responsibility for their neighbourhood, an ethic that 
may even turn into studied care for one’s neighbours. Of  
course, many of  the residents will not play ball, and all 
too frequently it is the same old people who come out. 
The challenge lies in finding ways of  cultivating interest 
in the local commons among the disinterested, perhaps 
through the promise of  small rewards and projects that 
capture the imagination.
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 The third sensibility concerns the aesthetic of  place. 
Architects, planners and social reformers have long 
understood the impact of  good design, green spaces, 
busy streets, functioning services, low-key surveillance, 
and human-scale development on civic behaviour. The 
aesthetic of  place comes with no clear guarantees – slums 
can yield feelings of  solidarity, and pristine suburbs 
strong feelings of  aversion. Chances are, however, 
that in a decent neighbourhood with plentiful signs of  
social life in public space, neighbourly relations may 
turn for the better, as people appreciate the commons 
shared by everyone, nod unthinkingly to the passer-by, 
come out when the aesthetic is threatened, and think 
again before making someone’s life miserable. None 
of  this is reducible to place aesthetics, but when such 
an atmosphere combines with a strong sense of  place 
identification, a new alchemy of  living with difference 
might be catalysed, where neighbours see each other as 
part of  a community. 
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What Drives Human Migration? 
Hein de Haas
associated with increasing emigration (de Haas, 2010). 
Any form of  development in the poorest countries 
of  the world is therefore likely to lead to accelerating 
emigration. This suggests that we need explanations that 
do not confuse individual factors or motivations to move 
(which, indeed, often refer to better opportunities) with 
macro-structural explanations of  migration processes.  
 Such rethinking can be achieved by conceptualising 
migration as a constituent part of  broader development and change, 
rather than as a problem to be solved, or as the sum of  
individual responses to given (unexplained) geographical 
opportunity gaps. For instance, in the modern age, 
much migration within and across borders has been 
inextricably linked to broader urbanisation processes. It 
is difficult to imagine urbanisation without migration, 
and vice-versa.  Rather than asking ‘why people migrate’ 
the more relevant question is therefore how processes 
such as imperialism, nation state formation, the industrial 
revolution, capitalist development, urbanisation and 
globalisation change migration patterns and migrants’ 
experiences.  
 For instance, how can we explain why development 
is often associated with more, instead of  less, migration? 
To understand this, we must move beyond sterile views 
of  migrants as predictable ‘respondents’ to geographical 
opportunity gaps. Conceptualising migration as a 
function of  people’s capabilities and aspirations to 
move can help to achieve a richer understanding of  
migration behaviour. Processes of  human and economic 
development typically expand people’s access to material 
resources, social networks and knowledge. At the same 
time, improvements in infrastructure and transportation, 
which usually accompany development, make travel less 
costly and risky. 
 Development generally increases people’s capabilities 
to migrate over larger distances, but it does not 
necessarily lead to migration. Migration aspirations 
depend on people’s more general life aspirations, as well 
as their perceptions of  life ‘here’ and ‘there’. Both are 
subjective and likely to change under the influence of  
broader processes of  structural change. Improved access 
to information, images and lifestyles conveyed through 
education and media tend to broaden people’s mental 
horizons, change their perceptions of  the ‘good life’, and 
increase material aspirations. Development processes 
tend to initially increase both people’s capabilities and 
aspirations to move, explaining why development often 
boosts migration. Once sizeable migrant communities 
have settled, social networks tend to reduce the costs 
Why do people migrate? This is a simple and a difficult 
question. On the one hand, it seems reasonable to assume 
that most people migrate hoping to find better conditions 
or opportunities, such as jobs, higher wages, safety or 
freedom of  expression. This is the implicit assumption 
underlying the ‘push-pull’ models taught at secondary 
school as well as neo-classical migration theories. Most 
migrants have good reasons to move. However, this 
does not really help us to understand the complexity and 
drivers of  real life migration. 
 To say that most people migrate to find better 
opportunities is somehow stating the obvious. Push-pull 
models usually list factors in origin and destination areas, 
but fail to make clear how the various factors together 
lead to migration. They fail to explain why there should 
be a difference between push areas and pull areas in the 
first place, and are therefore ‘a platitude at best’ (see also 
Skeldon, 1990).  
 Neoclassical migration theories assume that people 
migrate to maximise their income or wellbeing. Migration 
is a (temporary) response to development ‘disequilibria’ 
between origin and destination countries, and will decline 
through a process of  wage convergence. However, 
migration has been a constant factor in the history of  
humankind and is not a temporary by-product of  capitalist 
development.Furthermore, the wage convergence 
assumption naively ignores how power asymmetries 
usually sustain economic inequalities (Castles et al., 2014). 
 Both push-pull and neoclassical models fail to provide 
insight into the social, economic and political processes that 
have generated the spatial wage and opportunity gaps to 
which migration is supposedly a response. It is therefore 
not surprising that the predictions of  push-pull models 
and neoclassical theories are fundamentally at odds with 
what is seen in real life migration patterns. Most migrants 
do not move from the poorest to the wealthiest countries, 
and the poorest countries tend to have lower levels of  
emigration than middle-income and wealthier countries. 
It is often said that the only way to reduce migration from 
poor countries is to boost development. However, this 
ignores that the relation between development and levels 
of  emigration is fundamentally non-linear. Important 
emigration countries such as Mexico, Morocco, Turkey 
and the Philippines are typically not among the poorest. 
Going against popular perceptions of  a ‘continent on the 
move’, sub-Saharan Africa is the least migratory region of  
the world.  
 Analyses of  historical and contemporary data show 
that human and economic development is initially 
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and risks of  migrating, with settled migrants frequently 
functioning as ‘bridgeheads’. 
 However, as societies get wealthier, overall emigration 
aspirations are likely to decrease because more 
people can imagine a future within their own country, 
while immigration is likely to increase. Although it is 
often assumed that technological progress increases 
migration, easier transportation and communication may 
enable people to commute or work from home, while 
outsourcing and trade may also partly reduce the need to 
migrate. In fact, from a long-term historical perspective, 
technology has facilitated humankind to settle down. 
Ever since the agricultural (‘Neolithic’) revolution began 
some 12,000 years ago, technology has enabled people 
to shift from hunting and gathering to more sedentary 
lifestyles. In modern times, technological progress has 
certainly boosted non-migratory mobility – such as 
commuting, tourism and business travel – but its impact 
on migration is rather ambiguous. This may partly explain 
why the number of  international migrants as a share of  
the world population has remained remarkably stable at 
levels of  around 3 per cent over recent decades. 
 It is illusionary to think that large-scale migration 
is a temporary phenomenon that will disappear once 
– an equally illusionary – equilibrium is achieved. Such 
ideas reflect a fundamentally flawed, ahistorical  view on 
the history of  humankind. Development itself  drives 
migration. Migration has therefore always been – and will 
remain – an inevitable part of  the human experience. 
References
Castles, S. et al. (2014) The Age of  Migration: International 
Population Movements in the Modern World, 5th edn, London: 
MacMillan Press.
de Haas, H. (2010) ‘Migration Transitions: A Theoretical 
and Impirical Inquiry into the Developmental Drivers 
of  International Migration’, IMI Working Paper No 24, 
International Migration Institute, University of  Oxford.
Skeldon, R. (1990) Population Mobility in Developing Countries: A 
Reinterpretation, London: Belhaven Press. 
Rescaling and Re-placing
Multiculturally Yours: The Neighbourhood as Lived Diversity 
Ole Jensen
Neighbourhood is personal. Rather than a suburb, defined 
in terms of  its distance from an urban centre, neigh (Old 
English for ‘near’) emphasizes spatial proximity and 
closeness. And unlike a ward – a means of  government 
that can belong to politicians, demographers or urban 
planners – a neighbourhood is a geographical space 
loaded with individual meanings. It is, in other words, 
socially produced. It is, in the context of  immigration and 
settlement dynamics, also the site of  an ongoing everyday 
negotiation of  difference, with us-them distinctions 
increasingly blurred by diverse stories of  immigration and 
settlement. Accordingly, the neighbourhood doubles as a 
site of  lived diversity and a lens that provides insights into 
how individuals and groups actually live that diversity. 
 My neighbourhood, as a researcher and an immigrant, 
is basically a road in inner Woking, a town 30 miles south 
west of  London. Perhaps indicative of  the declining 
numbers of  ‘native’ residents, Woking Working Men’s 
Club, at the top of  the road, has been closed for a 
number of  years, and the Indian-run Polski sklep (Polish 
food shop) across the road is now the only local outlet 
selling alcohol. Emblematic of  the increasingly diverse 
nature, the barber shop further down the road advertises 
itself  as ‘specialists in European, Afro Caribbean, Asian 
& Traditional hair cut’. When the local post office closed 
down years ago, an Islamic school opened, then a short-
lived Brazilian shop, and the building is now divided 
into a Western Union outlet and a beauty parlour. In 
this manner, images of  the changing street provide 
insights into how diversity is built into, and continuously 
transforms, the area. What was there before is unclear, 
and it is indicative of  the area that the two longest-serving 
local shops are an Italian deli, opened in the 1970s when 
many Italian immigrants lived in the area, and a Pakistani 
supermarket, with a board commemorating ‘25 years of  
service to the community’.
 But what is that community about? “We’ve lost the 
track,” said the woman living opposite us – she herself  
Swiss-born, but a resident for 30 years. She was pointing 
to the row of  Victorian terraces where we live, recalling 
days when she could name everyone living in them. I could 
see her point. When our neighbours moved to France in 
2007, they let the house: first an Australian couple moved 
in; then three house-sharing engineers, two Pakistanis 
and one Palestinian; two moved on, and the remaining 
Pakistani then shared with his Chinese wife who moved 
down from Glasgow; when they bought a house nearer 
London, a Polish couple moved in, he working in IT. 
They stayed a year, then moved to Abu Dhabi where she 
found work; this year, a black British couple from Enfield 
moved in – still working and attending church in London. 
 This turnover is, in part, in the nature of  the 
neighbourhood, this being the cheap part of  town and 
thus the point of  arrival for newcomers – and increasingly 
so, with the number of  households in private rented, and 
thus flexible, accommodation in this area doubling in 
the period 2001-11. It is a process we know as ‘churn’, 
though that is not a helpful term, as it distracts from the 
diverse nature of  newcomers as well as, in this instance, 
the resourcefulness that allows them to move on. This is 
very much in contrast to the unskilled immigrants of  the 
1960s and 70s, who typically found a local job, moved 
the family, got a mortgage – altogether actions signalling 
long-term intent. 
 Untouched for years amongst all the comings and 
goings on the road is the glass-covered noticeboard at 
the roadside, holding messages from a now defunct 
community association – the notices undated, but faded. 
Community lost? Evidently, the fluidity and discontinuity 
characterising the area serves to question if  there is anything 
solid in terms of  lasting and inclusive associational bodies. 
The answer would be no, and it is indicative of  the make-
up of  the neighbourhood that the most well-established 
organisations are the Pakistani and the Kashmiri welfare 
organisations, both dating back to the early 1970s. But the 
absence of  neighbourhood-based organisations belies the 
more sporadic coming together around specific causes. So 
the local community centre, situated in a Victorian school 
building, came into existence after a campaign led by local 
minority groups. Italians, Spanish, Chinese, Pakistani, 
Moroccan groups established a community association 
for the purpose. No sooner was it up and running than 
the association was dissolved. 
 What constitutes the neighbourhood fabric is rather 
the dynamics whereby routine episodes become public 
familiarity and the ‘banal transgressions’ that are part of  
everyday life and, therefore, often remain unnoticed. It 
may be the fish curry from our Sri Lankan neighbour 
down the road, my daughter’s play-date with a Kurdish 
school mate, the sharing of  a joke with the retired Italian 
shopkeeper who, aged 70, has bought himself  a sporty 
Lamborghini to show for a lifetime of  toil.
 Overall, my research showed that memories of  the 
past and narratives of  the present neighbourhood share 
a lot of  explanatory ground. One was the nostalgic 
memories of  elderly white residents, remembering the 
past as a coherent, comprehensible era, a neighbourhood 
underpinned by strong local ties. The other was the 
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experience shared by younger, locally born Pakistanis. 
Many of  them erstwhile pupils in the same school where 
they later sent their own children, they referred to the 
neighbourhood as a ‘comfort zone’ where ‘you know the 
community and the people and everything’. 
 So yes, neighbourhood is personal. But it is personal 
in many different ways, characterised by both experiences 
of  local belonging and short-term settlement processes, 
without any one narrative of  community. And it is by 
observing how these experiences come together in the 
context of  everyday life that we arrive at more nuanced 
understandings of  how diversity is lived and experienced.
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Mediterranean 
Ferruccio Pastore 
The economic and political significance of  the 
Mediterranean for Europe has shifted dramatically from 
crucial reservoir of  labour to deeply problematic border. 
First came the gradual inclusion of  the continent’s 
southerners – Italy first, much later Greece, eventually 
Portugal and Spain – into the European Community and 
the Common Market. This accompanied, and to some 
extent promoted, their surprising metamorphosis from 
migrant-sending to receiving countries. In the meantime, 
and partly as a side effect, it was increasingly the southern 
and eastern shores – Yugoslavia, the Maghreb and Turkey 
in particular – which emerged as recruitment basins.
 By the early 1970s, active recruitment of  migrant 
labour had officially been discontinued, but it took one 
more decade for European governments to agree that 
the ban on low-skilled labour migration needed joint 
enforcement to become effective. Systematic cooperation 
and targeted harmonization were also felt necessary to 
achieve another strategic priority: a common space of  
economic and civic freedom through the suppression of  
customs and police controls at ‘internal borders’. What 
was later to be known as the ‘Schengen Club’ was born, 
and with it the ‘common external border’. Over 34,000 
km of  the EU’s Mediterranean coasts soon became the 
most politically contentious and symbolically charged 
emblem of  ‘Fortress Europe’.
 Harmonizing and reinforcing controls towards the 
outside was the price for lifting internal checks: freedom 
for insiders was enhanced at the expense of  freedom 
for outsiders. In the meantime, with the collapse of  the 
socialist bloc, perceptions of  where the line was drawn 
between Europe’s inside and outside markedly changed 
in the course of  a few years, and the grand eastern 
enlargement project took shape: the Union opened up to 
the east and closed down to the south.
 The European border which has been developing 
since then is a new kind of  border. Not any more a neat 
and simple border line punctuated by guarded checkpoints, 
in front of  which trucks and tourists’ cars queue, but 
rather a wide (and constantly widening) and complex 
border zone, itself  bounded by blurred borders, where pre-
emptive and repressive controls and surveillance activities 
are performed at multiple stages, through a variety of  
more or less technological means, and by a heterogeneous 
plethora of  public and private actors. Very significant 
human and financial resources have been invested in 
developing ever more sophisticated techniques, methods 
and infrastructures for profiling persons, scanning 
vehicles, screening spaces, and detecting anomalies and 
forgeries. Under the pressure of  (alleged and perceived) 
interdependence and growing anxiety about unwanted 
migration, Europe has turned into the largest and, by 
some possible measures, the most advanced laboratory in 
the world for migration controls, with the Mediterranean 
as prime testing ground.
 According to the letter and the spirit of  European 
treaties, every inch of  the external border is understood 
as ‘common’: established on behalf  of  all member states 
and benefitting them all. It is only due to the hazards of  
geography and territorial sovereignty that each stretch is 
primarily controlled by the agents of  one specific state.
 It was a few years after the formal incorporation of  
such principles in the law of  the European Union that 
the imbalances embedded in such an unprecedented 
distribution of  duties and responsibilities among 
sovereign nations became clear. Border countries, with 
Mediterranean ones on the frontline, were called to 
perform a common function, according to common 
standards, but using their own means. The distribution 
of  border surveillance costs, potentially heavy, especially 
in the case of  maritime activities, turned into an issue 
which started to climb up the EU’s policy agenda.
 Meanwhile, the borderization of  the Mediterranean 
was proving effective, although sometimes in unforeseen 
ways. The efforts of  coastal EU states, usually with the 
crucial cooperation of  neighbouring transit states, closed 
down several once prominent irregular migration routes, 
including the Otranto Channel, the Gibraltar Strait and 
the crossing to the Canaries.
  This successful border upgrade was applauded in 
politicians’ discourses and in public perceptions, but there 
were some collateral effects. Given the mixed nature of  
the deterred flows – where ‘economic migrants’ share 
boats with minors, victims of  trafficking and asylum 
seekers – externalization of  controls implied a substantial 
thwarting of  the international obligation to protect forced 
migrants. Even more seriously, the more risky smuggling 
techniques required by enhanced controls had as a side 
effect a rise in deaths at sea (conservative estimates reach 
a figure of  around 20,000 victims over two decades).
 Furthermore, the relative effectiveness of  such 
epochal transformation was integrally related to the 
authoritarian nature of  Europe’s main ‘partners’ operating 
on the southern shore. The strong and capillary control 
that so-called ‘moderate Arab regimes’ had over their 
territories and societies, and their capacity to disregard 
widespread popular opposition to exit controls and 
readmission policies, were critical factors in the success 
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of  European externalization strategies. This became 
transparent in 2011, when the collapse of  those regimes 
stirred a wave of  anxiety among migration control 
bureaucracies, amplified by the media, contributing to 
Europe’s precocious (and to some extent self-fulfilling) 
scepticism on the destiny of  ‘Arab revolutions’.
 Such anxiety proved exaggerated or at least premature, 
because – in a first phase at least – cooperation 
agreements were quickly and effectively negotiated 
between key players, as, for instance, between the 
Italian government and the new Libyan and Tunisian 
authorities. But the intensification of  regional push 
factors (from the escalation of  the Syrian conflict to a 
new deterioration of  the situation in the Horn of  Africa), 
together with the relapse of  Egypt and Libya into conflict 
and instability, are once more showing how fragile is a 
European migration management strategy which gives 
priority to the separating over the connecting function of  the 
Mediterranean. The weakness of  European responses in 
the wake of  the Lampedusa tragedy of  3 October 2013, 
and the tensions surrounding what ‘European solidarity’ 
should actually mean in such circumstances, are another 
urgent reminder of  the long-term unsustainability of  
reducing the Mediterranean to just a border.
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Every year since 2004, I travel back to South Africa to 
visit family. It is an eleven and a half  hour flight, usually 
made through the night, allowing the traveller to get 
from London to Cape Town without missing so much 
as a day. Except, like me, if  you don’t sleep well on a 
plane. Scrunched in an economy seat that perceptibly 
shrinks with each year, I mark the hours with in-flight 
movies and a good book. Around 3am I slink past the 
row of  sprawling bodies to walk up and down the aisles, 
passing seats filled with passengers in various bodily 
states of  oblivion and blankets that have slithered to the 
floor. Around 5am we are greeted by the full set of  lights 
being put back on, the unpalatable aroma of  egg that has 
been sitting in microwavable foils for the past 24 hours, 
and the determined cheeriness of  the flight attendants. 
At this point, having 
refused to take part in 
the breakfast charade, 
I resort to the in-
flight magazine. I flick 
past restaurant and 
city reviews; offers 
on perfume, faux 
jewellery and giant 
packs of  Toblerone; 
and finally, at the back, 
reach the map. The one 
element of  curiosity 
offered in the 11 hour 
flight, contained in a 
single A4 image of  
destinations the airline 
flies to and from. At 
the click of  a search 
engine we can find all 
thinkable articulations 
of  our global age, 
and yet it is this map, 
full of  its pinpoints, 
continental outlines and flight arcs, that evokes the 
wonder of  it. London to Accra; Singapore to Perth; New 
York to Mexico City. Millions and millions of  families, 
students, business people, leaders, crooks, writers, artists, 
doctors, nannies, all traversing the globe every day of  
every year. 
 So porous are our city borders that on any one day, 
airport passengers average 180,000 at Heathrow, 100,000 
at Gatwick and 50,000 at Stansted. Six hundred thousand 
students arrive from outside of  London each year, filling 
World Wide Street 
Suzanne M. Hall
the city’s university lecture rooms and libraries with daily 
attendance. Four hundred thousand tourists peruse its 
galleries, jostle up and down Oxford Street, and have 
their pictures taken in front of  Buckingham Palace. And 
that is just on one day. How could we comprehend the 
accumulation of  generations of  arrivals and departures 
in the making of  the city? In 2004, I moved into a flat 
above the Walworth Road in south London. A year later, 
intrigued by the diversity of  people who activate this 
linear ecosystem of  retail and day-to-day convenience, I 
decided to trace the origins of  independent proprietors 
on the street. I had in mind the connections of  that airline 
travel map, and so, relying on a colleague’s computer skills, 
we set out an image with a map of  the world below and 
a map of  the street directly above it. For two weeks we 
walked the Walworth 
Road, engaged in a 
face-to-face survey 
of  the independent 
proprietors My 
colleague Thiresh 
pinpointed the 
worldwide origins of  
the 93 shopkeepers 
on the mile length 
street who were 
willing to participate 
in our survey, and 
drew a line to the 
corresponding shop. 
I elected to leave out 
any visual distractions: 
no colour, just a 
simple black and white 
tracing of  one point 
connecting to another. 
What appeared in 
monochrome was no 
less captivating to me 
than the airline original. On one London street at one 
point in time, an aggregation of  origins of  stunning 
diversity: Afghanistan, China, Cyprus and Northern 
Cyprus, England, Ghana, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, 
Jamaica, Malawi, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan, 
Sierre Leone, Trinidad, Turkey and Vietnam. 
 There are many audits and tracings of  this kind that 
one would like to see: workers in the NHS, for example, 
or London bus drivers, or even students and staff  in 
my own university. I chose the street because it is so 
A map of  the origins and destination of  the diverse proprietors on a south 
London street, surveyed in 2009. 
Source: Hall, S. M. (2012) City, Street and Citizen: The Measure of  the Ordinary, 
London: Routledge.
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commonplace, an everyday urban currency that each of  
us, no matter where we are from, has a familiarity with. 
The intention is to reveal what is common to our urban 
landscapes and how the everyday alters in an increasingly 
mobile world. Our survey reveals the diversity of  
people that is integral to the way day-to-day life in our 
cities works. To deny this commonplace conviviality or 
the porosity of  the world in which we now live, would 
require holding, at all costs, to another truth. It would 
require a moral claim for the tightening of  borders, 
accompanied by an expedient pragmatism that allows 
for a discriminatory system of  access to those with high 
influence and income. To counteract the experience of  
living in the wider world, we would have to circulate 
a cynical apparatus of  hierarchy based on a singular 
national allegiance above cross-border interdependencies. 
To make the distinctions of  insiders and outsiders felt, 
there would need to be vans parading around London 
neighbourhoods with billboards demanding ‘Go home 
or face arrest’. But who would go that far down such a 
dead-end street? 
   On my return flight from Cape Town to London I 
pass through the South African border control. Because 
I am a dual nationality citizen, I am required to travel in 
and out of  South Africa with both passports, a minimal 
obligation which, on this occasion, I had forgotten to 
respect. As I handed the border guard my maroon UK 
passport, instead of  my Springbok green-and-gold one, 
he frowned:
“You have forgotten your passport,” he stated. 
“Yes,” I replied sheepishly. 
“But you wouldn’t forget this one, would you?” 
he insisted. “This is the one you wouldn’t forget.”
In today’s world, we are all migrants of  sorts. We perpetually 
travel across borders in airplanes, through mobile phone 
networks, along internet satellite signals. But as the border 
guard reminded me, we are not all equally migrants; some 
are permitted more access than others.
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Arrivals between Bildungsroman and the City Commons 
Michael Keith
The Athenians believed that the moral imperative was to 
leave the city a better place on departure than on arrival. 
The sense that there is a moral obligation towards what 
comes next, to those who inherit the present, famously 
informs Aristotle’s description of  the constitution of  
ancient Athens, and is central to the genesis of  a political 
vision of  the metropolis as the good city. It prefigures 
a notion of  intergenerational ethics, and foregrounds 
a sense of  obligation towards both the new arrival and 
the citizen. But it sits uneasily with the way in which the 
urban age of  the 21st century has treated the steady flow 
of  people to the city – of  those from rural areas to urban 
spaces, and as well as of  those across national boundaries.
 Migration provides a lens through which dilemmas 
of  particular moments of  human mobility speak to the 
human condition. Characteristically, people arrive in one 
place, more often than not as adults seeking a job, an 
education, or family ties. They arrive skilled and schooled 
to some degree already. To the extent that they work, they 
contribute to the metropolitan economy, even as their 
arrival may place strains on the commons of  the city 
– the public resources that we share – the ecology, the 
neighbourhood welfare nets, the competition for scarce 
land, housing and shelter.
 It is possible to see this process analytically as the 
transitional strains of  economic development. The 
long-term return on the mobility of  labour optimises 
factor resource distribution, powers economic growth, 
and drives social change – in 21st-century Shanghai and 
in 19th-century London. But as the city grows, it may 
undermine its own sustainability through ecological 
hazards of  pollution and traffic, and failures to plan waste, 
water, and the exploitation of  scarce public resources. 
This invokes a potential tragedy of  the commons as 
the metropolis spirals into decline. Detroit has become 
the emblematic site of  such malaise and post-industrial 
shrinking. But at times it is also possible to see less the 
tragedy of  the commons than the banality of  repertoires 
of  social closure in the face of  scarcity. Competition 
for scarce resources between those who have the least 
structures logics of  intolerance – for example, the 
responses of  an ageing Europe to a challenged welfare 
state paradoxically staffed by the very migrants who 
are popularly represented as threatening its survival; 
sponsored violence against Bihari movers to Mumbai; 
the heavy policing of  African enclaves in the emerging 
market economy of  21st-century Istanbul. 
 New urbanisms generate new commons in liminal 
and restructuring urban spaces and at the rural-urban 
interface in Europe and the USA, as well as in the 
emergent economies of  China, India and Brazil. As 
new arrivals make sense of  a city that is not their own, 
the metropolis mutates: ecologies and publics are 
reconstituted, and the calculus of  economic change is 
resynchronised. These changes inevitably challenge the 
legitimacy of  rule and governance of  existing common 
interests. But which parts of  the future metropolis, 
which spaces and times, should be properly thought of  
as common pool resources (CPR)?  When and how are 
private rights challenged by the collective needs in the 
future city? Migration brings such questions to the fore 
when mayors and municipal decision-makers have to 
balance the demands of  the present and the needs of  
the future metropolis. This is particularly pronounced in 
cities where development and expansion are most rapid  – 
in emergent megacities such as Delhi, Shenzhen and Sao 
Paolo  –  but also when old metropolises such as Moscow 
or London reinvent themselves. Optimal economic 
organisation of  the affluent metropolis may sit in tension 
with a moral calculus of  the good city, implying policy 
trade-offs between what is plausible and what is ideal, and 
requiring the reconciliation of  demographic pressures 
of  settlement with the rational organisation of  space, 
property rights, and popular demands for redistribution: 
that is, of  formal principles with informal realities.
 The economics and political science literature on the 
commons has focused primarily on the rural context. But 
revisiting the subject becomes more pressing as the world 
turns urban. Thus in her landmark work Governing the 
Commons, Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom briefly discusses 
migration as a potential threat to collective understandings 
of  and agreements on use of, and access to, resources 
(1990). But in her later writing Ostrom oriented her 
work towards an analysis of  the attributes of  community 
with stable resource pooling, including questions that 
should be asked of  the community by leaders seeking 
to address heterogeneity, generational population shifts, 
and migration. She synthesised the ethical questions and 
empirical challenges of  migration by incorporating both 
the putative threat of  diversity to legitimacy and also 
‘rules of  use’ through the following questions to which a 
shifting community and CPR should be held: 
• Is there general agreement on the rules related to 
who is included as a member with both benefits and 
responsibilities?
• Do the members have a shared understanding of  
what their mutual responsibilities are as well as the 
formulae used for distribution of  benefits?
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• Are these rules considered legitimate and fair?
• How are the rules transmitted from one generation 
to the next or to those who migrate into the group? 
(Ostrom, 2009)
In this set of  questions, Ostrom highlights both analytical 
and normative challenges of  migration for the city. 
Because migrants join communities that may already be 
tenure-insecure, whether in rural or urban settings, local 
groups ‘can be quick to abandon or to change ways of  
tenure in the face of  significant migrant arrival, because 
there can be little reason to continue with rules that others 
are not following’. The central question of  legitimacy, a 
crucial component of  protection against eviction in much 
of  the global south, is complicated, as migrant groups 
may shift, appropriate, or alter the premises for access to 
land-based resources. But the question of  legitimacy in 
the city also invokes the ethical obligation to the stranger, 
in other words, the rights of  new arrivals to have rights. It 
does not isolate empirical diversity from contested ethics 
of  the good life, and instead points toward the inevitable 
mixing of  moral private problems and instrumental 
public issues. 
 The contemporary city consequently reframes the 
sense of  arrival. Ethically, we arrive in the present as 
somehow strangers to ourselves. The facility of  the 
modern is the chameleon-like propensity for change so 
rapid that vernacular knowledges of  place are trumped 
by the transformation of  spaces of  the everyday in 
processes of  economic restructuring. We may identify 
and belong in one place, but owe a debt of  obligation to 
those near and distant in both time and space in the city 
that is yet to come.
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Housing 
David Robinson
Migration holds a mirror up to society and prompts 
reflection about social issues that might otherwise be 
brushed under the carpet of  political and popular debate. 
So it is with housing.
 England is suffering a housing crisis. Rising house 
prices and restricted access to mortgage finance have 
put home ownership beyond the reach of  increasing 
numbers of  households. There is a desperate shortage 
of  affordable homes. More than 1.5 million households 
are reported to be waiting for social housing, yet we 
are building fewer houses than at any time since 1945. 
Overcrowding is on the rise and more than 600,000 
households in England are now living in overcrowded 
conditions. The rising cost of  living is leaving many 
households struggling to cover housing costs and facing 
the possibility of  repossession or eviction. Homelessness 
is increasing and more and more homeless families are 
being placed in bed and breakfast hotels because suitable 
accommodation is simply not available. 
 Tackling this crisis should be on the pledge card of  
every political party. Decent, stable housing provides 
more than just a roof  over someone’s head. It provides a 
place of  safety and security, a healthy living environment 
and links to community. It promotes health and well-
being and life chances. Yet the housing issue rarely 
warrants a mention by politicians, while press and media 
coverage merely feeds the public’s appetite for news 
about the latest house price figures. However, the interest 
of  politicians and the public in the housing crisis can be 
piqued when a convenient folk devil emerges which they 
can blame for these miseries. 
 Housing is one of  the key issues around which popular 
and political debate about the impacts and consequences 
of  migration has coalesced. In England, anti-immigration 
groups and far-right parties frequently place housing at 
the centre of  their campaigns, criticising the political 
establishment for failing to protect and provide for its 
citizens. The housing shortage, rising house prices, and 
problems of  affordability are blamed on international 
migration. The accusation that migrants are unfairly 
advantaged in the allocation of  social housing is one 
of  the most frequently alleged injustices of  migration. 
Rather than asking why successive governments have 
failed to ensure a supply of  reasonable quality, accessible, 
secure and affordable housing, the housing crisis has been 
blamed on migration. The irony here is that migrants 
tend to be living in some of  the worst housing conditions 
of  all. 
 New migrants typically fill voids in the housing stock 
left aside or avoided by other households. Consequently, 
migrants often end up living in unpopular neighbourhoods 
and in poor quality housing, usually in the private rental 
sector. Such housing is often overcrowded and in a poor 
state of  repair. Insecurity is a major problem. Difficulties 
with paying the rent and limited recourse to public funds 
can increase the risk of  eviction and homelessness for 
many migrants. Estimates vary, but it is possible that 
upwards of  20 per cent of  people sleeping rough in 
London are migrants. 
 The fact that many migrants struggle to meet their 
basic material needs and frequently occupy a precarious 
position in the housing system is a cause for major 
concern. The 1951 Geneva Convention specifies the 
social rights of  refugees in relation to housing for good 
reason. Housing is fundamental to quality of  life and 
critical to the integration process. Housing that provides 
a place of  safety, security and stability provides a home. 
It improves life chances, promotes health, education and 
employment. It is fundamental to an adequate standard 
of  living. Of  course, this is true not just for migrants, 
but for everyone. We therefore urgently need to shift the 
focus of  attention away from blaming migration for the 
housing crisis to solving it, so that everyone can gain and 
sustain a safe and secure home.
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Diaspora Formation 
Nicholas Van Hear 
Diasporas form in two main ways, the common ground 
being dispersal of  a population across several destinations. 
They may form gradually by accretion, emerging as a result 
of  ‘voluntary’ or routine migration, or alternatively, be 
brought about by crisis, involving coercion, catastrophe, 
expulsion or other forcible movement resulting from 
conflict or persecution. Dispersal may also result from 
a combination of  compulsion and choice, and diasporas 
emerge as a result of  cumulative processes and crises 
(Van Hear, 1998). The classical diasporas – Jews, 
Africans, Armenians, Irish, and later the Palestinians – 
were scattered following a catastrophic event or series 
of  events that forced them into exile (Cohen, 2008). 
Subsequently, a much greater number of  dispersed 
peoples have come to term themselves diasporas or have 
been designated as such: these were often formed as a 
result of  less catastrophic events, or by a combination of  
migration crises and more routine migration.
 The literature on labour migration points to some of  
the ways in which diasporas form by accretion. In their 
book Worlds in Motion, Massey et al. (1998) traced ways 
of  accounting for the inception and perpetuation of  
migration. Their synthesis of  migration theories pointed 
to how explanations of  the initiation of  migration could 
be found in a number of  approaches: in neoclassical 
economics, which located the drivers of  migration in 
differences in income levels between countries; in the 
new economics of  (labour) migration; in segmented 
labour market theory, which held that migration 
stemmed from labour demand in industrialised societies; 
and in variants of  historical-structural and world-systems 
theories, which sought explanations of  migration in 
the unequal distribution of  power worldwide through 
a political economy approach. Explanations of  the 
perpetuation of  migration could be found in theories about 
social capital, networks and ‘cumulative causation’. All of  
these approaches could be applied in different ways to 
help explain the inception, formation and consolidation 
of  diasporas, but some are particularly relevant. The 
new economics of  (labour) migration approach points 
to decision-making not just by individuals, but by 
households and communities, with the object not just 
of  maximising income, but also of  spreading risk; this 
chimes with the behaviour of  diasporas in formation, 
particularly in circumstances of  stress. Ideas about social 
capital and networks are likewise helpful in explaining the 
formation and reproduction of  diasporas, by pointing to 
ways in which social connections can be drawn upon in 
the migration context. Likewise, the notion of  cumulative 
causation strikes a chord with diaspora behaviour, by 
highlighting how each act of  migration alters the social 
context in which subsequent migration decisions are 
made, often making additional movement more likely 
(Massey et al., 1998).
 While insights from analysis of  so-called ‘voluntary’ 
migration in the 1980s and 1990s helped account for the 
formation and perpetuation of  diasporas, other sources 
of  diaspora formation were found in the increased 
numbers of  asylum seekers moving from the global 
south to the global north, and also as a result of  major 
forced migration crises associated with the end of  the 
Cold War and the emergence of  a unipolar world from 
the early 1990s onwards – among them the break-up of  
the Soviet bloc in 1989-91; the 1990-91 Gulf  crisis; the 
genocide, wars and mass refugee movements in Central 
Africa from 1994; protracted conflict and displacement 
in Palestine, Afghanistan, the Horn of  Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Colombia and elsewhere; and more recently the refugee 
and migratory movements associated with the wars 
in Afghanistan (from 2001), Iraq (from 2003), and the 
upheavals in the Arab world from 2011, especially the 
war in Syria.
 Among people fleeing these and other conflicts, 
a common pattern has been for most to seek safety in 
other parts of  their country, for a substantial number 
to look for refuge in neighbouring countries, and for a 
smaller number to seek asylum further afield. Some of  
those in neighbouring countries of  first asylum may later 
be resettled in other continents, or migrate onward to 
new destinations, joining those who have gone there 
directly. If  exile persists, complex transnational relations 
will develop among the different locations of  the 
developing diaspora: that is, among those at home, those 
in neighbouring territories (what might be called the near 
diaspora), and those spread further afield (what might be 
termed the wider diaspora) (Van Hear, 2006). With their 
dispersal comes the establishment of  transnational 
relations and networks among the dispersed groups, 
and it is through these networks and relationships that 
diasporas can exert influence on their countries of  origin.
 Quite often, diasporas are formed from mixes of  
refugees and people who move for economic betterment, 
study, marriage or other reasons – sometimes called ‘mixed 
migration’. As the international migration and refugee 
‘regime’ has become more stringent and access to affluent 
destinations more limited, class or socio-economic 
standing, access to resources, and associated elaboration 
of  networks shape the capacity to migrate. Access to more 
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prosperous and desirable destinations are increasingly 
limited to the better resourced. Put simply, there tends 
to be a hierarchy of  destinations that can be reached by 
migrants and asylum seekers, according to the resources – 
financial and network-based – that they can call upon. 
 Major new diasporas have formed from or been 
augmented by both economic migration and conflict-
induced population movements – or mixes of  the two 
– over the past two decades. These new or resurgent 
transnational social formations have consolidated, are 
enduring, have undertaken new or extended existing 
forms of  transnational activity, and are becoming 
integrated into the global order, particularly in respect 
of  relations between affluent countries and emerging 
powers in the global south (Van Hear, 2009).   
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The Dynamics of  Pakistani State-Building and Balti Migration Practices
Ole Jensen
Pakistani migration patterns have principally been analysed 
either in relation to integration and social cohesion in 
European countries, or in the context of  international 
migration to the Gulf  states. There has been little attention 
to internal migration in Pakistan. In the studies that have 
been carried out, migrants have been perceived as labour 
migrants, pushed out from their rural environments due to 
economic hardship and landlessness, or pulled by actual 
or supposed opportunities in Karachi and in the cities of  
Punjab. Whereas present day internal migration patterns 
in Pakistan have largely evolved since Partition in 1947, 
there has been little emphasis on how this reshaping of  
the political landscape has impacted migration dynamics. 
I will here, based on fieldwork carried out in Thalay, a 
mountain valley in Baltistan, and among Balti migrants 
in Karachi, examine the relationship between Pakistani 
state-building and Balti migration practices.
 Baltistan is a high altitude mountain area, covering 
some 25,000 square kilometres and situated in the 
Karakorum Mountains. Classified as a mountain desert, 
with subsistence farming contingent on access to glacial 
melt water for irrigation, the scarceness of  the local 
resource base has historically curtailed the number of  
people that the land can support. Early western explorers 
of  the late 19th century referred to the local population 
as ‘overflowing’, and described chance encounters with 
Balti migrants [en route to Simla], ‘…clothed in filthy and 
scanty rags, and of  a half-starved appearance’ (Knight, 
1905). Since then, the Balti population has tripled, to 
approximately 300,000 in 2000, with the local population 
increasingly forced to look beyond the region for means 
of  subsistence.
 At the same time, the Balti room for manoeuvre has 
changed dramatically since 1947. Baltistan is part of  the 
disputed territory of  Kashmir, and is located immediately 
north of  the Line of  Control dividing Pakistani and 
Indian-held Kashmir. Due to the ongoing conflict over 
Kashmir, the Balti population has seen its traditional 
routes of  trade and migration to southern Kashmir 
cut. Instead, a physical and political infrastructure has 
emerged that construes Baltistan as an integrated part of  
Pakistan (though never officially recognised as such). 
 Most significantly, however, an all-year access route 
was constructed through the Indus Gorge in the early 
1980s, linking the regional capital of  Skardu to the 
Karakorum Highway and the Pakistani plains. A route 
previously only rarely used, as it passed through territory 
controlled by Sunni Muslim tribes (the Baltis are Shi’is 
and Nurbakshis), this has become a lifeline, providing 
food supplies from down country and a way out for Balti 
labour migrants who leave during the bitterly cold winter 
period. This seasonal migration is a recurring move which 
most households in the valley engage in, typically heading 
towards the regional centre of  Gilgit, an eight hour bus 
journey away, or to coal mines in northern Punjab. Going 
away over winter thus becomes part of  a subsistence 
cycle, solidly integrated in the totality of  things to do to 
make a living.
 Less recognisable, and only indirectly part of  a 
subsistence strategy, are the long-term moves away from 
the mountain region – mostly to Karachi, home to an 
estimated 8 to 10 per cent of  the Balti population. Seen 
from the mountain villages, the moves were explained as 
long-term investments. Young men would go to Karachi 
for educational purposes, in order to qualify for a job 
in government service on their return. The prospect of  
government service is key here, with many using the 
same metaphor: “A private job is like the snow; when 
it is melted, it is over. A government job is a fountain; it 
lasts forever.” “Forever” translated into the certainty of  
a monthly salary, a significant lump sum payable upon 
retirement, and a modest monthly pension. Pensioners – 
retired from the army or from government service – were 
living proof  of  the ‘fountain’. But unemployed graduates 
were aplenty in the valley, waiting for vacant positions. 
 The picture looked somewhat different among Balti 
migrants in Karachi. “You finish studies, you go home, 
that’s the system,” was how Ali, a migrant from Thalay, 
explained it to me. Except, he didn’t. 26 years old, Ali had 
moved to Karachi eight years prior. After finishing his 
studies, he had been working as a typist, living in shared 
accommodation with other migrants from Thalay. The 
pressure was on, however. Like most Balti migrants in 
Karachi, Ali had married during a visit back home, and 
his wife and baby son were now living in his father’s 
house.
 Ali would eventually go back to Thalay and take up 
the job in government service that his father – with 
good connections and a solid bribe – had secured for 
him. Others would be in a similar situation, torn between 
expectations from home and opportunities in a now 
familiar urban context. “What is there for me to do 
there?” was what many would argue. Altogether, two-
thirds of  the 32 Balti migrants I interviewed in Karachi 
had spent more than ten years in the city, and most of  
them had eventually moved their families to the city.
 But Balti migration to Karachi cannot be reduced 
to the sum of  individual trajectories of  return or 
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consolidation. It is also in Karachi – at a distance from 
the villages and valleys that constitute the primary points 
of  identification – that the idea of  Baltistan as a political 
entity is emerging. Protesting against a status quo where 
Baltistan is controlled by Pakistan without the Baltis 
being accepted as Pakistani citizens, immigrants from 
Baltistan have demonstrated against Pakistani domination 
and in favour of  closer ties with Ladakh, in Indian-held 
Kashmir. 
 In conclusion, the mechanisms of  Pakistani state-
building have clearly impacted the nature of, and 
motivations behind, Balti migration practices – to the 
point where these mechanisms are being questioned. So 
whereas the initial move to Karachi would seem driven by 
an ambition to avail oneself  of  livelihood opportunities 
brought about by the Pakistani state-building process, it 
is also here, at a distance from Baltistan, that questions 
emerge concerning Baltistan’s place within the Pakistani 
state.
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The offices of  local authority social services departments 
are rarely the most welcoming places, yet it is doubtful 
that they are intentionally hostile. As a goal of  social 
policy, hostility is reserved for one group of  people 
above all others – irregular migrants – as summed up by 
Theresa May in an interview with The Telegraph in May 
2012: “The aim is to create here in Britain a really hostile 
environment for illegal migration.” Although restricting 
access to basic services – free secondary healthcare, 
public housing, benefits and support from statutory 
social services – predates the coalition government, 
Britain’s current government is seeking to consolidate 
this approach through restrictions to primary health care 
and the right to rent accommodation in the private sector.
 In theory, denying basic rights and services to 
irregular migrants is supposed to force the issue of  
return; in practice, sometimes it works and sometimes it 
doesn’t, with many people remaining in Britain in spite 
of  these restrictions. From my experience of  working 
with migrants in social services, many people remain 
for years, if  not decades, often with children born and 
brought up in the UK. But little thought is given to what 
implementing this so-called hostile environment means 
in practice, including for those who have lived unlawfully 
in Britain for so long. What actually happens when people 
and their children are in need of  basic services such as 
financial help and accommodation, and what happens 
when those basic services are refused?
 It is not uncommon in the waiting rooms of  local 
authority social services offices to see families from 
abroad: parents, their children and their suitcases. 
Homeless children in Britain are ‘children in need’ 
according to laws governing local authority practice, and 
they cannot lawfully be left to live without a roof  over 
their heads, in spite of  this being an impact of  central 
government immigration policy. Here, then, begins the 
administration of  the hostile environment, a festival of  
bureaucracy, of  lengthy legal justifications for or against 
the provision of  services. It is the site of  brinkmanship 
between a parent and the state, mediated by his/her 
advocate and the duty social worker. There is a plethora 
of  legal and practical considerations to be made: the 
best interests of  the child, the definition of  ‘destitution’, 
the strength of  a family’s claim to remain in the UK. 
The outcome of  the assessment can result in statutory 
services being provided anyway, an offer of  tickets to 
return to the parents’ country of  origin, or a referral to 
friends, a charity, or a place of  worship for the provision 
of  informal support.
 In order to understand how fraught this process 
can be, it is worth looking at what happens to families 
before they arrive at the offices of  the local authority 
social services department. This narrative cannot speak 
for the heterogeneity of  Britain’s irregular migrant 
population, nor can it clarify what is often a confused and 
unquantifiable construction of  the ‘illegal immigrant’. 
However, it illustrates the policy dilemma as it relates 
to families who have been living unlawfully in Britain 
for some time, a situation that I saw again and again 
when working in social services. Up to this point, these 
individuals have been neighbours, colleagues, fellow 
pupils, friends, and family members. The bonds families 
create over the years in their communities, in their place 
of  worship, on their street, in school or workplace, 
constitute a network of  support that can prop people 
up for years, until a crisis situation (an argument, rent 
arrears, loss of  employment, domestic violence) forces 
them into precarious housing and living situations and 
into the offices of  their local social services department 
or voluntary sector advocate.
 It is perhaps in court where these issues have been 
considered in most depth. Many cases have found that 
the strength of  families’ bonds with their communities 
has the effect of  creating a legal obligation for local 
authorities to provide services. In looking at whether 
Birmingham City Council had breached article 8 of  
the Human Rights Act 1998 – the right to private and 
family life – in its decision to withhold accommodation 
and support from a destitute family that had been living 
unlawfully in the UK for years, the judge in Clue (2010) 
said: 
The right to private life entails considerations far 
wider than the right to family life. Importantly, 
private life includes the relationships and the 
social, cultural as well as the family ties that a 
person forms.
The case of  ZH (Tanzania) illustrates the added 
complexity of  families with ‘mixed status’, in this case 
relating to children in the care of  a Tanzanian refused 
asylum seeker, but with a British father:
They are British children; they are British, not 
just through the ‘accident’ of  being born here, 
but by descent from a British parent; they have an 
unqualified right of  abode here; they have lived 
here all their lives; they are being educated here; 
they have other social links with the community 
here; they have a good relationship with their 
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father here. It is not enough to say that a young 
child may readily adapt to life in another country. 
That may well be so, particularly if  she moves with 
both her parents to a country which they know 
well and where they can easily re-integrate in their 
own community…. But it is very different in the 
case of  children who have lived here all their lives 
and are being expected to move to a country which 
they do not know and will be separated from a 
parent whom they also know well (2011).
The story of  people’s relationship with their community, 
with friends, family, neighbours, fellow worshipers – 
irrespective of  their immigration status – shows that 
implementing a hostile environment has social as well as 
legal limitations. It begs the question of  whether Britain 
can be so easily made into such a hostile place after all.
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challenge of  future research agendas. We are attempting to 
offer eclectic bibliographic trails to follow.  Consequently, 
the scholarship that informs the text contributions is 
reflected in this bibliography under the sub-headings of  
the volume as a whole. 
 Third, we have tried to include a number of  pieces 
that are landmarks in migration studies, without defining 
a canon of  literature as such. For this reason, some of  the 
authors of  some of  the more canonical pieces have been 
included in subject areas that do not always reflect the 
substantive nature of  their research focus, or in categories 
which they might not recognise. This is deliberate and, we 
hope, a helpful way to rethink their ongoing relevance to 
new theoretical debates and emergent research agendas. 
 Fourth, we have attempted to include a 
disproportionate number of  contributions of  work 
from colleagues and researchers past and present at the 
Centre on Migration, Policy and Society in order to give 
a representative flavour of  the much greater volume 
of  scholarly publication over the last decade and in 
recognition of  the support provided in this decade by 
the Economic and Social Research Council.
Alongside the contributions made to this Anthology, 
and in addition to the huge body of  work produced by 
its contributors, we decided to provide a bibliographic 
supplement for readers wishing to read in further depth 
about the topics covered. We have included a selection of  
the many insightful and easily available novels and films 
about migration. We would also encourage those who 
are interested in engaging with the study of  migration to 
take a look at Global Networks and Migration Studies, two 
journals that COMPAS has established relations with 
over the years.
 With this bibliography we wanted to achieve four 
things: 
 First, we have deliberately avoided conventional 
reference practices for the academic contributors to the 
volume, in order both to make the volume more readable 
and the combination of  prose, poetry and imagery more 
sympathetic. 
 Second, we hope to help readers who are interested 
in developing interests both looking back at the growing 
body of  migration studies scholarship that accumulates 
in the rear view mirror of  history and forwards to the 
beyond rules  
Anderson, B., Gibney, M. and Paoletti, E. (eds.) (2011) 
‘Boundaries of  Belonging: Deportation and the Constitution 
and Contestation of  Citizenship’, Citizenship Studies, Special 
Issue, 15(5). 
Anderson, B., Gibney, M. and Paoletti, E. (eds.) (2013) The 
Social, Political and Historical Contours of  Deportation, Immigrants 
and Minorities, Politics and Policy, New York: Springer Science & 
Business Media. 
Balibar, E. (2004) We, the People of  Europe? Reflections on 
Transnational Citizenship, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press.
Banting, K. and Kymlicka, W. (eds.) (2006) Multiculturalism and 
the Welfare State. Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary 
Democracies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Benhabib, S. (2004) The Rights of  Others: Aliens, Residents and 
Citizens, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Betts, A. (2013) Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis 
of  Displacement, Cornell: Cornell University Press.
Betts, A. (ed.) (2011) Global Migration Governance, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Blom Hansen, T. and Stepputat, F. (2005) Sovereign Bodies: 
Citizens, Migrants and States in the Postcolonial World, Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Bommes, M. and Geddes, A. (eds.) (2000) Immigration and 
Welfare: Challenging the Borders of  the Welfare State, London: 
Routledge.
Bosniak, L. (2006) The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of  
Contemporary Membership, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press. 
Castles, S., de Haas, H. and Miller, M. J. (2013) The Age of  
Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, 
Fifth Revised Edition, Basingstoke: MacMillan.
Cole, P. (2000) Philosophies of  Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory 
and Immigration, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Costello, C. (2014) The Human Rights of  Migrants in European 
Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Costello, C. (2011) ‘Citizenship of  the Union: Above Abuse?’ 
in Rita de la Feria & Stefan Vogenauer (eds.) Prohibition of  
Abuse of  Law: A New General Principle of  EU Law, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing.
Costello, C. (2009) ‘Metock: Free Movement and “Normal 
Family Life” in the Union’, Common Market Law Review 46(2): 
587-622.
De Genova, N. and Peutz, N. (eds.) (2010) The Deportation 
Regime: Sovereignty, Space and the Freedom of  Movement, Durham: 
Duke University Press.
De Genova, N. (2002) ‘Migrant “Illegality” and Deportability 
in Everyday Life’, Annual Review of  Anthropology, 31: 419-47.
Dummett, A. and Nicol, A. (1990) Subjects, Citizens, Aliens and 
Others: Nationality and Immigration Law, London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson.
Düvell, F. (2011) ‘Paths into Irregularity: the Legal and Political 
Construction of  Irregular Migration’, European Journal of  
Migration and Law, 13(3): 275-95.
Routes and Reading
Fassin, D. (2011) ‘Policing Borders, Producing Boundaries. 
The Governmentality of  Immigration in Dark Times’, Annual 
Review of  Anthropology, 40: 213-26.
Gamlen, A. (2008) ‘The Emigration State and the Modern 
Geopolitical Imagination’, Political Geography, 27(8), 840-56.
Gibney, M. (1989) A Critique of  Norway’s Refugee/Asylum Policy 
and Proposals for Change, Oslo: Institute for Human Rights. 
Hall, A. (2012) Border Watch: Cultures of  Immigration, Detention and 
Control, London: Pluto Press.
Hammar, T. (1990) Democracy and the Nation State. Aliens, Denizens 
and Citizens in a World of  International Migration, Aldershot: 
Avebury.
Hemerijk A. C., Palm T.P., Entenmann E. and Van Hooren F.J. 
(2013) ‘Changing European Welfare States and the Evolution 
of  Migrant Incorporation Regimes’, IMPACIM Background 
Paper, Oxford: COMPAS.
Inda, J. X. (2006) Targeting Immigrants: Government, Technology, and 
Ethics, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Kanstroom, D. (2010) Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American 
History, Harvard: Harvard University Press. 
Kubal, A. (2013) Socio-Legal Integration: Polish Post-2004 EU 
Enlargement Migrants in the United Kingdom, Surrey: Ashgate.
Morris, L. (2003) ‘Managing Contradiction: Civic Stratification 
and Migrants’ Rights’, International Migration Review, 37: 74-100.
Mountz, A. (2010) Seeking Asylum: Human Smuggling and 
Bureaucracy at the Border, Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota 
Press.
Ngai, M. (2004) Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of  
Modern America, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University 
Press.
Oliver, C. (2011) ‘The Global Governance of  Lifestyle 
Migration’, in Betts, A. (ed.) Global Migration Governance, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Ong, A. (1999) Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of  
Transnationality, Durham: Duke University Press. 
Parekh, B. (2000) Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity 
and Political Theory, Basingstoke and London: Macmillan. 
Shapira, H. (2013) Waiting for José: The Minutemen’s Pursuit of  
America, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.  
Sigona, N. and Hughes, V. (2012) No Way Out, No Way In, 
Oxford: COMPAS.
Torpey, J. (2000) The Invention of  the Passport: Surveillance, 
Citizenship and the State, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Van Hear, N. (2005) ‘Diaspora, Immigration and Asylum from 
1900 to the Present’, in Gibney, M. J. and Hansen, R. (eds.) 
Immigration and Asylum, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO. 
Vollmer, B. (2012) ‘Making Light of  Borders: The Case of  the 
External EU Border’, Migration Letters, 9(2): 131-40. 
Walters, W. (2004) ‘Secure Borders, Safe Haven, Domopolitics’, 
Citizenship Studies, 8: 237-60.
Xiang B., Yeoh, B., and Toyota, M., (eds.) (2013) Return: 
Nationalizing Transnational Mobility in Asia, Durham: Duke 
University Press.  
Zhang, L. (2001) Strangers in the City: Reconfigurations of  Space, 
Power, and Social Networks Within China’s Floating Population, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
beyond ContrACt  
Anderson, B. and Ruhs, M. (2010) ‘The Origins and Functions 
of  Illegality in the Migrant Labour Market’, Population, Space and 
Place, 16(3): 195-211.
Anderson, B. (2010) ‘Migration, Immigration Controls and the 
Fashioning of  Precarious Labour’, Work, Employment and Society, 
24(2): 300-17.
Anderson, B. (2007) ‘A Very Private Business’, European Journal 
of  Women’s Studies, 14(3): 247-64. 
Anderson, B., Ruhs, M., Rogaly, B. and Spencer, S. (2006) 
Fair Enough? Central and East European Migrants in Low Wage 
Employment in the UK, Oxford: COMPAS.
Bauder, H. (2006) Labor Movement: How Migration Regulates Labor 
Markets, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Borjas, G. and Doran, K. (2012) ‘The Collapse of  the Soviet 
Union and the Productivity of  American Mathematicians’, The 
Quarterly Journal of  Economics, 127(3): 1143-1203. 
Brace, L. (2010) The Politics of  Property: Labour, Freedom and 
Belonging, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Brettell, C. (2003) ‘Migration Stories: Agency and the Individual 
in the Study of  Migration’, in Brettell, C., Anthropology and 
Migration: Essays on Transnationalism, Ethnicity, and Identity, Walnut 
Creek, CA and Oxford: AltaMira Press. 
Carens, J. (2008) ‘Live-in Domestics, Seasonal Workers, 
Foreign Students and Others Hard to Locate on the Map of  
Democracy’, Journal of  Political Philosophy, 16(4), 419-45.
Clemens, M. (2011) ‘Economics and Emigration: Trillion-
Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk?’, Journal of  Economic Perspectives, 
25(3): 83-106. 
Cohen, R. (1987) The New Helots: Migrants in The International 
Division of  Labour, Aldershot: Avebury/Gower Publishing 
Group. 
Cox, A., and Posner, E. (2009) ‘The Rights of  Migrants’, New 
York University Law Review, 84(6): 1403–63.
Dustmann, C., Glitz, A., and Frattini, T. (2008) ‘The Labour 
Market Impact of  Immigration’, Oxford Review of  Economic 
Policy, 24(3): 478 - 95. 
Feldman, D. (2003) ‘Migrants, Immigrants and Welfare from 
the Old Poor Law to the Welfare State’, Transactions of  the Royal 
Historical Society, 13: 79-104.
Goldin, I. (2011) Exceptional People: How Migration Shaped 
Our World And Will Define Our Future, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
Hahamovith, C. (2011) No Man’s Land: Jamaican Guestworkers 
in America and the Global History of  Deportable Labor, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
Pieke, F. N., Van Hear, N. and Lindley, A. (2007), ‘Beyond 
Control? The Mechanics and Dynamics of  “Informal” 
Remittances Between Europe and Africa’, Global Networks, 7: 
348–66. 
Routes and Reading
Lindquist, J., Xiang, B. and Yeoh, B. S. A. (2012) ‘Introduction: 
Opening the Black Box of  Migration: Brokers, the Organization 
of  Transnational Mobility and the Changing Political Economy 
in Asia’, Pacific Affairs, 85(1): 1-7. 
Mayhew, K. and Ruhs, M. (eds.) (2008) ‘Labour Migration in 
Europe’, Oxford Review of  Economic Policy, Special Issue, 24(3). 
O’Connell Davidson, J. (2010) ‘New Slavery, Old Binaries: 
Human Trafficking and the Borders of  “Freedom”’, Global 
Networks, 10(2): 244-61. 
Pieke, F. and Xiang, B. (2009) ‘Legality and Labour: Chinese 
Migration, Neoliberalism and the State in the UK and China’, 
Geopolitics, History, and International Relations. 1(1): 11–45. 
Ruhs, M. (2013) The Price of  Rights. Regulating International Labour 
Migration, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Ruhs, M. and Anderson, B. (eds.) (2010) Who Needs Migrant 
Workers? Labour Shortages, Immigration and Public Policy, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Sainsbury, D. (2012) Welfare States and Immigrant Rights. The 
Politics of  Inclusion and Exclusion, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Shutes, I. (2011) ‘Welfare-to-Work and the Responsiveness of  
Employment Provision to the Needs of  Refugees’, Journal of  
Social Policy, 40(3): 557-74. 
Skrentny, J. (2014) After Civil Rights: Racial Realism in the New 
American Workplace, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Stark, O. and Bloom, D. (1985) ‘The New Economics of  Labor 
Migration’, American Economic Review, 75: 173-8. 
Vargas-Silva, C. (2008) ‘Are Remittances Manna from Heaven? 
A Look at the Business Cycle Properties of  Remittances’, The 
North American Journal of  Economics and Finance, 19(3): 290-303. 
Steinfeld, R. (2009) Coercion/Consent in Labor, Oxford: COMPAS 
Working Paper, WP-09-66.
Waldinger, R. and Lichter, M. (2003) How the Other Half  Works, 
Berkeley: University of  California Press.
Xiang, B. (2012) ‘Predatory Princes and Princely Peddlers: The 
State and International Labor Migration Brokers in China’, 
Pacific Affairs, 85(1): 47-68.
Xiang, B. (2011) ‘A Ritual Economy of  “Talent”: China and 
Overseas Chinese Professionals’, Journal of  Ethnic and Migration 
Studies, 37(5): 821-38. 
keeping time
Adam, B. (1994) Time and Social Theory, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Ahmad, A. (2008) ‘Dead Men Working: Time and Space in 
London’s (Illegal) Migrant Economy’, Work, Employment and 
Society, 22: 301-18.
Baldwin, A. (2012) ‘Whiteness and Futurity: Towards a 
Research Agenda’, Progress in Human Geography, 36: 172-87.
Bastian, M. (2011) ‘Temporal Connectivities: a Scoping 
Study of  the Available Research on Time and Community’, 
Connected Communities Discussion Paper, available at: www.
temporalbelongings.org.
Bauböck, R. (1998) ‘Sharing History and Future? Time 
Horizons of  Democratic Membership in an Age of  Migration’, 
Constellations, 4: 320-45.
Berg, M. L. (2011) Diasporic Generations: Memory, Politics and 
Nation Among Cubans in Spain, Oxford: Berghahn Books.
Bosma, U., Kessler, G. and Lucassen, L. (eds.) (2013) Migration 
and Membership Regimes in Global and Historical Perspective, Leiden: 
Brill.
Boyarin, J. (ed.) (1994) Remapping Memory: The Politics of  
Timespace, Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota Press.
Cangiano, A., Shutes I., Spencer, S. and Leeson, G. (2009) 
Migrant Care Workers in Ageing Societies: Research Findings in the 
United Kingdom, Oxford: COMPAS.
Chatterjee, P. (2001) ‘The Nation in Heterogeneous Time’, 
Indian Economic & Social History Review, 38: 399-418.
Cohen, R. (1994) Frontiers of  Identity: The British and the Others, 
London: Longman and New York: Addison Wesley.
Conlon, D. (2011) ‘Waiting: Feminist Perspectives on the 
Spacings/Timings of  Migrant (Im)mobility’, Gender, Place and 
Culture, 18(3): 353-60.
Cwerner, S. (2001) ‘The Times of  Migration’, Journal of  Ethnic 
and Racial Studies, 27: 7-36.
Edensor, T. (2006) ‘Reconsidering National Temporalities: 
Institutional Times, Everyday Routines, Serial Spaces and 
Synchrocities’, European Journal of  Social Theory, 9: 525-45.
Emirbayer, M. and Mische, A. (1998) ‘What is Agency?’, 
American Journal of  Sociology, 103: 962-1023.
Fabian, J. (1983) Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its 
Object, New York: Columbia University Press.
Fielding, A. J. (1995) ‘Migration and Social Change: A 
Longitudinal Study of  the Social Mobility of  Immigrants in 
England and Wales’, European Journal of  Population, 11: 107-21. 
Fortier, A. M. (2000) Migrant Belongings: Memory, Space, Identity, 
Oxford: Berg.
Gidley, B. (2010) ‘Ghosts of  Kishinev in the East End’, in 
Valman, N. and Bar-Yosef, E. (eds.), The ‘Jew’ in Late-Victorian 
and Edwardian Culture: Between the East End and East Africa, 
London: Palgrave.
Gill, N. (2009) ‘Presentational State Power: Temporal and 
Spatial Influences Over Asylum Sector Decision-Makers’, 
Transactions of  the Institute of  British Geographers, 34(2): 215-33.
Gilroy, P. (1993) The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double 
Consciousness, London: Verso. 
Griffiths, M. (2013) ‘Frenzied, Decelerating and Suspended: 
the Temporal Uncertainties of  Failed Asylum Seekers and 
Immigration Detainees’, Oxford: COMPAS Working Paper, 
WP-13-105.
Griffiths, M. with Rogers, A. and Anderson, B. (2013) Migration, 
Time and Temporalities: Review and Prospect, Oxford: COMPAS.
Hägerstrand, T. (1975) ‘On the Definition of  Migration’, in 
Jones, E. (ed.) Reasonings in Social Geography, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Hoerder, D. (2002) Cultures in Contact: World Migrations in the 
Second Millennium, Durham: Duke University Press.
King, R., Thomson, M., Fielding, T. and Warnes, T. (2006) 
‘Time, Generations and Gender in Migration and Settlement’, 
in Penninx, M. B. R. and Kraal, K. (eds.) The Dynamics of  
International Migration and Settlement in Europe: A State of  the Art, 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Routes and Reading
May, J. and N. Thrift (eds.) (2001) Timespace: Geographies of  
Temporality, London and New York: Routledge.
Mountz, A., Wright, R., Miyares, I. and Bailey, A. J. (2002) 
‘Lives in Limbo: Temporary Protected Status and Immigrant 
Identities’, Global Networks, 2: 335-56.
Oliver, C. (2011) ‘Pastures New or Old? Migration, Narrative 
and Change’, Anthropologica, 53(1): 67-77. 
Oliver, C. (2010) ‘Between Time Not There And Time Not 
Theirs. Temporality in Retirement Migration to Spain’, The 
Journal of  Aging, Humanities and the Arts, 4(2): 110-18. 
Radu, C. (2010) ‘Beyond Border-Dwelling: Temporalizing the 
Border-Space Through Events’, Anthropological Theory, 10: 409-33.
Toyota, M. and Xiang B. (2012) ‘The Emerging Transnational 
“Retirement Industry” in Southeast Asia’. International Journal of  
Sociology and Social Policy, 32(11): 708–19. 
Xiang, B. (2005) ‘Working with Uncertainty’, in Parayil, G. (ed.) 
Political Economy and Information Capitalism in India: Digital Divide, 
Development Divide and Equity, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
 
representAtions: powers And pitfAlls
Anderson, B. and Ruhs, M. (eds.) (2010) ‘Researching Illegality 
in Labour Migration: Concepts, Ethics and Policy Nexus’, 
Population, Space and Place, Special Issue, 16(3).
Allen, W. and Blinder, S. (2012) Jessica Ennis, Mo Farah, and 
Identity Language in the British Press: A Case Study in Monitoring and 
Analysing Print Media, Migration Observatory Report, Oxford: 
COMPAS.
Billig, M. (1995) Banal Nationalism, London: Sage.
Blinder, S. (2013) ‘Imagined Immigration: The Impact of  
Different Meanings of  ‘Immigrants’ in Public Opinion and 
Policy Debates in Britain’, Political Studies (online version).
Boswell, C. (2009) ‘The Puzzle: Explaining the Uses of  
Knowledge’ in Boswell, C., The Political Uses of  Expert Knowledge: 
Immigration Policy and Social Research, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Chavez, L. (2008) The Latino Threat: Constructing Immigrants, 
Citizens, and the Nation, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Cohen, S. (1972) Folk Devils and Moral Panics: the Creation of  the 
Mods and Rockers, London: MacGibbon & Kee Ltd.
Doezma, J. (2000) Sex Slaves and Discourse Masters: the Construction 
of  Trafficking, London: Zed Books. 
Douzinas, C. (2007) Human Rights and Empire: The Political 
Philosophy of  Cosmopolitanism, Abingdon: Routledge.
Fanon, F. (2008) [1952]. Black Skin, White Masks, London: 
Pluto Press.
Fernando, M. L. (2009) ‘Exceptional Citizens: Secular Muslim 
Women and the Politics of  Difference in France’, Social 
Anthropology 17(4): 379-92.
Honig, B. (2003) Democracy and the Foreigner, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Keith, M. (2013) ‘Beyond European Imaginaries? The 
Paradoxical Cartography of  a Land of  Strangers’, Identities: 
Global Studies in Culture and Power, 20(1): 24-30. 
Kuntsman, A. (2008) ‘Queerness as Europeanness: 
Immigration, Orientalist Visions, and Racialised Encounters in 
Israel/Palestine’, Dark Matters, 3.
Malkki, L. H. (1995) ‘Refugees and Exile: From “Refugee 
Studies” to the National Order of  Things’, Annual Review of  
Anthropology, 24: 495-523. 
Malkki, L. H. (1996) ‘Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, 
Humanitarianism and Dehistoricization’, Cultural Anthropology, 
11: 377-404.
Martiniello, M. and Florence, E. (2005), ‘The Links Between 
Academic Research and Public Policies in the Field of  Migration 
and Ethnic Relations: Selected Case Studies’, International Journal 
on Multicultural Societies, Special Issue, 7(1): 3-10. 
Mills, C. W. (1998) Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race, 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
O’Connell Davidson, J. (2006) ‘Will the Real Sex Slave Please 
Stand Up?’ Feminist Review, 83: 4-22.
Park, R. E. (1928) ‘Human Migration and the Marginal Man’, 
American Journal of  Sociology, 33(6): 881-93.
Portes, A. (2010) ‘Migration and Social Change: Some 
Conceptual Reflections’, Journal of  Ethnic and Migration Studies, 
36(10).
Rath, J. and Martiniello, M. (eds.) (2012) An Introduction To 
International Migration Studies: European Perspectives, Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press.
Scholten, P. (2011) ‘Constructing Dutch Immigrant Policy: 
Research-Policy Relations and Immigrant Integration Policy-
making in the Netherlands’, British Journal of  Politics and 
International Relations, 13(1): 75-92.
Sharma, N. (2006) Home Economics: Nationalism and the Making 
of  ‘Migrant Workers’ in Canada, Toronto: University of  Toronto 
Press. 
Silverstein, P. (2005) ‘Immigrant Racialization and the New 
Savage Slot: Race, Migration and Immigration in the New 
Europe’, Annual Review of  Anthropology, 34:363-384.
Simmel, G. (1971) ‘The Stranger’ in George Simmel: On 
Individuality and Social Forms, Levine, D. (ed.) Chicago: University 
of  Chicago Press.
Siu, P. C. P. (1952) ‘The Sojourner’, American Journal of  Sociology, 
58:34-44.
Trouillot, M. R. (2003) ‘Anthropology and the Savage Slot: The 
Poetics and Politics of  Otherness’, in Global Transformations: 
Anthropology of  the Modern World, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Van Hear, N. (2012) ‘Forcing the Issue: Migration Crises and 
the Uneasy Dialogue Between Refugee Research and Policy’, 
Journal of  Refugee Studies, 25(1): 2-24. 
Vargas-Silva, C. (ed.) (2012) Handbook of  Research Methods in 
Migration, Cheltenham and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar 
Publishing.
Volpp, L. (2002) The Citizen and the Terrorist, UCLA Law Review, 
49: 1575-99.
Xiang, B. and Tan, S. (2005) ‘Does Migration Research Matter 
in China? A Review of  its Relationship to Policy Since the 
1980s’, International Journal of  Multicultural Societies, 7(1): 11-32.
 
troubling bodies
Agamben, G. (1998) Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Routes and Reading
Ahmad, A. (2009) ‘Bodies That (Don’t) Matter: Desire, 
Eroticism and Melancholia in Pakistani Labour Migration’, 
Mobilities, 4: 309-27.
Anagnost, A. (2004) ‘The Corporeal Politics of  Quality (Suzhi)’, 
Public Culture 16(2): 189-208.
Anderson, B. and O’Connell Davidson, J. (2004) Is Trafficking 
in Human Beings Being Demand-Driven? A Multi-Country Pilot 
Study, Geneva: International Organization for Migration. 
Andrijasevic, R. (2007) ‘Beautiful Dead Bodies: Gender, 
Migration and Representation in Anti-Trafficking Campaigns’, 
Feminist Review, 86: 24-44.
Cresswell, T. (1999) ‘Embodiment, Power and the Politics of  
Mobility: the Case of  Female Tramps and Hobos’, Transactions 
of  the Institute of  British Geographers, 24(2): 175-92.
Dunn, K. (2010) ‘Embodied Transnationalism: Bodies in 
Transnational Spaces’, Population, Space and Place, 16(1): 1-9.
Edwards, J. (2010) ‘Bodies Bridging Borders’, EastBordNet, 
Working Paper No. 95.
Fassin, D. (2005) ‘Compassion and Repression: The Moral 
Economy of  Immigration Policies in France’, Cultural 
Anthropology, 20(3): 362-87.
Federici, S. (2004) Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and 
Primitive Accumulation, New York: Autonomedia.
Goldberg, D. T. (2002) The Racial State, Maiden, MA and 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Gorman-Murraya, A. (2007) ‘Rethinking Queer Migration 
Through The Body’, Social & Cultural Geography, 8(1): 105-21.
Holmes, S. (2013) Fresh Fruit, Broken Bodies: Migrant Farmworkers 
in the United States, Berkeley: University of  California Press.
Jayaweera, H. and Quigley, M. (2010) ‘Health Status, Health 
Behaviour and Healthcare Use Among Migrants in the UK: 
Evidence from Mothers in the Millennium Cohort Study’, 
Social Science and Medicine, 71(5): 1002-10.
Keith, M. (2013) ‘Emergent Publics, Critical Ethnographic 
Scholarship and Race and Ethnic Relations’, Ethnic and Racial 
Studies, 26(9):1374-92.
Kulick, D. (2003) ‘Sex in the New Europe’, Anthropological 
Theory, 3(2):199-218.
Luibhéid, E. (2002) Entry Denied: Controlling Sexuality at the 
Border, Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota Press.
McDowell, L. (2013) Working Lives: Gender, Migration and 
Employment in Britain, 1945-2007, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Mountz, A. (2004) ‘Embodying the Nation-State: Canada’s 
Response to Human Smuggling’, Political Geography, 23(3): 323-
45.
O’Connell Davidson, J. (2005) Children in the Global Sex Trade, 
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Oliver, C. (2008) Retirement Migration: Paradoxes of  Ageing, New 
York: Routledge.
Pateman, C. (1988) The Sexual Contract, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press.
Qureshi, K. (2012) ‘Pakistani Labour Migration and Masculinity: 
Industrial Working Life, the Body and Transnationalism’, 
Global Networks 12(4): 485-504.
Ramos-Zayas, A.Y. (2011) ‘Learning Affect, Embodying Race: 
Youth, Blackness, and Neoliberal Emotions in Latino Newark’, 
Transforming Anthropology, 19(2): 86-104.
Scheper-Hughes, N. (2000) ‘The Global Traffic in Human 
Organs’, Current Anthropology, 41(2): 191-224.
Solomos, J. and Back, L. (1995) Race, Politics and Social Change, 
London: Routledge. 
Spade, D. (2011) Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical 
Trans Politics and the Limits of  Law, Brooklyn: South End Press. 
Stoler, A. (2002) Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and 
the Intimate in Colonial Rule, Berkeley: University of  California 
Press.
Ticktin, M. (2011) ‘How Biology Travels: A Humanitarian 
Trip’, Body and Society, 17(2-3): 139-58.
Vasta, E. (2009) ‘Engaging with Diversity: Europe Between 
Imagined Homogeneity and Enduring Cultural Difference’, in 
Eriksen, T. H., Ghorashi, H. and Alghasi S. (eds.), Paradoxes of  
Cultural Recognition: Perspectives from Northern Europe, Aldershot: 
Ashgate. 
Welke, B. (2010) Law and the Borders of  Belonging in the Long 
Nineteenth Century United States, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Wilson, C., Sobotka, T., Williamson L. and Boyle, P. (2013) 
‘Migration and inter-generational replacement in Europe’, 
Population and Development Review 39(1): 131-58. 
Wimmer, A. (2007) How (Not) To Think About Ethnicity In 
Immigrant Societies: A Boundary Making Perspective, Oxford: 
COMPAS Working Paper, WP-07-44.
Xiang B. (2006) Global ‘Body Shopping’: An Indian International 
Labor System in the Information Technology Industry, Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press.
troubling emotions
Ahmed, S. (2004) ‘Affective Economies’, Social Text, 22(2): 117-
39.
Amin, A. and Thrift, N. (2013) The Arts of  the Political: New 
Openings for the Left, Durham: Duke University Press.
Anderson, B. (2009) ‘What’s in a Name? Immigration Controls 
and Subjectivities: the Case of  Au Pair and Domestic Worker 
Visa Holders in the UK’, Subjectivity, 29: 407-24.
Berg, M. L. (2009) ‘Homeland and Belonging Among Cubans in 
Spain’, The Journal of  Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology, 
14(2): 265-90. 
Blinder, S., Ford, R. and Ivarsflaten, E. (2013) ‘The Better 
Angels of  Our Nature: How the Antiprejudice Norm Affects 
Policy and Party Preferences in Great Britain and Germany’, 
American Journal of  Political Science, 57(4): 841–57.
Brooks, A. and Simpson, R. (2012) Emotions in Transmigration: 
Transformation, Movement and Identity, London and New York: 
Palgrave.
Chamberlain, M. (1995) ‘Family Narratives and Migration 
Dynamics’, Nieuwe West-Indische Gids, 69(3-4): 253-75. 
Charlsey, K., Van Hear, N., Benson, M. and Storer-Church, B. 
(2012) ‘Marriage-Related Migration to the UK’, International 
Migration Review, 46(4): 861-90. 
Routes and Reading
Charsley, K. (2005) ‘Unhappy Husbands: Masculinity and 
Migration in Transnational Pakistani Marriages’, Journal of  the 
Royal Anthropological Institute, 11(1): 85-105.
Düvell, F., Triandafyllidou, A. and Vollmer, B. (2010) ‘Ethical 
Issues in Irregular Migration Research in Europe’, Population, 
Space and Place, 16(3): 227-239.
Dzenovska, D. (2013) ‘The Great Departure: Rethinking 
National(ist) Common Sense’, Journal of  Ethnic and Migration 
Studies, 39(2): 201-18.
Dzenovska, D. (2011) ‘Notes on Emptiness and the Importance 
of  Maintaining Life’, Anthropology of  East Europe Review, 29(2): 
228-41.
Gamburd, M. R. (2000) The Kitchen Spoon’s Handle: 
Transnationalism and Sri Lanka’s Migrant Housemaids, Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press.
Gardner, K. (1993) ‘Desh-Bidesh: Sylheti Images of  Home 
and Away’, Man, 28(1): 1-15.
Hondagneu-Sotelo, P. and Avila, E. (1997) ‘I’m Here, but I’m 
There: The Meanings of  Latina Transnational Motherhood’, 
Gender and Society 11(5): 548-71.
Jayaweera H. and Choudhury, T. (2008) Immigration, Faith and 
Cohesion, Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
Khosravi, S. (2007) ‘The “Illegal” Traveller: an Auto-
Ethnogrophy of  Borders’, Social Anthropology 15(3): 321-334. 
Levitt, P. (2001) The Transnational Villagers, Berkeley: University 
of  California Press.
Lindley, A. (2009) ‘The Early-Morning Phone Call: Remittances 
from a Refugee Diaspora Perspective’, Journal of  Ethnic and 
Migration Studies, 35(8): 1315-34.
Mazzarella, W. (2009) ‘Affect: What is it Good for?’ in Dube, 
S. (ed.) Enchantments of  Modernity: Empire, Nation, Globalization, 
New Delhi and Abingdon: Routledge.
Mezzadra, S. (2005) ‘Taking Care: Migration and the Political 
Economy of  Affective Labour’, presentation at the Centre 
for the Study of  Invention and Social Process, Goldsmiths 
University, London, 16 March.
O’Connell Davidson, J. (2001) ‘The Sex Tourist, The Expatriate, 
His Ex-Wife and Her “Other”: The Politics of  Loss, Difference 
and Desire’, Sexualities 4(1): 5-24. 
Parreñas, R. S. (2008) ‘Transnational Fathering: Gendered 
Conflicts, Distant Disciplining and Emotional Gaps’, Journal of  
Ethnic and Migration Studies 34(7): 1057-72.
Ramos-Zayas, A. Y. (2011) ‘Learning Affect, Embodying Race: 
Youth, Blackness, and Neoliberal Emotions in Latino Newark’, 
Transforming Anthropology 19(2): 86-104.
Reeves, M. (2011) ‘Fixing the Border: On the Affective Life of  
the State in Southern Kyrgyzstan’, Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space, 29: 905-23.
Sennett, R. (2011) The Foreigner: Two Essays on Exile, London: 
Notting Hill Editions.
Stoler, A. L. (2007)  ‘Affective States in Nugent, D. and Vincent, 
J. (eds.) A Companion to the Anthropology of  Politics, Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing. 
Svašek, M. (2012) Emotions and Human Mobility: Ethnographies of  
Movement, London: Routledge. 
Van Hear, N. and Maunaguru, S. (2012) ‘Transnational Marriage 
in Conflict Settings: War, Dispersal and Marriage Among Sri 
Lankan Tamils’, in Charsley, K. (ed.) Transnational Marriage: New 
Perspectives from Europe and Beyond, New York and Abingdon: 
Routledge. 
Walker, I. (2012) ‘Marrying at Home, Marrying Away: 
Customary Marriages and Legal Marriages in Ngazidja and in 
the Diaspora’, in Charsley, K. (ed.) Transnational Marriage: New 
Perspectives from Europe and Beyond, New York and Abingdon: 
Routledge.
Walker, I. (2010) Becoming the Other, Being Oneself: Constructing 
Identities in a Connected World, Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing.
Wessendorf, S. [forthcoming] Super-diversity and Everyday Life. 
Living Together, Dwelling Apart, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
mAking politiCs
Anderson, B. (1983) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin 
and Spread of  Nationalism, London and New York: Verso.
Anderson, B., Sharma, N. and Wright, C. (eds.) (2009), ‘No 
Borders as Practical Politics’, Refuge, Special Issue, 26(2). 
Anderson, B. (2013) Us and Them: The Dangerous Politics of  
Citizenship, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brown, W. (2006) Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of  
Identity and Empire, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Castles, S. (2004) ‘Why Migration Policies Fail’, Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 27(2): 205-27.
Chua, J. (2010) Cosmologies of  Credit: Transnational Mobility and 
the Politics of  Destination in China, Durham and London: Duke 
University Press. 
Creswell, T. (2006) On the Move: Mobility in the Modern Western 
World, London: Routledge.
Dzenovska, D. (2010) ‘Public Reason and the Limits of  Liberal 
Anti-Racism in Latvia’, Ethnos: Journal of  Anthropology, 75(4): 
425-54. 
Düvell, F, Jordan, B (2002) Irregular Migration: The Dilemmas of  
Transnational Mobility, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Enns, D. (2012) The Violence of  Victimhood, Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State University Press.
Fassin, D. (2001) ‘The Biopolitics of  Otherness: Undocumented 
Foreignness and Racial Discrimination in French Public 
Debate’, Anthropology Today, 17(1): 3-7.
Fikes, K. (2009) Managing African Portugal: The Citizen-Migrant 
Distinction, Durham: Duke University Press. 
Gidley, B. and Kahn-Harris, K. (2012) ‘Contemporary Anglo-
Jewish Community Leadership: Coping with Multiculturalism’, 
British Journal of  Sociology, 63(1): 168-87. 
Greenberg, J. (2011) ‘On the Road to Normal: Negotiating 
Agency and State Sovereignty in Postsocialist Serbia’, American 
Anthropologist 113(1): 88-100. 
Holgate, J. (2005) ‘Organizing Migrant Workers’, Work, 
Employment and Society, 19(3): 463-80.
Holmes, D. (2000) Integral Europe: Fast-Capitalism, Multiculturalism, 
Neofascism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Routes and Reading
Isin, E. F. and Nielson, G. M. (eds.) (2008) Acts of  Citizenship, 
London: Zed Books.
Kahn- Harris K, and Gidley B. (2010) Turbulent Times: The 
British Jewish Community Today, London: Continuum.
Keith, M. (2008) ‘Between Being and Becoming? Rights, 
Responsibilities and the Politics of  Multiculture in the New 
East End’, Sociological Research Online, 13(5): 11. 
Keith, M. (2008) ‘Public Sociology? Between Heroic Immersion 
and Critical Distance: Personal Reflections on Academic 
Engagement with Political Life’, Critical Social Policy, 28(3): 320-
34.  
Lowe, L. (1996) Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural 
Politics, Durham: Duke University Press. 
Malkki, L. (1995) Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory and National 
Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees In Tanzania, Chicago: Chicago 
University Press.
Massey, D. (2005) For Space, London: Sage. 
Nyers, P. (2010) ‘Abject Cosmopolitanism: The Politics of  
Protection in the Anti-Deportation Movement’, in de Genova, 
N. and Peutz, N. (eds.) The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space 
and the Freedom of  Movement, Durham: Duke University Press. 
Papadopoulus, D., Stephenson, N. and Vassilis T. (2008) Escape 
Routes: Control and Subversion in the 21st Century, London: Pluto 
Press.
Però, D. (2014 forthcoming) ‘Class Politics and Migrants. 
Collective Action Among New Migrant Workers In Britain’, 
Sociology. 
Però, D. (2013) ‘Migrants, Cohesion and the Cultural Politics 
of  the State. Critical Perspectives on the Management of  
Diversity,’ Journal of  Ethnic and Migration Studies, 39(8): 1241-59.
Però, D. and Solomos, J. (2010) ‘Migrant Politics and 
Mobilization: Exclusion, Engagements, Incorporation’, Ethnic 
and Racial Studies, 33(1): 1-18.
Pero, D. (2007) Inclusionary Rhetoric/Exclusionary Practices: Left-
wing Politics and Migrants in Italy, Oxford: Berghahn. 
Però, D. (2007) Migrants and the Politics of  Governance. Social 
Anthropology, 15(3): 271-86.
Rogaly, B. and Taylor, B. (2009, 2011) Moving Histories of  Class 
and Community. Identity, Place and Belonging in Contemporary England, 
Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Rovelli, M. (2006) Lager Italiani, Milan: Bur. 
Sartre, J.-P. (1973) ‘Sartre on Amnesty’, The New York Review of  
Books, 20, No. 6. 
Schuster, L. (2005) ‘A Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut: 
Deportation, Detention and Dispersal in Europe’,  Social Policy 
and Administration, 39(6): 606-21. 
Sheller, M. and Urry, J. (2006) ‘The New Mobilities Paradigm’, 
Environment and Planning A, 38(2): 207-26. 
Sigona, N. and Clough Marinaro, I. (eds.) (2011) ‘Anti-
Gypsyism and the Politics of  Exclusion: the Roma and Sinti 
in Contemporary Italy’, Journal of  Modern Italian Studies, Special 
Issue, 16(5).
Spencer, S. (2011) The Migration Debate, Bristol: The Policy 
Press.
Van Hear, N. and McDowell C. (eds.) (2006) Catching Fire: 
Containing Forced Migration in a Volatile World, Lanham MD: 
Lexington Books.
Vasta, E. and Kandilige, L. (2010) ‘London the Leveller: 
Ghanaian Work Strategies and Community Solidarity’, Journal 
of  Ethnic and Migration Studies, 36(4): 581-98. 
Vollmer, B. (2011) ‘Policy Discourses on Irregular Migration in 
the EU – “Number Games” and “Political Games’’’, European 
Journal of  Migration and Law, 13(3): 317- 39. 
Wacquant, L. (2009) Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government 
of  Social Insecurity, Durham: Duke University Press.
Vertovec, S. and Wessendorf, S. (eds.) (2010) The Multiculturalism 
Backlash. European Discourses, Policies and Practices, Abingdon and 
New York: Routledge.
Wills, J. (2008) ‘Making Class Politics Possible: Organizing 
Contract Cleaners in London’, International Journal of  Urban and 
Regional Research, 32(2): 305-23.
Zolberg, A. (1999) ‘Matters of  State: Theorizing Immigration 
Policy’, in Hirschman, C., Kasinitz, P. and DeWind, J. (eds.) 
The Handbook of  International Migration: The American Experience, 
New York: Russell Sage. 
resCAling And re-plACing
Amin, A. (2012) Land of  Strangers, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Bakewell, O. (2011) ‘Migration and Development in Sub-
Saharan Africa’, in N. Phillips (ed.) Migration in the Global Political 
Economy, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Basch, L., Glick Schiller, N. and Szanton Blanc, C. (1994) 
Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments 
and Deterritorialized Nation-States, Langhorne, PA: Gordon and 
Breach. 
Behar, R. (2003) Translated Woman: Crossing the Border with 
Esperanza’s Story, Tenth Anniversary Edition, Boston: Beacon 
Press. 
Berg, M. L., Sigona, N. and Gidley, B. (2013) (eds.) ‘Ethnography, 
Diversity and Urban Space’, Identities: Global Studies in Culture 
and Power, Special Issue, 20(4).
Berg, M. L. (2009) ‘Between Cosmopolitanism and the National 
Slot: Cuba’s Diasporic Children of  the Revolution. Identities: 
Global Studies in Culture and Power, 16(2): 129-56.
Brubaker, R. (2005) ‘The “Diaspora” Diaspora’, Ethnic and 
Racial Studies, 28(1): 1-19.
Brun, C. and Van Hear, N. (2012) ‘Between the Local and 
the Diasporic: the Shifting Centre of  Gravity in War-Torn Sri 
Lanka’s Transnational Politics’, Contemporary South Asia, 20(1): 
61-75. 
Castles, S., de Haas, H., Van Hear, N. and Vasta, E. (eds.) (2010) 
Theories of  Migration and Social Change, 36(10).
Chamberlain, M. (1995) ‘Family Narratives and Migration 
Dynamics’, Nieuwe West-Indische Gids, 69(3-4): 253-75. 
Cohen, R. (2008) Global Diasporas: An Introduction, Second 
Edition, Abingdon and New York: Routledge.
Dufoix, S. (2008) Diasporas, Berkeley, CA and London: 
University of  California Press.
Routes and Reading
Düvell, F., Collyer, M. and de Haas, H. (2012) ‘Critical 
Approaches to Transit Migration’, Population, Space and Place, 
Special Issue, 18(4): 407-14.
Düvell, F. and Vollmer, B (2009) Irregular Migration in and from 
the Neighbourhood of  the EU. A Comparison of  Morocco, Turkey and 
Ukraine, a Clandestino Research Project Report.
Eriksen, T. H. (2010) Small Places, Large Issue: An Introduction 
to Social and Cultural Anthropology, Third Edition, London and 
New York: Pluto.
Gardner, K. (2013) ‘Migration’, in Carrier, J. G. and Gewertz, 
D. B. (eds.) The Handbook of  Sociocultural Anthropology, London: 
Bloomsbury Academic. 
Gupta, A. and Ferguson, J. (1997) ‘Culture, Power, Place: 
Ethnography at the End of  an Era’, in Gupta, A. and Ferguson, 
J. (eds.) Culture, Power, Place: Explorations in Critical Anthropology, 
Durham: Duke University Press. 
Hausner, S. (2012) ‘Category and Practice as Two Aspects of  
Religion: The Case of  Nepalis in Britain’, Journal of  the American 
Academy of  Religion, 80(4): 971-97.
Hollifield, J. (2004) ‘The Emerging Migration State’, International 
Migration Review, 38(3): 885–912.
Jensen, O., Jayaweera, H. and Gidley, B. (2012) Diversity, Cohesion 
and Change in Two South London Neighbourhoods, Concordia 
Discors Report for the European Commission, Oxford: 
COMPAS.
Keith, M. (2011) ‘City-zenship in Contemporary China: 
Shanghai, Capital of  the Twenty-First Century?’, in Bridge, G. 
and Watson, S. (eds.) The New Blackwell Companion to the City, 
Malden, MA and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Keith, M., Lash, S., Arnoldi, J. and Rooker, T. (2014) (eds.) 
China Constructing Capitalism: Economic Life and Urban Change, 
Abingdon and New York: Routledge. 
King, R. (2012) ‘Theories and Typologies of  Migration: 
An Overview and A Primer’, Willy Brandt Working Paper, 
International Migration and Ethnic Relations, 3(12), Malmö: Malmö 
University. 
Massey, D., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A. 
and Taylor, J. (1998) Worlds in Motion: Understanding International 
Migration at the End of  the Millennium, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Oliver, C. and O’Reilly, K. (2010) ‘A Bourdieusian Analysis of  
Class and Migration: Habitus and the Individualising Process’, 
Sociology, 44(1): 49-66. 
Olwig, K. F. (2007) Caribbean Journeys: An Ethnography of  
Migration and Home in Three Family Networks, Durham: Duke 
University Press. 
Pieke, F., Nyíri, P., Thunø, M. and Ceccagno, A. (2004) 
Transnational Chinese: Fujianese Migrants in Europe, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press.
Sassen, S. (2006) Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to 
Global Assemblages, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sökefeld, M. (2006) ‘Mobilising in Transnational Space: A 
Social Movement Approach To The Formation of  Diaspora’, 
Global Networks, 6(3): 265-84.
Van Hear, N (2011) ‘Diasporas, Recovery and Development in 
Conflict-Ridden Societies’, in Faist,T., Fauser, M. and Kivisto, 
P. (eds.), The Migration-Development Nexus: A Transnational 
Perspective on Changing Paradigms and Organizations, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Van Hear, N (2010) ‘Diaspora and Migration’, in Diasporas: 
Concepts, Intersections, Identities (eds.) Knott, K. and McLoughlin 
S., London: Zed Books.
Vargas-Silva, C. (2009) ‘The Tale of  Three Amigos: 
Remittances, Exchange Rates and Money Demand in Mexico’, 
Review of  Development Economics, 13(1): 1-14. 
Vertovec, S. (2007) New Complexities of  Cohesion in Britain: 
Super-Diversity, Transnationalism and Civil-Integration, London: 
Commission on Integration and Cohesion.
Vertovec, S. (2007) ‘Introduction: New Directions in the 
Anthropology of  Migration and Multiculturalism’, Ethnic and 
Racial Studies, 30(6): 961-78.
Vollmer, B. (2008) Undocumented Migration: Counting the 
Uncountable. Data and Trends Across Europe, Clandestino UK 
Country Report, Oxford: COMPAS.
Waldinger, R. and Fitzgerald, D. (2004) ‘Transnationalism in 
Question’, American Journal of  Sociology, 3: 117-95.
Walker, I. (2011) ‘Hybridity, Belonging, and Mobilities: The 
Intercontinental Peripatetics of  a Transnational Community’, 
Population, Space and Place, 17: 167–78. 
Wimmer, A. and Glick Schiller, N. (2003) ‘Methodological 
Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study of  Migration: 
an Essay in Historical Epistemology’, International Migration 
Review 37(3): 576-610.
Xiang B., Yeoh, B., and Toyota, M. (eds.) (2013) Return: 
Nationalizing Transnational Mobility in Asia, Durham: Duke 
University Press.
Xiang, B. (2013) ‘Multi-scalar Ethnography: An Approach 
for Critical Engagement with Migration and Social Change’, 
Ethnography, 14(3): 282–99. 
